Hiron v State of Queensland [2025] QIRC 320 | Case summary

Queensland Industrial Relations Commission|2025-11-24|Before: Dalton J

PUBLIC SECTOR - EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY - PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL - where allegations that the appellant accessed and inappropriately disclosed confidential information - where appellant placed on suspension without remuneration - whether decision to suspend without remuneration was fair and reasonable - where public interest of suspension without remuneration was considered - whether financial impact on employee considered - whether decision to suspend without remuneration was punitive - decision was fair and reasonable.

Directive 06/23: Suspension, cl 4.7, cl 7, cl 8 and cl 9

Australia Meat Holdings Pty Limited v Q-COMP [2007] ICQ 44 (2006); 186 QGIG 527

Bah v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 096

Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2) [2022] QIRC 16

Colebrook v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 53

George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104

Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)

Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 97

Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252

Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 219

Roche v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance) (No 2) [2024] QIRC 230

Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2022] QIRC 400

[1] Ms Melissa Hiron ('the Appellant') has been employed as a Child Safety Officer with the Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety ('the Respondent') since April 2023.

[2] A complaint was received from a member of the public alleging that the Appellant had inappropriately accessed confidential information regarding a departmental client and inappropriately disclosed confidential information to a third party.

[3] An audit of the Appellant's system access identified a high number of unauthorised searches and access of records.

[4] On 13 May 2025, the Appellant was suspended from duty on full remuneration and advised that the delegate, Ms Julieann Cork, Regional Executive Director, Sunshine Coast and Central Region, was considering placing her on suspension without pay. As part of this correspondence the Appellant was afforded 14 days to show cause as to why she should not be placed on suspension without pay.

[5] The Appellant provided her response on 29 May 2025 and subsequently received correspondence from the delegate confirming the decision to not impose suspension without pay. Ms Hiron did not receive this email until 10 October 2025 due to it being sent to her work email address in error.

[6] The period of suspension was initially until 12 August 2025.

[7] On 12 August 2025, the Appellant was asked to show cause in relation to the disciplinary findings as well as why she should not be placed on suspension without pay effective from 1 September until 1 October 2025. Ms Hiron provided her response on 28 August 2025.

[8] By letter dated 23 September 2025, the delegate determined all three allegations were substantiated and confirmed that the Appellant would be placed on suspension without pay effective from 6 October 2025 to 16 November 2025 ('the decision').

[9] The Appellant filed her Appeal Notice in the Industrial Registry on 3 October 2025 seeking a review of the decision.

[10] The issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the decision dated 23 September 2025, to suspend the Appellant without remuneration from 6 October 2025, was fair and reasonable.

[11] I am satisfied that the decision to suspend the Appellant without remuneration was fair and reasonable.

[13] Pursuant to s 131(1)(f) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act') an appeal may be made against a suspension without pay decision. A suspension without pay decision is defined within s 129 of the PS Act, in the following terms:

suspension without pay decision means a decision to suspend a public sector employee under section 101 without entitlement to normal remuneration.

[14] I am satisfied that the suspension without pay decision is one that can be appealed pursuant to s 131 of the PS Act, and further, that the Appellant is entitled to appeal.

[15] Section 564(3) of the IR Act requires an appeal to be lodged within 21 days after the day the decision appealed against is given.

[16] The Appellant received the decision letter on 23 September 2025 and the Appeal Notice was filed in the Industrial Registry on 3 October 2025. I am satisfied that the appeal has been brought within the required time.

[17] Section 562B(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') provides that a public sector appeal is to be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against and 'the purpose of the appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable'.[1]

[18] The IR Act provides that for an appeal against a disciplinary decision, the commission:[2]

(a) must decide the appeal having regard to the evidence available to the decision maker when the decision was made; but

(b) may allow other evidence to be taken into account if the commission considers it appropriate.

[19] A public sector appeal is not a fresh hearing, but rather, a review of the decision arrived at by the decision-maker.[3]

[20] The issue for my determination is whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.[4]

[21] Section 562C(1) of the IR Act prescribes that the Commission may determine to either:

set the decision aside and return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate; or

set the decision aside and substitute another decision.

[22] Within her Appeal Notice filed on 3 October 2025, the Appellant outlined the following Grounds of Appeal:

Clause 4.2 of the Suspension (Directive 06/23) provides that Chief Executives are required to act in a way that is compatible with the main purpose of the PS Act and how the main purpose is achieved, including fair treatment of public sector employees.

The Appellant contends that the decision to suspend her without remuneration was not fair and reasonable, and not in accordance with the requirements of the PS Act to treat public sector employees fairly.

[23] Section 101 of the PS Act provides for the suspension of a public sector employees as follows (emphasis added):

(1) A public sector employee's chief executive may, by notice, suspend the employee from duty if the chief executive reasonably believes -

(a) the employee is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law; or

(b) the proper and efficient management of the entity might be prejudiced if the employee is not suspended.

(b) whether the employee is entitled to remuneration for the period of the suspension; and

(c) the effect that alternative employment may, under subsection (5), have on any entitlement to remuneration for the period of the suspension.

(3) However, before suspending the employee, the chief executive must consider all reasonable alternatives available to the employee.

_Examples of reasonable alternatives which may be available to the employee - _

• a change in the location where the employee performs duties

(4) The employee is entitled to normal remuneration for the period of the suspension, unless -

(a) the employee is suspended under subsection (1)(a); and

(b) the employee's chief executive considers it is not appropriate for the employee to be entitled to normal remuneration for the period of the suspension, having regard to the nature of the discipline to which the chief executive believes the employee is liable.

(9) In suspending a public sector employee under this section, the chief executive must comply with the directive made under section 102.

[24] Section 91 of the PS Act sets out the grounds for discipline and disciplinary action generally as follows:

(1) A public service employee's chief executive may discipline the employee if the chief executive is reasonably satisfied the employee has -

(a) engaged in repeated unsatisfactory performance or serious under performance of the employee's duties, including, for example, by performing duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently; or

(c) been absent from duty without approved leave and without reasonable excuse; or

(d) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a direction given to the employee as a public sector employee by a responsible person; or

(e) used, without reasonable excuse, a substance to an extent that has adversely affected the competent performance of the employee's duties; or

(f) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a requirement of the chief executive under section 71 in relation to the employee's employment or secondment by, in response to the requirement -

(i) failing to disclose a serious disciplinary action; or

(g) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a provision of -

(i) this Act, other than section 39 or 40; or

(ii) another Act that applies to the employee in relation to the employee's employment; or

[25] Clause 7 of the Public Sector Commission's Directive 06/23: Suspension ('the Suspension Directive') provides for the suspension of a person from duty in line with the following procedural matters (emphasis added):

7.1 A chief executive of a public sector entity may suspend an employee as provided for under section 101 of the Act.

7.2 In accordance with the requirements under section 101(2) of the Act, a suspension notice must state an end date, or express the period of the suspension in terms of a specified number of weeks or months. It is not sufficient to state that suspension will end by reference to events, such as 'until this disciplinary process is finalised', or to state that the suspension will continue 'until otherwise determined'. A suspension notice advising of suspension without remuneration must also include information on the time limits for starting an appeal provided for in the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act), and the directive relating to appeals.

7.3 When considering all reasonable alternatives as provided for at section 101(3) of the Act:

(a) the individual circumstances and facts of the matter must be assessed on their own merits to determine whether there are reasonable alternatives available to the employee, and whether it would be reasonable to direct the employee to undertake those alternative arrangements, or whether it is appropriate to suspend the employee

(b) alternative duties do not have to form part of an established role and can be outside the employee's usual place of work

(c) employers must document and provide to the employee what duties or other options had been identified and considered, including any reason why the employee could not undertake those alternative options.

7.4 Entities must have ongoing and clear communication with the employee, both throughout the suspension process and immediately before returning to work. This will assist in clarifying the employer's expectations for the employee and help in the situation where an employee needs to be reintegrated into the workplace. An appropriate contact person may be assigned to perform this function.

7.5 The employee should also be offered support on an ongoing basis whilst on suspension. For example, referral to an employee assistance program, participation in a mentoring process with a third party, or other invitations to access support.

[26] Clause 8 and 9 of the Suspension Directive provides for suspension of an employee from duty without remuneration in the following terms (emphasis added):
1. Suspension without remuneration

8.1 A chief executive may decide that normal remuneration is not appropriate during a suspension under section 101(1)(a). This decision will usually occur after a period of suspension with remuneration but may be made from the start of the suspension.

8.2 Having regard to the nature of the discipline in accordance with section 101(4)(b) of the Act, the circumstances in which a chief executive may decide a public sector employee is not entitled to normal remuneration for the period of the suspension of the employee are limited to where:

(a) there are factors not within the control of the agency that are preventing the timely conclusion of the discipline process, for example if there are criminal charges and the investigation or discipline process is pending the outcome of these charges; or

(b) it is otherwise fair and reasonable to suspend an employee without remuneration, taking into account the financial impact on the employee and the broader public interest of the employee remaining on suspension with remuneration.

9.1 Unlike a decision to suspend an employee with remuneration, a decision to suspend an employee without remuneration is subject to procedural fairness.

9.2 As part of the suspension without remuneration process:

(a) the employee must be given the opportunity to respond to the proposed suspension without remuneration prior to the decision being made by the delegate. This must occur through a 'show cause' process where the employee is notified in writing the reasons that it is proposed that the employee be suspended without remuneration

(b) the show cause notice may be given at the time of the initial suspension on normal remuneration, or at any subsequent stage during the suspension

(c) the chief executive must provide the employee with a minimum of 7 days from the date of receipt of a show cause notice to consider and respond to the notice. The time to respond must have regard to the volume of material and complexity of the matter. The chief executive must consider any request, and may grant, an extension of time to respond to a show cause notice if there are reasonable grounds for extension

(d) if the employee does not respond to the show cause notice or does not respond within the nominated timeframe in clause 9.2(c) and has not been granted an extension of time to respond, the chief executive may make a decision on suspension without normal remuneration based on the information available to them

(e) where a decision is made to suspend an employee without normal remuneration, the employee is to be provided with written notice, including the particulars required by section 101(2) of the Act, and reasons for the decision. The employee must be informed of the time limits for starting an appeal provided for in the IR Act and the directive relating to appeals.

[27] The Allegations which were substantiated against the Appellant by letter dated 23 September 2025 are as below:

On various dates between 17 April 2023 and 25 March 2025, you misused a departmental computer on multiple occasions to view your own information and/or confidential client information without authority and/or for official use.

On two occasions, on unknown dates, you inappropriately disclosed confidential departmental client information to a member of the public.

You provided false or misleading information relating to conduct concerns to Ms Leonie Keitley, Manager, Fitzroy Child Safety Service Centre (CSSC) and Ms Sandy Wilson, Acting Regional Director on 11 and 14 March 2025.

[28] A Further Directions Order was issued to the parties on 22 October 2025, inviting the provision of written submissions as follows:

Appellant's outline of submissions filed on 24 October 2025.

Respondent's outline of submissions filed on 7 November 2025.

Appellant's reply submissions filed on 14 November 2025.

[29] The parties have not requested an oral hearing and therefore the matter will be decided on the papers pursuant to s 451(1) of the IR Act.

[30] I have considered all of the submissions and attached evidence provided by the parties although they may not be specifically referred to in these reasons.

[31] The Appellant submits that pursuant to s101(4) of the PS Act, employees are entitled to normal remuneration while suspended unless the suspension meets a two-limb test which is outlined within that section of the Act.[5]

[32] The Appellant further submits that cl 8.2 of the Suspension (Directive 06/23) ('the Suspension Directive') limits the circumstances in which the delegate may decide to impose a period of suspension without pay and that in the Appellant's case there are no factors outside the Respondent's control that would prevent a timely conclusion of the discipline process.

[33] The Appellant then contends that the decision would cause significant financial impacts to her and her family. The Appellant submits she is a single mother residing in a regional location and that this information was provided to the delegate prior to the decision.

[34] The Appellant submits that while the decision letter stated that the financial impacts had been considered, there were no factors outlined which would mitigate the financial impact. The Appellant contends that the delegate did not give appropriate weight to the significant financial hardship.

[35] It is contended by the Appellant that the decision letter is punitive in nature as the delegate has had regard to [t]he nature of the discipline I am now considering you are liable to. The Appellant submits this comment is in relation to the proposed penalty of termination despite there not being a decision on disciplinary penalty at this stage.

[36] The Appellant contends that cl 4.7 of the Suspension Directive explicitly prohibits suspension from being used as a form of punishment. It is further contended that the decision pre-empts the proposed disciplinary penalty and is therefore in and of itself a disciplinary action.

[37] In response to the statement in the Decision letter which outlined that the delegate had regard to the potential reputational damage to the department should the public become aware the situation, the Appellant submits that any potential reputational damage could be mitigated by timely resolution of the disciplinary process which the department is in control of.

[38] The Appellant contends that clause 4.2 of the Suspension Directive requires Chief Executives and their delegates to act in a way that is compatible with the main purpose of the PS Act and how the main purpose is achieved. This includes the fair treatment of public sector employees. The Appellant submits that this obligation is not subordinate to obligations for responsible and efficient management of public resources or to prevent reputational damage to the Department.[6]

[39] The Appellant submits that the financial impact on the Appellant is dire and unmitigated; and the broader public interest is in favour of the Appellant remaining on suspension with remuneration. The Appellant therefore contends that the public interest test in clause 8 of the Suspension Directive means that the public interest favours the Appellant remaining on suspension with pay.

[40] The Appellant submits that any impact on the Department's reputation and public confidence in its financial accountability could be mitigated by swiftly and efficiently concluding the disciplinary process.

[41] In response to the Appellant's contentions that the Respondent did not give appropriate weight to the financial impact that would be suffered, the Respondent disputes this and maintains that the delegate appropriately considered the relevant factors set out in clause 8.2 of the Suspension Directive.

[42] The Respondent submits that clause 8.2 of the Suspension Directive does not require the delegated decision-maker to examine if any factors would 'mitigate' the financial impact on the Appellant prior to suspending her without pay. In making that submission the Respondent acknowledges that in exercising its ability to suspend employees without pay under the Suspension Directive, it has an obligation to treat employees fairly and reasonably. This has to be balanced with the Department's obligations to manage public resources effectively.[7]

[43] The Respondent contends that financial impact is only one consideration and must be balanced with the Department's obligation to ensure the effective, efficient and appropriate use of public resources. The Respondent submits that given the seriousness of the misconduct, the delegate was entitled to take potential reputational damage of the department into account.

[44] The Respondent submits that the Appellant was advised of her ability to engage in alternative employment during the course of the suspension should she engage in the appropriate notification and conflict check.[8] The delegate considered Ms Hiron's submission that it would be difficult to find alternative employment during the suspension period and determined that the suspension without pay was still appropriate in the circumstances. The Respondent submits that her ability to seek other employment may have been difficult but not impossible and would have mitigated any financial impact.

[45] In response to the Appellant's contention that any reputational damage could be mitigated by timely resolution of the process, the Respondent submits that the broader public interest would not be satisfactorily resolved by merely endeavouring to resolve the matter in a timely fashion or by a 'fresh assessment' of whether alternative working arrangements could be provided to the Appellant.

[46] The Respondent contends that the delegate, when previously considering whether to impose suspension without pay, determined not to, based on the Appellant's concerns about her family circumstances and financial situation. The Respondent submits that it was not until Ms Cork turned her mind to the grounds for discipline, the seriousness of the allegations and the breadth of evidence that she again required Ms Hiron to show cause as to why suspension without pay should not be imposed.

[47] The Respondent submits that Ms Cork was entitled to re-assess the public interest with regards to Ms Hiron remaining on paid suspension on this basis. The Department also relies on the decision of McLennan IC, Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) ('Smith')[9]:

The Department has financial accountability obligations, including to use public resources in a responsible and effective manner. In light of the seriousness of the allegations against the Appellant as well as the consideration of terminating his employment - which ultimately occurred - I agree that it was not an appropriate use of public resources, nor in the public interest, for the Appellant to remain suspended with remuneration.

[48] The Appellant submits that the opportunity to seek further employment during the disciplinary process does not sufficiently mitigate the financial impact on the Appellant. The Appellant maintains that the delegate's failure to outline mitigating factors against the financial impact indicates that appropriate weight was not afforded to this factor.

[49] The Appellant submits that the reasoning of Industrial Commissioner Power in Colebrook v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[10] ('Colebrook') should be applied to the appeal and the relevant factors weighed. In Colebrook the Appellant states that Industrial Commissioner Power concluded that a 'fresh assessment' would be required as part of ongoing periodic reviews of the suspension, not a decision to suspend without pay. Further, the Appellant contends that appropriateness of alternative working arrangements were not a determinative factor in Colebrook and similarly should not be a determinative factor in this appeal.

[50] The Appellant submits that the Respondent disproportionately weighed potential reputational damage to the Department against a near certainty of financial distress caused to the Appellant should the suspension without remuneration be imposed.

[51] The Appellant contends that the Respondent's submissions confirm that the Decision was made because of the disciplinary findings decision and in consideration of the proposed penalty. It is submitted that this is a punitive action.

[52] The Appellant maintains the submission that suspension without remuneration is the default position of the PS Act and the language of clause 8.2(b) of the Suspension Directive indicates that the public interest favours an employee continuing to be paid during a period of suspension.

[53] The Appellant submits that the Decision and its implementation is a punitive action which pre-empts the proposed penalty contained within the same letter as the Decision. The Appellant contends that the decision-maker has conflated the suspension decision with the disciplinary process, which are separate and distinct processes requiring separate and distinct consideration.

[54] In relation to the Respondent's reliance on Smith, the Appellant contends that the decision should be distinguished from this appeal as it does not sit within the jurisprudence of vaccination appeals.[11]

[55] The Appellant submits that throughout this disciplinary process, she has acknowledged the gravity of her alleged conduct and expressed remorse. Further, the Appellant submits that should her employment continue, she would not engage in the conduct again. It is contended by the Appellant that this position is in contrast to the factual circumstances in Smith that lead McLennan IC to reach her decision.

[56] I am required to decide this appeal by assessing whether or not the decision appealed against is fair and reasonable. This involves a review of the decision-making process that has been utilised, and the decision arrived at.

[57] Deputy President Merrell in Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2)[12] ('Colebourne') considered the meaning of 'fair and reasonable' and concluded that it should be construed within the ordinary meaning of the phrase as used in the context of s 562B of the IR Act.[13]

[58] In Colebourne his Honour further noted that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' is not an assessment of whether the decision was unreasonable only by reference to the legal standard.[14] His Honour concluded that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' permitted a review of both the factual merits and legal reasonableness of both the decision itself and the process of making that decision.[15]

[59] If the decision is flawed by conclusions that were not fairly and reasonably open to the decision-maker to reach, then that decision is prone to being overturned on appeal.[16]

[60] I note that the Appellant was suspended from duty on normal remuneration by the correspondence dated 12 May 2025.[17] That correspondence considered relevant alternative duties or alternative working arrangements, however, the decision-maker concluded that because of the nature of the allegations and the nature of the Appellant's role as a Child Safety Officer, there was an unacceptable risk to the Department if the Appellant was to remain in the workplace during the discipline process.

[61] The correspondence dated 12 May 2025 then went on to provide the first show cause notice for suspension without remuneration in the period from 12 May 2025 to 12 August 2025 and invited the Appellant to show cause why suspension from duty without pay should not be imposed on the Appellant.

[62] The correspondence dated 12 May 2025 also included relevant directions to the Appellant. Within the correspondence was a paragraph which dealt with alternative employment in the following manner:

In accordance with section 101 (4) of the PS Act, during this period of suspension you will be paid normal remuneration (your ordinary salary plus relevant allowances), less any amount you earn from alternative employment you engage in during the period of suspension. I refer you to section 101 (5) of the Act in this regard. Alternative employment does not include employment you were engaged in at the time of the suspension, and which was not in contravention of the Act, Code of Conduct or a standard of conduct applying to you under a standard of practice under the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994. Any deduction for alternative employment will not exceed your normal remuneration. Prior to commencing alternative employment, you must advise Leonie Keitley. Further, you must also complete an engaging in other employment form, provide wages details, and receive departmental approval (with respect to managing any conflict of interest relating to the alternative employment) prior to commencement.

[63] I am satisfied that the Appellant was made aware of her ability to seek alternative employment even during the period that she was on paid suspension.

[64] The Appellant provided her show cause response on 29 May 2025. The delegated decision-maker provided correspondence dated 4 June 2025 which confirmed the continuation of suspension with pay. [18] In that correspondence the decision-maker noted:

Decision on proposed suspension without remuneration

In reaching my decision on proposed suspension without pay, I have had regard to the concerns that you raised regarding your family circumstances and disclosed exposure to domestic and family violence. I have given consideration to the financial impacts that imposing suspension without pay would have on your children in respect to your circumstances.

Accordingly, I have decided not to impose suspension from duty without pay. Your suspension with pay will continue until 12 August 2025, unless the matter concerning the allegations advised in your correspondence of 12 May 2025 are resolved prior to 12 August 2025, pursuant to section 101(1)(a) of the PS Act.

[65] The starting point when considering the suspension of a public sector employee is s 101(1) of the PS Act which provides a discretion for a chief executive to suspend an employee where the chief executive 'reasonably believes' the employee is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law.

[66] The High Court considered the term 'reasonable grounds' in the cited case of George v Rockett[19] in which the Court stated:

When a statute prescribes that there must be "reasonable grounds" for a state of mind - including suspicion and belief - it requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.

[67] In Roche v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance) (No 2)[20] ('Roche (No 2)'), Industrial Commissioner Pratt said in relation to the phrase "liable to discipline" as follows:

[33] I am therefore of the view that "liable" should be construed broadly within the context of section 101(1)(a) of the PS Act. The legal consequence is discipline under a disciplinary law, and so the event triggering exposure to that legal consequence must be something that is rationally and logically connected to a potential finding of discipline under a disciplinary law. The scheme underpinning the power to suspend under section 101(1)(a) clearly contemplates that the event creating exposure to a discipline under a disciplinary act can be something as slight as an allegation of wrongdoing. Sections 101 and 91 provide for suspension occurring before any findings are made, or indeed any substantial investigation has occurred.[21]

[68] In relation to Allegation One, there was a substantial body of evidence arising from the system audit of the Integrated Case Management System ('ICMS') which indicated that the Appellant had on multiple occasions misused a departmental computer to access information inappropriately.

[69] In relation to Allegation Two, there was evidence available to the delegated decision-maker of:

the initial complaint which included allegations of the Appellant inappropriately accessing confidential records and revealing the contents to another person;

admissions made by the Appellant to Ms Keitley and Ms Wilson at a meeting on 11 March 2025 about providing information to her former partner.

[70] In relation to Allegation Three, there was evidence available to the delegated decision-maker of what the Appellant had told Ms Keitley and Ms Wilson in meetings held on 11 and 14 March 2025 regarding the extent of her accessing information on the ICMS in comparison to what the audit of the Appellant's access had revealed.

[71] Given the evidence summarised above, there was more than a sufficient basis in my opinion for the delegated decision-maker to form a reasonable belief that the Appellant may be liable to discipline under a disciplinary law. As confirmed by Industrial Commissioner Pratt in Roche No 2, for the Appellant to be 'liable', all that is needed is a reasonable belief that there are allegations that exposed the Appellant to discipline under a disciplinary law.[22] I am satisfied that it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to make this finding in light of the evidence available to her.

[72] As discussed above, in the present case there was an initial decision to suspend the Appellant with remuneration. In that decision the decision-maker considered reasonable alternatives to suspending the Appellant. Despite that earlier decision, it is still necessary for a subsequent decision to suspend without remuneration to comply with cl 9.2(e) of the Suspension Directive.[23]

[73] The decision letter dated 23 September 2025, in accordance with s 101(3) of the PS Act provided further consideration to the issue as to whether there were any reasonable alternatives to suspending the Appellant. In relation to that issue, the decision-maker noted:

On consideration of the information before me, I reasonably believe that you are liable to discipline under a disciplinary law.
In accordance with section 101(3) of the PS Act, I have considered whether there are any reasonable alternatives to suspending you from duty, including alternative duties, a temporary transfer (either in your current workplace or another workplace) or another alternative working arrangement, such as directing you to work under close supervision or with another employee.
In considering this, I have undertaken an assessment of the substantiated allegations and the duties of your role within the Fitzroy CSSC and other roles within the Sunshine Coast and Central Region, and whether your continuation in the role or another role presents any potential risk to the department or others. I have carefully considered the serious nature of your conduct and the responsibilities of your role as a Child Safety Officer, including your access to highly confidential and sensitive information.
It would not be reasonable or practicable for your work conduct to be continuously scrutinised to ensure your integrity in the workplace whilst this matter remains unresolved, therefore your continued work performance under supervision is inappropriate. Additionally in the context of the substantiated allegations, I consider there is an unacceptable risk to the department if you were to remain in your current role or an alternative role whilst the matter is being resolved.

I do not therefore consider there are any alternatives to suspension which are available or appropriate in the current circumstances.

[74] I am satisfied that the decision-maker has given appropriate consideration to whether there were reasonable alternatives to suspending the Appellant from duty. I am also satisfied that the reasons provided by the decision-maker for finding that reasonable alternatives were not available, and that it was not appropriate for the Appellant to return to the workplace, were open to her. I am satisfied that the decision-maker complied with s 101(3) of the PS Act.

[75] The Appellant has been provided with the opportunity to show cause in relation to the decision to suspend her without remuneration. The Appellant has also been provided (via the decision letter dated 23 September 2025) with a written notice setting out the reasons for the decision.

[76] The decision letter also informed the Appellant of her appeal entitlements and the timeframe for lodging an appeal. The Appellant was also informed that more information was contained in the Appeals Directive and a copy of this directive was attached to the decision letter. Finally, the decision letter also informed the Appellant that she was suspended effective from 6 October 2025 to 16 November 2024 and that this suspension was without remuneration.

[77] I am therefore satisfied that the decision-maker has complied with the requirements in clause 9.2(e) of the Suspension Directive and s 101(2) of the PS Act.

[78] Section 101(4) of the PS Act permits the chief executive to suspend a public sector employee from duty without remuneration in the following circumstances:

the chief executive reasonably believes the employee is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law; and

the chief executive considers it is not appropriate for the employee to be entitled to normal remuneration for the period of the suspension, having regard to the nature of the discipline to which the chief executive believes the employee is liable.

[79] In relation to the first element, I have confirmed above that I am satisfied that the delegated decision-maker had grounds for a reasonable belief that the Appellant was liable to discipline under a discipline law.

[80] As noted above, the Suspension Directive provides at cl 8.2 that a decision to suspend an employee without normal remuneration in accordance with s 101(4)(b) is limited to the following circumstances:

(a) There are factors not within the control of the agency that are preventing the timely conclusion of the discipline process, for example if there are criminal charges and the investigation or discipline process is pending the outcome of these charges; or

(b) It is otherwise fair and reasonable to suspend an employee without remuneration, taking into account the financial impact on the employee and the broader public interest of the employee remaining on suspension with remuneration.

[81] When used to link two expressions, the word "and" is usually considered to be used in a conjunctive sense and the word "or" is disjunctive.[24] I am satisfied that the word or at the end of cl 8.2(a) of the Suspension Directive is being used in a disjunctive sense. That is, to suspend an employee without remuneration, the decision-maker has to be satisfied of only one of the matters listed in cl 8.2 (and not both of them).

[82] In relation to cl 8.2(a), the Appellant in her submissions notes that the decision did not detail any factors outside of the Respondent's control that would prevent a timely conclusion of the disciplinary process. This is correct because the decision-maker did not rely upon cl 8.2(a) of the Suspension Directive in determining to suspend the Appellant without remuneration.

[83] In relation to the second limb of s 101(4)(b) of the PS Act, this requires that the delegated decision-maker must consider that normal remuneration is not appropriate having regard to the nature of the discipline to which they believe the employee is liable.

[84] Clause 8.2(b) of the Suspension Directive requires consideration of the financial impact on the employee and the broader public interest of the employee remaining on suspension with remuneration.

[85] The Appellant's submissions note that in response to the show cause on suspension without remuneration, the Appellant outlined that this would cause significant financial impacts to the Appellant and her family, particularly considering she is a single mother residing in a regional location.

[86] The Appellant further submits that the decision letter does not outlie any factors which mitigate the financial impact on the Appellant, considering the matters raised in the preceding paragraph. As a consequence, the Appellant contends that the decision-maker did not give appropriate weight to the significant financial hardship that the Appellant will suffer on suspension without remuneration.

[87] In response, the Respondent in its submissions contends that cl 8.2 of the Suspension Directive does not require the decision-maker to examine if any factors would 'mitigate' the financial impact on the Appellant prior to suspending her without pay. I accept this submission based on a plain reading of cl 8.2 of the Suspension Directive which makes no mention of the chief executive having an obligation to mitigate the financial impact of a decision to suspend without remuneration.

[88] In the decision letter, Ms Cork specifically notes matters that she had regard to from the Appellant's response, as follows:

The financial impact a decision to suspend without pay would have on the Appellant and her family as a 'single mother to two young dependent children' and the impact this would have on her mental and emotional wellbeing.

That the Appellant had been impacted by DFV and coercive control and that the disciplinary matter 'arose from these circumstances'.

The difficulties that the Appellant submitted she would experience in finding alternative employment during the suspension period due to her location in a regional community.

[89] The decision letter demonstrated that the decision-maker had regard to the financial impact on the Appellant, but then went on to weigh the matters raised by the Appellant against the other matters that the decision-maker was required to give consideration to in determining the broader public interest. I am satisfied that the decision-maker has given appropriate weight to the significant financial hardship that the Appellant may suffer from a decision to suspend without remuneration.

[90] In relation to those other matters, the decision-maker noted that in considering the proposed suspension from duty without pay, the decision-maker had regard to:

The nature of the discipline that the decision-maker now considered the Appellant to be liable to; and

The public interest in ongoing payment to an employee in those circumstances. The decision-maker particularly had regard to the potential reputational damage to the department and the diminishing of public confidence in the Department's financial accountability, if the public were to become aware of the Appellant being suspended with remuneration.

[91] The Appellant in her reply submissions submits that the decision-maker has disproportionately weighed a remote risk of potential reputational damage to the Respondent against the near certainty that the decision to suspend the Appellant without remuneration would cause significant financial distress to the Appellant and the Appellant's family.

[92] I firstly note in relation to the Appellant's contentions regarding the financial impact of a suspension without pay, that the Appellant has not at any stage of the disciplinary process, nor in the submissions to the Commission, provided any information as to her financial circumstances, her financial obligations, or whether she has the ability to access accrued recreation or long service leave. That is, there is an allegation that the suspension would cause significant financial distress which is not supported by relevant evidence.

[93] In relation to the matters considered by the decision-maker, I am satisfied that these were appropriate considerations for the decision-maker to take into account in determining where the broader public interest lay.

[94] I consider that the Department had an obligation to ensure the effective, efficient, economical and appropriate use of public resources. This included considering the effect upon the Department's finances while continuing suspension with remuneration in the circumstances.

[95] The circumstances relevant to this appeal appear to be that there is evidence which confirms that:

on numerous occasions over a period of time just short of two years, the Appellant has repeatedly made inappropriate use of a departmental computer to make unauthorised searches; and

on two occasions the Appellant has breached her duties as a public servant by inappropriately disclosing confidential client information to a member of the public; and

When the above conduct was raised with the Appellant, she provided misleading information to her managers.

[96] I consider it to be inherently likely that if the public were to become aware of those circumstances and that the Appellant remained on a paid suspension when those facts became clear to the Respondent, that the department would suffer reputational damage. I do not consider this risk to be at all remote.

[97] I am satisfied that the decision-maker's decision to attribute considerable weight to the factors identified in paragraph [90] above, was not unreasonable in the circumstances.
[98] The final issue to be addressed is the Appellant's submission that the decision to suspend without remuneration is punitive in nature and is in fact a disciplinary action taken in contravention of cl 4.7 of the Suspension Directive.

[99] The Appellant submits that the decision does not detail how the nature of the discipline makes it not appropriate for the Appellant to be suspended with remuneration. The Appellant further contends that the suspension decision is so intertwined with the decision on disciplinary findings, that the suspension decision was in fact made because of the disciplinary finding decision.

[100] Clause 4.7 of the Suspension Directive relevantly provides:

Suspension is an administrative action, taken for administrative necessity. It is not disciplinary action and is not to be used as a form of punishment.

[101] To the contrary of the submissions made by the Appellant, the Respondent in its submissions contend that the disciplinary process relating to the Appellant was being run in a manner to prevent the Appellant from being on suspension without remuneration for an extended period of time.

[102] The Respondent notes that at the point of issuing the decision to suspend the Appellant without pay, the disciplinary process was almost finalised, given that the Appellant had been invited to show cause as to why Ms Cork should not impose the disciplinary penalty of termination.

[103] The Appellant in her primary submissions notes that in the decision letter the decision-maker specifically notes that she has had regard to the 'nature of the discipline I am now considering you are liable to'. In my view this was perfectly appropriate. Indeed, pursuant to s 101(4)(b) of the PS Act, it was a specific matter that the decision-maker had to consider in determining to suspend without pay.

[104] In light of the evidence available to the decision-maker, and the matters I have noted at paragraph [95] above, I am not able to conclude the Respondent is using its authority to suspend without pay as a punitive measure. Both the PS Act and the Suspension Directive allow for suspension without remuneration in particular circumstances after consideration of mandatory factors and such action is not inherently punitive.

[105] I finally note that the decision-maker has also taken the Appellant's human rights into consideration in relation to both the disciplinary finding decision and the suspension decision.

[106] For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the decision-maker in determining to suspend the Appellant without remuneration has complied with the requirements set out in s 101 of the PS Act and in the Suspension Directive.

[107] I do not consider that the decision to suspend the Appellant without remuneration lacks justification in the circumstances set out above. Based on the evidence available to me, I am satisfied that the decision to suspend the Appellant without remuneration was fair and reasonable.

Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the decision appealed against is confirmed.

[3] Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5 as to the former, equivalent provisions in s 201 of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld).

[4] Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252, [60]-[61] (Byrne SJA).

[5] Colebrook v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 53, [25].

[6] Citing Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 219, [83], per McLennan IC.

[7] Citing Bah v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 096, [88] - [89] per McLennan IC.

[8] Attachment 1 - Suspension Letter and First Show Cause on Suspension without Remuneration dated 12 May 2025, page 3.

Hiron v State of Queensland

At a glance

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Judgment (214 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (5)

Cases Cited (1)