Dismiss the second respondents' objections to the appeals' competency.

Professions and Trades - Auctioneers and Agents - Disciplinary Proceedings - Whether a right of appeal against summary dismissal by the Property Agents Board - Broad right of appeal created by the Property Agents and Land Transactions Act 2016 - Appeal by way of rehearing.

Property Agents and Land Transactions Act 2016, ss 92 and 116;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020, ss 10, 75, 78, 83, 84 and 89;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Amendment (Additional Jurisdictions) Act 2025.

Favato v Property Agents Tribunal [2026] TASCAT 3;

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499;

Lawler v Real Estate Institute of Tasmania [2024] TASSC 31;

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30;

Pepper v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [No 2] [2008] 2 Qd R 353; [2008] QCA 207;

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34.

First Respondent: C Groves - Dobson Mitchell Allport

1. This is a ruling in three appeals under the Property Agents and Land Transactions Act 2016 (PALTA). It is convenient to commence with the background to the appeals.
2. The appellant owns a residential property. He engaged a property management agency, Peterswald, to manage the lease of his property to some tenants. Those tenants later complained to Peterswald about delays in repairs.
3. The appellant was unhappy with how Peterswald managed the tenants', and later his, complaints. Broadly speaking, he considered that Peterswald inappropriately took the tenants' side and failed to act in his best interests.
4. He made complaints to the first respondent, the Property Agents Board (the Board) about the conduct of each second respondent. The second respondents (the agents) were property agents at Peterswald and involved, in some way or another, in managing the appellant's property or his complaints about their management. As property agents, they were regulated by PALTA.
5. The Board decided to summarily dismiss the complaint against each second respondent. The appellant appeals against each of the three summary dismissals. In delivering this ruling, it is unnecessary to consider the reasons why the Board made that decision. It suffices to note that that the Board found each agent's alleged conduct to be incapable of amounting to unsatisfactory professional conduct, professional misconduct, or a breach of a code of conduct under PALTA, and that each complaint was misconceived.
6. The ruling deals with a preliminary issue: is there a right of appeal against the Board's decisions to dismiss each complaint? In answering that question, it is appropriate to me to explain the nature of an appeal under PALTA.

The Property Agents and Land Transactions Act 2016

1. PALTA, amongst other things, regulates property agents. As Brett J observed in Lawler v Real Estate Institute of Tasmania [2024] TASSC 31 (Lawler) at [1], it:

[I]ncludes a process for investigating, determining and, if appropriate, imposing discipline in respect of complaints made about such conduct. Conduct subject to the disciplinary provisions of [PALTA] includes that which amounts to professional misconduct or unsatisfactory personal conduct. Those terms are defined in the legislation. Complaints about conduct are received and investigated by the [Board]. After it has completed its investigation, the Board may dismiss the complaint, deal with minor misconduct or otherwise refer the complaint to a Tribunal...

2. Section 92 allows the Board to summarily dismiss a complaint. It provides:

92. Summary dismissal of complaints > > (1) The Board may dismiss a complaint if - > > (a) any information it requests the complainant to provide to the Board is not provided within a reasonable time; or > > (b) any information it has requested be verified by a statutory declaration is not verified in that way within a reasonable time; or > > (c) the Board is satisfied that the complaint is vexatious, misconceived, frivolous or lacking in substance. > > (2) The Board is to dismiss a conduct complaint if it is satisfied that the conduct complained about has been the subject of a previous complaint either by the same or another person and that appropriate action was taken in respect of that previous complaint.

3. Section 116 allows a right of appeal to the Tribunal. It provides:

116. Right to appeal decisions of Board > > (1) An aggrieved person may appeal to the Tribunal against a decision of the Board under this Act. > > (2) In particular, a person may appeal against a decision of the Board - > > (a) to refuse to grant or renew a licence; or > > (b) to suspend the person's property agent licence. > > (3) An appeal under this section is to be made in writing - > > (a) within 14 days after notice of the Board's decision is given to the person; or > > (b) within such further period as the Tribunal considers is appropriate in the interest of justice. > > (4) An appeal under this section stays the operation of the decision that is the subject of the appeal. > > (5) . . . . . . . .

Does the s 116 appeal right extend to summary dismissal under s 92?

1. At the first directions hearing, I raised whether the appeal right under PALTA, s 116 extends to summary dismissal under s 92.
2. The agents contend that the appeal right does not so extend and that the appeal is therefore incompetent. The appellant and the Board contend that summary dismissal under s 92 does fall within the ambit of s 116.
3. Section 116(1) confers a broad appeal right. The requirements are only that the person be aggrieved and that the decision be made by the Board under PALTA.
4. The issue relates to s 116(2). The agents contend that it limits the ambit of s 116(1) to decisions to refuse to grant or renew or to suspend a property agent licence. That is because sub-s (2) commences with the words "[i]n particular", which, they submit, limit the operation of sub-s (1).
5. In Lawler, Brett J considered s 116 prior to its amendment in 2025. The 2025 amendments are immaterial to this issue and, with respect to s 116, were limited to repealing sub-s (5). His Honour said at [32]:

It is clear that the appeal can relate to any decision of the Board under the Act, which includes a diverse range of administrative decisions. It certainly includes the matters referred to in s 116(2), that is a decision to refuse to grant or renew a licence or suspend a licence, but in my view the generality of the ambit of s 116(1) is not limited by the more specific provisions of s 116(2): see Pepper v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2008] QCA 207.

6. His Honour's remarks are obiter dicta and, strictly speaking, not binding on the Tribunal. But they are highly persuasive.
7. I respectfully consider his Honour's observations to be correct and consistent with an application of the ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. Those principles are uncontroversial and were conveniently summarised by Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34 at [14]:

The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. [Citations omitted]

8. As Muir JA, de Jersey CJ and Fraser JA agreeing, stated in Pepper v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [No 2] [2008] 2 Qd R 353; [2008] QCA 207 at [28] (citations omitted):

The normal role of the words "in particular" appearing after words describing a class of matters or matters of a general nature is to identify a specific matter or specific matters which come within the general class or description. The expression is not one of limitation.

9. Section 116 of PALTA, read with the Act's context and purpose, compels the same conclusion. The Act confers many powers on the Board, many decisions in respect of which would have significant consequences for a property agent or a complainant. As the Board submits, the agents' interpretation:

[W]ould render s 116 inutile within Part 7, and also leave the Act with no appeal mechanism for adverse determinations such as those made under Part 3.

10. I am satisfied that the appeal right under PALTA, s 116 extends to summary dismissal under s 92.

What is the nature of the appeal to the Tribunal?

1. This is the first appeal under PALTA that the Tribunal has heard where the appeal was instituted in the Tribunal rather than the then-Property Agents Tribunal (PAT). It is appropriate for me to outline the nature of such an appeal. Doing so now promotes transparency and ensures that the appeal is resolved as quickly, cheaply, and flexibly as possible, each of which is an objective of the Tribunal under the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (TASCAT Act), s 10(1)(a)(iv), (c), (d), and (g). It also gives effect to the Tribunal's obligations under s 83(2)(a) and (c).
2. This requires analysis of the legislative history of PALTA. Prior to the commencement of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Additional Jurisdictions) Act 2020 (Amendment Act), an appeal under PALTA, s 116 was to the PAT. In Lawler, Brett J held at [32] and [40] that an appeal from the Board to the PAT was by way of a hearing de novo.
3. A hearing de novo is not an appeal in the strict sense. It is a fresh hearing in which the PAT was to stand in the shoes of the Board and make the correct or preferable decision based on the material before the PAT. It was not bound by the material before the Board. However, in deciding what the correct or preferable decision was, the PAT was limited to the powers provided under s 116(5). At the time, that provision stated:

(5) At the hearing of an appeal, the Tribunal may - > > (a) confirm the decision under appeal; or > > (b) set aside the decision and direct the Board to take such action as the Tribunal considers necessary.

4. The Amendment Act repealed s 116(5). It also abolished the PAT and made several other amendments to PALTA. In substitution, an appeal under s 116 now lies to this Tribunal.
5. Unlike in PALTA as it existed before Brett J, I find that an appeal to this Tribunal under s 116 is an appeal by way of rehearing and not a hearing de novo.

1. PALTA, s 116, on its face, confers on the Tribunal jurisdiction to review a decision made by the Board. This engages Div 3 of Pt 7 of the TASCAT Act, which prescribes the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. The purpose of the review is to produce the correct or preferable decision: s 75(1). But that does not answer what is the nature of the review or appeal. That is, is the appeal by way of rehearing or is it a hearing de novo? And what is the difference between them?
2. Since preparing these reasons, the Tribunal's decision in Favato v Property Agents Board [2026] TASCAT 3, which considered an appeal instituted prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act, has been published. I respectfully agree with Senior Member Winter's summary, at [17]-[31], of the nature of an appeal under PALTA.
3. Under the TASCAT Act, an appeal is by way of rehearing unless otherwise provided. Section 75 states:

75. Nature of proceedings in review jurisdiction > > (1) The purpose of a review of a reviewable decision is to produce the correct or preferable decision. > > (2) Subject to subsection (6) , if an application for review is made to the Tribunal in respect of one of the following reviewable decisions, the review by the Tribunal of the reviewable decision is to be by way of a hearing de novo of the matter to which the reviewable decision relates: > > (a) a reviewable decision under an Act, including any regulations or instruments made under such an Act, that is an Act in relation to which the functions and powers of the Tribunal are allocated under clause 3 of Part 8 of Schedule 2 to the Resource and Planning stream; > > (b) a reviewable decision under an Act or a provision of an Act, including any regulations or instruments made under such an Act, that is specified in Schedule 4. > > (3) Subject to subsections (4), (5), (6) and (7) and the provisions of a relevant Act, if a reviewable decision, to which an application for review made to the Tribunal relates, is a decision in relation to an Act, or regulations or an instrument made under an Act, that is not an Act to which subsection (2) applies, the review by the Tribunal of the reviewable decision is to be by way of a rehearing of the matter to which the reviewable decision relates. > > (4) On a rehearing, the Tribunal may have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision-maker. > > (5) Proceedings on a rehearing may include - > > (a) an examination of the evidence or material before the decision-maker, unless any such evidence or material is to be excluded under another provision of this Act or under any other law; and > > (b) a consideration of any further evidence or material that the Tribunal decides, in the circumstances of the particular case, to admit for the purposes of rehearing the matter. > > (6) In exercising its review jurisdiction in relation to a reviewable decision under a relevant Act - > > (a) the Tribunal is to deal with a matter in accordance with this Act and the relevant Act; and > > (b) has, in addition to the powers of the Tribunal under this Act, all the powers that are conferred by the relevant Act on the original decision-maker. > > (7) The relevant Act may modify the operation of this Act in relation to a matter that comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction under the relevant Act.

4. Section 75(2) does not pick up PALTA. Nor is there anything in PALTA in its present form that states that an appeal under s 116 is by way of hearing de novo. The appeal must therefore be by way of rehearing: TASCAT Act, s 75(3).

1. It is convenient to describe what an appeal by way of rehearing involves. The Tribunal may have regard to the Board's decision: s 75(4). Subject to exceptions, the Tribunal may have regard to the material before the Board: s 75(5)(a). With leave (i.e. the Tribunal's permission), the Tribunal may have regard to further evidence or material: s 75(5)(b).
2. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30 at [30]- [50], Gageler J helpfully described the nature of a rehearing. His Honour's description was cited at length in Lawler. The salient points as they apply to an appeal under PALTA are as follows:
   • The Tribunal must determine the correctness of the Board's decision. This is known as the 'correctness standard'. To succeed on appeal, an appellant needs to identify one or more errors made by the Board.
   • If reviewing the exercise of a discretion, the Tribunal cannot substitute its own decision merely because it "would ... have exercised the original discretion ... in a different way". The standard applicable was set out by the High Court in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505. However, it is unnecessary to consider this further because the power under PALTA, s 92 is not a discretionary one. Either the complaint is misconceived (or vexatious, frivolous, or lacking in substance) or it is not. While there may be several matters relevant to that question, the power is not a discretionary one.
   • The appeal is based on the material before the Board while, consistent with the TASCAT Act 75(3), having regard to further evidence as it decides to admit.
   • The Tribunal must draw its own inferences and conclusions from the evidence rather than relying on the Board's inferences and conclusions, but having regard to the Tribunal's limitations and the Board's advantages relating to hearing evidence firsthand. The latter point is less relevant where, as here, the evidence before the Board was documentary.
   • The Tribunal must apply the law as it is at the time that the appeal is determined.
3. These three appeals must be determined consistent with these principles. Following the repeal of PALTA, s 116(5), and putting to one side interlocutory powers such as summary dismissal under the TASCAT Act, s 84, the Tribunal's powers on hearing these appeals are prescribed by s 78(1):

(1) Subject to the provisions of a relevant Act, the Tribunal, on a review by the Tribunal of a reviewable decision, may - > > (a) affirm the decision that is being reviewed; or > > (b) vary the decision that is being reviewed; or > > (c) set aside the decision being reviewed and - > > (i) substitute its own decision; or > > (ii) send the matter back to the decision-maker for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations that the Tribunal considers appropriate - > > and, in any case, may make any order that the Tribunal considers appropriate.

1. In making submissions as to the interpretation of PALTA, s 116, the agents applied for the appeals to be dismissed summarily under the TASCAT Act, s 89. This section allows the Tribunal to dismiss a proceeding where it is "frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance" or "otherwise an abuse of process".
2. That application is not supported by submissions, nor have the other parties had an opportunity to make submissions in response. I will list the application and the appeals for directions. To ensure that the appeals are dealt with expeditiously, I intend to hear the application soon afterwards.

1. I dismiss the second respondents' objections to the appeals' competency.