Health Care Complaints Commission v Irani [2026] NSWCATOD 5 | Case summary

Pursuant to s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) publication of the name of any patient of the Respondent referred to in the Tribunal's decision is prohibited.

By Amended Application filed 12 December 2025 the Health Care Complaints Commission (the Commission) sought orders against Dr Mazyar Irani (the Practitioner) pursuant to the provisions of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2013 (NSW) (the National Law). The Commission alleged, in reliance upon the matters alleged pursuant to three complaints, that the Practitioner was guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct, and that such conduct was sufficiently serious to constitute professional misconduct pursuant to the provisions of the National Law.
The Practitioner admitted the facts relied on by the Commission in support of its application, admitted that those facts constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct, and admitted that his unsatisfactory professional conduct was sufficiently serious to constitute professional misconduct. The Practitioner having admitted that he was guilty of professional misconduct, the power of the Tribunal pursuant to cancel or suspend his registration pursuant to s 149C(1)(b) of the National Law is thus enlivened.
The Practitioner opposed the granting of the relief sought by the Commission, and sought that he be reprimanded pursuant to s 149A(1)(a) of the National Law and be ordered to pay the Commission's costs of the proceedings.
On 15 and 16 December 2025 the Tribunal heard evidence and submissions in relation to the determination of appropriate protective orders (Stage 2 Hearing), at the conclusion of which the Tribunal reserved its decision. These are the reasons for the decision of the Tribunal.

The Commission relied on a volume of documents comprising 577 pages, to which was added an AHPRA evidentiary certificate, which became Exhibit A1. The Commission also relied on an expert report from Dr Michael Golding dated 6 October 2025 (Exhibit A2). The Commission's Amended Complaint became Exhibit A3. A schedule detailing drugs prescribed/dispensed to one of the patients referred to in the Commission's Amended Complaint for the period 10 June 2022 to 27 March 2023 was tendered (Exhibit A4). A copy of Regulations with respect to patient records was tendered (Exhibit A5). An email exchange between the Practitioner and the Sydney Adventist Hospital (SAN) of 24 May 2023 and 25 May 2023, a Medical Certificate issued by a Dr Talab dated 3 May 2023 and an emailed letter from the Practitioner to the regulator dated 24 May 2023 became Exhibit A6.
The Practitioner relied on a number of references (Exhibit R1) and the Clinical Radiology Training Requirements Policy dated 1 July 2023 (Policy) issued by the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Radiologists (Exhibit R2).
Counsel for the parties provided helpful and comprehensive written submissions, and provided the Tribunal with copies of a number of relevant decisions of the Tribunal.
At the completion of the hearing, the ambit of the dispute between the parties had been considerably narrowed. The Commission sought that the Practitioner be suspended for a period of three to six months, and pay the Commission's costs of the proceedings. The Practitioner did not oppose an order that he pay the Commission's costs of the proceedings, but opposed any suspension of his registration, and continued to seek that, in lieu of suspension, the Tribunal reprimand him. After hearing all the evidence, the Tribunal raised with Counsel for the parties the possibility that the Tribunal may find that suspension was not necessary to protect the health and safety of the public, but that, without more, a reprimand would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the Practitioner's offending conduct and the seriousness with which the Tribunal treats such misconduct. Counsel for the parties engaged helpfully with that issue.
By the conclusion of the hearing, a number of matters were either conceded or not seriously disputed, and are matters which the Tribunal finds have been established. Relevantly these matters included:

(1) the Practitioner expresses genuine remorse and contrition for his offending conduct;

(2) the Practitioner is unlikely to reoffend;

(3) whilst the Practitioner's offending conduct involved risk to the health and safety of at least one of the three close family members identified in the Commission's application, the Practitioner's offending conduct did not involve risk to the health and safety of the public;

(4) that declining to suspend the Practitioner's registration would not constitute an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of the public;

(5) that, other than the offending conduct which gave rise to the present proceedings, the Practitioner has not previously, in 17 years in medical practice in Australia, been the subject of disciplinary proceedings;

(6) that, as a consequence of the Practitioner's offending conduct, the hospital in which he was at the time employed suspended the Practitioner for a period of approximately seven months (March to October 2023);

(7) in August 2025 the Practitioner was accepted into the fellowship training program of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Radiologists (training program) and is currently working at St George Hospital as a first year accredited Radiology Registrar;

(8) in October 2025 the Practitioner sat and passed the Part 1 Applied Imaging Technology Examination and is currently studying for the Part 1 Anatomy Examination in April 2026 pursuant to his fellowship training program;

(9) by reason of the requirements of the Policy, there is a likelihood that the Practitioner would be withdrawn from the training program if his registration is suspended or, at the very least, he would have his trainee status "reviewed" if that were to occur;

(10) the Practitioner, although resist

(11) ing an order imposing a fine on him if his registration is not suspended, the Practitioner does not dispute the appropriateness of a fine of $20,000, representing 181 penalty units, the maximum fine which could be imposed being 250 penalty units, an amount of $27,500; and,

(12) the Practitioner has at all relevant times admitted the allegations made against him.

It was agreed, and the Tribunal orders, pursuant to s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (CAT Act) that the identity of the three patients referred to in the Commission's Amended Application not be disclosed to any persons, or appear in the course of these reasons, it being sufficient to record that each of the three patients, who shall be referred to as Patients A, B and C, are "close family members".

Counsel for the parties agreed that, in the circumstances identified above, a determination of appropriate protective orders turns overwhelmingly on two considerations, they being:

(1) the need for general deterrence, or to signify to members of the medical profession that offending conduct of the kind which occurred in this case is a serious matter, and viewed accordingly by the Tribunal; and

(2) to signify to the public that the Tribunal takes seriously offending conduct of the kind which occurred in this case.

To provide context for the Tribunal's determination of appropriate protective orders, it is appropriate to identify the particulars of the Commission's complaint. As noted above, the Practitioner admitted the facts and circumstances relied upon by the Commission, and the implications of such admissions. The expert report of Dr Golding, which was not challenged by cross-examination, amply supports findings in the terms of the Commission's complaint, and the appropriateness of the Practitioner's admissions with respect to them.

The background to all complaints, as identified in the Commission's Amended Application is that, in or about 2003, the Practitioner obtained a Medical Doctorate from the Medical School of the Shiraz University of Medical Sciences, Iran. On 12 September 2008, the Practitioner was first registered as a medical practitioner in Australia. At the time of his offending conduct, the Practitioner was working as a Senior Resident Medical Officer at Westmead Hospital, and was also working as a locum through an agency at various other hospitals.
The drugs prescribed by the Practitioner which gave rise to the Commission's application fell within three categories:

(1) drugs of addiction within the meaning of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966 (NSW) (PTGA), being drugs contained in Schedule 8 of the Poisons List proclaimed under s 8 of the PTGA (Schedule 8 drugs);

(2) prescribed restricted substances within the meaning of the PTGA, being drugs contained in Appendix D of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Regulation 2008 (NSW) (PTGR) (Schedule 4D drugs); and

(3) restricted substances within the meaning of the PTGA, being drugs contained in Schedule 4 of the Poisons List proclaimed under s 4 of the PTGA (Schedule 4 drugs).

For the purpose of the particulars contained in the Commission's Amended Application, the recognised standard of what was appropriate in relation to treating close family members included:
- clause 4.15 of the "Medical Board of Australia Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for doctors in Australia", issued in October 2020 (the Code of Conduct); and
- the Medical Council of New South Wales, Guidelines for self-treatment and treating family members.
For the purpose of the particulars contained in the Commission's Amended Application, the recognised standard of what was appropriate in relation to the issuing of medical certificates included:
- clause 10.9 of the Code of Conduct; and
- the Medical Council of New South Wales, Guideline for self-treatment and treating family members.
As recorded earlier, it is not in issue that each of Patients A, B and C was, at the times referred to in the amended complaint a close family member of the Practitioner as that term is employed in the Code of Conduct and the Guideline for treating family members.
The Commission alleged (Complaint 1) that the Practitioner was guilty of unsatisfactory conduct pursuant to s 139B(1)(l) of the National Law, in that the Practitioner engaged in improper or unethical conduct relating to the practise or purported practise of medicine. The particulars of Complaint 1 alleged:

"1. Between 9 March 2021 and 17 January 2023, the practitioner inappropriately prescribed medications including Schedule 4 drugs, Schedule 4D drugs and Schedule 8 drugs to Patient A, in the quantities and on the dates particularised in Annexure A, in circumstances where:

a. Patient A was a close family member; and

b. the prescribing was not unavoidable in the manner described in the Code of Conduct.

2. Between 9 March 2021 and 17 January 2023, the practitioner prescribed Schedule 4D drugs to Patient A in the quantities and on the dates set out in Annexure A, in circumstances where he did not make a record of the following particulars, contrary to clause 38 of the PTGR:

a. the name, strength and quantity of the substance prescribed and the date on which it was prescribed;

b. the name and address of the person to be treated;

c. the maximum number of times the substance may be supplied on the prescription;

d. the directions for use, as shown on the prescription.

3. Between 9 March 2021 and 17 January 2023, the practitioner prescribed Schedule 8 drugs to Patient A in the quantities and on the dates set out in Annexure A, in circumstances where he did not make a record the following particulars, contrary to clause 82 of the PTGR:

a. the name, strength and quantity of the drug prescribed and the date on which it was prescribed;

b. the name and address of the person to be treated;

c. the maximum number of times the drug may be supplied on the prescription;

d. the intervals at which the substance may be supplied on the prescription;

e. the directions for use, as shown on the prescription.

4. Between 9 March 2021 and 17 January 2023, the practitioner, without proper authority, prescribed type B drugs of addiction under clause 123 of the PTGR to Patient A in the quantities and on the dates set out in Annexure B, for continuous therapeutic use for a period exceeding two months, contrary to section 28(2) of the PTGA_."_

Complaint 2 alleged that the Practitioner was guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct under s 139B(1)(b) of the National Law in that the Practitioner has contravened clauses 5, 6 and 8, and clauses 1 and 3 of Schedule 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation (NSW) Regulation 2016. The particulars of Complaint 2 alleged that:

(1) between 9 March 2021 and 17 January 2023 the Practitioner failed to make any records of the occasions when he prescribed the Schedule 4 drugs set out in Annexure A to Patient A; and

(2) between 4 December 2022 and 10 March 2023, the Practitioner failed to make any record of the occasions when he prescribed the Schedule 4 drugs set out in Annexure C to Patient B.

Annexure A referred to drugs prescribed by the Practitioner, and dispensed to Patient A between 10 March 2021 and 16 January 2023. Annexure C referred to drugs prescribed by the Practitioner and dispensed to Patient B between 5 December 2022 and 9 February 2023.
Complaint 3 alleged that the Practitioner was guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct pursuant to s 139B(1)(l) of the National Law in that the Practitioner has engaged in improper or unethical conduct relating to the practise or purported practise of medicine. The particulars of Complaint 3 alleged:

"1. The practitioner inappropriately provided medical care, which included the issuing of medical certificates, to Patient C, on or about 24 April 2021, 28 March 2023, and/or 2 May 2023, in circumstances where:

(a) Patient C was a close family member; and

(b) the care was not unavoidable in the manner described in the Code of Conduct.

2. On or around 24 April 2021, the practitioner inappropriately issued a medical certificate to Patient C, in circumstances where:

(c) the certificate was issued on Northern Beaches Hospital letterhead;

(d) the certificate falsely stated that Patient C "presented to this centre";

(e) the practitioner did not work at Northern Beaches Hospital at the relevant time.

3. On or around 28 March 2023, the practitioner inappropriately provided a medical certificate to Patient C, in circumstances where:

(f) the certificate was issued on Sydney Adventist Hospital letterhead;

(g) Patient C was not a patient at Sydney Adventist Hospital at the relevant time.

4. On or around 2 May 2023, the practitioner inappropriately provided a medical certificate to Patient C, in circumstances where:

(h) the certificate was issued on Sydney Adventist Hospital letterhead;

(i) the certificate falsely stated that Patient C was "seen and examined in Sydney Adventist Hospital";

(j) Patient C was not a patient at Sydney Adventist Hospital at the relevant time."

Complaint 4 alleged that the Practitioner was guilty of professional misconduct pursuant to s 139E of the National Law in that the Practitioner has:

(1) engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct of a sufficiently serious nature to justify suspension or cancellation of the Practitioner's registration, and/or

(2) engaged in more than one instance of unsatisfactory professional conduct that, when the instances are considered together, amount to conduct of a sufficiently serious nature to justify the suspension or cancellation of the Practitioner's registration.

The particulars of Complaint 4 alleged that Complaints 1, 2 and 3, individually or cumulatively establish professional misconduct.

The Practitioner made a statement which he adopted on oath in the witness box. In his statement, the Practitioner set out his professional experience and considerable post-graduate academic success in Australia, before addressing the present application. The Practitioner referred [22], accurately, to having received a letter from Westmead Hospital in March 2023 notifying him of concerns about his prescribing of medications, and suspending him from practice on full pay. The Practitioner promptly contacted his medical defence organisation who, on 12 April 2023, made a notification to the Medical Board of Australia on his behalf (Exhibit 1A, page 228). That notification records that, pursuant to s 130(1) and s 130(3)(a)(iv) of the National Law, a notification was being made to the Medical Board on behalf of the Practitioner.
The Practitioner deposed, accurately, to his subsequent appearance before Delegates of the Medical Council of NSW at a hearing convened pursuant to s 150 of the National Law. The Practitioner alleged, accurately, that at the conclusion of the s 150 hearing, the Delegates did not take to suspend his registration, or impose conditions on it. The Tribunal has considered the transcript of the s 150 hearing before the Delegates (Exhibit A1, pages 298-383) and the written reasons of the Delegates for their decision of 16 June 2023, which were published on 3 July 2023 (Exhibit A1, pages 384-396).
The Practitioner referred [25] to his receipt of a letter from Westmead Hospital confirming that its investigation of him had been concluded and that he would be issued with a formal written warning, as Exhibit A1, pages 512-515 confirms that he was. The Practitioner said "I accept that action was entirely appropriate. I returned to work shortly after that".
The Practitioner referred [27] to the completion since 2023 of training programs suggested to him by his medical defence organisation. Exhibit A1 pages 276-282 and 283-294 identify the courses which the Practitioner undertook and confirm his successful completion of them. The Practitioner also referred to having completed a second plan in July 2023, as Exhibit A1 pages 522-533 confirms that he did.
The Practitioner said "I have also reflected deeply on my conduct which, whilst well intentioned, was misguided and unacceptable." The Practitioner said that following his suspension from practise and return to work he has not "treated myself or any family member. I am also making medical records which I believe are detailed, appropriate and relevant. I believe that I now have a sound understanding of the appropriate use of opioid medications and when those should be prescribed". Albeit the Practitioner's conduct previously fell well short of what was required of him with respect to prescribing opioid medications, it is not suggested in the present proceedings that the Practitioner's current prescribing of Schedule 4, Schedule 4D or Schedule 8 medications, or his recording of such prescribing would justify suspension of his registration.
The Practitioner referred to having returned to practice in October 2023 "in accordance with a formal supervision plan which was focused on my prescribing of Schedule 4D and Schedule 8 medications" and said, accurately, that he "completed that supervision without incident".
Under the heading "General", the Practitioner reiterated that he was "most disappointed to have got myself into the situation that I did in early 2023. I accept that my conduct was not appropriate". The Practitioner reiterated his earlier assertions that he "did not intend to do anything wrong or inappropriate but I accept that I was misguided and ill-equipped. I genuinely thought I was helping (Patient B) and (Patient A). With the benefit of hindsight, my experience with the Council and HCCC and my learnings, I fully accept that my actions were inappropriate".
The Practitioner accepted responsibility for his conduct and apologised "unreservedly for it" adding that "I can indicate to the Tribunal that I have taken the matter extremely seriously I have learned a very worthwhile lesson and will not make such a mistake again."
The Practitioner further said that, "Without minimising the seriousness of my conduct, I believe it resulted from a lack of education in respect of prescribing in the general community and that resulted from my practising in the hospital system for the duration of my career". The Practitioner reiterated his previous assertions [36] that he "attempted to act appropriately in so far as only prescribing on the advice of the specialist who was overseas and who had treated my (close family members) and in doing that, I was careful to ensure that I crossed the name of any other medical practitioner out and wrote my name on the prescription. That is, I was not attempting to hide the prescribing".
The Practitioner, "without minimising the seriousness of my conduct", reiterated that the prescribing to two close family members "took place during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic when Sydney faced lockdowns and my in-laws were unable to travel". As submitted by Counsel for the Commission, although that may be the Practitioner's belief, the prescribing did not coincide entirely with the Sydney lockdown.
The Practitioner was cross-examined searchingly but courteously by Counsel for the Commission. The Practitioner impressed as essentially honest, albeit at times volunteering information which went well beyond answering questions he was asked. Although highly intelligent, as his academic achievements confirm, the Tribunal is mindful of the reality that English is not the Practitioner's first language, and that he has clearly been embarrassed by the process he has been subjected to as a result of his offending conduct. Repeatedly in cross-examination, the Practitioner reiterated "definitely it was a mistake I made", "I made the mistake - I apologise for that", "I take responsibility for that" and that the "most sad part" of his offending conduct was that he "made mistakes".
Although at times the Practitioner's answers might have been construed as attempts at exculpatory advocacy, the Practitioner repeatedly saying "I am not making excuses, I am just trying to explain how this happened" leave the Tribunal unable to accept that the Practitioner is other than genuinely remorseful for his offending conduct, or that his volunteering unnecessary additions to his answers to Counsel's questions were attempts to influence the Tribunal.
As the Practitioner readily acknowledged in cross-examination, the circumstances in which he found himself did not excuse his ignorance with respect to prescribing for close family members. The Tribunal accepts that the Practitioner's inappropriate prescribing arose from ignorance, and out of a genuine, but misguided desire to assist family members. The absence of attempts to conceal the prescribing support so finding. Although, as Counsel for the Commission submitted, the Practitioner was less vigilant in relation to the medications which he prescribed for close family members, there is no issue that the family members were suffering from the conditions for which the Practitioner prescribed medication. The Practitioner did not purport to diagnose those conditions and first prescribe for them. No harm actually came to any of the close family members, although, in at least one instance, there was a risk of that occurring. There is no suggestion that the Practitioner made, or stood to make a financial gain as a result of any of his inappropriate prescribing.
The Practitioner readily acknowledged that his ignorance of the provisions of the Code of Conduct, and with respect to prescribing for close family members and monitoring such prescribing with a view to discerning side effects, and the risk of addiction or overdosing were matters about which he did not know but "should have known".
The Practitioner's explanations for the shortcomings in his prescribing and monitoring of drugs, although the Tribunal accepts were genuine, were less than compelling in some respects. Had the Practitioner not undergone the training which the evidence shows him to have successfully completed since the offending conduct, the Tribunal may have had residual concerns about the Practitioner's prescribing. It is not in issue that the Practitioner has had no constraints on his ability to prescribe Schedule 4, Schedule 4D or Schedule 8 medications since October 2023. The Practitioner readily acknowledged and never sought to rationalise his admitted shortcomings.
The Practitioner's responses to questions from the Tribunal with respect to his understanding of ethical issues as a result of what he has learnt were less than compelling, but as no part of the Commission's application, or submissions ultimately made with respect to the Practitioner's prescribing competence raises it as an issue, this is not a matter which the Tribunal need take further. Similarly, and again acknowledging that it is not part of the particulars of any of the complaints against the Practitioner, his explanation for the need to prescribe, and prescribe as often as he did, the medications for Patient A identified in the admitted tables of medications, particularly when Patient A was overseas, were potentially concerning but ultimately, on balance, do not fuel present concerns.
The instance in respect of which the Practitioner was alleged to have been dishonest, in relation to Patient C, was explained by him as a mistake which he said that he promptly corrected. Some support for that assertion can be gained from Exhibit A6.
The Practitioner, properly, admitted that, in the circumstances, he should have referred Patient A to a pain specialist sooner than he did and that he should have recognised the "red flag" constituted by another practitioner declining to prescribe medication which the Practitioner prescribed.
The Practitioner said, and it has not been contradicted, that he had made the Committee responsible for selecting candidates for the radiology training program aware of his prior suspension by Westmead Hospital and the fact that these proceedings were pending during the selection process for the course. The Practitioner was cross-examined about his informal mentoring. Nothing emerging from that cross-examination provides a basis for doubting either that the Practitioner has been amenable to mentoring in the past, or that he would not seek appropriate mentoring and guidance in the future.
The Tribunal has recorded earlier in these reasons the matters which have either been admitted or are not ultimately in contest.

On 1 December 2025 Dr Abbas Vahedian, a Structural Engineer with a doctorate, provided a reference for the Practitioner. Dr Vahedian, as with all of the Practitioner's other referees, and sensibly, was not required for cross-examination on his reference.
Dr Vahedian said that he had spoken with the Practitioner "regarding the complaint" and that during their discussions the Practitioner "appeared open, transparent, and genuinely concerned about the matter. He took the complaint seriously and expressed a clear commitment to cooperating fully with the process. His response was thoughtful, responsible and consistent with the professional standards I know him to uphold". Dr Vahedian said that he has known the Practitioner since late 2013, the relationship being one of "longstanding family friends" in the course of which Dr Vahedian has had "regular personal interactions with him and his family, and I have come to know him well on both a personal and professional level". Nothing emerging from the cross-examination of the Practitioner, or any other evidence before the Tribunal, militates against accepting Dr Vahedian's evidence. With no disrespect to Dr Vahedian, his reference is entitled to limited weight. Medical practitioners are expected to be persons of good character and repute.
Dr Shamila Haddad, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Sydney provided a reference for the Practitioner earlier this month. Dr Haddad's reference was consistent with that of Dr Vahedian. Dr Haddad has known the Practitioner since 2012. The Practitioner's evidence does not provide any basis for rejecting or discounting the weight appropriate to be given to Dr Haddad's reference.
The Practitioner's wife, Dr Masumeh Talebi, who is a Staff Specialist at Westmead Hospital, provided a reference for the Practitioner on 5 December 2025. As Senior Counsel for the Practitioner properly acknowledged, Dr Talebi was not, and could not be expected, to be entirely impartial or dispassionate in her reference. However, Dr Talebi's reference was balanced and, not insignificantly, although suggesting that the Practitioner's motivation was honourable, did not seek to rationalise or excuse his offending conduct. With no disrespect to Dr Talebi, for the Tribunal's purposes, the most significant statements contained in Dr Talebi's reference recorded that "Since this matter came to light, Mazyar has been deeply remorseful. He blames himself for what he now understands was a regulatory error - even though his intention was solely to help my parents - and I feel genuinely sorry for him. The emotional toll has been profound. I have seen him carry the weight of this incident heavily, despite knowing that he acted in good faith at the time". Having heard the Practitioner's evidence in cross-examination, the Tribunal is satisfied that the possible consequences of the Practitioner's offending conduct have weighed heavily on him for more than two years.
The Tribunal relies on Dr Talebi's undisputed and uncontradicted statement as supporting a finding that the Practitioner's remorse is genuine, that the "emotional toll" that his offending conduct has imposed on him has been significant, and for a significant period, and that he is unlikely to re-offend.
The Practitioner also relied upon a reference dated 2 December 2025 from Dr Derek Glenn, a Consultant Radiologist and Head of the Radiology Department at St George Hospital, a position which, amongst other appointments, Dr Glenn has held since 1990. Dr Glenn stated that he had known the Practitioner for approximately 18 months, since the Practitioner commenced at St George as "initially an unaccredited trainee, and now as an accredited Radiology trainee for the College of Radiologists". Dr Glenn said that the Practitioner had "shared with me the details of the complaint levied by the HCCC" and was "completely candid" about those allegations the "veracity" of which he accepted.
At the conclusion of his report, Dr Glenn gratuitously expressed a number of opinions which he was entitled to express, to which the Tribunal has little regard. In any event, in cross-examination, the Practitioner declined to embrace those opinions. Importantly for present purposes Dr Glenn recorded that "I have had no concerns about Dr Irani's approach to the practice of medicine. We, as a Department, were sufficiently impressed with his skills and conduct that we selected him from a highly contested field for advanced training, and have moved him from a non-accredited JMO role to a highly sought after Accredited training position". Dr Glenn added that he regarded the Practitioner as "very highly committed to the practice of Medicine and to his training, he has made excellent academic progress in his career, both inside Radiology and outside the field with medicine". Save with respect to his irrelevant opinions, which do not infect his views of the Practitioner's skill and commitment, Dr Glenn's report is entitled to substantial weight.
Dr Philip Vladica provided a reference for the Practitioner on 5 December 2025. Dr Vladica is an Interventional and Diagnostic Radiologist serving as a Staff Specialist Radiologist with the Western Sydney Local Health District (WSLHD) at Westmead Hospital, as well as having another appointment at the Sutherland Hospital. Dr Vladica said that he has known the Practitioner "in my role as Senior Staff Specialist, whilst Dr Irani was serving as SRMO in the Radiology Department of Westmead Hospital, commencing from 30 January 2022 until his departure in 2024". Dr Vladica had previously known the Practitioner whilst working in the Department of Nuclear Medicine and Ultrasound at Westmead Hospital from February 2020 until January 2022. Importantly, Dr Vladica was the nominated supervisor for the Practitioner from October 2023 to March 2024- the six month monitoring period imposed by the WSLHD. Since that time Dr Vladica said that he has "continued to maintain occasional contact with Dr Irani ... maintaining interest in his career development and progress as a trainee registrar in radiology at St George Hospital. I continue to provide support and encouragement for a deserving, hardworking and capable trainee that our community as a whole so far has divested significant resources and effort in his training and development". Dr Vladica said that his relationship with the Practitioner was limited to "professional work interests" and that the Practitioner has "at all times conducted himself professionally and in a thoroughly respectful manner".
Dr Vladica stated that he had discussed the current proceedings with the Practitioner whose "accounts regarding the matter at hand has been so far truthful and consistent with the available facts and in line with his commitment to ongoing professional medical care and conduct". Dr Vladica said that he had not found any "reasons or concerns about the manner" of the Practitioner's practice and was supportive of his "full and unrestricted practise as a medical professional". Dr Vladica further said that during the time he had worked with the Practitioner, he found him "to be engaged in (the) safe practise of medicine proving himself time after time as a reliable and extremely competent and effective caring practitioner". Dr Vladica referred, undoubtedly correctly, to the Practitioner's "past and present commitment to research and ongoing training" and to not having "received any criticism or been aware of any other concerns raised so far from any other medical professional working with or in close contact with Dr Irani". Dr Vladica's statements with respect to the Practitioner's skill and dedication to the medical profession are entitled to substantial weight.
The Practitioner's current position in the radiology training program, and the impact of the outcome of these proceedings on his continuance in the program assume considerable significance in the determination of these proceedings, and require careful consideration.

The Clinical Radiology Training Requirements Policy (the Policy)

Clause 2.3 of the Policy (Exhibit R2) under the heading "Registration Status" provides that:

"(a) trainees must maintain medical registration, without conditions or limitations that would limit clinical practise in the relevant jurisdiction,

(b) trainees must notify the college within 7 days of their medical registration being suspended or withdrawn for any reason whatsoever, or if conditions, restrictions or agreed undertakings to limit practise have been placed on their medical registration,

(c) trainees who have conditions or restrictions placed on their practise, and, or, if undertakings have been agreed to limit the trainee's practise (voluntary or imposed) or if a trainee's medical registration is suspended or cancelled, the trainee will have their trainee status reviewed by the CRETC. The college will be guided by conditions or undertakings (if any) stipulated by the MBA, MCNZ or other authority in determining whether the trainee will be withdrawn from the training program,

(d) trainees who have failed to maintain medical registration with the MBA, MCNZ or other authority will be considered for withdrawal from the training program."

The acronym CRETC refers to the Clinical Radiology Education and Training Committee, MBA refers to the Medical Board of Australia and MCNZ refers to the Medical Council of New Zealand.
Whether, if he were suspended, the Practitioner would fall within clause 2.3(a), and thus be ineligible to continue in the training program, or whether, if he were suspended, the Practitioner would fall within clause 2.3(c) and thus have his trainee status "reviewed" is less than entirely clear, and not a matter about which the Tribunal needs to suggest a concluded view. At the conclusion of the hearing, it was accepted that, if the Practitioner were suspended, clause 2.3(c) would be enlivened. That concession was appropriate. If suspension enlivened clause 2.3(a), it is difficult to suggest why suspension would also find expression in clause 2.3(c). It was, fairly, acknowledged by the Commission that, pursuant to clause 2.3(c), a review of the Practitioner's trainee status may result in him being withdrawn from the training program. If withdrawn from the program, whether pursuant to clause 2.3(a) or (c), the evidence does not establish that the Practitioner would not have to re-apply for a position in the program.
The issue is not without practical significance. If the Tribunal suspends the Practitioner's registration, for any period, and the CRETC determines that the Practitioner should be "withdrawn" from the training program, the evidence is reasonably clear that he would have to re-apply for a position in the training program. The Commission fairly conceded that it was open to the Tribunal to accept, and the Tribunal does accept, the evidence of the Practitioner that he was successful in obtaining a position in the training program from a field of 800 applicants in the first round and that, one applicant was successful from 500 practitioners in the second round of applications. It is not suggested, and sensibly could not be that the Practitioner would not be withdrawn from the training program or, that if he was, he would necessarily be successful in a subsequent application for a place in the program. It is not in doubt that, if withdrawn from the training program, the Practitioner would be unable to sit the Part 1 Anatomy examination scheduled for April 2026. Unlike a case in which a practitioner had yet to be accepted into a training program, or had completed a training program, the implications of a suspension for the Practitioner in this case potentially go significantly beyond an inability to practise medicine during the period of his suspension.

Counsel for the Commission provided the Tribunal with comprehensive and helpful written submissions at the commencement of the hearing. Unsurprisingly, those submissions focused on the complaints and particulars articulated in the Commission's Amended Application. By the time of closing submissions, as recorded earlier, although relatively complex, the issues for determination had been considerably refined, due to the efforts of Counsel for the parties and those instructing them.
Counsel for the Commission submitted, correctly, that denunciation of the Practitioner's conduct and publicly denouncing it, both by way of general deterrence and to uphold public confidence in the administration of the National Law were pivotal to the determination of the appropriate protective orders in this case. The Commission submitted that anything short of suspension of the Practitioner for the admittedly relatively short period of three to six months inadequately addressed those two important issues.
Prior to Counsel for the parties' oral submissions, the Tribunal raised the possibility that suspension might not be found to be necessary in order to protect the health and safety of the public, and achieve the other recognised objectives of protective orders, but that a reprimand without more would not properly address issues of general deterrence and public confidence in the administration of the National Law and whether, in the event of either of those eventualities, a reprimand combined with a significant fine would be appropriate, the figure of $20,000 being suggested by the Tribunal as potentially an appropriate sum.
Counsel for the Commission informed the Tribunal, that 250 was the maximum penalty units which could be imposed on the Practitioner, which translates as a fine of $27,500. Although not inviting the Tribunal to do so, if contrary to the Commission's contentions, the Practitioner's registration was not suspended, a reprimand and fine of $20,000, representing 181 penalty units, could be ordered by the Tribunal.
The Commission submitted that the Practitioner's offending conduct with respect to Patient A was the most serious as it continued for two years, involved no face to face consultations, that it involved no questioning of the appropriateness of the prescribing, or the quantity or regularity of the prescribing, and had occurred post as well as during the Covid-19 lockdown. There is force in those submissions. It was submitted that the three Medical Certificates issued with respect to Patient C involved one instance of attempting to mislead the SAN. It was submitted that the Practitioner did not "wholeheartedly accept the seriousness of his conduct", and that there was no "wholehearted acceptance of the risk" to the family members for whom the Practitioner prescribed. The Practitioner was criticised for having not told his current mentor about the proceedings. Each of those contentions has substance.
It was fairly conceded by Counsel for the Commission that the need to protect the health and safety of the public was not a factor which advanced its case with respect to suspension.
Senior Counsel for the Practitioner emphasised the Practitioner's "having dedicated himself to the public health system", and to his having suffered from significant medical setbacks which caused the Practitioner to have to abandon his "first love", which was orthopaedic medicine, and to embrace radiology. Senior Counsel for the Practitioner submitted, correctly and the Tribunal accepts, that the Practitioner was not motivated by money but rather by a desire to give service to the public.
Senior Counsel for the Practitioner relied significantly on the evidence of Dr Glenn and Dr Vladica, submitting, correctly in the Tribunal's view, that each of them had sufficient knowledge and experience of the Practitioner to be able to attest to his professional competence and integrity, and to the Practitioner's offending conduct being out of character with the rest of his professional history and unlikely to be repeated.
Senior Counsel for the Practitioner submitted that Patients A and B both had significant health issues as confirmed by a number of documents contained in A1. Senior Counsel for the Practitioner relied on the letter from Dr Habib Zakeri, under whose care Patient A had been since 2015 (Exhibit A1, page 203) and a letter from Dr Zakeri (Exhibit A1, page 204) with respect to Patient B. Those documents confirm that Patients A and B did have significant and long term health conditions and confirmed that the Practitioner had been in consultation with Dr Zakeri in relation to their medication over the period identified in his emails. The Practitioner also relied on the email from Dr Zakeri of 2 August 2024 (Exhibit A1, page 208). As conceded on behalf of the Practitioner, those documents did not excuse his conduct, but did place the offending conduct in a less malign context.
It was submitted that it was "inconceivable" that the Practitioner would put his career at risk again in the future and that he "genuinely admitted" his offending conduct and mistakes. The Tribunal agrees with those contentions. Although it was submitted that the Practitioner ought not be fined if he was not to be suspended, Senior Counsel for the Practitioner did not dispute that a fine of $20,000 would not be inappropriate in the circumstances.

Principles governing the determination of appropriate protective orders

In written submissions provided to the Tribunal at the commencement of the second day of the hearing, Senior Counsel for the Practitioner provided a helpful analysis of the principles governing the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion with respect to protective orders. It was submitted that the Tribunal is empowered under the National Law to impose "a broad range of penalties". As is not in doubt, although an appropriate protective order may constitute a penalty for the Practitioner, that is not the basis upon which such orders are made, in view of the terms s 3 and s 3A of the National Law, which provide that, in determining these proceedings, the health and safety of the public is the Tribunal's "paramount" consideration.
Disciplinary proceedings against members of a profession are intended to maintain proper ethical and professional standards, primarily for the protection of the public, but also for the protection of the profession (Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] NSWSC 297; (1997) 41 NSWLR 630). The public interests served by protective orders include, indirectly, the standing of the medical profession and the maintenance of public confidence in the high standards of medical practitioners (Prakash v Health Care Complaints Commission [2006] NSWCA 153). Protective orders involve an element of deterrence or, expressed more positively, encouragement to other practitioners to recognise the importance of complying with professional standards and the risks of failing to do so (Prakash). Although the specific purpose for which the Tribunal makes orders is protective of the public interest and not punitive with respect to the practitioner, that is not to deny that such orders may be punitive in effect and that punitive effect may be relevant in formulating a protective order (Lee v Health Care Complaints Commission [2012] NSWCA 80; Director General, Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care v Lambert [2009] NSWCA 102; (2009) 74 NSWLR 523).
Senior Counsel for the Practitioner submitted that a finding by the Tribunal that the Practitioner's conduct is of a sufficiently serious nature to justify suspension did not mean that suspension or cancellation was the appropriate order to make in the circumstances of this case (Health Care Complaints Commission v Karalasingham [2007] NSWCA 267). As is not in doubt, the fact that the power to suspend the Practitioner's registration has been enlivened does not mean that the power must be exercised.
Senior Counsel for the Practitioner reminded the Tribunal that, pursuant to s 3A(c) of the National Law "restrictions on the practice of a health profession are to be imposed under the scheme only if it is necessary to ensure health services are provided safely and are of an appropriate quality". In this case, there is no issue that suspension is not necessary to ensure that the Practitioner provides health services of an appropriate quality. To the extent that it is controversial, the Tribunal is not satisfied that suspension is necessary to ensure health services are provided safely by the Practitioner. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Aref [2018] NSWCATOD 133 the Tribunal accepted that it exercises a wide discretion when determining appropriate protective orders, and that each case turns on its own facts and circumstances, the exercise of discretion involving matters of degree and judgement (Sabag v Health Care Complaints Commission [2001] NSWCA 411).
Considerations relevant to the exercise of discretion include the gravity of the professional misconduct, and remorse and insight, if any, demonstrated by the Practitioner. In Lee v Health Care Complaints Commission [2012] NSWCA 80, Barrett JA observed at [31] that elements of general deterrence are subsidiary to other protective elements in the exercise of a protective jurisdiction, and that the actual deterrent effect that disciplinary proceedings have on the profession is difficult to ascertain. Those observations were embraced by the Tribunal in Health Care Complaints Commission v Morcos (No. 2) [2025] NSWCATOD 117.
In Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria v Lal [2009] VSCA 109 the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria observed that "Public confidence in the medical profession is not turned on and off like a switch. Public confidence is won - or lost - gradually, as the cumulative effect of the experiences of thousands of individuals in their dealings with medical practitioners over many years. The decision to register a particular person to practise medicine is unlikely, in our view, to have any material or lasting effect on the established reputation of the medical profession as a whole. It is not irrelevant that the standing of the medical profession in this community is very high". With respect to their Honours, and Senior Counsel for the Practitioner, 16 years later, whatever the current "standing" of the medical profession is in the community, upholding the standards of and public confidence in medical practitioners is a relevant and potentially important consideration in the determination of appropriate protective orders. Doing so is in the interests of the medical profession, and the health and safety of patients. Lal was decided four years prior to the commencement of the National Law. It cannot be assumed that, if the standing of the medical profession in the community is "very high" that the Tribunal does not need to remain vigilant in exercising jurisdiction under the National Law.
Senior Counsel for the Practitioner referred to a series of cases confirming that a reprimand is a "serious order" and involves general denunciation. The Tribunal accepts that a reprimand in itself acts as a deterrent both directly and indirectly as was accepted in NSW Bar Association v Meakes [2006] NSWCA 340. The Tribunal also accepts that, as was accepted in Health Care Complaints Commission v Sahebi [2024] NSWCATOD 91, that a reprimand is not a trivial penalty and has serious adverse implications for a professional person and serves as a protective order with significant consequences.
In Health Care Complaints Commission v Nguyen (No. 2) [2023] NSWCATOD 28 the Tribunal distinguished between a caution and a reprimand, noting that the latter provokes more serious consequences, in that it is an official rebuke for past wrongful conduct and has a significant impact on a professional's record. For present purposes, given the Practitioner's otherwise unblemished record, and considerable academic and professional accomplishments, a reprimand would be a significant blot on his escutcheon. The Tribunal accepts that a reprimand is a serious rather than a trivial sanction (Health Care Complaints Commission v Negus [2021] NSWCATOD 50). Albeit in the context of proceedings against a barrister, in Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Levick (No. 2) [2018] NSWCATOD 108, the Tribunal accepted that a reprimand was serious, and marks the disgrace of a member of an honourable profession inherent in proven misconduct. Although also involving a legal practitioner, in Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Judah [2022] NSWCATOD 89 the Tribunal accepted that a reprimand acted as a deterrent for both the practitioner and other legal practitioners from engaging in similar conduct and performed an educative function. In the context of medical practitioners, similar observations were made by the Tribunal in Health Care Complaints Commission v Akinci (No. 2) [2024] NSWCATOD 104, Health Care Complaints Commission v Kay (No. 2) [2022] NSWCATOD 79, Health Care Complaints Commission v Matta [2024] NSWCATOD 33 and Health Care Complaints Commission v Ghazal [2023] NSWCATOD 92.
During the course of their submissions Counsel for the parties referred the Tribunal to three further decisions. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Suri [2016] NSWCATOD 54 the Tribunal suspended a practitioner for three months, which was deferred for one month, with the imposition of practise conditions. The Tribunal there held at [89] that the matters identified by the Tribunal were "indicative of a medical practitioner who was not prepared to obey the law concerning the prescribing and keeping of drugs of addiction" and that:

"No matter how naïve or well intentioned that the Respondent might have been, there can be no excuse for deliberately flouting the law, creating a situation where (the practitioner) was administering drugs of addiction to drug addicts or, worse, administering drugs of addiction to persons who became dependent upon them. Although there is no suggestion the Respondent was aware that there is a market for drugs of this kind, and that he may have unwittingly been responsible for the dissemination of these drugs by way of sale by his patients, this is a matter is well known to general practitioners, especially those who habitually prescribe Schedule 8 drugs, and something which he should have borne in mind while prescribing to his patients."

There are, as the findings recorded by the Tribunal earlier in these reasons confirm, very significant differences between the facts of this case and the facts in Suri. The Tribunal there recorded [100] that the Tribunal "did not consider that the Respondent was at all times open and frank concerning his evidence" for reasons which were then recorded. Although as submitted by the Commission, the Practitioner was at times somewhat loquacious, and tended to repeat that he was seeking to explain rather than excuse his offending conduct, the Tribunal is not persuaded that the Practitioner was other than open and frank in giving evidence. Not insignificantly, the Practitioner was not shown to have been inconsistent, save in one respect which he explained, in his communications with the regulator, the Delegates of the Medical Council in the s 150 proceedings or other relevant entities.
The Tribunal was referred to the decision in Health Care Complaints Commission v Perera [2018] NSWCATOD 112, in which a practitioner was reprimanded. The Tribunal's decision was primarily concerned with whether the practitioner's conducted constituted professional misconduct. The Tribunal recorded at [97] that, having not found professional misconduct established, suspension of the practitioner's registration was not available. In relation to whether it was appropriate to impose a fine, the Tribunal simply recorded at [100] that "Although the HCCC sought we should impose a fine on the practitioner, in the circumstances of this case, we do not find a fine is warranted". The Tribunal does not know to what extent the imposition of a fine was actively pursued, or ultimately pursued, or to what, if any, extent it was really a live issue in the case, but, in the absence of more than was found by the Tribunal, we do not find this case to be of assistance.
The Tribunal was referred to the decision in Health Care Complaints Commission v Quan [2018] NSWCATOD 111 in which a practitioner was cautioned. The practitioner was found to have a "high reputation in the medical and general community, and until these proceedings, had an unblemished record as a general practitioner for over 30 years". The Tribunal found that the practitioner was guilty of professional misconduct. Not insignificantly, the Tribunal recorded [67] that:

"Our focus, in the facts of this case, largely revolve around issues of deterrence and the upholding of the standards of the profession. We are conscious that our reasons and orders should send a strong message to practitioners and the public that irregular prescribing, without proper consultation and recording, is unacceptable practice. Further, these reasons, and the orders flowing from them, should reflect the due diligence practitioners should observe before being involved in provision of prescriptions or supplies for services offered by other allied health professionals or non-registered persons which service or services may cause a risk to the health and welfare of the public."

There are both significant similarities and dissimilarities between the facts of that case and the present case. As in this case, the practitioner relied upon references from "eminent professionals who attest to the practitioner's high reputation" and his achievements in medicine, and other fields. For the reasons the Tribunal recorded [77]-[80], the Tribunal imposed a caution in that case.
The case turns on its own facts and circumstances. Although the Practitioner had an unblemished record in this Country of approximately 15 years prior to his offending conduct, the practitioner in Quan had 3 decades of experience.

As emerged from closing submissions of Counsel, the exercise of discretion in this case ultimately turns on a limited, but important number of considerations. Ultimately, as with all discretionary or evaluative determinations, on the same facts, minds might reasonably disagree with respect to a particular outcome (Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; [1986] HCA 17).
The Tribunal concludes that in all the circumstances of this case, suspension of the Practitioner's registration is not necessary to protect the health and safety of the public. Nor is it necessary in order to deter the Practitioner, or other practitioners from engaging in offending conduct of the kind which the Practitioner in this case has admitted. The Practitioner has had ample opportunity to re-offend, particularly as two of the three close family members for whom the Practitioner's gave rise to these proceedings apparently live in his home. Nor in the Tribunal's view would declining to suspend the Practitioner's registration tend to undermine public confidence in the medical profession or in the Tribunal's observance of the objects and purpose of the National Law, or the rigour with which the Tribunal applies the National Law. We have recorded earlier the concessions properly made by the Commission which are favourable to him. We have also recorded that, although we accept the genuineness of the Practitioner's remorse, the Tribunal is not entirely persuaded that his prescribing with respect to Patient A, and his vigilance in relation to aspects of that prescribing and dispensing of medications did not involve serious deficiencies, both in terms of the Practitioner's knowledge of the relevant provisions of the Code of Conduct and his admitted failure to have done things which he now realises he ought to have done and/or his failure to respond to "red flags".
The Tribunal accepts that the Practitioner is unlikely to re-offend. Although it does not excuse his admitted offending conduct, it is not insignificant that there were extenuating circumstances in relation to the conduct, that it is now more than two years since the offending conduct, during which time the Practitioner has been able to prescribe without restriction, and, having regard to the evidence of Dr Glenn and Dr Vladica, the Practitioner's offending conduct was out of character on a personal and professional level. The Tribunal accepts the evidence of Dr Talebi that, albeit he brought it on himself, the Practitioner has suffered emotionally as a result of his offending conduct. It is significant in the Tribunal's determination of appropriate protective orders, albeit he seems to have been paid and advanced his academic qualifications during that time, that the Practitioner has served a six month suspension which was imposed, properly as he concedes, by Westmead Hospital when the Practitioner's offending conduct was suspected. It is also significant that the Practitioner upon the termination of his suspension satisfactorily served a six month period of supervision.
As recorded earlier, a vexing aspect of this case arises from the provisions of clause 2.3 of the Clinical Radiology Training Requirements Policy. If the Practitioner had not been accepted for or commenced his specialist radiology training, or if the Practitioner had completed training for any particular specialty, suspension of his registration would have been less difficult to resist. It is apparent that, if the Practitioner's registration is suspended, at least, his continuation in the radiology specialty training program will be "reviewed". Although the Tribunal is unable to make findings on the probabilities, there is a "real or not remote chance or possibility" (Tillmans Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (1979) 42 FLR 331; 27 ALR 367) that, if suspended, the Practitioner may be withdrawn from the radiology training program, and may not subsequently regain admission to the program if he has to reapply for a position, presumably again in competition with hundreds of other applicants. Although not analogous to extra curial punishment, suspension of the Practitioner in this case may involve consequential punishments the implications of which could be more significant and enduring than any suspension itself. In view of the fact that Counsel for both parties have emphasised the significance of general deterrence in the determination of these proceedings, reference to the sentencing principles applied by courts with respect to extra curial punishment is considered to be instructive.
The term "extra curial punishment" refers to "loss or detriment imposed on an offender by persons other than the sentencing court, for the purpose of punishing the offender for his [or her] offence or at least by reason of the offender having committed the offence" (Silvano v R [2008] NSWCCA 118, at [29]). Although s 3A(c) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) provides that a purpose of sentencing is "to protect the community from the offender", and the High Court accepted in Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14, at [476] that the purposes of sentencing include the "protection of society", the Tribunal acknowledges that the extent to which criminal law sentencing principles can permissibly inform its evaluative determination of appropriate protective orders is limited. Although admittedly guilty of offending conduct, constituting professional misconduct, the Practitioner has not committed an offence. There is no suggestion in this case that if the Practitioner was withdrawn from the radiology training program, that would be done to punish him. If the Practitioner is withdrawn from the program after a review, that would be because his registration had been suspended. No other ground for review of the Practitioner's place in the program has been suggested.
The Tribunal takes into account the possible consequences for the Practitioner resulting from the actions of others if his registration is suspended. The weight to be given to that possibility depends on all the circumstances of the case, and there is no presumption that it will be afforded any, or more than little weight (R v Daertz [2003] NSWCCA 26). If the Practitioner is suspended, and his career prospects are adversely affected, his offending conduct may or may not have occurred in the course of his employment (Wanstall v R [2024] NSWCCA 167). Although his employment enabled his offending conduct, the connection between the course of that employment and the offending conduct is tenuous. In all the circumstances, the possible consequence for the Practitioner's career if his registration is suspended is a matter which the Tribunal affords some, but not decisive weight, without relying, or needing to rely on extra curial punishment.
On balance, the Tribunal is not persuaded that, in all the circumstances, protecting the health and safety of the public requires that the Practitioner's registration be suspended. The evidence does not satisfy the Tribunal that declining to suspend the Practitioner's registration creates an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of the public. Nor do conditions need to be added to the Practitioner's registration, and, properly, the Commission has not sought such an outcome in any event.
Having heard and reflected on all the evidence, the Tribunal raised for Counsels' consideration the possibility of the Practitioner being reprimanded and fined $20,000. Section 149B of the National Law invests the Tribunal with power to impose fines "in certain cases". Doing so is not prohibited by s 149B(2)(a) - the Practitioner has been found guilty of professional misconduct.
The Tribunal is ultimately persuaded that it is appropriate to reprimand the Practitioner and fine him $20,000. Section 17 of the Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provides that each penalty unit is worth $110. Section 149B(1) of the National Law provides for the imposition of fines in an amount of not more than 250 penalty units. The maximum fine which the Tribunal could impose is thus $27,500. The Tribunal considers that a fine of $20,000, appropriately reflects the need for general deterrence with respect to offending conduct of the kind which the Practitioner has admitted, and the need to demonstrate to the public that the Tribunal strongly disapproves of such misconduct.
Section 149B(2)(b) of the National Law provides that a fine is not to be imposed unless the Tribunal is satisfied that "there is no other order, or combination of orders, that is appropriate in the public interest". The Tribunal is so satisfied. Section 149B(3) does not prevent the imposition of a fine. The fine will be payable within 28 days of the Tribunal's orders (s 149B(4)). Given the seriousness of the Practitioner's offending conduct, and accepting that a reprimand is a serious sanction, the Tribunal is concerned that, without more, a reprimand may inadequately signify to other practitioners the Tribunal's disapproval of offending conduct of this kind and, thereby fail to maintain public confidence in the medical profession and the Tribunal's oversight of it pursuant to the provisions of the National Law. Imposing a fine would not of itself have a direct connection with the health and safety of the public, which the Tribunal does not consider to be influential in determining appropriate protective orders in this case in any event. It would however, being a significant sum, and being in the upper reaches of the range of permissible fines, coupled with a reprimand, be a tangible reflection of the Tribunal's disapproval of offending conduct of this kind.

For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal orders that the Practitioner be reprimanded and that the Practitioner pay a fine of $20,000. The Practitioner does not dispute that he should pay the Commission's costs of the proceedings.

(1) Pursuant to s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) publication of the name of any patient of the Respondent referred to in the Tribunal's decision is prohibited.

(2) The Respondent is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct.

(3) The Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.

(6) The Respondent pay the Applicant's costs of the proceedings as agreed or assessed on a party and party basis.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

23 January 2026 - Paragraph 2: s 149B(1)(b) replaced with s 149C(1)(b);

Paragraph 5: reference to "23 May 2023" replaced with "24 May 2023 and 25 May 2023"

Paragraph 9(6): "for a period of six months (March to August 2023)" amended to "for a period of approximately seven months (March to October 2023)"

Paragraph 18(2) and 18(3) the word section deleted.

Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999(NSW)

Administrative Tribunal Act 2013

Health Care Complaints Commission v Irani [2026] NSWCATOD 5;

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Cases Cited (5)