Health Care Complaints Commission v Baker [2025] NSWCATOD 170 | Case summary

Wojciechowska v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice; Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Wojciechowska [2025] NSWCATAP 248

Health Care Complaints Commission of NSW (Applicant)

By application filed 29 October 2025, the applicant (Commissioner) sought a temporary stay of the proceedings pursuant to s 23(6) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act (NSW) 2013 (NCAT Act).
By an amended application filed 24 November 2025, the Commissioner now seeks a temporary stay of the proceedings pursuant to s 51 of the NCAT Act.
The application is not opposed by the respondent (practitioner), who consents to an adjournment of the proceedings to a date in June 2026.
For the following reasons, the application is refused.
The matter will be listed for directions on a date to be advised in February 2026.

On 2 August 2021, the Commission filed application 2021/00221422.
In that application, the Commission sought substantive orders:

(1) pursuant to s 149C(4)(a) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) (National Law), if the practitioner were still registered as a psychologist, for cancellation of the respondent's registration;

(2) pursuant to s 149C(4)(b) of the National Law, that the practitioner be disqualified from being registered as a psychologist for a period of 10 years from the date of the orders;

(3) pursuant to s 149C(5)(a) of the National Law, a prohibition order prohibiting the practitioner from providing a health service, as defined in s 4 of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW), unless and until the Tribunal makes a reinstatement or other order in relation to the practitioner under s 163B of the National Law.

Attached to the application s a complaint (Complaint) which pleads as follows.
First, that pursuant to s 144(a) of the National Law_,_ the practitioner has been convicted of criminal offences in NSW (Complaint One).
The background to Complaint One is that:

(1) the practitioner was born in South Africa in 1966. In 1974, the practitioner's family migrated to Australia and he became an Australian citizen;

(2) between 1992 and 1999, the practitioner resided in the United States;

(3) between 2015 and 2017, the practitioner practised in Coffs Harbour and Nambucca Heads on a part-time basis. In this role, the practitioner was regularly referred and consulted with adults and children.

The Particulars of Complaint One are that on 12 November 2019, the practitioner was convicted before the District Court of NSW on 13 counts on indictment for offences in respect to eight patients which occurred when each of those persons had been under his care.
Secondly, that pursuant to s 144(a) of the National Law, the practitioner has been made the subject of a criminal finding for a criminal offence in NSW (Complaint Two).
The background to Complaint Two is that on 7 September 2020, the practitioner was sentenced before the District Court of NSW (District Court) to an aggregate term of 18 years imprisonment to commence on 17 December 2017 and expire on 16 December 2035 with a non-parole period of 12 years.
The Particulars of Complaint Two are that at the time of the practitioner's sentence, the District Court found proven and took into account on sentence seven "Form 1" offences that related to counts on the indictment in respect to six patients and which occurred when each of those persons had been under the care of the practitioner. The details of those offences are set out in the Table at Schedule A of the Complaint.
Thirdly, that the practitioner is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct pursuant to s 139B(1)(b) of the National Law in that the practitioner contravened s 130 of the National Law (Complaint Three).
The background to Complaint Three is the background to Complaints One and Two.
The Particulars of Complaint Three are that:

(1) the practitioner failed to notify the National Board within seven days that he had been charged with offences, as set out in Schedule B to the Complaint, punishable by 12 months imprisonment or more on 29 May 2017, 20 November 2017, 18 December 2017 and 7 May 2018;

(2) the practitioner failed to notify the National Board within seven days that, on 12 November 2019, he had been convicted of offences as set out in Schedule A to the Complaint, punishable by 12 months imprisonment or more;

(3) the practitioner failed to notify the National Board within seven days that, on 7 September 2020, he had been the subject of findings of guilt for offences, as set out in Schedule A to the Complaint, punishable by imprisonment for 12 months or more.

Fourthly, that the practitioner is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct pursuant to s 139B(1)(I) of the National Law in that the practitioner has engaged in improper or unethical conduct relating to the practice or purported practice of psychology (Complaint Four).
The background to Complaint Four is that:

(1) on 24 January 2013, the practitioner completed an application for provisional registration as a psychologist.

(2) in that form at Question 15, the practitioner was asked: "Do you have any criminal history in another country" to which the practitioner responded by placing a tick within the "NO" field.

(3) on 27 February 2014 and 11 November 2014, the practitioner completed application forms to renew his provisional registration and for general registration respectively with the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (APHRA);

(4) in the application of 25 February 2014 at Question C6 the practitioner was asked: "Do you have any criminal history that you have not disclosed to AHPRA"?, to which the practitioner responded by placing a tick within the "NO" field.

(5) in the application of 11 November 2014 at Question 22, the practitioner was asked: "Do you have any criminal history in another country"? To which the practitioner responded by placing a tick within the "NO" field.

The Particulars of Complaint Four are that the practitioner's declarations in each of the application forms dated 25 January 2013, 27 February 2014 and 11 November 2014 were false in that the practitioner had been convicted in the United States of America of offences of public indecency in 1992 and 1993, theft in 1992, and gross sexual imposition of a minor in 1996.
Fifthly, that the practitioner is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct pursuant to s 139B(1)(I) of the National Law in that the practitioner has engaged in improper or unethical conduct relating to the practice or purported practice of psychology (Complaint Five).
The background to Complaint Five is that on 5 June 2018, the practitioner provided submissions he had prepared to a panel convened pursuant to s 150 of the National Law in which he submitted at [4] "I do not have a prior criminal record ..."
The Particulars of Complaint Five are that the practitioner's statements as set out above were false as the practitioner did have a criminal record for offences committed in the United States of America.
Sixthly, that pursuant to s 144(d) of the National Law, the practitioner has an impairment within the meaning of s 5 of the National Law, being a disorder that detrimentally affects or is likely to detrimentally affect the practitioner's capacity to practise the profession of psychology (Complaint Six).
The Particulars of Complaint Six are that the practitioner has an established diagnosis of paedophilia.
Seventhly, that pursuant to s 144(e) of the National Law, the practitioner is otherwise not a suitable person to hold registration in the practitioner's profession (Complaint Seven).
The background to Complaint Seven is Complaints One, Four and Five
The Particulars of Complaint Seven are Complaints Two, Three, Four and Five and the particulars thereto.
Eighthly, that practitioner is guilty of professional misconduct under s 139E of the National Law (Complaint Eight) in that the practitioner has:

(1) engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct of a sufficiently serious nature to justify suspension or cancellation of the practitioner's registration, and/or

(2) engaged in more than one instance of unsatisfactory professional conduct that, when the instances are considered together, amount to conduct of a sufficiently serious nature to justify the suspension or cancellation of the practitioner's registration.

The background to Complaint Eight is the background to Complaints One, Four and Five.
The Particulars of Complaint Eight are Complaints Three, Four and Five, relied on individually and cumulatively.

The Commission relied on the affidavit of Ms G Pritchard affirmed 27 October 2025. Ms Pritchard is a lawyer employed by the Commission. Her affidavit is seven pages in length to which are annexed 260 pages of materials.
Based on that uncontradicted affidavit and materials I make the following relevant findings.
On 30 May 2017, the Commission received complaints from NSW Police and Family & Community Services regarding the practitioner.
On 5 June 2017, the Commission received a referral pursuant to s 150 of the National Law from the Psychology Council of NSW (Council) regarding the practitioner. Earlier that day, the Council had suspended the practitioner from practising under s 150 of the National Law.
On 12 November 2019, the practitioner pleaded guilty to 13 charges (First Conviction). The offences occurred between 1 January 2015 and 31 May 2017 against eight young male patients. The charges were:

(1) aggravated indecent assault - victim under authority of offender (three charges);

(2) indecent assault person under 16 years (two charges);

(3) groom child under 14 years for unlawful sexual activity (three charges)'

(4) groom child for unlawful sexual activity;

(5) incite aggravated indecency - victim 16 or over-under authority;

(6) groom child under 14 years for unlawful sexual activity (two charges);

(7) commit active indecency with child under 10 years.

On 7 September 2020, the respondent was sentenced at the District Court to 18 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 years (First Sentence).
On 8 September 2020, the respondent filed a Notice of Intention to Appeal the First Sentence.
On 2 August 2021, the Commission filed its application for protective orders with the Tribunal.
On 20 August 2021, the Tribunal held a directions hearing, at which the usual orders were made for the filing of evidence. In addition, the matter was set down for final hearing on 27 January 2022, for two days.
On 19 January 2022, the Tribunal held a directions hearing. The practitioner had sought the directions hearing for the purpose of seeking an adjournment of the final hearing, as his solicitor had ceased to act for him, he was unrepresented and was not ready to proceed. The practitioner informed the Tribunal that he intended to appeal in relation to the First Conviction and First Sentence. The final hearing was vacated and the matter adjourned.
On 22 March 2022, the Tribunal held a directions hearing. Relevantly, orders were made for the practitioner to file a Reply to the Complaint, and to advise the Tribunal by 20 May 2022 whether he was going to proceed with the appeal in relation to the First Conviction and First Sentence. The matter was further adjourned to allow the practitioner to receive confirmation whether he had been granted funding from Legal Aid NSW and to obtain psychiatric and psychological advice.
Further directions hearings were held on 20 June 2022, 29 September 2022, 14 October 2022and 8 December 2022.
At the directions hearing on 8 December 2022, the practitioner informed the Tribunal that further charges had been laid against him.
Further directions hearings were held on 3 February 2023, 28 April 2023 and 21 July 2023. On 21 July 2023, the Tribunal noted that while a notice of intention to appeal the First Conviction and First Sentence had been filed in the Court of Criminal Appeal, an appeal had not been filed.
On 7 August 2023, the practitioner was charged on indictment of two new offences (Further Offences). The Further Offences occurred between 1 April 2017 and 31 May 2017, against one 15-year-old male patient, including an act of indecency and aggravated sexual assault.
On 12 October 2023, the Commission sought an adjournment of the Tribunal proceedings to July 2024, as the practitioner's trial for the Further Offences was listed for 20 June 2024. That application was granted, and the matter adjourned to 19 July 2024.
On 19 July 2024, the matter was listed for directions, and adjourned.
On 2 August 2024, the matter was listed for directions, and adjourned.
On 12 August 2024, the matter was listed for directions. On this occasion, one party, the directions did not indicate which, sought an adjournment, and the Tribunal made orders for the filing of materials on the adjournment, and listed the matter for further directions on 25 October 2024.
On 18 October 2024, the matter was listed for directions. The Tribunal made directions for the filing of materials, and listed the matter for directions on 12 February 2025.
On 4 December 2024, the Commission was informed that the practitioner had been assaulted, was in hospital, and needed an extension of the time in which to file his materials.
On 6 December 2024, the Commission sought an adjournment of the matter spending the hearing of criminal proceedings for the Further Offences.
On 12 February 2025, the Commission granted the adjournment and listed the matter for a directions hearing on 30 July 2025.
On 24 July 2025, the Commission confirmed that the respondent was found guilty and convicted of the Further Offences (Second Conviction).
On 28 July 2025, the Commission requested a two-week adjournment to allow it to obtain more information after being informed of the Second Conviction.
On 6 August 2025, the Commission sought a two month adjournment to request that an Own Motion Complaint be made by the Commissioner of the Commission to the Commission be made in relation to the Second Conviction.
On 7 August 2025, the Tribunal granted an adjournment to 8 October 2025.
On 29 August 2025, the Commissioner of the Commissioner made an Own Motion Complaint about the practitioner's Second Conviction. The Commissioner noted in the Own Motion Complaint that the indictment in relation to the Further Offences provided that the practitioner had been charged with:

(1) between 1 April 2017 and 31 May 2017, the practitioner, did assaulted a person under the age of 16 years, namely, 15 years, and at the time of the assault did an act of indecency, pursuant to s 61M(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (Crimes Act);

(2) between 1 April 2017 and 31 May 2017, at Coffs Harbour in the State of NSW, did have sexual intercourse with [sic] without his consent, and knowing that he was not consenting to the sexual intercourse, in circumstances of aggravation, namely that at the time of the offence the person was under the age of 16 years, being aged 15 years, pursuant to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act.

On 8 October 2025, the Commission was advised that the sentencing hearing for the Second Conviction was listed for 24 November 2025:

but is also dependent upon the initial appeal review finalisation which of course is a separate issue from the further appeal on the 2025 matters that will encompass aspects of the earlier appeal given the related evidence in the 2025 trials.

On 17 October 2025, the Commission was informed that the sentencing hearing in relation to the Second Conviction was to be listed on 29 January 2025.
As at 24 October 2025, the Investigations Officer assigned to the Own Motion Complaint advised Ms Pritchard that the investigation in relation to the Second Conviction is likely to take until June 2026 to complete.

In its application for what was described in the application tiled on 29 October 2025 as a "temporary stay", the Commission sought the stay pursuant to s 23(6) of the NCAT Act.
That section provides that:

23 Functions of registrars

...

(6) The procedural rules may make provision for or with respect to the functions of the principal registrar and other registrars, including authorising registrars to make ancillary or interlocutory decisions of the Tribunal on behalf of the Tribunal.

As that section did not appear to me to provide a proper basis for the order sought, I sought clarification of the order sought and the power of the Tribunal to grant the stay.
A response was prepared by the Commission's counsel, Mr A Bhasin, dated 19 November 2025.
Mr Bhasin accepted, on behalf of the Commission, that s 23(6) of the NCAT Act does not confer any power upon the Tribunal to grant a stay, and that the reference to that provision in the application was erroneous.
In summary, Mr Bhasin then submitted:

(1) the Tribunal's power under s 51 of the NCAT Act to adjourn proceedings "to any time and place" is sufficiently broad to enable the Tribunal to temporarily stay proceedings before it until a specified event occurs or a specified date;

(2) such a stay is, in substance, the same as an adjournment. It is an aspect of the Tribunal's power to control its own processes, and is of a different character to "stays" that suspend the effect of otherwise operative final decisions (for example, pending an application for review or appeal where power must be found elsewhere; NCAT Act, s 43(3);

(3) this approach is reflected in James v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2020] NSWCATAP 64, where the Appeal Panel overturned the first instance decision refusing an adjournment or stay of proceedings pending the determination of criminal proceedings. In substitution, the Appeal Panel ordered that "the proceedings are stayed until such time as the criminal proceedings against the appellant are disposed of";

(4) James uses the terms stay or adjournment interchangeably, and it is tolerably clear from [16] (of the James decision) that the power exercised was the broad power to adjourn proceedings under s 51 of the NCAT Act.

Mr Bhasin then notes the Commission had filed an amended application with these supplementary submissions seeking relief framed "in either terms" Given the potential for uncertainty in identifying the precise expiry of the stay sought in the Commission's original application, the amended application sought a stay or adjournment "until June 2026", or such other date convenient to the Tribunal, so that the matter can be listed for directions before the Tribunal on a fixed date.

I am cognisant that, relevant to the exercise of a power under a NSW provision of the National Law (and ss 144 and 149C are NSW provisions), are ss 3A and 3B of the National Law. Those sections relevantly provide:

3A Guiding principles [NSW]

(1) The main guiding principle of the national registration and accreditation scheme is that the protection of the health and safety of the public must be the paramount consideration.

...

3B Objective and guiding principle [NSW]

In the exercise of functions under a NSW provision, the protection of the health and safety of the public must be the paramount consideration.

I also note that cl 9 of Div 3 of Sch 5 of the NCAT Act provides that:

9 Certain objectives and principles under National Law to be applied

(1) The Tribunal, when exercising its Division functions for the purposes of the National Law, is under a duty to observe the objectives and principles referred to in sections 3 and 3A of the National Law.

(2) The provisions of this clause are in addition to, and do not limit, the provisions of section 36(5) of this Act.

I further note that s 36 of the NCAT Act relevantly provides:

36 Guiding principle to be applied to practice and procedure

(1) The guiding principle for this Act and the procedural rules, in their application to proceedings in the Tribunal, is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.

(2) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the guiding principle when it -

(a) exercises any power given to it by this Act or the procedural rules, or

(b) interprets any provision of this Act or the procedural rules.

...

(5) However, nothing in this section requires or permits the Tribunal to exercise any functions that are conferred or imposed on it under enabling legislation in a manner that is inconsistent with the objects or principles for which that legislation provides in relation to the exercise of those functions.

The power of the Tribunal to temporarily stay proceedings before it was considered in Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Sideris [2025] NSWCATOD 26. While that decision was in the context of legal disciplinary proceedings, the decision provides guidance to me.
In that matter, the applicant, a solicitor, Mr George Sideris, was a solicitor who held a practising certificate until 30 June 2022. He was the respondent to an application for disciplinary findings and orders lodged with the Occupational Division of the Tribunal under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (Uniform Law) and the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) by the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (Law Council).
Mr Sideris was the subject of earlier disciplinary proceedings brought under s 300 of the Uniform Law in the Tribunal, in which he was found guilty of professional misconduct: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Sideris [2024] NSWCATOD 3. The Tribunal made protective orders in those proceedings, namely a recommendation that Mr Sideris' name be removed from the roll of solicitors: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Sideris (No 2) [2024] NSWCATOD 121.
The Law Council commenced proceedings in the NSW Court of Appeal in which it sought the removal of the name of Mr Sideris from the roll (Roll Removal Proceedings). Mr Sideris sought to have the disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal temporarily stayed, or adjourned, until after the Roll Removal Proceedings have been determined by the Court of Appeal.
In the Tribunal's decision, the President of the Tribunal, Armstong J, considered the Tribunal's power to adjourn or stay proceedings. Her Honour relevantly stated:

16 NCAT's procedures in respect of disciplinary applications made to it (as designated tribunal) under s 300 of the Uniform Law concerning a respondent lawyer are governed by Part 11 of the Application Act,[1] the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) and by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act).

17 There is no express power in the Application Act or the NCAT Act to grant a temporary stay of legal disciplinary proceedings before NCAT. Nevertheless, the power to grant a temporary stay of proceedings may be found in the NCAT Act at s 38(1) (powers of the Tribunal to determine its own procedures for which the NCAT Act or the NCAT Rules do not otherwise provide), and s 51 (power to grant adjournments). There is also the power conferred on NCAT by s 143 (located in Pt 11) of the Application Act "to make interlocutory or interim orders as it thinks fit before making its final decision about a complaint against a respondent lawyer". In written submissions, the Applicant refers to NCAT's power in s 38(1) as a basis for NCAT to grant its application for a temporary stay or adjournment of these disciplinary proceedings.

18 There is nothing in the NCAT Act or procedural rules, in the Uniform Law or the Application Act that (relevantly) constrains NCAT's power to determine its own procedure in these disciplinary proceedings, nor otherwise constrains its exercise of discretion with respect to the Applicant's Stay Application. I am satisfied that NCAT has the power to make the orders sought by the Applicant, whether that power is located in s 38(1) and s 51 of the NCAT Act, or s 143 of the Application Act, or some combination of those statutory provisions.

(emphasis added)

This issue was further considered by the Appeal Panel in Wojciechowska v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice; Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Wojciechowska [2025] NSWCATAP 248.
I draw the following guidance from Wojciechowska:

(1) the Tribunal is empowered to adjourn proceedings at any time: NCAT Act, s 51;

(2) relevant factors are not expressly identified in s 51 and the discretion is unconfined, save with respect to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statutory regime: Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning [1947] HCA 21; (1947) 74 CLR 492 at 505 (Dixon J); [1947] HCA 21; NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 277; [2003] HCA 35;

(3) the discretion must be exercised judicially: Ghazal v Masterton Homes Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAP 227 at [54];

(4) without being exhaustive, the following provisions touch upon the exercise of the discretion:

(a) the objects of the Tribunal, as set out in s 3 of the NCAT Act include, to ensure that the Tribunal is accessible and responsive to the needs of all its users, to enable the Tribunal to resolve the real issues in the proceedings "justly, quickly, cheaply and with as little formality as possible" and to ensure the decisions of the Tribunal are "timely, fair, consistent and of a high quality".

(b) the guiding principle of the Tribunal as set out in s 36(1) of the NCAT Act to "facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings";

(c) the aim of proportionality of costs identified in s 36(4) of the NCAT Act;

(d) the obligation imposed by s 38(5)(c) of the NCAT Act to "ensure that the parties have a reasonable opportunity to be heard or otherwise have their submissions considered in the proceedings";

(5) where there is no specific legislative basis to do so, the Tribunal has power to stay proceedings under s 38 of the NCAT Act: Alexakis v Health Care Complaints Commission [2021] NSWCA 217 at [6]; Wojciechowska at [31];

(6) the concepts of a stay of proceedings and adjournment of proceedings may overlap depending on the length or purpose of the hiatus. In the latter case, the break in the proceedings may not bring with it any suggestion that the parties ought to be continuing (whether behind the scenes or overtly) to progress the matter, whereas in the former case, that may be required;

(7) a prime consideration in relation to an adjournment application is the reason for the need for delay. There must be a "good reason" for the disruption: AHB v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2014] NSWCA 40 at [6] per Macfarlan JA, Gleeson JA agreeing [8], Leeming JA agreeing at [9]. There must be "proven justification": Wakim v Kolotouros; Wakim v New South Wales [2017] NSWSC 697 at [3];

(8) one way to consider an adjournment application is to consider whether there would be a breach of procedural fairness, if the adjournment is not granted: Nobarani v Mariconte (2018) 265 CLR 236; [2018] HCA 36 at [46] and [47];

(9) another way to consider this is to ask whether, when there is a basis for the adjournment, there is no good or apparent reason to refuse it: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 at [82]; GR v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2023] NSWCA 239 at [178];

(10) even where there is what is, on the face of it, a reasonable excuse, there must be cogent evidence of the reason for delay: Pachkovski v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd [2011] NSWCA 94 at [4] per Hodgson JA, McColl and Campbell JJA agreeing; Waters v Waghorn [2016] NSWCATAP 247;

(11) the utility of the adjournment: Kyriakou v Long [2014] NSWCA 308 at [23] per Meagher JA, Basten JA agreeing [1]; R v Rogerson; R v McNamara (No 42) [2016] NSWSC 405 at [62].

I accept that I have the power to "temporarily stay" or (further) adjourn these proceedings: NCAT Act, s 51. It appears that the Commissions is seeking an adjournment until (at least) June 2026, that is to a date almost five years after the proceedings were filed.
I say "it appears" as, while I was provided with Ms Pritchard's affidavit, I was not provided with any submissions from the Commission on the substantive application, only brief submissions prepared by the Commission's counsel on the Tribunal's power to grant the temporary stay, after I had raised the question of the Tribunal's power.
The question is, should I grant the adjournment sought. In my view, I should not.
The decisions of the High Court in Aon Risk Services v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 and Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Limited [2013] HCA 46 confirm that:

(1) the public interest in the efficient use of court resources is a relevant consideration in the exercise of discretions to adjourn, and

(2) the impact on other pending cases is a relevant consideration since the resolution of disputes serves the public as a whole, not merely the parties to the proceedings.

To obtain an adjournment, an applicant needs to explain precisely why an adjournment is warranted: AHB v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2014] NSWCA 40 at [5].
These proceedings have been "on foot" since 2021. They have been twice set down for a final hearing. It is hardly in the interests of justice, or the public, or the practitioner, that these proceedings continue to drag on into at least their sixth year, and probably longer if the application were granted.
What is the utility in a further adjournment until June 2026, at the earliest (Kyriakou v Long )? At a directions hearing at that time, the Tribunal would set a timetable for the filing of further materials, and it would be unlikely that there would be a final hearing in 2026. Given the history of the proceedings, it is possible that the practitioner will appeal the Second Conviction and seek further adjournments of the matter.
The Commission is already seeking cancellation of the practitioner's registration (were he still registered), together with a non-renewal period of 10 years. In my experience, that is a very lengthy period, and I very much doubt that the Tribunal being satisfied of further convictions based on further conduct of the practitioner would result in a more punitive protection order being sought. As noted above, putting aside the Further Offences and Second Conviction, the practitioner has already been convicted and sentences in relation to some 13 charges involving assault of minors, including one involving a nine year old.
Further, what is the "good reason" for any further adjournment (AHB v NSW Trustee and Guardian )?
In my view, "enough is enough", and the Commission should proceed to pursue the proceedings in their current form. After five years of directions hearings, the Commission must accept that the public interest in the efficient use of Tribunal resources weighs heavily against the Tribunal granting any further adjournments of this matter.
I will direct that that the matter be listed for directions before the List Manager of the Health Practitioner, Judge Seiden SC, on a date to be advised in late February 2026. The parties can inform Her Honour of the outcome of the sentencing hearing for the Second Conviction, and make any further application to Judge Seiden SC that they think fit. I strongly suggest that on this occasion any such application be supported by affidavit evidence accompanied by submissions.
Nevertheless, the parties must be in a position to inform Her Honour of any further steps necessary to allow the proceedings in their current form to be set down for hearing in the period April to June 2026.

(1) The application of the applicant for the adjournment of the proceedings "until June 2026" is refused.

(2) The matter be listed for directions before the List Manager of the Health Practitioner on a date to be advised in late February 2026.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Care Complaints Act 1993

Administrative Tribunal Act 2013

Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014

Health Care Complaints Commission v Baker [2025] NSWCATOD 170;

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