Hassall v Commissioner of Police

NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity|2021-04-19|Before: Richard J, Health J

reasons for decision

This is an ex parte interlocutory motion by the respondent Commissioner seeking confidentiality for certain evidentiary material and exemption from the obligation to file and serve certain documents as required by s 58 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (ADR Act).
On 25 February 2021, the applicant Mr Richard Hassall applied to this tribunal for review of a decision by an adjudication officer of the respondent made on 20 October 2020 to revoke his category AB firearms licence No. 411112197 on the ground that the respondent had health concerns regarding his ability to possess a firearms licence. Information held by the police indicated that the applicant engaged in abusive behaviour towards his partner, and those concerns raised doubts regarding his ability to possess firearms safely.
He had been the subject of a police application for an apprehended domestic violence order (ADVO), his partner at the time, Ms ****, being the person in need of protection. The applicant was not charged with any criminal offence and Ms ****made no formal complaint against him and she informed police when the application was to be defended that she did not wish to provide a statement to police, had no fears in relation to the applicant and did not seek an ADVO for her protection.

Applicable legislation

Section 49 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (CAT Act) provides for the holding of confidential hearings: 49 Hearings to be open to public (1) A hearing by the Tribunal is to be open to the public unless the Tribunal orders otherwise. (2) The Tribunal may (of its own motion or on the application of a party) order that a hearing be conducted wholly or partly in private if it is satisfied that it is desirable to do so by reason of the confidential nature of any evidence or matter or for any other reason.
Confidentiality orders relating to evidence and proceedings are regulated by s 64, which relevantly provides: Tribunal may restrict disclosures concerning proceedings (1) If the Tribunal is satisfied that it is desirable to do so by reason of the confidential nature of any evidence or matter or for any other reason, it may (of its own motion or on the application of a party) make any one or more of the following orders: (a) an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of the name of any person (whether or not a party to proceedings in the Tribunal or a witness summoned by, or appearing before, the Tribunal), (b) an order prohibiting or restricting the publication or broadcast of any report of proceedings in the Tribunal, (c) an order prohibiting or restricting the publication of evidence given before the Tribunal, whether in public or in private, or of matters contained in documents lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence by the Tribunal, (d) an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure to some or all of the parties to the proceedings of evidence given before the Tribunal, or of the contents of a document lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence by the Tribunal, in relation to the proceedings.
Section 59 of the ADR Act gives the tribunal the power to direct that an administrator not be required to lodge certain documents as would otherwise be required by s 58 of that Act:: 59 Objections to lodgement (1) An administrator may apply to the Tribunal before the expiry of the period referred to in section 58 (1) for an order that the administrator not be required to lodge a copy of a document under section 58. (2) On any such application, the Tribunal may make an order that a copy of a document not be lodged with the Tribunal if: (a) it is satisfied that section 67 (Privileged documents) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (as applied by section 67 of this Act) operates so as not to require the disclosure of the document, or (b) it considers that, if an application were made under section 64 (Tribunal may restrict disclosures concerning procedures) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, it would be appropriate to make an order under that section prohibiting or restricting the publication or disclosure of evidence of the document.
In the present interlocutory motion, the respondent seeks orders under those provisions.

The evidence

The respondent did not call oral evidence but relied on the s 58 documents (exhibit R1) and certain other documentary material, including a confidential statement, confidential exhibit CR3. The applicant did not adduce any evidence.
The respondent tendered a signed statement by Senior Constable Kelly Swords, currently a domestic violence officer at Sutherland Police Station, dated 6 April 2021 (exhibit R2). The statement explains that the confidential material that is partly the subject of this motion comprises records and documents held by the police containing information that can be provided to the tribunal if its disclosure is prohibited.
After outlining the operation of the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF) Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS), S/C Swords explained that having viewed the confidential material, she believes that disclosure of any of it would or could identify confidential sources of information to law enforcement, place identified persons at risk of harm and reveal sensitive personal and health information of third parties (who have not given their consent to disclosure of the information) relevant to the proceedings.
Confidential material is accessible only by law enforcement personnel with clearance to access it. The confidential material has been collated and maintained by NSWPF and other law enforcement agencies to assist in the monitoring and investigation of criminal activity and those persons who participate in it. It is necessary that such intelligence holdings remain confidential and not known to those who are the subject of it.
Disclosure of the confidential material would allow a picture to emerge showing what matters are known to the police about the activities of persons of interest known to police and connected to the applicant, and from which inferences could be drawn by the applicant as to what matters are therefore not known to the NSWPF. While it is possible that the applicant might know some of the information, third parties had not provided written consent for the information to be disclosed in these proceedings. In those circumstances S/C Swords did not consider it appropriate for that information, which is very sensitive, to be disclosed.
The respondent also tendered the confidential statement signed by S/C Swords dated 6 April 2021 (confidential exhibit CR3)
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Applicant's submissions

The applicant filed written submissions dated 15 April 2021 (exhibit A1) in which he submitted that the applicant should be able to know the evidence that the respondent seeks to rely upon against him in its decision to revoke his firearms licence, so that he can properly provide evidence in response to it. He should be allowed to cross-examine those witnesses to whom the confidential material relates, where that information is directly relevant to the proceedings. He should also be in a position where he can make submissions to the tribunal regarding all the evidence that the respondent seeks to rely upon in the proceedings.
The applicant noted that in both the statements of S/C Swords and the respondent's submissions, some, if not all, of the confidential material relied upon relates to sensitive personal and health information of third parties (who have not given their consent to disclosure of the information) that is relevant to the proceedings. The applicant submitted that this lack of consent might not only be to the applicant, but might also be to the tribunal, particularly given the nature of the information.
The applicant submitted that should the respondent be seeking to rely on the confidential information as it pertains to a third party's personal and health information, consent should first be obtained from that third party. Should that consent be obtained, the information should not remain confidential and should be available to the applicant to properly prosecute his application before the tribunal. The applicant submitted that the respondent's application pursuant to s 59 should be refused and all material relevant to the proceedings the provided to the applicant.

Consideration

The normal rule in the tribunal is that its hearings are open to the public and its reasons for decision given publicly, sometimes orally, but more often in writing. That rule is recognized in s 49(1) of the CAT Act. As the Appeal Panel has said, however, the principle of open justice must sometimes be balanced against other values. There are other public interests that may militate against identifying witnesses or third persons mentioned in proceedings (CYL v YZA [2017] NSWCATAP 105, [94] - [96]). That is particularly so where the evidence to be provided concerns evidence of a sensitive nature provided by a victim or matters that are being investigated by police.
Before making an order under s 59 of the ADR Act or s 64 of the CAT Act, the tribunal must consider that it would be appropriate to make an order prohibiting disclosure of the documents because of "the confidential nature" of those documents or "for any other reason" (Ibrahim v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2019] NSWCATAD 41, [3]. See also Bungree Aboriginal Association Ltd v New South Wales Registrar of Community Housing [2019] NSWCATAD 61, [26] - [27].).
The Appeal Panel surveyed the applicable principles in detail in State of New South Wales (Justice Health) v Dezfouli [2018] NSWADTAP 69, (examining the equivalent provisions in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997), [50] - [53] and [81] - [82]: 50 Within the opening words of section 75(2) of the ADT Act (and indeed of section 35(2) of the AAT Act), three elements of prime importance are the word 'desirable', the phrase 'for any other reason' and the word 'may'. These indicate that the purpose (or purposes) to be served by a suppression order may be 'any … reason' (or reasons) whatever, that the power arises when the Tribunal is satisfied that the order is 'desirable' and that the actual making of the order is not mandatory but within the Tribunal's discretion. 51 There are evident and important differences between a power conferred in these terms and the common law power to prohibit or restrict the reporting of matters occurring in open court described by McHugh JA in John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 4. As set out above at [44], his Honour stated that by virtue of the principle of open justice, an order prohibiting fair and accurate reports of what occurs in the courtroom is only valid if it is 'really necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in proceedings before it'. In this statement of principle, both the purposes to be served by a suppression order and the criterion for determining whether one may be made are formulated in distinctly narrower terms than in section 75(2) of the ADT Act. 52 In a number of leading authorities dealing with suppression orders at common law, the order sought was (as in the present case) an order preventing the public identification of a person - most commonly a witness - involved in proceedings being heard in open court. Frequently (though not in the present case) the order was sought at or near the commencement of the hearing and, if the application was granted, the order made was that throughout the proceedings the person concerned should be identified by a pseudonym. 53 In such cases, the courts have applied a criterion of 'necessity', such as that stated by McHugh JA. They have, however, widened the permitted range of purposes so as to include securing the proper administration of justice generally - i.e., in future proceedings as well as in the proceedings currently being heard. …. 81 It is difficult if not impossible to set out in short form all the matters that, according to the case law just discussed, should be taken into account in deciding whether an order should be made under section 75(2). It must suffice here simply to draw attention to the following points of relevance to our decision in this case: (a) the presumption in favour of open justice; (b) the need for an applicant for a suppression order to establish good grounds for making the order; (c) the comparative breadth of the criterion of 'desirability'; (d) the important differences between the types of suppression order that may be made - between (for instance) an order (as in this case) prohibiting disclosure of the identity of a participant and an order that a hearing occur in closed session, without notice to a party; (e) the undoubted breadth of the range of purposes that may be served ('any other reason'); (f) the possibility that the purposes to be served may be a mixture of private and public interests; and (g) the possibility that, although generally speaking the prospect of damage to reputation or 'embarrassment' affecting a participant in the proceedings will not provide sufficient grounds for a suppression order, there may be unusual circumstances where this is the principal consideration underlying an order. 82 In view of Ms Johnson's submission regarding the criterion stated by the Court of Appeal in Walton v Momot, unreported, 17 April 1997 (BC9708241) (see [37] above), it is appropriate for us to express an opinion on its applicability. In the light of our examination of the authorities, we would not dispute that, for an order to be made, the circumstances should be 'special' or 'out of the ordinary' (though a requirement that they be 'exceptional' may involve setting the bar too high). But it is important to recognise that this is at most a necessary, not a sufficient, condition….
As Smart J said in Simring v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWSC 270, [69], there is a strong public interest in criminal offences being reported to the police and the sources of information not drying up: "If the victims of crime thought that statements made in the course of a criminal investigation revealing their personal affairs, or some of them, could be released to an applicant under the FOI Act, those sources of information may well dry up or at least there could be a reduction in the flow of information available to the Police"….
S/C Swords's open statement (exhibit R2) explains in general terms the confidential and sensitive nature of the confidential material, which could be accessed only by select law enforcement personnel who hold the required clearance. The purpose of the information is to assist in monitoring and investigating persons who participate in unlawful conduct and is collated by police. For that purpose it needed to remain confidential, and any disclosure of the confidential material would demonstrate what matters are known and unknown to the police about the activities of the applicant or other persons.
It could reveal the identity of persons providing confidential intelligence to police, including registered sources and informants. Police rely heavily on assistance from these people and the confidential information provided is an important and useful form of intelligence. Disclosing the identity of these persons could result in retribution against them and also in deterring those who might otherwise have supplied valuable information from doing so. Disclosure could endanger the physical security, safety and protection of an individual who has provided information. The police wished to minimize the risk of reprisals against informants and to protect its sources and those who provide confidential information.
Further, disclosure of the confidential material in this case would reveal personal and health information relevant to the proceedings relating to a third party who had not given her consent to disclosure.
The evidence suggests that the circumstances of this case are sufficiently special that the making of the orders sought is "desirable" within the meaning of s 64(1). At the same time, I note the strength of Mr Mainstone's contentions concerning the compromising of procedural fairness resulting from a grant of confidentiality. But any derogation from natural justice that could arise from the making of orders under s 64(1) of the CAT Act is not a reason to avoid making such an order. That provision implicitly permits such a denial of procedural fairness: Grant v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2020] NSWCATAD 158, [24].
The applicant also contended that the lack of consent to the disclosure of the confidential health information might not only be to the applicant, but also to the tribunal itself, particularly given the nature of the information. The respondent could therefore not rely on that information without first obtaining consent from the third party. The admissibility and weight of such evidence in relation to the reviewable decision, should the respondent seek to rely on it, is, however, a matter for the substantive hearing, not for this motion.
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For the purposes of this application, it is assumed that the facts are as stated in exhibit R1, R2 and CR3. In my view that evidence makes a cogent case for the grant of confidentiality and I will make the orders as asked.

Orders 1. Pursuant to s 49 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (CAT Act), the hearing of the application in the substantive proceedings be conducted in the absence of the applicant in the substantive proceedings, the legal representatives for the applicant in the substantive proceedings, and the public, insofar as it relates to the Confidential Material described in the Confidential Statement. 2. Pursuant to s 59 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997, the respondent ("the Commissioner") not be required to lodge copies of the documents or parts of documents ("the Confidential Material") specified in the Confidential Statement in support of the application and provided to the tribunal in accordance with the orders of the tribunal (confidential exhibit CR3). 3. Pursuant to s 64(1)(c) of the CAT Act, the publication of the Confidential Material and confidential exhibit CR3, or matters contained in the Confidential Material and confidential exhibit CR is prohibited. 4. Pursuant to s 64(1)(d) of the CAT Act, the disclosure of the Confidential Material and confidential exhibit CR3, or matters contained in the Confidential Material and confidential exhibit CR3, is restricted to the Commissioner, the legal representatives for the Commissioner and the tribunal. 5. Pursuant to ss 64(1)(b), 64(1)(c) and 64(1)(d) of the CAT Act, the publication and recording of the confidential hearing of these preliminary proceedings, including confidential exhibit CR3 and any evidence given during the hearing, is prohibited, and the contents of all paragraphs in these reasons marked "[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]" are not to be published or released to the applicant.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Registrar I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 28 April 2021

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