[2001] AATA 871
General information, not legal advice.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
2001-10-19
Original judgment source is linked above.
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2001] AATA 871
Decision The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review. The Tribunal remits the matter to the Respondent with a direction that Exhibit 1 is not an exempt document.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION - exempt documents - consultant's report New Tax System - whether in public interest
Freedom of Information Act 1982 s 22, 36, 40(1)(d)
Waterford and Department of Treasury (No2) [1984] AATA 67; (1984) 1 AAR 1
Murtagh and FCT [1984] AATA 249; (1984) 1 AAR 419)
Chapman and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1996) 43 ALD 139
Harris v ABC [1983] FCA 242; (1983) 50 ALR 551 and 567 and the Full Court [1984] FCA 8; (1984) 51 ALR 581
Cleary and Treasury [1993] AATA 248; (1993) 31 ALD 214
Corr and PM&C (1993) 35 ALD 1410
Department of Finance and Administration and Herald and Weekly Times [2000] AATA 506; (2000) 31 AAR 251);
Telstra and ACCC (2000) AATA 71)
Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 21 ALR 505
Commonwealth v John Fairfax [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 52[1980] HCA 44; , 32 ALR 485
ASCIC and AFP (1986) 11 ALD N184
Tilmans Butcheries Pty Ltd v AMIE (1979) 27 ALR 367 at 382
Mann and ATO (1985) 7 ALD 698
Searle Australia Pty Ltd v PIAC and another (1992) 108 ALR 163
Re Bayliss (1997) 48 ALD 443
1. The applicant applied to the respondent for access to a final report by consultants in relation to a contract for "Consultancy services of market research and reporting on community views on a variety of aspects of the personal income tax system".
2. The respondent refused access to the report on the basis "that disclosure of the documents would be contrary to the public interest". The documents were said to be "exempt from disclosure in terms of section 36 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982" ("the Act").
3. The applicant sought internal review of the respondent's decision. On review the respondent affirmed the claim for exemption under section 36(1) of the Act and refused an edited version of the document giving effect to section 22 of the Act. On review the grounds of the claim under section 36(1) were expanded so as to claim, in effect, that the document was part of the deliberative processes of the Australian Taxation Office ("ATO") and the respondent because it is concerned with policy-making and decision-making processes that relate to the administration of the taxation laws by the respondent (and the ATO).
4. At the hearing the respondent also claimed that paragraph 40(1)(d) of the Act had operation to exempt the document. That ground was raised in a directions hearing and particularised in the respondent's statement of facts and contentions lodged in the Tribunal on 20 July 2001. The essence of the reason for the claim was set out as follows:
"The respondent contends that the Report is exempt in full from disclosure to the applicant pursuant to sub-section 40(1)(d) of the FOI Act, as the release of the Report would have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of the respondent."
36 (1) Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if it is a document the disclosure of which under this Act:
(a) would disclose matter in the nature of, or relating to, opinion, advice or recommendation obtained, prepared or recorded, or consultation or deliberation that has taken place, in the course of, or for the purposes of, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the Government of the Commonwealth; and
36 (5) This section does not apply to a document by reason only of purely factual material contained in the document.
(a) reports (including reports concerning the results of studies, surveys or tests) of scientific or technical experts, whether employed within an agency or not, including reports expressing the opinions of such experts on scientific or technical matters;
36 (7) Where a decision is made under Part III that an applicant is not entitled to access to a document by reason of the application of this section, the notice under section 26 shall state the ground of public interest on which the decision is based."
"40 (1) Subject to sub-section (2), a document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would or could reasonably be expected to:
(d) have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of an agency; or
40 (2) This section does not apply to a document in respect of matter in the document the disclosure of which under this Act would, on balance, be in the public interest."
(a) business design - which is developing alternatives to the existing annual taxpayer prepared tax return;
(b) policy review - which is conducting a review of deductions and rebates; and
(c) community consultation - involving the community in the developing and testing of new concepts.
"We're not trying to avoid public debate but what we would like is informed public debate, and I guess the release of this material in isolation of the other components of the consultation process that we will go through, will just not provide a balanced view."
"37. ... and the participants regarded their input as a positive process. If this process is misunderstood by the public or cannot be carried out without the threat of premature exposure prior to its being considered by the Treasurer and the Government, the risk is that consultation activities of this nature will have to be curtailed or ceased."
"...if the information acquired were to be released at this stage of the project, it will create ill-informed public debate and an expectation by the community that certain proposals which are not actively being considered by the Government at this time, would actually be delivered. In my experience, the ATO does not want incorrect information to be supplied to its clients, as this would create incorrect perceptions."
63. In Austin v ABC (supra) the applicant claimed that reports by a special investigator to be released by the ABC to a third party were exempt documents within the terms of sections 36, 40 and 43 of the Acts. She sought an order for review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.
64. An enquiry had been conducted into the affairs of the Legal Department of the ABC. Two interim reports had been submitted to the ABC by the special investigator.
65. At first instance Beaumont J considered the reports in the context of section 36 of the Act. His Honour characterised the reports by their contents but in the context of the terms of reference of the enquiry. He said that the reports which he found to include factual material were within the terms of reference of the enquiry and to be characterised accordingly. The reports were in the nature of opinion, advice or recommendation prepared for the purpose of the deliberative processes involved in the functions of the ABC and within the terms of section 36(1)(a) of the Act.
66. As to whether a grant of access would be contrary to the public interest Beaumont J said (50 ALR 561) that in evaluating where the public interest ultimately lies it is necessary to weigh the public interest in citizens being informed of the processes of government on the one hand against the public interest in the proper working of government on the other. His Honour cited the judgments in Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 21 ALR 505 and Commonwealth v John Fairfax [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 52[1980] HCA 44; , 32 ALR 485.
67. While it must be accepted that concepts of public interest are necessarily flexible in the particular circumstances of the case it is relevant to note the following extract from the judgment of Gibbs ACJ in Sankey at 21 ALR 527 where his Honour was considering production of documents in the context of the frank and candour advice arguments:
"However, this consideration does not justify the grant of a complete immunity from disclosure to documents of this kind. Another reason was suggested by Lord Reid in Conway v Rimmer, at 952: 'To my mind the most important reason is that such disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and no government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticize without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind.'
Of course, the object of the protection is to ensure the proper working of government, and not to protect ministers and other servants of the Crown from criticism, however intemperate and unfairly based. Nevertheless, it is inherent in the nature of things that government at a high level cannot function without some degree of secrecy. No minister or senior public servant, could effectively discharge the responsibilities of his office if every document prepared to enable policies to be formulated was liable to be made public. The public interest therefore requires that some protection be afforded by the law to documents of that kind. It does not follow that all such documents should be absolutely protected from disclosure, irrespective of the subject matter with which they deal."
68. After referring to a Senate Committee report and decisions in the United States of America Beaumont J concluded that full disclosure of the reports would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest because the reports were interim reports, the applicant had not been interviewed and the possible consequence of disclosure would be either a misleading or unfair impression in the minds of readers who would be without the benefit of any response of the applicant. His Honour was of the opinion that section 36(1) of the Act was satisfied so far as any opinion, advice or recommendation was expressed in the interim reports.
69. A distinction was drawn in relation to purely factual material in the interim reports. Beaumont J was of the opinion that the public interest would not suffer on balance, because of any disclosure of such matters. His Honour also held that section 36(5) had the effect of directing disclosure. In the result his Honour found that access should be allowed to the document after deletions of exempt material in accordance with section 22 of the Act ie access to the purely factual material was allowed.
70. His Honour was called on to further define what was "purely factual material" ((1983) [1983] FCA 281; 50 ALR 567). Two broad categories of material were discerned in the first interim report:
(a) investigative material consisting of the underlying facts as perceived by the investigator at that stage of her enquiry; and
(b) material in the nature of recommendations to the ABC.
71. The material under (a) was, his Honour said, to be properly characterised as purely factual for the purpose of the order made. The fact of there being some fact finding did not alter the essential character of the material, even if those findings were provisional. Excluding the material in the nature of recommendations his Honour found the rest of the report to be purely factual material.
72. In relation to the second interim report Beaumont J found that the introduction and two annexures were purely factual material. The body of the second interim report consisted in the main of recommendations to the ABC. There was some factual material which was not severable from the context and was not therefore purely factual material.
73. The applicant appealed the decisions of Beaumont J ((1984) [1984] FCA 8; 51 ALR 581). The appellant appealed on the basis that the interim reports were exempt documents within the terms of section 36(1) of the Act but conducted the appeal on the basis that the Full Court should determine what parts of the report were purely factual material.
74. In the course of judgment the Full Court said (at 51 ALR 585) that the wording of section 36(1) makes it clear that it extends to documents of the kind specified which originate outside the agency but which are supplied for use in its deliberative processes.
75. Referring to the notions of primary facts and ultimate facts the Full Court said at page 596 that a statement of ultimate fact may be a statement of purely factual material notwithstanding that it involves a conclusion based on primary facts. On the other hand, a conclusion which involves opinion, advice or recommendation for the purposes of the deliberative process may well prevent material from being purely factual and render it exempt. But section 36(5) only operates where section 36(1) would otherwise operate to make the document exempt (51 ALR 586).
76. The Full Court concluded that the interim reports came within the terms of section 36(1) subject to section 36(5) excluding from exemption purely factual material. After considering the contents of the interim reports the Full Court dismissed the appeal.
77. In relation to the claim that section 40(1)(d) applies to exempt the subject document that issue also arose before Beaumont J in Harris (but not on appeal). It is relevant to note that the present form of section 40 is different to the provision as enacted when the section was considered in Harris.
78. Beaumont J rejected a submission that there would be an adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of the ABC. At 50 ALR 564 his Honour said that the insertion of a requirement that the adverse effect be "substantial" is an indication of the degree of gravity that must exist before this exemption can be made out.
79. Section 40, as it then was, was also considered by Muirhead J in Re ASCIC and AFP (1986) 11 ALD N184. Where his Honour expressed disagreement with "substantial" being an indication of the degree of gravity that must exist before the exemption can be made out. After referring to dicta of Deane J in Tilmans Butcheries Pty Ltd v AMIE, (1979) 27 ALR 367 at 382, his Honour said in effect that the word "substantial" did not import a concept of gravity.
80. In _Tilmans c_ase Deane J preferred a concept of "real or of substance and not insubstantial or nominal". Bowen CJ preferred, in the context of the case, "loss or damage that is more than trivial or minimal" so as to import a notion of "relatively" in the circumstances of the case (27 ALR 374).
81. In the light of those authorities I am not satisfied that a concept of degree of gravity is to be imported into section 40(1)(d). It follows that I am in agreement with dicta of Deputy President Forgie in Re Bayliss (1997) 48 ALD 443 in so far as the Deputy President says that what is required by the exemption in section 40(1)(d) is an adverse effect that is real or of substance and which is not insubstantial or nominal.
82. It is necessary to determine what effect a grant of access to the report will have on the proper and efficient operations of the agency. There is nothing before me that shows a direct adverse effect on the operations of the ATO but the material does indicate secondary adverse effects as to future surveys that may be conducted on behalf of the ATO. The material also satisfies me that public controversy could follow from the grant of access and publication of the subject report. In so far as it is suggested that misleading publicity and ill-informed debate may result, I am not satisifed that I could find that as a fact as distinct from a possibility. In other words I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that misleading publicity and ill-informed debate would result from a grant of access. It might be reasonable to infer that the grant of access would have the opposite effect but it is not necessary for me to decide this.
83. I am not satisfied, on the material before me, that the grant of access would be likely to result in a lack of frankness and candour in responses by participants in future surveys. That is not (and probably could not be) established in the material before me. Any fears in that regard are in my view ill-founded, lack a basis in fact and, with respect, indicate a somewhat jaundiced view of Australian taxpayers in particular and the Australian community in general.
84. I turn now to the public interest issues. In Re Mann and ATO (1985) 7 ALD 698 the Tribunal discussed the various public interest tests in the Act. In relation to section 36(1)(a) it must be shown, quite independent of that paragraph, that the grant of access would be contrary to the public interest. However in section 40 the satisfaction of grounds in sub-section (1) would ordinarily be enough, by itself, make grant of access prima facie contrary to the public interest. However that prima facie position may be displaced in a particular case by something more than the general policy of the Act as expressed in section 11 and, I might add, section 3 of the Act. That is not to suggest that an onus lies with the applicant to show that the prima facie situation is overcome by making out a positive case with respect to public interest.
85. That proposition was rejected by the Full Court in Searle Australia Pty Ltd v PIAC and another, (1992) 108 ALR 163. In that case the Tribunal had weighed up the public interest in the public knowing from whom the agency received information when it was evaluating therapeutic goods with the agency's ability to receive sound advice to enable it to fulfill its responsibilities. In the result the Tribunal found that the documents should be released with deletions so as not to identify the evaluators.
86. That conclusion was not set aside by the Full Court. Although the Court did not accept aspects of the Tribunal's reasoning it did accept that there had been a weighing up of the effect of granting access.
87. Exhibit 1 is a copy of the subject report consisting of two volumes. A report, in general terms that discusses outcomes from the survey and detailed analysis of survey results in a form that does not identify participants in the surveys. In the light of section 64 of the Act I have taken time to read the report. While the survey has been conducted by a private company prima facie at arms length from the ATO, the survey was conducted, with some exceptions while ATO officers were present although without the knowledge of the persons being surveyed.
88. Although the report categorises participants by locations, incomes, etc they remain anonymous throughout the report.
(a) the report deals with a sample survey of the public's reaction to the taxation system;
(b) the report discusses possible changes to the system and public reaction to those possible changes;
(c) the report was not prepared by and clearly does not reflect input by the ATO;
(d) the report is not only dealing with public interest in the taxation system and possibilities for change, but is a document of overwhelming public interest;
(e) the material before the Tribunal establishes that the document is not part of the deliberative processes of the ATO except that it forms a possible factual basis for such deliberative processes;
(f) the deliberative processes of the ATO would not be adversely affected by granting access to this report and the material before the Tribunal suggests that those deliberative processes may be enhanced by any public debate that may arise as a result of publication of the report;
(g) the fact that the report may reflect on the ATO is not, in my view, a factor that changes the balance of whether it is in the public interest to grant access or refuse access;
(h) the fact that the report may reflect on the ATO is not, in my view, something that would or could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of the ATO because on the evidence of Ms Vivian, any short term adverse effect would be minimal and any long term effect might be expected to be a positive effect and not an adverse effect;
(i) the report is a report that comes within the terms of section 36(1) of the Act because it is a document that would disclose matter in the nature of opinion and advice arising out of consultation for deliberative purposes involved in the functions of the ATO;
(j) the content of the report relates to purely factual material to which section 36(5) would be applicable;
(k) I am satisfied that disclosure of the document would not be contrary to the public interest because the very nature of the document is that it arises out of and reports on consultations with the public by a contractor otherwise at arms length from the ATO for the purpose of gauging public opinion through community consultation - it is, in simple terms - the public's document;
(l) on my reading of the document there is nothing that could be said to be likely to confuse or create misunderstanding or lead to debate which would be contrary to the public interest; and
(m) whether the report is likely to create public controversy is difficult to assess but it is clear that the report would lead to more informed debate but without any perceivable adverse effect on future community consultations that may be undertaken for the ATO.
90. For these reasons the decision under review will be set aside and a decision made that the subject report (Exhibit 1) is not an exempt document within the terms of the Act.
I certify that the 90 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr K L Beddoe (Senior Member)
Signed: .....................................................................................
Harris
ABC
(1984) 51 ALR 581
(1979) 27 ALR 367
(1992) 108 ALR 163
(1983) 50 ALR 551
(1978) 142 CLR 1
(1980) 147 CLR 39