"One of the traditional evidentiary privileges
available to the Government in the civil discovery
context is the common-sense, sommon-law
deliberative process privilege. See Louisell
Federal Evidence, s 228-231 (1978). See generally
Nixon v.Sirica[1973] USCADC 472; , 159 U.S. App D.C. 58, 121-23, 487
F.2d 700, 763-65 (1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
This privilege protects the 'consultative
functions' of government maintaining the
confidentiality of 'advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part
of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated.' Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C.
1966), aff'd per curiam 128 U.S. PP. D.C. 10, 384
R.2D 979, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952, 88 S.Ct.
334, 19 L.Ed.2d 361 (1967); Grumman Aircraft Eng.
Corp. v. Renogotiation Board, 157 U.S.App. D.C.
121[1973] USCADC 428; , 482 F 2d 710 (1973), rev'd on other grounds,
[1975] USSC 82; 421 U.S. 168, 95 S.Ct. 1491, 44 L.Ed.2d 57 (1975).
The privilege attaches to inter- and intra-agency
communications that are part of the deliberative
process preceding the adoption and promulgation of
an agency policy. There are essentially three
policy bases for this privilege. First, it
protects creative debate and candid consideration
of alternatives within an agency, and, thereby,
improves the quality of agency policy decisions.
See NLRB v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 151,
[1975] USSC 81; 95 S.Ct. 1504; Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train,
[1974] USCADC 40; 160 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 273[1974] USCADC 40; , 491 F.2d 63, 66 (1974).
Second, it protects the public from the confusion
that would result from premature exposure to
discussions occurring before the policies
affecting it had actually been settled upon. See
Grumman Aircraft Eng. Corp. v. Renegotiation
Board, note 77 supra, 157 U.S.App. D.C. at 129,
482 F.2d at 718; Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 146
U.S.App.D.C. 237, 245-246[1971] USCADC 275; , 450 F.2d 698, 706-708
(1971). And third, it protects the integrity of
the decision-making process itself by confirming
that 'officials should be judged by what they
decide(,) not for matters they considered before
making up their minds.' Grumman Aircraft Eng.
Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, note 77 supra, 157
U.S.App.D.C. at 129, 482 F.2d at 718. See Boeing
Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 108 U.S.App. 106, 112,
280 F.2d 654, 660 (1960); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, note 77 supra, 40 F.R.D.
at 325-326."