1. Before applying for summary judgment, the respondents corresponded with the applicant. In this correspondence the respondents isolated perceived difficulties in the applicant's case. They also identified a legal avenue open to the applicant should he choose seek an extension of time.[9] In applying for summary judgment, or alternatively an order striking out the applicant's statement of claim, the respondents argued that none of the applicant's claims had a real prospect of success. It was said that this was so because the doctrines of res judicata and Anshun estoppel precluded the applicant's claims arising out of the 2010 arrest. It was also said that each of the claims made in the 2022 proceeding were out of time and thus statute-barred. The associate judge then heard and determined the respondents' application for summary judgment.

1. The associate judge concluded that the doctrine of res judicata applied to the applicant's claim in the 2022 proceeding of false imprisonment relating to the 2010 arrest: the 2022 proceeding was an attempt to relitigate a cause of action that had merged into judgment in the earlier 2013 County Court proceeding.
2. As the associate judge observed, in respect of the 2013 County Court proceeding and judgment:

It is evident from the judgment that the [applicant] agreed that his claim relating to the events in 2010 was for false imprisonment and covered the entirety of events from his arrest and throughout his time at the police station.[10]

...

Relevantly for these proceedings, the judgment adjudicates upon the alleged false imprisonment on 12 February 2010 when [the applicant] was arrested at his home and taken to Footscray Police Station. The finding is that [the applicant] was aware of the reason for his arrest on that date and was not detained longer than necessary. As a result, the claim for false imprisonment failed.[11]

1. After tracing the course of the applicant's earlier proceeding from the County Court, through the Court of Appeal, and culminating with a failed application for special leave in the High Court, the associate judge concluded this part of her reasons in the following manner:

I am satisfied that the [applicant] is claiming relief for the same alleged false imprisonment on 12 February 2010 in his renewed pleadings. As the County Court has already adjudicated on this matter, I find that the doctrine of res judicata prevents the [applicant] from re-agitating this claim.[12]

1. The associate judge then gave consideration to the submission made by the first to fourth respondents, namely, that the applicant's claims of assault, battery, trespass to goods and defamation arising from the 2010 arrest should be dismissed by operation of Anshun estoppel.[13]
2. In light of the associate judge's conclusion concerning res judicata, her Honour considered that it was 'not strictly necessary'[14] to consider the Anshun issue. Nevertheless, the associate judge considered that had she not determined that the doctrine of res judicata applied to the applicant's claim of false imprisonment in respect of the 2010 arrest, then she would have 'held that the doctrine of Anshun estoppel prevents [the applicant] from re-litigating the events from that time'.[15]
3. Noting that the doctrine of Anshun or 'issue' estoppel arises 'when an issue of fact or law has already been disposed of once and for all by judicial determination, and operates to prevent the same parties from raising the issue at a later time',[16] the associate judge considered that there was a 'substantial overlap' between the applicant's 2013 County Court proceeding and 'this one'.[17] As the associate judge described matters:

The same facts arise for consideration and they relate to the February 2010 arrest. The [applicant's] claims are based on his central contention that the arrest was unlawful. As explained above, Judge Smith adjudicated upon that issue. It would be unreasonable to allow the [applicant's] claims regarding the 12 February 2010 arrest to proceed. There is a risk that any judgment would overlap with Judge Smith's judgment. [The applicant] gave no explanation as to why any new claims relating to the February 2010 arrest were not made in the County Court proceedings. It was unreasonable for him not to have made the claims at that time.[18]

1. The associate judge then dealt with the first to fourth respondents' contention that the applicant's claims concerning both the 2010 arrest, and the 2012 arrest, were time‑barred.
2. The associate judge concluded that the applicant's claims were 'plainly out of time'.[19]
3. The associate judge considered that the nature of the applicant's claim for damages was 'unclear', but her Honour observed that 'at the hearing, [the applicant] asserted that he was not seeking damages for personal injury arising from the February 2010 incident'.[20] Thus it was that the associate judge remarked as follows:

If that is the case, the limitation period for the causes of action in tort (false imprisonment, assault, battery, trespass to goods, and conversion) is six years from the date the cause of action accrued under s 5(1)(a) of the LAA. The limitation period for these causes of action therefore expired on or about 12 February 2016.[21]

1. In respect of the 2010 arrest, the associate judge determined that even if the applicant was seeking damages for personal injury then the limitation period expired either in 2013[22] or 12 February 2022.[23] The associate judge noted that the applicant's claim in defamation, referable to the 2010 arrest, expired on 12 February 2011.[24] Thus, according to the associate judge, 'the actions arising from the February 2010 arrest are statute‑barred'.[25]
2. The associate judge then turned to the applicant's claims made in respect of the 2012 arrest. Her Honour, again, observed that the nature of the damages sought by the applicant was 'unclear'.[26]
3. The associate judge noted that if the applicant was not seeking damages for personal injury, then the limitation period for 'these causes of action' would have expired on 3 February 2018 and would therefore be statute-barred.[27] If it was the case that the applicant was making a claim for personal injury, and the long stop period of limitation of 12 years did not apply, then the applicant's cause of action alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery would have been out of time, the 'limitation period [having] expired three years later, namely, on or about 3 February 2015'.[28] The applicant's claims concerning the 2012 arrest - insofar as damages were sought for personal injury - would not be statute-barred, however, if the 12‑year long stop limitation period applied.
4. The associate judge then turned to the issue concerning whether the long stop limitation period applied to the applicant's claims arising out of the 2012 arrest; and thus whether the applicant was making a claim for personal injuries.
5. The associate judge referred to the definition of 'personal injuries' found in the LAA.[29] By reference to written reply submissions made by the applicant, as well as the content of the applicant's pleadings, the associate judge observed that '[o]verall, it does not appear that [the applicant] is making a personal injuries claim'.[30]
6. The associate judge was satisfied, however, that the applicant had 'no real prospect of success' of showing that the 12‑year long stop limitation period applied (if his cause of action in respect of the 2012 arrest was to be characterised as one which claimed loss on account of personal injury).[31] This was so because, according to the associate judge, a claim for personal injury by the applicant was 'discoverable'[32] by him at 'or about the time' of the 2012 arrest.[33] The applicant was - at that time - already prosecuting 'two proceedings' giving rise to issues similar to those connected with the 2012 arrest. And those proceedings went to hearing in 2013 in the County Court, and were pursued as far as the High Court.
7. The associate judge concluded that it was 'clear' that the applicant was 'aware of his legal rights' at that time and 'knew he could take action against the first [respondent] (and did).'[34] The associate judge considered that there was 'no evidence' that the applicant had sought 'legal or medical advice' or 'relief for any condition arising from the 2012 arrest'.[35] Thus her Honour observed that she was

satisfied that, if [the applicant] had taken all reasonable steps at that time, he ought to have known that he had a cause of action for personal injury against the first defendant at or about that time.[36]

1. This meant that the time-period for a claim for personal injuries made in respect of the 2012 arrest had expired over eight years earlier.[37]

1. The associate judge noted that the applicant had not applied for an extension of time. Nevertheless, her Honour considered that even had such an application been made it would have possessed no real prospect of success.[38]
2. To the extent that the applicant had not made a claim for personal injury there was no evidence to suggest that such a claim had been delayed by 'disability or fraud and mistake'.[39] Thus the associate judge observed:

As a result, I am satisfied that there is no avenue for the Court to extend [the applicant's] claims for false imprisonment, trespass to goods, defamation, assault and battery.[40]

1. To the extent that the applicant could be taken to have made a claim for personal injury, the associate judge considered that any reliance by the applicant on s 23A of the LAA was misconceived.[41] To the extent that the applicant's claims could be brought within the purview of s 27B of the LAA, there was - according to the associate judge - 'no real prospect that time would be extended' if an application had been brought to extend time under ss 27K and 27L of the LAA.[42]
2. The associate judge noted that the relevant periods of delay between accrual of the alleged causes of action and an extension of time application, had it been made, would be '12 years and nine months' in the case of the 2010 arrest, and '10 years and nine months' in the case of the 2012 arrest. Her Honour observed that '[t]hese [were] significant delays' and that the

[applicant] was aware of relevant facts as evident by his prior legal proceedings. He has provided no evidence of any disability or legal incapacity that would affect the discoverability of his cause of action. To the contrary, he acted promptly by taking legal action both in the criminal and civil arenas. As a result, there is no explanation as to why this specific action has been brought so late, nor is there evidence of him seeking any legal or medical advice about the delay.[43]

1. The associate judge did not hold that 'there could not be a fair trial',[44] but concluded that '[s]ynthesising all relevant factors there [was] no real prospect that [the applicant] would obtain an extension of time'.[45]
2. The associate judge held that the limitation period could not be extended to a period of 15 years for any of the applicant's causes of action on the basis that his case against Victoria Police constituted a 'specialty' for the purposes of s 5(3) of the LAA.[46]
3. Nor - so the associate judge found - could s 20(3A) of the Wrongs Act 1958 ('Wrongs Act') avail the applicant so as to extend the limitation period beyond six years. This was so because there had not been a wrongful act or neglect or default causing death.[47]

Whether the applicant's claim enjoyed no real prospect of success and the application of s 64 of the Civil Procedure Act

1. As to the determination of the application for summary judgment, the associate judge applied the terms of ss 62-4 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 ('CPA') in light of the principles set out in Lysaght Building Solutions Pty Ltd v Blanalko Pty Ltd,[48] and concluded as follows:

Given [the applicant] has no real prospect of success, the question is whether there should be summary judgment in favour of the first to fourth [respondents], or whether the proceeding should proceed to trial per s 64 of the CPA. There is no good reason why it would be in the interests of justice for the matter to proceed to a full hearing, or why the dispute is of such a nature that only a full hearing on the merits is appropriate.

In all the circumstances, already outlined above, it is not in the interests of justice to allow this matter to proceed to trial. It is not a dispute that requires a hearing on merit. Allowing this matter to proceed to trial would be contrary to the overarching purpose of the CPA. In particular, it would be inefficient, cause unnecessary costs, and result in further delays. This would not be a just outcome for any of the parties.

I will make orders for summary judgment in favour of the first to fourth [respondents]. As the issues against all [respondents] are pleaded together, the orders should apply to all the claims made here. Accordingly, the proceeding will be dismissed.[49]

1. The associate judge observed that even had she not concluded that summary judgment ought be given, she would have 'struck out the proceeding' in any event on the basis that 'the causes of action pleaded are conclusionary and embarrassing' and 'do not appear curable by amendment'.[50]
2. The associate judge concluded her reasons by holding that that all respondents, other than the first respondent, should not have been joined as parties.[51]

1. As referred to above, the applicant appealed the orders made by the associate judge. The judge who heard the appeal concluded that the associate judge had not erred in giving summary judgment; to the contrary, the associate judge had been correct to do so. Thus the judge determined that the applicant's appeal should be dismissed.[52] Given that the applicant now seeks leave to appeal from the judge's decision, it is necessary to consider that decision in some detail.

1. The judge gave consideration to the nature of appeals from associate judges, and noted that in order for the applicant's appeal to succeed it was ordinarily necessary to identify an error in the associate judge's decision.[53] The judge noted that the applicant's grounds of appeal were 'largely discursive' and 'occasionally difficult to understand'.[54] Nevertheless, the judge set out what she considered to be the 'substance' of the applicant's five grounds of appeal.[55] The judge considered it convenient to approach the issues raised by the applicant's grounds by reference to the following subjects:

(a) whether the findings the Associate Judge reached showed a justification for her conclusion that the proceeding should be summarily dismissed (ground 1);

(b) whether an Associate Judge had the authority to summarily determine a civil proceeding commenced by writ (grounds 2, 4 and 5);

(c) whether police tort claims are a 'speciality' for the purposes of s 5(3) of the LAA (ground 2);

(d) whether the Court should have extended the time for [the applicant] to bring the proceedings under the LAA (grounds 2 and 3); and

(e) whether the Associate Judge erred in concluding that there was an Anshun estoppel with respect to the claims based on the 2010 arrest, in circumstances where the charges underlying that arrest were not fully resolved until October 2013 when an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court in relation to an appeal against conviction was refused and [the applicant] could not have included all claims in his County Court proceeding which was commenced on 22 September 2011 (ground 3).[56]

1. The judge then turned to consider each of these subjects.

1. The judge noted, under this subject, that the applicant had appeared to submit that the associate judge had simply reached the wrong conclusion concerning whether time should have been extended; and that the associate judge had committed this error, specifically, by determining that a claim based on the 2012 arrest was discoverable at or about the time of that particular arrest.
2. The judge rejected that submission. According to the judge, the conclusion drawn by the associate judge was correct, namely, that any relevant claim by the applicant was discoverable at or around the time of the 2012 arrest, with the consequence that the three-year limitation period[57] had 'expired well over eight years ago'. The judge described the conclusion drawn by the associate judge as

an entirely rational conclusion, clearly expressed, that was open to her Honour. It was ample justification for concluding that the limitation period in s 27D(1)(a), being the period which expired before the 12 year long stop limitation period in s 27D(1)(b), was the limitation period which applied.[58]

1. In response to a submission made by the applicant that the associate judge had failed to find that the applicant's writ had no prospect of success, the judge observed that at the very point in the associate judge's process of reasoning that was relied on by the applicant (namely, when the associate judge was considering the application of ss 62-4 of the CPA) it was unnecessary for the associate judge 'to discuss again why the claims had no real prospect of success'.[59] By that stage, so the judge reasoned, the associate judge had made findings earlier in her judgement concerning the various reasons why the applicant's claims could not succeed. As the judge stated:

It was unnecessary to repeat those conclusions. They constituted clear justification for the conclusion that the claims had no real prospect of success.[60]

1. The judge considered that the applicant had misconceived the associate judge's observation concerning whether the second to fourth respondents had committed 'police torts' within the meaning of s 72(1) of the Victoria Police Act 2013. According to the judge, the associate judge had not positively found that such torts had been committed; rather she had simply described the substance of what had been alleged (with the consequence that those respondents had been improperly joined).[61] Thus, the judge concluded in respect of subject (a) that

[t]he remaining observations in [the applicant's] submissions about the reasons of the Associate Judge do not disclose any inadequacy in her Honour's conclusions as to why the claims were either precluded by statute or otherwise had no real prospect of success.[62]

1. Concerning subject (a), the Judge concluded that the 'Associate Judge's reasons disclose clearly why her Honour concluded that the claims had no real prospect of success, and should be summarily dismissed pursuant to s 63 of the CPA'.[63] It was in this manner that the judge concluded that the applicant's ground 1 could not succeed.

1. The judge then turned to consider arguments made by the applicant under grounds 2, 4 and 5. Those grounds contended that it was beyond the authority of an associate judge to hear and determine an application for summary judgement. The applicant's arguments before the judge were premised upon rr 77.02(1)(a)-(b) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 ('Supreme Court Rules'), wherein it is provided that the trial of a proceeding shall not be held before an associate judge. Reliance was also placed by the applicant on r 77.02(3)(c). That rule provides that an associate judge does not have authority to hear and determine proceedings relating to the liberty of the subject. The applicant submitted before the judge that the hearing of the application for summary judgement was a trial for the purposes of r 77.02(1)(a), and that the associate judge did not have authority to determine the summary judgment application because the applicant's claims of false imprisonment, in his statement of claim, were claims relating to deprivation of liberty for the purposes of r 77.02(3)(c).
2. The judge noted in her reasons that there was no rule which provides that only a 'Judge of the Court or the Court of Appeal may hear an application for summary judgment'.[64] Her Honour observed, moreover, that there was a 'significant degree of overlap' between the matters raised in the applicant's submissions and the issues the subject of consideration by the associate judge (at first instance) and O'Meara J (on appeal) concerning the application to set aside default judgment.[65]
3. The judge held that an associate judge has the power to hear and determine an application for summary judgment 'because it is an application under the CPA, for the purposes of r 77.01(2)(a)(iiia)'.[66] The judge set out the terms of this particular rule. It is expressed as follows:

77.01 Authority

(1) Subject to this Order, an Associate Judge, in addition to exercising the powers and authorities conferred by any other provision of these Rules, may, in any proceeding to which these Rules apply, give any judgment or make any order, including any judgment or order in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

(2) Subject to this Order, an Associate Judge, in addition to exercising the powers and authorities conferred by any other provision of these Rules, may hear and determine -

(a) any application and exercise any powers and authorities under the following statutory provisions -

...

(iiia) the Civil Procedure Act 2010; ...[67]

[a]lthough that power is, pursuant to the opening words of r 77.01(2)(a), 'subject to this Order', that power is not then the subject of any limitation on the powers of the Associate Judge in s 77.02(1). In particular, it does not involve an order made in the 'trial of a proceeding' for the purposes of r 77.02(1)(a).[68]

1. The judge noted that the second limb of the applicant's argument in respect of this subject - namely, that the applicant's was a 'proceeding relating to the liberty of the subject' for the purposes of r 77.02(3)(c) - had been 'squarely dealt with by O'Meara J, and cannot succeed for the reasons his Honour gives'.[69] Upon analysis of relevant authority, and after consideration of a passage taken from O'Meara J's reasons, the judge observed that the authoritative approach to the issue raised by the applicant was that the 'liberty of the subject' was to be taken to refer to a state of affairs consequent upon, and caused by, determination of the 2022 proceeding itself rather than the nature of the acts that are alleged to give rise to this proceeding in the first place.[70] As the judge described it:

Although the words 'relating to' are words of connection of wide breadth, the intention of the phrase is to be understood, as observed by O'Meara J, against the background of a settled understanding of the phrase as directed to the need to ensure unfettered access to the courts in cases where the liberty of a person may be affected by the outcome of the case itself.[71]

1. The judge thus rejected the applicant's submission that it was beyond the power of the associate judge to hear and determine the application for summary judgment.

1. The judge then turned to the associate judge's conclusion that the applicant's claims were not a 'specialty' for the purposes of s 5(3) of the LAA, and the applicant's submission that the torts that he alleged in his statement of claim were 'special torts' covered by s 5(3) which gave rise to a limitation period of 15 years.
2. The judge concluded that the associate judge had been correct to conclude that the term 'specialty' in s 5(3) of the LAA refers generally to a 'contract under seal, with a specialty debt being a debt due under seal'.[72] The judge noted that the term 'specialty' might also extend to 'debts due under statute'. The judge considered that the associate judge's conclusions in this respect were supported by further authority bearing upon statutes of limitation,[73] and was reinforced - in the case of s 5(3) - by that particular section's use of the composite phrase 'action upon a bond or other speciality'.[74] Rejecting the applicant's submissions concerning this subject, the judge observed:

The term 'specialty' is, therefore, a legal term with specific, established meaning. [The applicant] appears to have understood the word as engaging matters of a 'special' kind. That more ordinary usage is not the way that term is used in s 5(3). Further, there is no basis for his submission that there are 'special' torts, nor that any tort is intended to be caught by the reference to 'specialty' in s 5(3). There is also no relationship between the concept of a 'special body' under the Public Administration Act and the concept of an action on a specialty for the purposes of the LAA.[75]

1. The judge noted, in respect of this particular subject, that the applicant's ground 2 did 'not clearly identify' any error in the approach of the associate judge to the question of whether there ought be an extension of time.[76]
2. The judge considered, nevertheless, that the associate judge had been correct to reject the applicant's submission concerning the applicability of the Wrongs Act. The judge found that there was 'no error' implicit in the associate judge's conclusion that s 23A of the LAA could not apply so as to extend time. To this end, as the judge recognised, none of the applicant's claims were for 'negligence, nuisance or breach of duty'. Further, the judge noted that it was not apparent that the applicant was seeking damages for personal injury - despite his statement of claim having referred to 'mental trauma' and the need for 'mental treatment.' It was observed by the judge that, in his statement of claim, the applicant stated expressly that:

The [applicant] has got all the medical evidences in his custody. The [applicant] alleges that defendant-1 is vicariously liable for their action. Nevertheless, the [applicant] is not claiming any compensation for medical & work compensation in this civil proceeding.[77]

1. The judge observed that the 'remedy sought' by the applicant did not identify whether any damages sought related to personal injury.[78] As such, the judge found that it was 'open' for the associate judge to conclude that s 23A of the LAA had no application to the applicant's claims.[79]
2. The judge referred, in this respect, to the fact that in his Outline of Written Submissions the applicant acknowledged that he 'did not claim any specific personal injury compensation in his present writ';[80] and, that in answer to a direct question from the bench - directed at the applicant - the applicant 'confirmed that he did not make any claims for personal injury, and observed that claims in false imprisonment, assault, trespass to the person do not require proof of injury'.[81]
3. The judge then noted that the applicant had been put on notice by the respondents of the prospect that he might need to make an application to extend time. But the applicant had not availed himself of this opportunity. Indeed, the applicant still had not sought to extend time even after default judgment had been set aside. Nor had he done so even after O'Meara J dismissed his appeal against the setting aside of default judgment. As the judge observed:

[The applicant] had ample time to make an application to extend time before the hearing of the summary judgment application on 19 March 2024.[82]

1. The judge described the associate judge's close analysis of the prospects of success of any application to extend time should it have been made by the applicant. In particular, the judge noted the associate judge's conclusion that such an application would have been bereft of merit. The judge considered that the analysis conducted by the associate judge had been a thorough one and concluded that '[e]ven had some further opportunity been given to make an extension of time application, it could have made no difference to the outcome of the summary judgment application'.[83]
2. The judge concluded that had the applicant's case been characterised as one seeking redress for personal injury, the associate judge was correct to conclude that a cause of action of this type had been 'discoverable' by the applicant at such a point in time that the 2022 proceeding would still have fallen foul of the applicable period of limitation.[84] As the judge described matters:

The fact that her Honour considered whether there was any prospect that [the applicant] would be granted an extension of time enabled her to be certain in her conclusion that the claims [the applicant] sought to make were statute barred, which was one of the reasons why the claims had no real prospect of success.[85]

1. The judge concluded therefore that there was 'no error' in the associate judge's approach to the question of 'any potential extension of time'.[86]
2. Before turning to 'subject (e)', the judge dealt with further submissions that had been made by the applicant which concerned a potential application to extend time. The judge indicated that it was 'not clear' whether these matters had been raised before the associate judge.[87]
3. The applicant had raised before the judge - for instance - his asserted mental incapacity which he alleged had prevented him from commencing the 2022 proceeding in a timely manner. Insofar as this matter was concerned, the judge was, it seems, prepared to accept that the applicant did suffer from a level of mental trauma in the period following his arrests. But the judge considered that there was 'no evidence' as to how this may have 'caused a delay in [the applicant] bringing the proceedings'.[88] Nor, so the judge observed, was there any evidence explaining how it came about that 'during that period' the applicant was able to pursue his County Court proceedings from 2010 through to judgment in 2013, as well as the associated appellate proceedings that took place in the Court of Appeal and High Court. The judge concluded therefore that it was 'not possible' to accept this as a reason for the delay.[89]
4. Nor - according to the judge - was a valid explanation for the delay to be found in the claim that the applicant had been required to wait until resolution of his High Court special leave application before he could bring an action, for instance, for malicious prosecution. As the judge held, it was doubtful that the applicant was required to wait in order to bring such an action; and, in any event, the judge determined that there still remained a very lengthy period which had elapsed between resolution of the appealed matter in 2013 and the filing of the Writ and statement of claim in the 2022 proceeding.[90]
5. The judge rejected that the applicant had good reason to delay due to his absence from Australia and inability to return for 15 months during the COVID‑19 pandemic. This was said to create difficulties for the applicant when it came to filing documents and making arrangements for video-conferencing. The judge considered that these matters did not constitute fresh evidence admissible on the appeal; and, according to the judge, these particular matters were not 'materially relevant' in any event. As the judge concluded, '[n]one of these matters could provide any relevant explanation as to why [the applicant] did not at least file the claim earlier through the Registry which was accepting electronic filings throughout 2020 and 2021'.[91]
6. Lastly, the judge rejected the applicant's explanation that he had delayed because of his concern about outstanding costs orders connected with the County Court proceedings. The judge thought it 'not entirely clear' how it could be that such costs orders might bear upon the issue of delay. But the judge thought that perhaps the applicant may have stayed his hand pending expiry of the limitation period concerning the State of Victoria's ability to claim its costs. But the judge concluded that even had that been so, it 'would certainly not be a proper reason' for a court to grant an extension of time. This would permit the applicant effectively to bring 'further proceedings relating to the same facts as the proceedings giving rise to the costs orders'.[92]

1. 'Subject (e)' concerned the associate judge's conclusions relating to the application of res judicata and Anshun estoppel. The applicant had claimed to the judge that the associate judge had erred by concluding that it had been unreasonable of him not to have brought all of his current causes of action concerning the 2010 arrest as part of his earlier County Court proceeding. It appeared to the judge that the focus of the applicant's submission in this regard was to argue that before he could make a relevant claim - based essentially upon an allegation of unlawful arrest - it was necessary that there have been final resolution of his criminal charges. As the judge understood it, this followed because if the applicant was found not guilty of the criminal offences then the arrest would necessarily have been unlawful and thus a claim for malicious prosecution could then arise.[93]
2. The respondents had submitted before the judge that this particular argument had not been made to the associate judge; but it was put by the respondents that this argument was misconceived in any event.
3. The judge considered that the associate judge had been correct to conclude that the applicant was estopped by the Anshun principle from bringing all of his present claims that related to the 2010 arrest.[94] The judge noted that the associate judge's description of the Anshun principle - at one point in her reasons - might not have done full justice to the principle's true scope. But it was apparent - according to the judge - from the process of reasoning engaged in by the associate judge, that she had correctly apprehended the Anshun principle's substance.[95]
4. The judge determined that the applicant had made a new argument on appeal concerning his professed need to wait until the conclusion of his criminal matters. But the judge found that the applicant's argument was legally misconceived in any event: the lawfulness of the arrest was not contingent upon a failure to prove the criminal charges that were said to have justified the arrest in the first place. Even granting the applicant some degree of latitude in light of his status as a self-represented litigant could not change matters in circumstances where the applicant - according to the judge - 'did in fact make allegations in the County Court proceeding that he was unlawfully arrested in February 2010, as a foundation for his claim that he had been falsely imprisoned'.[96] Thus the judge concluded:

In these circumstances, I do not accept that the explanation now raised by [the applicant] was a reason for not bringing forward the unlawful imprisonment and other causes of action based on the 2010 arrest in the County Court proceeding. It was unreasonable for [the applicant] not to do so. As a result, the principles of Anshun estoppel preclude him from making the claims in this proceeding.[97]

1. The judge then noted the associate judge's conclusion that there was no reason why the 'ordinary rule' as to costs should not apply. The applicant had sought to appeal that order before the judge. The judge observed that the applicant had failed to identify any error in the decision by the associate judge concerning her order for costs. The judge could see no reason why costs ought not to have followed the event in the proceeding before the associate judge. The judge thus dismissed the applicant's appeal against that costs order.[98]

1. The judge dismissed the applicant's appeal, concluding that:

For the above reasons, none of the matters raised by [the applicant] in his grounds of appeal and his written and oral submissions show any error of law on the part of the learned Associate Judge in granting summary judgment. I am satisfied on this rehearing that her Honour's decision was correct, that [the applicant's] claims had no real prospect of success, and that it was appropriate to enter summary judgment for the Respondents on the claims. There was also no error in her Honour's determination on costs.[99]

Proposed grounds of appeal in support of the application for leave to appeal the decision of the judge

1. The terms of the applicant's proposed grounds of appeal are as follows:

Ground 1: The judgments & orders of the court below were unjustified and there was a substantial miscarriage of justice.

Ground 2: The appellant appeal to the Court of Appeal from the Court below was in Questions of Law.

Ground 3: The judgments & orders of the Court below were error or contrary of law.

Ground 4: The judgements & orders of the Court below breaches the Supreme Court Rules and others claim related Rules & Act.

Ground 5: The discretionary power applied by the Court below were in bad faith.

1. There are, however, lengthy particulars that are subjoined by the applicant to these proposed grounds. Those particulars are closely typed and extend for a number of paragraphs in the case of each proposed ground. In some instances these particulars extend for pages. For reasons that will become apparent, it is unnecessary to set these particulars out verbatim here. The applicant supplemented his proposed grounds with written submissions. As in the appeal before the judge, the applicant's written material is largely discursive and occasionally difficult to understand. The applicant made oral submissions at the hearing of this matter. This provided a degree of focus. Yet, as was apparent before the judge, there was considerable overlap in substance between the various proposed grounds of appeal in terms of issues that were raised by the applicant. It became evident from a close reading of the applicant's written material (including the particulars subjoined to his proposed grounds) and his oral argument that he sought essentially to make the same points concerning alleged error that he had made before the associate judge and the judge. Thus it is that the applicant's complaints can conveniently be grouped into five broad groups, or subjects, similar to those that were identified by the judge.
2. The first question raised by the applicant ('Question 1') concerns his contention that the judge's decision was 'unjustified' or given in bad faith (proposed grounds 1 and 5). Submissions made concerning this question appeared essentially to overlap with various matters that were dealt with under 'subject (a)' by the judge.
3. The second question raised by the applicant ('Question 2') concerns the applicant's contention that the applicable limitation period was 15 years under the LAA (proposed grounds 1, 2, 3 and 5). This question overlaps with the matters dealt with by the judge under 'subject (c)'.
4. The third question raised by the applicant ('Question 3') concerns the judge's determination, under 'subject (b)', as to whether the associate judge had the power to hear and determine the application for summary judgment (proposed grounds 2, 4 and 5).
5. The fourth question raised by the applicant ('Question 4') concerns the judge's conclusion, under 'subject (e)', that the associate judge was correct to decide that Anshun estoppel precluded the applicant's related claims which concerned his 2010 arrest (proposed grounds 1, 2 and 3).
6. The fifth question ('Question 5') that arises is whether the judge's conclusion, under 'subject (d)', that the applicant's claims were statute-barred is correct (proposed grounds 2 and 3).

Question 1 - the judge's 'subject (a)' - proposed grounds 1 & 5

1. The applicant, pursuant to this question, repeated his claim that he had made to the judge, namely, that the associate judge had not concluded that the applicant's claims possessed no real prospect of success. The applicant argued, as well, that the associate judge had positively concluded that the second to sixth respondents had committed the relevant torts that the applicant alleged.
2. The respondents submitted that the applicant had simply misunderstood the associate judge's findings as well as the judge's conclusions made in respect of those findings.
3. The contentions now made by the applicant were dealt with squarely by the judge. It is convenient to set out precisely what the judge had to say concerning the initial argument that the applicant makes in respect of this question:

[The applicant] referred to various other aspects of her Honour's Reasons, in support of his contention that her conclusion was 'unjustified'. He submitted that the Associate Judge 'did not conclude that, the [applicant] writ has no real prospect of success'. This may have been in response to the section of her Honour's judgment where she dealt with the question as to whether the claims had no prospect of success and if so whether they would be allowed to proceed. The heading to this section stated:

• Does the [applicant's] claim have no real prospect of success? If so, should he be allowed to proceed to trial per s 64 of the CPA?

Her Honour quoted the relevant sections of the CPA, and the principles relevant to s 63 and entry of summary judgment, as stated by the Court of Appeal in Lysaght Building Solutions Pty Ltd v Blanalko Pty Ltd. Her Honour then observed:

• Given the [applicant] has no real prospect of success, the question is whether there should be summary judgment in favour of the first to fourth [respondents], or whether the proceeding should proceed to trial per s 64 of the CPA.

When her Honour came to consider the application of ss 63 and 64 of the CPA, it was not necessary for her to discuss again why the claims had no real prospect of success, as she had already made findings earlier in her judgment about the various reasons why the claims could not succeed: that the false imprisonment claim based on the 2010 arrest claims was barred by res judicata, all claims based on the 2010 arrest were barred by Anshun estoppel and that all claims with respect to both arrests were statute barred. It was unnecessary to repeat those conclusions. They constituted clear justification for the conclusion that the claims had no real prospect of success.[100]

1. As to the applicant's second argument made concerning this question, the judge stated as follows:

Another finding focussed on by [the applicant] was her Honour's observation that 'I am satisfied that the second to fourth [respondents] are individuals alleged to have committed "police torts"'. He contends that notwithstanding this finding of the Associate Judge, her Honour 'wrongly dismissed the appellant writ'. It appears that [the applicant] may have misunderstood this finding as a conclusion that her Honour was satisfied that the claims of police torts had been established. The observation was made in the context of considering whether the claims alleged in the statement of claim were allegations of having committed police torts and so were 'police tort claims' within the meaning of s 73 of the Victoria Police Act. If they were, they were required by s 75 of that Act only to be made against the State, and not against individual police officers. Her Honour's conclusion was not that claims in the Statement of Claim were established or proven, but that the allegations could be characterised as police tort claims. The conclusion was in my respectful opinion correct.[101]

1. I am not persuaded that the judge erred, or even arguably erred, in dealing with the applicant's submissions that were referable to this question. Nor can I detect any error, arguable or otherwise, in her Honour's approach, even leaving aside the particular arguments that the applicant makes. It seems to me that, as with the judge's assessment of the associate judge's process of reasoning, the judge's finding that the associate judge's conclusions were justified was an entirely rational conclusion for the judge to draw. As will be dealt with below, the only real possibility that arose wherein the applicant's claims were not statute-barred was in respect of his claims concerning the 2012 arrest but only to the extent that such claims could be characterised as claims for personal injury. But as was clear, there was considerable doubt that this was so. And yet, even if such a characterisation had been defensible, the judge's general conclusion of justification on the part of the associate judge was amply justified by reference to the limitation period prescribed at s 27D(1)(a) of the LAA (and not the 12‑year long stop period). It was clear that at or around the time of the 2012 arrest the applicant was conducting litigation in the County Court which included litigation concerning the circumstances of the 2010 arrest. It was inexplicable in such circumstances that - insofar as they related to claims for personal injury - the applicant's claims concerning 2012 could not have been raised at that time.
2. I am not persuaded of any reason that would cause me to doubt the correctness of the judge's approach to the issues requiring determination under 'subject (a)'.

Question 2 - the judge's 'subject (c)' - proposed grounds 1, 2, 3 & 5

1. As to this question, the applicant's submissions were directed to establishing that the judge had erred by failing to hold that the applicable limitation period was 15 years pursuant to s 5(3) of the LAA (dealing with an action upon a 'specialty'), or by operation of s 5(4) of the LAA (dealing with an action upon a judgment).
2. The respondents submitted that, insofar as the applicant had not raised new arguments concerning this question, it could be seen that the judge's process of reasoning was correct. The respondents submitted that to the extent that the applicant may have appeared to rely on s 5(7) of the LAA at various stages in his written materials, such reliance was misconceived; that section could have no relevance to the circumstances of the present case. The respondents argued that the applicant's submission concerning s 5(4) was made for the first time as part of the present application. It was submitted that reliance on s 5(4) was misconceived because that section is concerned with actions brought upon a judgment of the court.
3. I would uphold the respondents' submissions. The applicant has not persuaded me that there was any error in the process of reasoning undertaken by the judge; or that the result reached by the judge was incorrect in deciding that s 5(3) of the LAA had no application to the applicant's case given that the applicant's action was not one on a specialty as defined. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of her Honour's conclusion in this regard, namely that specialty in s 5(3) has a specific legal meaning and does not apply to torts of the kind alleged in this proceeding.
4. To the extent that the applicant relied on s 5(4) of the LAA, it is apparent that this argument was not put below. The point is without substance in any event. As the respondents submitted, s 5(4) concerns itself with actions brought upon a judgment of the Court. That is not this case as is evident from the words of the section.

Question 3 - the judge's 'subject (b)' - proposed grounds 2, 4 & 5

1. The applicant again submitted, as he had submitted before both the associate judge and the judge, that the associate judge lacked power to hear and determine an application for summary judgment. It was said that this was so because the terms of rr 77.02(1)(a)-‍(b) of the Supreme Court Rules preclude an associate judge from holding a trial of a proceeding or giving any judgment or making any order at the trial of a proceeding. The applicant's argument was that the application for summary judgment was a 'trial' for the purposes of that rule. And it was argued that r 77.02(3)(c) precludes an associate judge from hearing any proceeding that relates to the liberty of the subject which, given the circumstances of the 2010 and 2012 arrests, the 2022 proceeding was. The applicant contended that the judge had erred by finding to the contrary. Indeed, it was submitted that there was an internal inconsistency apparent in the judge's process of reasoning, especially given - according to the applicant - that the judge had apparently concluded that the applicant's 'proceeding was relating [sic] to the liberty of the subject'.
2. The respondents argued that the applicant's submissions were essentially a repeat of what the he had submitted before O'Meara J in the appeal relating to the setting aside of the default judgment. This argument was also - so the respondents submitted - a repeat of what had been submitted before the judge.
3. The respondents submitted that the applicant had failed to show any error committed by the judge in her approach to these matters. It was argued that the judge's conclusions were plainly correct. The respondents submitted that the judge was correct to locate power to order summary judgment in r 77.01(2)(a)(iiia) of the Supreme Court Rules; and it was argued that the judge had been also correct to conclude that an order for summary judgment was not one that was given at the 'trial of the proceeding'. According to the respondents, the order for summary judgment was an order of an interlocutory nature. The respondents argued that this was so

because a trial is a hearing involving evidence and full argument for the purpose of making a final determination of rights, whereas a summary judgment application involves only an assessment, on the material then before the court, of the prospects of a moving party successfully prosecuting the proceeding.[102]

1. The respondents submitted, also, that the judge was correct to conclude that the applicant's proceeding did not relevantly 'relate to the liberty of the subject' for the purposes of r 77.02(3)(c). The respondents submitted that this definition related to the effect or consequence of the proceeding in question (the 2022 proceeding) and not the nature of alleged acts or events which were said to give rise to that proceeding in the first place.
2. I am unable to detect any error, arguable or otherwise, in either the judge's approach or conclusions that relate to these issues. As the judge concluded, an associate judge is afforded power to hear and determine applications under the CPA by r 77.01(2)(a)(iiia) of the Supreme Court Rules. The Court of Appeal has determined that the hearing and determination of an application for summary judgement does not come within the exception described in rr 77.02(1)(a)-(b) of the Supreme Court Rules because orders made consequent upon an application for summary judgment 'were not made at a trial'.[103] This, as the respondents submitted, is consistent with a line of authority which treats an order for summary judgment as an order that is interlocutory in nature.[104]
3. Nor can I detect any error, arguable or otherwise, present in the judge's approach to the issue concerning whether the associate judge lacked authority to hear and determine the respondents' application for summary judgment because the applicant's proceeding was one 'relating to the liberty of the subject' for the purposes of r 77.02(3)(c). There is thus no reason to doubt the correctness of her Honour's conclusion that this exception applied in circumstances where 'the outcome of the proceeding would involve a party's liberty', rather than where a claim in a statement of claim is based upon some past wrongful deprivation of liberty.[105] Her Honour's conclusion in this regard is, I consider, consistent with the authority cited by her Honour.

Question 4 - the judge's 'subject (e)' - proposed grounds 1, 2 & 3

1. The applicant contended that the judge was wrong to conclude that the associate judge had been correct to decide that Anshun estoppel precluded his claims concerning the 2010 arrest; and, in particular, it was argued by the applicant that it had been erroneous for the associate judge to find that it was unreasonable for the applicant not to have brought the 2010 arrest claims made in the 2022 proceeding in the earlier County Court proceedings. The applicant submitted that he did not know the real reason for his arrest at the time of those County Court proceedings; and, in any event, he argued that he could not bring his new claims until his criminal proceedings had been finalised.
2. The respondents submitted that the applicant's submissions were wholly unpersuasive. As a matter of law, it was submitted, there was nothing preventing the applicant from commencing the entirety of his civil claims concerning the 2010 arrest prior to the culmination of the criminal proceedings. It was contended, moreover, that the applicant's claim that he believed himself to be precluded, for this reason, from bringing an action could not - in any event - be accepted. This was so because it was clear from the judgment in the County Court that the applicant had considered his arrest to be unlawful and that it was such unlawfulness which was said to provide the well‑spring for the entirety of the applicant's civil claims concerning the 2010 arrest.
3. Thus, even if criminal charges at the time of the County Court civil proceedings were yet to be fully determined, it was correct of the judge to conclude that this circumstance was effectively immaterial to the applicant's state of mind relevant to the lawfulness of the 2010 arrest. The respondents submitted, moreover, that to the extent that the applicant now argued that he had only come to learn the real reason for his 2010 arrest at some later point in time, this was patently inconsistent with Judge Smith's finding in his Honour's reasons that the applicant's arrest was lawful.[106]
4. The applicant's submissions relevant to this particular question have not persuaded me - to any level of satisfaction - of error on the part of the judge. Indeed, I consider that there is no reason to doubt that the judge was correct to hold that the associate judge had not erred in determining that the applicant's current claims in respect of the 2010 arrest were precluded either by operation of res judicata or Anshun estoppel. The applicant had already litigated his claim for false imprisonment; and, as the judge recognised, the applicant 'had already litigated similar claims based on that arrest in the County Court proceedings (and subsequent appeals).[107]
5. As the judge explained, notwithstanding a degree of incompleteness in the associate judge's description of the principle in Anshun, the associate judge's application of this principle, in substance, was correct. As the judge observed:

[T]hat limitation in her Honour's expression of the principles did not have any impact on the Associate Judge's correct disposition of the application on the basis that the claims were precluded by Anshun estoppel. The principles that her Honour applied when considering the Anshun estoppel argument, and her Honour's application of those principles to the facts at [26] of her Reasons, makes clear that her Honour was applying the 'extended principle' of estoppel recognised in Anshun in finding that the claims in this proceeding were estopped. Her Honour observed that the matter on which Judge Smith had adjudicated related to the 2010 arrest, as did the claims in this proceeding, and there was a risk that judgment in this proceeding would overlap with Judge Smith's judgment. Her Honour then concluded:

• The [applicant] gave no explanation as to why any new claims relating to the February 2010 arrest were not made in the County Court proceedings. It was unreasonable for him not to have made the claims at that time.

This conclusion that it was unreasonable for [the applicant] not to have made the current claims at the time of the County Court proceeding, given they also related to the 2010 arrest, is the central element of the doctrine of Anshun estoppel, and demonstrates her Honour's correct application of the principles.

There was therefore no error in the Associate Judge's application of the Anshun estoppel principles to conclude that, in addition to the specific cause of action in false imprisonment being barred by res judicata, all new claims relating to the 2010 arrest could not be brought.[108]

1. Having found that - in substance - the associate judge had correctly applied the principle of Anshun estoppel, there is no reason to doubt that the judge was correct also to reject the applicant's arguments about why it was not reasonable for the applicant to have brought all related claims concerning the 2010 arrest at an earlier point in time.
2. Plainly it was legally open to the applicant to have brought all claims relevant to the 2010 arrest prior to the final determination of his criminal charges. Insofar as the new claims concerning the 2010 arrest were sourced in the lawfulness of that arrest, such lawfulness was contingent upon a reasonable belief concerning the applicant's criminality rather than proof of the criminality itself.[109] And, as the reasons of the judge demonstrate, it was apparent that the applicant considered his 2010 arrest to have been unlawful by the time of his County Court proceedings before Judge Smith.[110]

Question 5 - the judge's 'subject (d)' - proposed grounds 2 & 3

1. That leaves the applicant's submission that the judge erred by failing to find that the associate judge's conclusion that the applicant's claims were statute-barred was incorrect.
2. It was put, first, by the applicant that he had relevantly been under a legal incapacity for a period of time for the purposes of s 27J of the LAA; secondly, it was argued that s 23A of the LAA applied to the applicant's claim thereby permitting an extension of time; and thirdly, that the long stop limitation period applicable to a personal injury claim (12 years) began to run from the date that the applicant 'discovered' his personal injury, namely, on 11 September 2013 or 9 October 2013.
3. The respondents contended that the applicant had failed to identify any error or reason why the judge was wrong to find that the applicant's claims were statute‑barred. The judge had not erred in failing to find that the applicant had been labouring under a relevant legal incapacity. Nor, according to the respondents, had the applicant made any submission of substance concerning why the judge had been wrong to hold that s 23A of the LAA did not apply to his claims. The respondents submitted that it was simply wrong as a matter of law to contend that the 12‑year long stop limitation period did not commence to run until the applicant became aware of his personal injury.
4. The applicant has failed to persuade me that that the judge erred, arguably or otherwise, in the manner that he alleges. There is thus no reason to doubt that the judge was correct to hold that the associate judge had not erred in finding the applicant's claims to be statute‑barred.
5. The judge perceived by reference to the applicant's statement of claim, his written submissions, and an answer given by the applicant to a question asked of him by the judge, that the applicant was not seeking damages for personal injury. The judge considered that it was open to the associate judge to have concluded that this was so.[111] Thus the applicant possessed no general right to seek an extension of time beyond a 6‑year period.[112]
6. Nevertheless, like the associate judge, the judge considered whether to the extent that the applicant was in fact making a claim for personal injuries (sourced in the applicant's reference to 'mental trauma'), such a claim would also have been statute‑barred.
7. As a matter of chronology, the applicant's claims made in respect of the 2010 arrest would still have been barred, even if they had been characterised as personal injury claims and the 12‑year long stop limitation period had applied.
8. Insofar as the applicant's claims concerning the 2012 arrest are concerned, even if these claims were to be characterised as claims for personal injury, I can detect no error in the judge's conclusion that such claims would also have been statute-barred. The 12‑year long stop limitation period might have operated to bring claims of this nature within time; but, contrary to the applicant's submissions, that period would operate from the 'date of the act or omission alleged to have resulted in the ... personal injury with which the action is concerned'.[113] But, crucially - and as the associate judge held - any such claim was discoverable at or about the time of the 2012 arrest; and thus the long stop period could not operate.[114] The judge upheld the associate judge's conclusion in this regard.[115]
9. I can see no error in both judicial officers (the associate judge and the judge) having drawn such conclusions. As is clear, the applicant was - at or around the time of the 2012 arrest - conducting proceedings (including a County Court trial) that included proceedings for the 2010 arrest. Those proceedings continued all the way through to the High Court in 2014. As the associate judge concluded:

It is therefore clear that [the applicant] was aware of his legal rights at the time of the 2012 arrest and that he knew he could take action against the first [respondent] (and did). Despite this, there is no evidence that [the applicant] sought legal or medical advice, or that he sought relief for any condition arising from the 2012 arrest. I am satisfied that, if [the applicant] had taken all reasonable steps at that time, he ought to have known that he had a cause of action for personal injury against the first [respondent] at or about that time. While it is not necessary to set a specific date, I am satisfied that the three year limitation period for this claim for personal injury expired well over 8 years ago.[116]

1. The applicant did not apply to extend time. Nevertheless, I can detect no error on the part of the judge (or, for that matter, the associate judge) in concluding that any application to extend time would possess no real prospect of success.
2. Section 23A of the LAA could not apply to the applicant's situation - as both the judge and associate judge concluded - in the event that the applicant's claims were characterised as claims for personal injury. The applicant's claims were not, as was explained, in respect of 'negligence, nuisance or breach of duty'.
3. And had an extension of time application been made by the applicant under s 27K of the LAA, there is no reason to doubt that the judge and associate judge were both correct to conclude that such an application possessed no real prospect of success. This is so for the reasons that were given by their Honours.[117]
4. Additionally, no reason has been provided which causes me to doubt that the judge was correct to conclude that the associate judge had not erred by failing to hold that time had been suspended by operation of s 27J of the LAA. Although the judge accepted that the applicant had suffered some 'mental trauma' after his arrests, her Honour also observed - importantly - that there was 'no evidence as to whether, and if so how, [the applicant's] medical treatment and rehabilitation had caused a delay in him bringing the proceedings'.[118]
5. As such there was no evidence sufficient to satisfy the definition of 'incapacitated person' located at s 27J(4) of the LAA. It has been held, in respect of a similarly phrased provision, that the kind of impediment required to satisfy the relevant definition

needs to be an impediment that has interfered with the ability of the plaintiff to commence the action within time to an extent sufficient to warrant the suspension of the limitation period.[119]

1. The judge concluded that this evidential precondition had remained unsatisfied; and that this was so in circumstances where it was apparent that over a sustained period - and during the period of claimed incapacity - the applicant had managed, as the judge described it, 'to bring the County Court proceedings in 2010 and pursue them until judgment in 2013, with further applications arising from the County Cout decision to the Court of Appeal and the High Court'.[120]

1. The applicant has failed to demonstrate any error (reasonably arguable or otherwise) in the approach adopted, and the conclusions reached, by the judge. Accordingly, I have been unable to locate any reason which causes me to doubt that the judge was correct to find that the associate judge had not erred in making an order for summary judgement in the respondents' favour and in ordering that the applicant pay the respondents' costs. This being so, I consider that the judge was correct, also, in her determination as to costs in the proceeding before her. The applicant's proposed grounds of appeal have no real prospect of success. The application for leave to appeal must therefore be refused.

[1] Haque v State of Victoria (Supreme Court of Victoria, Ierodiaconou AsJ, 14 May 2024) ('the associate judge's reasons').

[2] Haque v State of Victoria [2024] VSC 703 ('the judge's reasons').

[3] This proceeding was accompanied by a claim for malicious prosecution concerning theft allegedly committed by the applicant in 2008.

[4] Haque v State of Victoria [2013] VCC 1035.

[5] Haque v State of Victoria [2013] VSCA 332. Nor did this Court find any error in Judge Smith's decision regarding the accompanying malicious prosecution claim.

[6] Haque v State of Victoria [2014] HCASL 86. The fate of the applicant's separate proceeding, heard before Judge Smith, is traced in the judge's reasons at [9].

[7] The respondents were served on 28 April 2023.

[8] Haque v State of Victoria [2024] VSC 57 ('the O'Meara J judgment'). The process of obtaining default judgement, its being set aside, and the appeal to O'Meara J is described in the judge's reasons at [11]-‍[14].

[9] That is, an extension of the limitation periods applicable to the applicant's causes of action. See the judge's reasons at [15]. See also the Limitation of Actions Act 1958, s 27K ('LAA').

[10] The associate judge's reasons at [16].

[11] The associate judge's reasons at [18].

[12] The associate judge's reasons at [22].

[13] The associate judge's reasons at [23]. See also Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; [1981] HCA 45.

[14] The associate judge's reasons at [24].

[16] The associate judge's reasons at [25].

[17] The associate judge's reasons at [26].

[19] The associate judge's reasons at [34].

[20] The associate judge's reasons at [36].

[21] The associate judge's reasons at [36].

[22] Under s 5(1AA) of the LAA.

[23] Pursuant to s 27D(1) of the LAA (by operation of the long stop limitation period referable to a claim for personal injury).

[24] LAA, s 5(1AAA).

[25] The associate judge's reasons at [39].

[26] The associate judge's reasons at [40].

[28] The associate judge's reasons at [41]. Section 27D of the LAA sets the limitation period for any cause of action for personal injury as the first to expire either of (a) a period of 3 years from the date the cause of action is discoverable, or (b) 12 years from the date of the alleged act or omission. Sections 27F(1)-‍(3) of the LAA deal with when a cause of action is 'discoverable'.

[29] See s 3(1) of the LAA.

[30] The associate judge's reasons at [43]. At this point the associate judge noted, however, that the applicant - at para 8 of his claim - alleged that he had suffered 'serious mental trauma' and had 'lost his work capacity and require[d] medical treatment for nearly 8-9 years'. But the associate judge observed that this particular paragraph of the applicant's claim referred to the 2010 arrest.

[31] The associate judge's reasons at [45].

[32] See LAA, s 27D(1)(a).

[33] The associate judge's reasons at [45].

[34] The associate judge's reasons at [48].

[38] The associate judge's reasons at [50].

[39] The associate judge's reasons at [51]. See the LAA, ss 3(2), 27.

[40] The associate judge's reasons at [51].

[41] The associate judge's reasons at [52]-[54]. The applicant had submitted that a claim in respect of personal injury was for 'deprivation of liberty' and thus was a claim in tort. It was not one where damages were sought for 'negligence nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of a provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision)' as required by s 23A of the LAA.

[42] The associate judge's reasons at [56].

[43] The associate judge's reasons at [60].

[44] The associate judge's reasons at [61].

[45] The associate judge's reasons at [62]. The associate judge noted, at [63], that a possible extension on the applicant's claim for defamation would be of no assistance to him.

[46] The associate judge's reasons at [65]-[68].

[47] The associate judge's reasons at [69]-[71].

[48] [2013] VSCA 158; (2013) 42 VR 27, 40 [35] (Warren CJ and Nettle JA, Neave JA agreeing at 40 [36]); [2013] VSCA 158.

[49] The associate judge's reasons at [74]-[76].

[50] The associate judge's reasons at [80].

[51] The associate judge's reasons at [87].

[53] The judge's reasons at [17]-[18].

[57] LAA, s 27D(1)(a).

[67] See the judge's reasons at [36].

[68] The judge's reasons at [41]. The judge cited, in support of her conclusion that an associate judge has the power to hear and determine an application for summary judgement, the following authority: Hou v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] VSCA 57, [77] (Whelan and Beach JJA) ('Hou'); Hind v Ronsel Investments Pty Ltd [2024] VSCA 53, [75] (Beach and Lyons JJA); Waddington v Magistrates' Court of Victoria at Dandenong [2013] VSC 101, [12] (Lansdowne AsJ) ('Waddington').

[70] The judge's reasons at [42]-[43].

[73] The judge referred to State Government Insurance Commission v Teal (1990) 2 WAR 105, 114 (Commissioner Williams QC); Carabelas v Scott [2003] SASC 389; (2003) 177 FLR 334, 349 [77] (Doyle CJ, Prior J agreeing at 353 [112], Vanstone J agreeing at 353 [113]); [2003] SASC 389.

[77] The judge's reasons at [56] (emphasis added).

[81] See footnote 75 in the judge's reasons.

[95] The judge's reasons at [85]-[89].

[96] The judge's reasons at [92]. That the applicant had made such an allegation was evident from the judgement of Judge Smith in the County Court.

[98] The judge's reasons at [95]-[96].

[100] The judge's reasons at [27]-[29] (citations omitted).

[102] Emphasis in original. The respondents cited in support of this submission the following authority: Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401; [2009] FCAFC 117 ('Kowalski'); Dimitrovski v Boland [2023] FCAFC 86 ('Dimitrovski'), referring to Macatangay v State of New South Wales [No 2] [2009] NSWCA 272 ('Macatangay'); Hou [2015] VSCA 57; JBS Southern Australia Pty Ltd v Westcity Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 476 ('JBS Southern'); Waddington [2013] VSC 101.

[103] See Hou [2015] VSCA 57, [77] (Whelan and Beach JJA). See also Waddington [2013] VSC 101, [8]-‍[12] (Lansdowne AsJ).

[104] See Kowalski [2009] FCAFC 117; 178 FCR 401, 411 [40]-[43] (Spender, Graham and Gilmour JJ); [2009] FCAFC 117; Dimitrovski [2023] FCAFC 86, [21]-[25] (Markovic, Downes and Kennett JJ); Macatangay [2009] NSWCA 272, [10]-[13] (Allsop P, Tobias JA and Handley AJA). In Macatangay, the court stated at [11]: 'The courts have had a consistent approach to the status of orders for, or to the effect of, summary dismissal since the 19th century: they are interlocutory.' See also JBS Southern [2011] VSC 476, [28]-‍[30] (Croft J).

[105] See the judge's reasons at [43]. Her Honour earlier (at [42]) considered the reasoning of O'Meara J in Haque v State of Victoria [2024] VSC 57, [54]-[57].

[106] Judge Smith found that the police officers had, when arresting the applicant in 2010, made the reason for the arrest clear to him.

[108] The judge's reasons at [88]-[90].

[109] See the judge's reasons at [92].

[111] The judge's reasons at [56]-[59].

[112] See the associate judge's reasons at [51].

[113] Section 27D(1)(b) of the LAA. Those dates were 12 February 2010 and 3 February 2012 respectively.

[114] The associate judge's reasons at [42]-[49].

[115] The judge's reasons at [63]-[64].

[116] The associate judge's reasons at [48] (emphasis in original).

[117] See the reasons of the associate judge at [59]-[62], and the judge's reasons at [60]-[74].

[119] See Guthrie v Spence [2009] NSWCA 369; (2009) 78 NSWLR 225, 252 [152] (Campbell JA, Basten JA agreeing at 228 [1], Handley AJA agreeing at 264 [210]); [2009] NSWCA 369, quoted in Azzam v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] VSC 484, [54] (Zammit J)