Freedom of Information Act 1991 ss 12, 40,

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 8, 37, 56, 57, 58

Coulthard v State of South Australia [2020] FCA 76

South Australian Housing Trust v Brady and Milera [2018] SACAT 2

Re HWS [2018] SACAT 39

Tronnolone v Edwards & Bryan [2016] SACAT 27

Mr Bruce Hull represented by Mr Tim Campbell by telephone

Made under the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 57 and 58

1. By Order made on 6 March 2020 the Tribunal determined an application by Kris Hanna, which sought review of a decision made by the City of Marion ('the Council') on 21 October 2019 pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) ('the FOI Act'), refusing to release to Mr Hanna certain documents held by the Council. The application was dismissed, and the decision made by the Council was affirmed, pursuant to s 37(1)(a) of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ('the SACAT Act').
2. At the commencement of the hearing of Mr Hanna's application, the second respondent, Bruce Hull, at his request and with no objection from Mr Hanna or the Council, was joined as a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal.
3. Mr Hull attended the Tribunal hearing of the application, and was represented at the hearing by Mr Campbell, who made written and oral submissions to the Tribunal on Mr Hull's behalf.
4. On 20 March 2020 an application was made to the Tribunal by Mr Campbell for an order for costs to be paid by Mr Hanna to Mr Hull, pursuant to s 57(2) of the SACAT Act.
5. With his application Mr Campbell provided an affidavit concerning the management of Mr Hull's concerns before the Tribunal, and invoices totalling $4561.70, indicating costs charged to Mr Hull for the conduct of this matter before the Tribunal.
6. No application for costs was received from or on behalf of the Council, and the Council did not appear and was not represented at this hearing, and made no submissions concerning this matter.

1. Mr Campbell submitted that s 57(2) of the SACAT Act empowered the Tribunal to make an order as to costs where it was appropriate to do so, and in addition he referred to s 40(8) of the FOI Act, which provides that the Tribunal may make an order as to costs if it is satisfied that a party has acted unreasonably, frivolously or vexatiously in bringing the proceedings. Mr Hanna's application to the Tribunal was brought pursuant to the FOI Act.
2. Mr Campbell submitted that Mr Hanna had been unreasonable in bringing the proceedings as he knew they had no reasonable prospect of success.
3. Mr Campbell referred the Tribunal to a communication he made to Mr Hanna on 24 December 2019 on behalf of Mr Hull, advising that in his view the application would fail, and if Mr Hanna proceeded with the application, costs on an indemnity basis would be sought against him.
4. Mr Campbell submitted that the Tribunal has a discretionary power to make an order as to costs pursuant to s 57(2) of the SACAT Act, and that it ought exercise that discretion in this matter taking into account the advice to Mr Hanna of 24 December 2019, and that Mr Hanna's application had failed in all aspects of his claim before the Tribunal.
5. Mr Campbell submitted that Mr Hanna had made the application as Mayor of the Council, but he had not been authorised by the Council to do so. He suggested Mr Hanna had only become aware of the existence of the documents sought as Mayor, and accordingly his application was in his role as Mayor. In addition, he submitted that as Mr Hanna is himself a solicitor this gave him special knowledge whereby he should have appreciated that his application had no chance of success. Mr Campbell submitted the application was unreasonable and had little chance of success, and under these it circumstances was a waste of the Tribunal's time and so costs should be awarded against Mr Hanna.
6. Mr Campbell told the Tribunal that Mr Hanna had acted unreasonably in failing to properly consider the likelihood of success of the application. In addition Mr Campbell suggested that the nature of the application and the frailty of Mr Hanna's case should lead the Tribunal to conclude that the application was vexatious or frivolous.
7. Mr Campbell referred to the objectives of the SACAT Act which emphasise, among other things, that the Tribunal is not a court and has a simplified process, and that its accessibility should not be burdened by costs. Nevertheless he submitted there needed to be some gatekeeping to the Tribunal, and this required some merit in the application made to the Tribunal, reflected in s 57(2) of the SACAT Act. He submitted there had been no merit in Mr Hanna's application, as demonstrated by the dismissal by the Tribunal of all aspects of the claim, and the failure of all aspects of Mr Hanna's claim demonstrated its unreasonable nature.
8. Mr Campbell told the Tribunal Mr Hull's costs had been kept to a minimum. However Mr Hanna's application was damaging to Mr Hull as disclosure of the documents sought created significant risks to Mr Hull's reputation and so significantly disadvantaged him, and he had considered he was obliged to seek to be joined as a respondent in order to protect his reputation and circumstances. Mr Campbell noted that Mr Hull's application to be joined as a respondent had not been opposed.
9. Mr Campbell referred the Tribunal to a recent Federal Court decision of Coulthard v State of South Australia [2020] FCA 76, where the Court considered if costs should be awarded where the bringing of an application was unreasonable in that it had no reasonable prospects of success, or the applicant "had failed to give proper consideration to the legal and factual issues which such an application raised". He submitted this was the case in Mr Hanna's application to the Tribunal.

1. Mr Hanna told the Tribunal that s 57(2) of the SACAT Act provides guidance to the Tribunal as to the relevant factors to take into account in considering an application for costs, and that s 40(8) of the FOI Act applies a similar test: that the Tribunal must not award costs unless SACAT is satisfied that the party acted unreasonably, frivolously or vexatiously in the bringing or the conduct of the proceedings. He submitted that the fundamental matter to be considered in an application for costs is that of the accessibility of the Tribunal, and that this principle of accessibility applied as much to him, as an unsuccessful applicant, as to other parties. He submitted that any person should be enabled to challenge the decision of an authority without the fear of costs inhibiting such a challenge.
2. Mr Hanna submitted that the awarding of costs in relation to an action before the Tribunal is not a matter of success in the outcome of the action, and that his application could not be considered unreasonable, vexatious or frivolous, in either the bringing or the conduct of the proceedings.
3. Mr Hanna told the Tribunal that as applicant he had made every effort to narrow the issues before the Tribunal so the hearing was focussed and limited. He had made it clear both prior to and at the hearing of the application that he did not challenge the decision in relation to material subject to legal professional privilege, and nor did he challenge that the documents related to matters personal to Mr Hull. He had acknowledged that the primary issue before the Tribunal was the balancing of the right to know and the right to confidentiality of personal matters. He told the Tribunal he had not opposed Mr Hull being joined as a party because he had not considered this would have further complicated the proceedings, and he submitted that it had not in fact done so. Mr Hanna told the Tribunal that the Tribunal's reasons for decision made it clear that he had made these concessions and the issue of balancing of interests had been the central issue.
4. He submitted that being unsuccessful in an action does not lead to a conclusion that the application was unreasonable.
5. Mr Hanna told the Tribunal that his main point had been that the allegations had been made to the Council and he understood that there had been no investigation made of those allegations, either at the time they were made or subsequently. He believed they should have been investigated and that as Mayor he had a proper interest in ensuring this occurred. As he understood the Council had not conducted an investigation, he had sought the documents to determine to his own satisfaction there was no risk to the Council.
6. Mr Hanna directed the Tribunal's attention (as he had at the hearing) to s 12 of the FOI Act which makes it clear he does not require special standing to make an application under that Act: s 12 provides that a person has a legally enforceable right to be given access to an agency's documents in accordance with this Act. That is, any member of the public may apply for the release of documents.
7. Mr Hanna also submitted that Mr Hull's joinder in the action before the Tribunal was made on his own application but was unnecessary to protect his interests. Mr Hanna suggested that Mr Hull could have sufficiently protected his interests by providing his affidavit and factual matters to be presented by the Council. He submitted that the separate submissions of Mr Hull had added nothing to the material on the substantive issue before the Tribunal, already presented by the Council, and which formed the essence of the Tribunal's decision. Mr Hanna accepted that Mr Hull had incurred financial loss but submitted that in seeking to join the action as a party had placed himself in harm's way in that respect.
8. Mr Hanna also referred to the Federal Court decision in Coulthard v State of South Australia [2020] FCA 76. He told the Tribunal White J in that case indicated that applications for costs should be treated with care, and even if an application is not likely to succeed it should not necessarily be discouraged.
9. He also referred the Tribunal to a decision by Justice Hughes as President of the Tribunal in South Australian Housing Trust v Brady and Milera [2018] SACAT 2 ('Brady and Milera'), where Justice Hughes considered the application of s 57 of the SACAT Act, emphasising that the "overarching principles are that parties bear their own costs unless it is appropriate for the Tribunal to make an order" (para 18). In the same paragraph Justice Hughes refers to the fact that in that case "there was no suggestion that the parties' representatives had conducted themselves in a manner that resulted in 'unnecessary costs'", and Mr Hanna asserted he had not conducted matters in the present matter in a manner that resulted in unnecessary costs.
10. Mr Hanna concluded that his application had not been unreasonable, as he was entitled as a member of the public to seek disclosure of the documents he sought, and in any event he asserted a legitimate interest (albeit one rejected by the Tribunal) in doing so, and the application was not outlandish or amounting to a wild goose chase. In particular he told the Tribunal that the fact that he was a solicitor was beside the point: he had pursued the application because of his position as Mayor and because he had regarded the allegations in the documents as leading to serious concerns.

1. In considering an application for costs following the determination of an application before the Tribunal the Tribunal must have reference to the provisions in the SACAT Act concerning the award of costs. Those provisions are contained primarily in ss 57 and 58 of the SACAT Act. These provisions make it clear that the conventional position before a court, that costs follow the event (that is, a successful litigant is entitled to recover their costs from the other party), is not the starting point in relation to matters heard and determined in the Tribunal.
2. Rather, s 57(1) of the SACAT Act provides that parties are to bear their own costs, unless the Tribunal orders otherwise or there is some other legislative provision relating to the provision of costs in relation to the particular matter. Section 57(1) of the SACAT Act provides as follows:

Unless otherwise specified in this Act, a relevant Act, or an order of the Tribunal under this section, parties bear their own costs in any proceedings before the Tribunal.

1. In considering the principles to be applied to this application for costs I have reference to two earlier decisions of the Tribunal, namely Brady and Milera (5 January 2018), and Re HWS [2018] SACAT 39 (17 October 2018) These decisions consider in detail the general principles concerning the award of costs under the SACAT Act, and I adopt the analyses in those decisions.

General principles concerning the award of costs by the Tribunal

1. Section 57(2) of the SACAT Act provides that the Tribunal may make an order for costs against a party if the Tribunal thinks it is appropriate to do so, after taking into account the following factors:
   • (a) the main objectives of the Act that are relevant to simplifying proceedings and issues before the Tribunal and to keeping costs to parties in proceedings before the Tribunal to a minimum insofar as it is just and appropriate; and
   • (b) the need to ensure that proceedings are fair and that parties are not disadvantaged by proceedings that have little or no merit; and
   • (c) provisions made by the rules; and
   • (d) any other matter considered relevant by the Tribunal.

In Brady and Milera President Hughes emphasised that these factors are all subservient to the overarching proposition set out in s 57(1) of the SACAT Act for the operation of the Tribunal, that parties bear their own costs.

1. The main objectives of the Tribunal are set out in s 8 of the SACAT Act, and these objectives must inform any order for costs made by the Tribunal, and consideration must be given to how any costs order reflects or furthers these objectives.
2. President Hughes in Brady and Milera points out that the need to ensure proceedings are fair and parties are not disadvantaged by proceedings that have little or no merit, recognises that legal proceedings can be used as a tool by one party to achieve ends other than to resolve a legal dispute.
3. Rule 27 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 ("the SACAT Rules") addresses the details required in making an application for costs, but does not add to the factors the Tribunal needs to consider in relation to an application for costs. Rule 4 of the SACAT Rules requires that Tribunal proceedings be conducted efficiently and in a manner proportionate to the matter in dispute. Proportionality includes ensuring that legal and other costs incurred are reasonable and proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matter in dispute, and parties, including legal practitioners representing parties must make their best endeavours to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in proceedings before the Tribunal.
4. Section 57(3) of the SACAT Act provides that where the Tribunal dismisses or strikes out an application in prescribed circumstances the Tribunal should make an order for costs. However this matter was not dismissed in the circumstances prescribed in the Act, and there was no application for it to be struck out.
5. Section 58 of the SACAT Act sets out some additional considerations relevant to a costs order. I note this matter was one which arose in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction, and accordingly s 58(2) applies, which requires the Tribunal in those circumstances to have regard to whether the party genuinely attempted to enable and assist the decision-maker to make a decision on its merits, and whether the party (being the decision-maker) genuinely attempted to make a decision on its merits. However, I am satisfied that these considerations are not relevant in this matter. I am also satisfied that s 58(4) of the SACAT Act, which enables the Tribunal to make a costs order against the representative of a party, rather than the party, in certain circumstances, is of no relevance here, and I note that Mr Hanna represented himself at the hearing.
6. Pursuant to s 57(2)(d) of the SACAT Act the Tribunal may also take into account any other relevant matter, and this gives the Tribunal a wide discretion to consider a wide range of facts, circumstances and conduct in determining if it is appropriate to make an order for costs.
7. Section 57(1) of the SACAT Act refers to a relevant Act which might determine if costs are to be awarded by the Tribunal. Section 40(8) of the FOI Act includes a provision concerning the award of costs in relation to proceedings before the Tribunal.
8. Section 40(8)(a) of the FOI Act provides that where proceedings have been commenced by an agency the Tribunal must order that the agency pay the other party's reasonable costs. In this matter the proceedings were commenced by Mr Hanna, not the agency, so s 40(8)(a) is not relevant. However, s 40(8)(b) provides further:

(b) ... SACAT must not make an order requiring a party to pay any costs of an agency unless SACAT is satisfied that the party acted unreasonably, frivolously or vexatiously in the bringing or conduct of the proceedings.

1. In this matter the party seeking the payment of costs is not the agency (the Council), but Mr Hull, who was joined as a party to the proceedings. On this basis the considerations of s 40(8)(b) are not relevant, but in the hearing the parties made submissions as to whether Mr Hanna had acted unreasonably, frivolously or vexatiously in the bringing or conduct of the proceedings.
2. Section 40(8)(b) of the FOI Act makes it clear the default position is that proceedings under the FOI Act before the Tribunal, where they have been brought against an agency, are not subject to costs. The Tribunal is directed not to make such an order unless significant findings are made in relation to the conduct of the party in the bringing or conduct of the proceedings. Section 40(8)(b) is not applicable to Mr Hull's application for costs against Mr Hanna, but the considerations referred to in that provision may be, in my view, relevant matters to which I can give consideration pursuant to s 57(2)(d) of the SACAT Act.
3. In Tronnolone v Edwards & Bryan [2016] SACAT 27 (24 August 2016) Justice Parker (then President of the Tribunal) made the following comment on the operation and application of s 57 of the SACAT Act:

The clear effect of section 57 of the SACAT Act is that SACAT is generally a no costs jurisdiction, and costs will rarely be awarded. In particular, section 57(2)(b) indicates that costs should only be awarded where a party has been disadvantaged by proceedings that have little or no merit. I do not consider that to be the situation with the present matter. The proceedings were no more or less meritorious than most of the cases that come before the Tribunal. There was clearly a dispute that required adjudication. [at para. 25].

Application of these principles to the present application

1. The costs sought in this matter are set out in the invoices provided by Mr Campbell's firm concerning charges made by his firm to Mr Hull in relation to his proceedings before the Tribunal. They are charges related to Mr Campbell's advice to and representation of Mr Hull in this matter. "Costs" for the purpose of the SACAT Act refers to expenses and losses (see s 58(1) of the SACAT Act). Parties appearing before the Tribunal are entitled to legal representation (see s 56 of the SACAT Act: there is nothing in the FOI Act to preclude this), and so the expenses and losses may extend to representation costs.
2. There was no assertion that these charges did not represent reasonable charges, and I note Mr Hanna did not challenge the nature or reasonableness of the charges.
3. It is my view that costs should not be awarded against Mr Hanna in this matter and the application should be dismissed.
4. Section 57(1) is very clear concerning the default position of the Tribunal: parties bear their own cost in relation to proceedings before the Tribunal.
5. Section 57 permits the Tribunal to make orders as to costs, but it is clear that any order for costs must be consistent with and promote the purposes of the SACAT Act. The main objectives of the Tribunal are set out in s 8 of the SACAT Act, and the most significant in terms of costs orders, are to be found in the following provisions:

(b) to be accessible by being easy ... to access, and to be responsive to parties...

(d) to keep costs to parties involved in proceedings before the Tribunal to a minimum insofar as is just and appropriate

I am satisfied costs in this matter have been managed in a just and appropriate manner by the parties. However, the central concern with respect to the issue of costs is that of access to the Tribunal. The possible award of costs on an unsuccessful party will always represent a burden to access: the imposition of, or possibility of, a costs order will always operate as a significant issue of access. This is a particular consideration in relation to applications to the Tribunal made under the FOI Act, which permits applications for information to be made by anyone: "a person" has a right to obtain information from an agency (see s 12 of the FOI Act), and if refused may make an application to the Tribunal for a review of that decision. The possibility of a costs order in relation to an unsuccessful application to the Tribunal subverts the reality of any person being enabled to seek information from an agency. Access to the Tribunal is a primary objective of the SACAT Act, and the Tribunal in considering whether to award costs must take into account the impact the possibility of a costs order may have on the objective of accessibility.

1. The submissions for Mr Hull focussed principally on the assertion that Mr Hanna's application was comprehensibly dismissed in all aspects by the Tribunal in its decision of 6 March 2020, and as a consequence, it should be seen as particularly meritless, and it followed it was therefore unreasonable to bring the application in the first place. In addition, Mr Campbell argued that he had advised Mr Hanna prior to the Tribunal proceedings that if the matter proceeded and was unsuccessful (as Mr Campbell had suggested to Mr Hanna it would be) Mr Hull would seek indemnity costs, and that Mr Hanna, the applicant in those proceedings, should have appreciated, as a solicitor himself, the risk that his application might fail and he might be exposed to costs. Under these circumstances Mr Hanna should pay the costs of the proceedings before the Tribunal. Allied to this submission was the assertion that Mr Hull had no effective choice but to be joined as a party in order to protect his reputation and circumstances should the documents sought by Mr Hanna be publicly disclosed.
2. I do not accept any of these submissions in this matter.
3. It is the case that Mr Hanna's application was comprehensively dismissed by the Tribunal. Mr Campbell's submission raises the issue referred to in s 57(2)(b) of the SACAT Act, that the Tribunal must ensure the proceedings are fair and that parties are not disadvantaged by proceedings that have little or no merit. However, as Mr Hanna submitted, and I accept, lack of success in terms of the outcome does not necessarily lead to the inevitable conclusion that the initial application was without merit, unreasonable and should not have been made. I refer to President Parker's statement in Tronnolone, that [T]he proceedings [in that matter] were no more or less meritorious than most of the cases that come before the Tribunal. There was clearly a dispute that required adjudication. I am satisfied that there was a dispute in the substantive matter which came before the Tribunal that required adjudication.
4. In addition, to characterise an application which has not been successful before the Tribunal (even "comprehensively" unsuccessful) as one that should attract a costs order because it must have been of little or no merit and so disadvantaged the other party, is to undermine the fundamental proposition of s 57(1), that the Tribunal is a costs free jurisdiction except in very limited circumstances. To argue that because an application was unsuccessful it had little or no merit and therefore may attract a costs order against the applicant proposes a back door means of subverting that overarching proposition for the operation of the Tribunal, that parties bear their own costs.
5. Nor do I accept the submissions that because Mr Hanna is a solicitor (representing himself before the Tribunal), and because Mr Campbell had advised him that in his view the application was likely to fail and in that case he would seek costs against him, it was peculiarly inappropriate or unreasonable for Mr Hanna to pursue his application before the Tribunal. That Mr Hanna is a solicitor may well have provided him with some insights as to the likely success of his application, but he was a solicitor representing himself in proceedings before the Tribunal and I do not accept it is the case that a self-representing solicitor is subject to reduced access and greater risk, through costs, in making an application to the Tribunal, than other persons.
6. I am also satisfied that Mr Hanna's substantive application was a dispute that required adjudication, and under those circumstances was an appropriate application capable of being made to the Tribunal.
7. In his submissions to the Tribunal Mr Campbell referred to the need for some notion of "gatekeeping" in relation to applications before the Tribunal, and also referred to President Hughes' comment in Brady and Milera (see para. 19), that

The need to ensure proceedings are fair and that parties are not disadvantaged by proceedings that have little or no merit recognises that legal proceedings can be used as tool by one party to achieve ends other than to resolve the legal dispute.

1. I accept as accurate general principles the submissions made by Mr Campbell. However I do not accept that Mr Hanna's application in this matter was so without merit that it should not have been made to the Tribunal, with the implication that there was nothing arguable in its favour, and so the respondent (the Council) was significantly disadvantaged in being required to defend the application. I am satisfied that the application was, in President Parker's terms in Tronnolone, no more or less meritorious than most of the cases that come before the Tribunal, and that there was clearly a dispute that required adjudication.
2. The second point made by Mr Campbell, and to which President Hughes' comment in Brady and Milera pertains, is whether the application was not just unmeritorious, but was a front with some other purpose than the resolution of legal dispute, namely that Mr Hanna was seeking information about Mr Hull in order to politically discredit him. Mr Hanna indicated at the hearing that he strenuously objected to this suggestion, and it was not pursued either at the hearing of this costs application, nor at the hearing of the substantive application. In my view, to establish such an assertion it would be necessary to demonstrate some clear and deliberate decision taken by reference to extraneous circumstances unrelated to the prospects of success. I am not satisfied there is any material before me to lead to any conclusion that Mr Campbell's suggestion has credibility, and in any event I am satisfied that the application did demonstrate a legal dispute which required adjudication.
3. Section 57(2)(a) and (b) of the SACAT Act set out mandatory considerations for the Tribunal. I am satisfied they support no order as to costs.
4. In terms of simplifying proceedings and keeping costs to the parties to a minimum (see s 57(2)(a) of the SACAT Act), I am satisfied that a dismissal of this application is appropriate. With reference to the requirement contained in s 57(2)(b), namely the requirement to ensure that the proceedings are fair and parties are not disadvantaged by proceedings with little or no merit, this aspect is addressed above, and I am satisfied the application was an appropriate one for the respondent to defend and the Tribunal to adjudicate.
5. Section 57(2)(d) empowers the Tribunal to also take into account any other matter it considers relevant. The Tribunal heard extensive submissions as to whether Mr Hanna had acted unreasonably, frivolously or vexatiously in the bringing or conduct of the proceedings, with reference to s 40(8)(b) of the FOI Act.
6. I have indicated that in my view s 40(8)(b) of the FOI Act is not strictly relevant to the application as the costs are sought not in relation to the agency but for Mr Hull, a separate party (at his own request) joined to the proceedings, but I am satisfied these considerations, addressed by the parties, are relevant considerations for me to take into account pursuant to s 57(2)(d) of the SACAT Act.
7. I am satisfied that Mr Hanna's application, and his conduct of the proceedings, cannot be characterised as unreasonable, frivolous or vexatious.
8. I have addressed the issue of reasonableness above, and I am satisfied that the ultimate lack of success of the application in the Tribunal is not enough of itself to make the application unreasonable, or the conduct of the proceedings relating to it unreasonable. Such a conclusion would undermine the fundamental proposition of s 57(1) of the SACAT Act, that parties bear their own costs in any proceedings before the Tribunal: in most proceedings before the Tribunal, as in any litigation, there will be a losing party. Mr Campbell suggested the application and proceedings were vexatious in his suggestion that Mr Hanna was pursuing some agenda other than the resolution of a legal dispute, namely a political agenda, but this was objected to and denied by Mr Hanna and was not pursued by Mr Campbell, and I am not satisfied it is established. These are the same considerations as discussed above in the context of whether there was any merit in the application or whether it was using the Tribunal as a front for another purpose, other than the resolution of a legal dispute. Other than in the general context of the submissions that the application was unreasonable, it was not argued that the application was frivolous.
9. I also note some other issues raised by Mr Hanna. In particular he submitted that Mr Hull had made his own application to be joined as a party, thus seeking the benefits of being a party to the proceedings (including being able to act as direct agent in presenting his own case, rather than relying on the issues raised by the Council), and also attracting possible disadvantages, including incurring the cost of the proceedings within a jurisdiction where as a general rule parties bear their own costs. Mr Hanna submitted that Mr Hull could have relied on the response of the Council against whom the application had been made to protect his interests, and could have provided his affidavit evidence through the Council rather than separately on his own behalf.
10. I accept that Mr Hull had significant concerns about the application and was understandably keen to protect his reputation and take whatever steps were available to him to do so. However I also accept Mr Hanna's submissions on this matter: Mr Hull sought to be joined as a parry in the proceedings and in doing so takes on the risk of engaging in proceedings before the Tribunal, and one risk of which he must have been aware was the risk of not recovering costs even if he were successful, given the legislative prescription in s 57 of the SACAT Act.
11. For these reasons I am satisfied costs should not be awarded to Mr Hull, and the application will be dismissed.

1. The application for costs to be paid by the applicant to the second respondent Mr Hull is dismissed.