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[2013] AATA 127
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
2013-03-12
Original judgment source is linked above.
The Tribunal affirms the objection decisions of the Commissioner of Taxation dated
16 April 2010 relating to the 2004 and 2005 income years.
.....[sgd Egon Fice]...................................................................
TAXATION - research and development activities - research and development expenditure - research and development deductions - tax offset - the meaning of expenditure incurred - expenditure incurred not at arm's length - eligible feedstock expenditure - substantiation of research and development expenditure - burden of proof - depreciation assets - company books as evidence - penalties - remission of penalties
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1305
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 51, 73B, 73B(1A), 73B(1AB), 73B(2B), 73B(12A), 73B(14), 73B(31), 73BA, 73BC, 73BD, 73BE, 73BG, 73BH, 73IA, 73I, 73J, 73Y, 160ZH, 226G, 226H, 226J, 226K, 226L, 226M
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 8-1, 40-25, 40-100, 40-105, 40-110, 67-30, 70-45
Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (Cth) ss 39AA, 39L, 39S, 39T
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 14ZW, 14ZZK, 284-75, 284-80, 284-85, 284-90, 284-220, 284-225, 298-20
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27
Allen (As Trustee of the Allen's Asphalt Staff Superannuation Fund) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 80 ATR 849
Aurora Developments v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 196 FCR 457
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 417; (2005) 191 FLR 385
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229; (2009) 236 FLR 1
A W Furse No 5 Will Trust v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 21 ATR 1123
Coles Myer Finance Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1993] HCA 29; (1993) 176 CLR 640
Commissioner of Taxation v Dixon (Trustee) (2007) 67 ATR 87
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v AXA Asia Pacific Holdings Ltd [2010] FCAFC 134; (2010) 189 FCR 204
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citylink Melbourne Ltd [2006] HCA 35; (2006) 228 CLR 1
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco [1990] HCA 3; (1990) 168 CLR 614
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v James Flood Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 65; (1953) 88 CLR 492
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Traviati (2012) 205 FCR 136
GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 50; (2003) 128 FCR 1
Gibson Motor Sport Merchandise Pty Ltd v Robert James Forbes [2005] FCA 749
Granby Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 129 ALR 503
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24
MLC Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 1491; (2002) 126 FCR 37
Nielsen Development Laboratories Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 6; (1981) 144 CLR 616
Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1963] HCA 21; (1963) 109 CLR 9
North Ryde RSL Community Club Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 121 FCR 1
QFL Photographics Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation [2010] AATA 758
Re Hains (deceased); Barnsdall v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 ATR 1352
Explanatory Memorandum to the Income Tax Assessment Amendment (Research and Development) Bill 1986
Mahoney, Berger, and Wolff, Century 21 Accounting (Australian Edition, South Western Publishing and Co, 1972)
Seddon NC and Ellinghaus MP, Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (9th Australian ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008)
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed, 1983)
Aerogel tubing and aerogel technology licence fee (Described more generally as 'Materials' and 'licence fee')
Rent for facilities used for experimentation on R & D project
Utilities used in experimentation processes in R & D project
Aerogel tubing (referred to as materials or Coated fiber optic coils)
Rent for facilities used for experimentation on R & D project
Utilities used in experimentation processes in R & D project
(1AAA) The object of this section is to provide a tax incentive, in the form of a deduction, to make eligible companies more internationally competitive by:
...
The benefits of the tax incentive are targeted by being limited to particular expenditure on certain defined activities.
[Deduction for non-contracted expenditure] Deduction for research and development expenditure. Subject to this section, where:
(a) an eligible company incurs research and development expenditure (other than contracted expenditure) during a year of income; and
(b) the aggregate research and development amount in relation to the company in relation to the year of income is greater than $20,000,
the amount of that expenditure multiplied by 1.25 is allowable as a deduction from the assessable income of the company of the year of income.
If an eligible company has a notional Division 40 deduction for a section 73BA depreciating asset for a year of income, the company is entitled to a deduction under this section for the asset for the year of income.
If the eligible company's aggregate research and development amount for the year of income is more than $20,000, the deduction is equal to the notional Division 40 deduction multiplied by 1.25. If not, it equals the notional Division 40 deduction.
An eligible company has a notional Division 40 deduction for a section 73BA depreciating asset for a year of income if it would be entitled to a deduction under section 40-25 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 for the asset for the year of income assuming the changes set out in this section were made.
On an application for review of a reviewable objection decision:
(a) ...
(b) the applicant has the burden of proving that:
- (i) ...
- (ii) ...
- (iii) in any other case - the taxation decision concerned should not have been made or should have been made differently.
research and development expenditure, in relation to an eligible company in relation to a year of income, means expenditure (other than core technology expenditure, interest expenditure, feedstock expenditure, excluded plant expenditure or expenditure incurred in the acquisition or construction of a building or of an extension, alteration or improvement to a building) incurred by the company during the year of income, being:
(a) contracted expenditure of the company;
(b) salary expenditure of the company, being expenditure incurred on or after 1 July 1985; or
(c) other expenditure incurred on or after 1 July 1985 directly in respect of research and development activities carried on by or on behalf of the company on or after 1 July 1985;
and includes any eligible feedstock expenditure that the company has in respect of related research and development activities.
the uncertainty of obtaining the outcome can be removed only through a program of systematic, investigative and experimental activities in which scientific method has been applied, in a systematic progression of work (based on principles of physical, biological, chemical, medical, engineering or computer sciences) from hypothesis to experiment, observation and evaluation, followed by logical conclusions.
R & D tax offset. He should therefore be familiar with recordkeeping requirements necessary for eligible research and development claims in general and in relation to claiming the R & D tax offset in particular.
A book kept by a body corporate under a requirement of this Act is admissible in evidence in any proceeding and is prima facie evidence of any matter stated or recorded in the book.
In my view the true meaning of the words "prima facie" lies between the alternatives identified in the defendants' submission. The statement in s. 1305(1) that the company's books are prima facie evidence of a matter stated or recorded in them does more than merely to convey that they are the starting point to proof or a "first view". All other things being equal, the fact that a matter is stated in a book kept by a company is sufficient to prove that matter in civil proceedings. That does not reverse the onus of proof in the proceedings in any general way, but it means that the tendering of the book is evidence of the matter recorded in it, and that the matter will be thereby proven unless other evidence convinces the tribunal of fact to the contrary, on the balance of probabilities.
This is a new provision based on s-sec 156(3) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act. It is an evidentiary provision that is intended to expedite legal proceedings where books are to be introduced in evidence. This provision obviates the need to call witnesses to prove that the books are books of the corporation when this fact is not in question or to prove transactions recorded in books or when these matters are not in dispute.
In my view it would be open to the tribunal of fact to find that the prima facie evidence constituted by the company's books is outweighed by other evidence (including evidence adduced by the proponent of the books, even if the opponent does not give evidence about them); or by some quality or characteristic of the books themselves, even if there is no other evidence. In particular, if a book has the appearance of a draft or (being electronic) has a file title indicating that it is the draft, that alone may be sufficient (all other things being equal) for the tribunal of fact to reject the book as evidence of the matter stated in it, notwithstanding that the book is prima facie evidence of that matter; a fortiori if, in addition to having the appearance of a draft, the book contains inconsistencies or ambiguities or the matter otherwise demands explanation.
Therefore s 1305(1) allows a company's books to be introduced into evidence as they are, without any "authenticating" evidence by any witness, and allows the books to be relied upon to prove transactions recorded in them. But it does not elevate matters contained in the books to a plane of probative value that requires the court to disregard the context in which the matters relied on appear in the tendered document. If, for example, there is some doubt as to whether a particular transaction is "recorded" in a book because of some uncertainty about the status of the document or ambiguity about what it contains, s 1305(1) does not overcome the problem.
... Absent such a confining of the issues for determination, the Commissioner is entitled to rely upon any deficiency in proof of the excessiveness of the amount assessed to uphold the assessment, though the taxpayer is limited to the grounds of his objection. In Gauci v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (44), Mason J. said:
"The Act does not place any onus on the Commissioner to show that the assessments were correctly made. Nor is there any statutory requirement that the assessments should be sustained or supported by evidence. The implication of such a requirement would be inconsistent with s. 190(b) for it is a consequence of that provision that unless the appellant shows by evidence that the assessment is incorrect, it will prevail."
That view, expressed in a dissenting judgment, now prevails: Macmine Pty. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation (45); McCormack's Case (46).
8 September 2003 in the amount of £14,350. That document describes the services provided as:
Engineering services in connection with solar tiles and solar pave using Glass reinforced concrete GRC) in your "Environmentally friendly house" development project.
R & D Consulting's role was to manage the project to design, develop and test the integration of the light guides into a building. R & D Consulting did not do any design and development work itself. R & D Consulting located and subcontracted this work to other building and engineering specialists.
The research will be in assisting in the management, work flow and integrated systems required to build in all the aspects of an environmentally friendly economic building being undertaken by the Corporation [HFN]. Currently no such total system exists anywhere in the world predominantly because the building industry is very slow to uptake new technology. Sub contracts and licences will be implemented by Licere to handle various aspects of the research such as Scallan Wall and integration of electrical conduits etc. at the time of the pouring of the concrete in situ; the bringing of natural light into a building by tubes conveying sunlight; biometric access and security systems linked to security centres; smarthome wireless whole house technology; built in voice over IP for telephony, conferencing and IP driven video. In addition, Licere has association with building company DTC Construction who will help implement.
In the marketing phase Licere has associates who currently own and are building 700 low cost homes in Shepparton and a resort development with the retail value of $300m. If your development is successful the entire system can be implemented in these projects.
Arrange for the incorporation of the HFN solar collector and light-guide into a low cost building system. This will initially be done together with a company Ladyhill Pty Ltd and 7 Stars Building Products Pty Ltd. (Currently being formed).
It is the intention to Research the incorporation of the Light-guides and solar collector into the Building panels.
Draft drawings are attached.
All of the activities were carried out in Warrandyte, Victoria, and the Poly Optics Australia Pty Ltd facility in Queensland. The exception to this was that one consultant, Mr van der Matten, an engineering specialist previously with the European Space Program who provided materials knowledge which was relevant to the project.
There was no R&D carried out overseas. The purchase of the feedstock material from the USA was coated tubing used in the ordinary course of the R&D. This was sent under the Licere contract to Poly Optics where it was used in [sic] by changing the core material iteratively in trying to arrive at a tubing which would transmit sunlight into a building. All the R&D was carried out in Australia and has been clearly demonstrated to AusIndustry together with invoices, photographs of 'spent' material etc (Also sent to ATO).
TECHNOLOGY LICENCE FEE AND COST OF AEROGEL TUBING
A light guide is disclosed and includes a flexible elongated tube having an inner surface and a first and second ends. A non-supercritically dried hydrophobic aerogel film is affixed to the inner surface of the tube as a cladding layer, and a fluid core is disposed within the tube. The fluid core has a refractive index greater than the refractive index of the aerogel cladding film.
All Parties with interests in the License will agree:
that the license and inventory may be paid by way of note convertible to any form of participation agreed for value given in the entity commercialising the rights to the developed product if not HADRIAN FRAVAL NOMINEES of not less than a 6% return on capital, and...
The common, often fatal, difficulty experienced by a party in seeking to make out a contract to vary has been the evidentiary one of proof of the contract itself: see Liebe v Malloy, above; Trimis v Mina, above at [64].
(3) For an alleged subsequent variation to be contractually effective notwithstanding non-compliance with the written modification requirement, it must itself otherwise satisfy the requirements of a valid contract, i.e. "the terms of the arrangement must be certain, and... there must generally be real consideration for the agreement":...
(6) Though lacking legal effect in the face of the subsequent oral or implied agreement, it seems to be accepted that a no oral modification clause can have significant evidentiary effect. As Holm's J commented in Bartlett v Stanchfield, above: "the [clause] is a fact to be taking into account in interpreting the subsequent conduct of the plaintiff and defendant";...
...Absence of a formal business transfer agreement and valuation of assets are not determinative of whether there was a transfer of ABC's assets and liabilities.
Arrangements between closely related entities can be expected to be transacted without the same level of documentation that independent parties might bring into existence. Just because there is an absence of formality in the manner in which the transaction is effected does not mean the transaction was not effected; and it is not for the Commissioner, or the Tribunal on review, to dictate to the taxpayer the manner in which the transactions ought be effected.
It is for the Commissioner, and the Tribunal on review, to take the transactions as effected and determine how the Assessment Act applies to them. Moreover, the scheme of the Assessment Act recognises that parties who do not have an arm's length relationship might enter transactions on terms, or in a manner, different to those who do have an arm's length relationship. The market value substitution rule is one illustration. The scheme of that and similar rules is that the transfer of the rights involved in the transaction as entered is to be recognised and the Assessment Act substitutes values to be attributed to those transactions for the purposes of determining tax liability where the threshold conditions enlivening their operation are met.
Both Flood and Nilsen take up and apply the statement of Dixon J. in New Zealand Flax Investments Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1):
"'Incurred' does not mean only defrayed, discharged, or borne, but rather it includes encountered, run into, or fallen upon. It is unsafe to attempt exhaustive definitions of a conception intended to have such a various or multifarious application. But it does not include a loss or expenditure which is no more than impending, threatened, or expected."
As his Honour said, to come within the relevant provision, which was the predecessor of s. 51 (1), "there must be a loss or outgoing actually incurred" (1).
But it is not enough to establish the existence of a loss or outgoing actually incurred. It must be a loss or outgoing of revenue character and it must be properly referable to the year of income in question (2). So it was that in New Zealand Flax the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct all payments of interest in future years notwithstanding that it had incurred a liability to pay them in the accounting period under assessment.
R & D tax offset claim, he answered: That is my statement. Yes. 7. Dr Fraval was then asked who it was that spoke to the person at the ATO, whether it was him or Mr Sachlan Fraval. He said: I think it must have been Sachlan, not me. When it was then put to him that Mr Sachlan Fraval came to him and indicated there was a problem with the convertible note, Dr Fraval said he did not think his previous answer was correct. He said: I think what had happened was, when he had a meeting with Desiree Beasley and Carmen Van Gusen, who are the R&D tax concession managers - whatever they call themselves, they were our - clearly, of - and I was there. But I don't know whether that was - your question was who first did it. I don't know that that was first or whether Sachlan contacted them. But, at a meeting that I was present at, both Carmen Van Gusen and Desiree Beasley said this was not an acceptable method, according to the ATOs R&D tax concession regulations - rules - whatever. So I had a physical meeting, where they were there and they made that statement. But I don't know whether, I mean, that was already known to Sachlan or not, before that date. 8. Mr Sachlan Fraval said in his amended witness statement that he did some research after he prepared the terms of the convertible note which disclosed there could be technical difficulties if the loan (sic - debt) was converted to equity which could impact on the
R & D tax concession. He said he did his research sometime during the 30 June 2005 year. Mr Sachlan Fraval testified that he mentioned the problems to Dr Fraval who told him the convertible note should be changed to a loan. He then said: I believe that the "convertible" nature of the loan (sic) note was abandoned during the 30 June 2005 year by agreement between HFN and Translight that was made during discussions held between Hadrian, Hanafi and me. The note was ever (sic) converted into shares by HFN. I disclosed the $480,000 as a loan in the accounts of HFN for the 30 June 2005 year. 9. It should be apparent from the above that the evidence regarding the licence fee agreement purportedly made on 8 July 2003 was wholly unsatisfactory. It is unclear who drafted that document. However, accepting for the moment that there was such an agreement between Translight and HFN, then it would appear to be in the terms expressed in that document because, on its face, clause 12.3 provides that amendments can only be made in writing as agreed by all parties. Absent any evidence that Translight and HFN entered into an oral agreement for which consideration was given, I cannot conclude that the parties entered into an agreement to alter the terms of their written agreement so that the payment said to have been made by way of convertible note subsequently became a loan. Therefore, I cannot accept Dr Bender's submissions regarding oral amendments to those terms. Furthermore, I did not have in evidence any other document by which the terms of the purported agreement were amended. 10. The terms of the purported agreement clearly provided that payment of the licence fee as well as the cost of inventory may be made by way of a convertible note to any form of participation agreed. This of course is despite the fact that clause 3.1 of the document provides that the licence fee and the costs of inventory were to be paid from the Effective date. I understand that expression to mean that the US$25,000 and US$306,135 became due and payable on 7 July 2003 despite the fact that I have found the document was drafted in 2004. Putting aside that small problem, it is clear from clause 3.4 that if HFN issued a convertible note to Translight after July 2003, then the liability to pay the licence fee and the cost of inventory was extinguished. 11. On 30 June 2004 Dr Fraval signed a document on Translight letterhead paper as managing director of HFN acknowledging and agreeing that Translight was the holder of a convertible note in HFN. It appears that Dr Fraval treated that document as the convertible note because that was the evidence in his witness statement. While the document itself is plainly deficient as it appears to be open-ended with no conversion date noted, and the conversion broadly states that it will be to equity but does not set out, for example, any particular class of shares which would issue, there is no reason why that confirmation was not intended to extinguish HFN's liability to pay Translight the monetary sum for the licence fee and the cost of materials (tubing) it acquired. In fact, I find that it did. Therefore, as at 30 June 2004, it cannot be said that HFN was liable to pay Translight a pecuniary sum. It follows that at this point in time at least, it cannot be said that HFN incurred core technology expenditure in respect of the licence fee. 12. The evidence indicates that this problem was drawn to the attention of Dr Fraval and Mr Sachlan Fraval by Ms Beasley and Ms Van Gusen from the ATO. In his cross-examination Dr Fraval said: we were told this was not a preferred method that the ATO recognised. And, therefore, it was converted into a loan. In his witness statement Dr Fraval said he did not recall the date on which the convertible note was changed to a loan. In cross-examination, Dr Fraval said it was about 2005/6. Mr Sachlan Fraval said in his amended witness statement that he believed the convertible nature of what he described as the loan note was abandoned during the 30 June 2005 year by agreement made during discussions between Dr Fraval, Hanafi and himself. 13. There are other serious problems with the claims made by Dr Fraval and Mr Sachlan Fraval regarding the abandonment or change of the convertible note into a loan. Despite the letter of 30 June 2004 signed by Dr Fraval confirming that Translight was the holder of the convertible note, which, in accordance with the agreement, constituted payment and therefore discharge of any pecuniary liability to Translight, HFN nevertheless purported to treat the convertible note as a long-term loan from Translight. This is stated in the Commissioner's reasons for decision regarding the objection in respect of the 2004 income year which was issued on 18 November 2009. 14. Furthermore, attached to Mr Sachlan Fraval's witness statement is a number of what he described as reconstructed accounting records for the 2004 year. According to Mr Sachlan Fraval, Mr Christiansz, who was HFN's former accountant, had its records but following his conviction on fraud charges, HFN was unable to recover its documents. He said the accounts were reconstructed using some source documents and other information provided by Dr Fraval. He also said that an invoice was initially issued by Translight to HFN for the US dollar amount ($331,153) but that a second invoice was subsequently issued by Translight in the Australian dollar amount being $479,901. A copy of that second invoice was attached to his witness statement. However, curiously, although also dated 30 June 2004, the Australian dollar invoice in the amount of $479,907 refers only to the supply of coated fibre optic coils delivered to Poly Optics via Rofin Australia for use in natural sunlight research. There is no mention of the licence fee component which, according to the first invoice, is embedded in that sum. 15. As for the reconstructed accounts, they also contain anomalies. In the Statement of Financial Performance for the year ended 30 June 2004, if HFN incurred expenditure in acquiring the tubing material and the right to use the licence, one would ordinarily expect to see an expense item relating to the licence fee and the materials acquired by HFN. This is particularly so because Mr Sachlan Fraval and Dr Fraval maintained that the licence fee was payable annually in each of three years and the tubing material was intended to be consumed in the course of R & D activities. There is no such item in that statement. The explanation appears to be found in the General Ledger which is also a reconstructed document. In the account entitled Loan Translight, which is a liability account, there is a credit entry on 30 June 2004 for materials supplied in the amount of $480,000. Once again, there is no mention of the licence fee. The balancing entry (although short by $92.91 which appears to have been made up by adding this amount to one of the other entries in the General Ledger) is a debit in the amount of $479,907.09 on 30 June 2004 in an asset account called Environmental Home Development which is described as capitalised costs - materials used in R&D. In other words, that expenditure has been treated as the acquisition of a capital item. 16. If one then looks at the Statement of Financial Position as at 30 June 2004, which in fact is a Balance Sheet setting out the assets and liabilities of the company for the 2004 financial year, there is an entry described as Intangible assets in the amount of $479,907. It appears that, without any explanation, the capitalised costs of materials used in research and development, including the right to use the patent acquired by Translight, has become an intangible asset. The problem of course is that R & D expenditure, in order to attract concessional tax treatment, must be deductible against the revenue account. 17. Therefore, in my opinion, the attempt by Dr Fraval and Mr Sachlan Fraval to revive the pecuniary liability extinguished by the convertible note by converting the claimed liability of $480,000 into a capital item must necessarily fail. That expenditure is not deductible against revenue. In addition, it was a retrospective attempt to expunge from the agreement the convertible note clause because the ATO had subsequently advised Dr Fraval and Mr Sachlan Fraval that the claimed issue of the convertible note had removed the pecuniary liability of HFN to pay Translight the licence fee and for the materials it had acquired. It follows I must find that HFN did not incur core technology expenditure in acquiring the rights under the purported licence agreement. Accordingly, I need not determine whether the licence fee of US $25,000 was only payable on one occasion or whether that sum was payable in each of three years. 18. The considerations I have referred to above, save for the convertible note, apply equally to the 2005 income year where HFN claimed expenditure for the licence fee of $36,232. There is no such entry in the general ledger as at 30 June 2005. There was no other evidence of that expenditure having been incurred.
"feedstock expenditure", in relation to an eligible company, means expenditure incurred by the company in acquiring or producing materials or goods to be the subject of processing or transformation by the company in research and development activities, and includes expenditure incurred by the company on any energy input directly into the processing or transformation.
[Eligible feedstock expenditure] For the purposes of this section, an eligible company has eligible feedstock expenditure in respect of a year of income in relation to related research and development activities if the company's feedstock input in respect of the year of income in relation to those activities exceeded the company's feedstock output in respect of the year of income in relation to those activities, and the amount of the excess constitutes the company's eligible feedstock expenditure in respect of the year of income in relation to those activities.
73B (31) [Expenditure incurred not at arm's length] Where -
(a) an eligible company has incurred an amount of research and development expenditure, an amount of core technology expenditure, or an amount of expenditure in the acquisition or construction of plant, a building or an extension, alteration or improvement to a building for use by the company exclusively for the purpose of carrying on by or on behalf of the company of research and development activities; and
(b) the Commissioner is satisfied that -
- (i) having regard to any connection between the company and the person to whom the expenditure was incurred and to any other relevant circumstances, the company and that other person were not dealing with each other at arm's length in relation to the incurring of that expenditure; and
- (ii) the amount of that expenditure would have been less if the company and that other person had dealt with each other at arm's length in relation to the incurring of that expenditure,
so much only of that expenditure as the Commissioner considers reasonable having regard to -
(c) the connection between the company and that other person;
(d) the amount of the expenditure that would, in the opinion of the Commissioner, have been incurred by the company if the company and that other person had dealt with each other at arm's length in relation to the incurring of that expenditure; and
(e) such other matters as the Commissioner considers relevant, shall be taken into account for the purposes of this section.
If the term were simply "not at arm's length", Australian Trade Commission v WA Meat Exports Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 287 would apply....
However, s 26AAA(4) used the expression "not dealing with each other at arm's length". That term should not be read as if the words "dealing with" were not present. The Commissioner is required to be satisfied not merely of a connection between a taxpayer and the person to whom the taxpayer transferred, but also of the fact that they were not dealing with each other at arm's length. A finding as to a connection between the parties is simply a step in the course of reasoning and will not be determinative unless it leads to the ultimate conclusion.
I have no real difficulty with any of the propositions which emerge from those cases. They may be summarised as follows:
... It follows from this consideration that, if conduct of parties is not consistent with conduct of independent third parties, because one party is exerting personal influence or control over the other or others, dealings between them cannot be termed "arm's length."
If the parties to the transaction are at arm's length it will follow, usually, that the parties will have dealt with each other at arm's length. That is, the separate minds and wills of the parties will be applied to the bargaining process whatever the outcome of the bargain may be.
That is not to say, however, that parties at arm's length will be dealing with each other at arm's length in a transaction in which they collude to achieve a particular result, or in which one of the parties submits to the exercise of its will to the dictation of the other, perhaps, to promote the interests of the other. As in Minister of National Revenue v Merritt 69 DTC 5159 at 5166 where the parties to the transaction were parties at arm's length, the terms of a loan transaction made between them had been dictated by a unilateral decision of one of them and no independent will in the formation of that transaction had been exercised by the other. It followed that it could not be said that the parties had dealt with each other at arm's length at the material time: cf Robinson v Minister of National Revenue [1987] 1 CTC 2055.
Whether parties not at arm's length had dealt with each other at arm's length will be a matter of fact. As Hill J stated in Furse at 4015, determination of the manner in which the parties not at arm's length had dealt with each other requires "an assessment whether in respect of that dealing they dealt with each other as arm's length parties would normally do, so that the outcome of their dealing is a matter of real bargaining".
31 December 2004 should have disclosed inventory remaining. It does not. As I have already indicated, the accounts are unreliable. 15. Having determined the dispute between HFN and the Commissioner as to the nature of the expenditure on aerogel coated Ionimer tubing for the purposes of s. 73B of ITAA 1936, that is whether the expenditure should be regarded as feedstock expenditure or research and development expenditure, I should address whether any expenditure was in fact incurred in acquiring tubing. This is a troubling issue given the long-standing association between HFN, Rofin, Translight, Poly Optics and Mosquito Free Pty Ltd. 16. In cross-examination Mr Joseph confirmed that Mr Sachlan Fraval held about 3% of the shares in Poly Optics and that he was a director between about 2001 to about 2009 or 2010. He confirmed that Poly Optics had a long association with HFN, Dr Fraval and Rofin. In his amended witness statement, Mr Sachlan Fraval did not disclose that he had been a director and shareholder of Poly Optics. Mr Joseph confirmed that the aerogel coated Ionimer tubing was shipped from Rofin to Poly Optics in Queensland in about 2004. He said he believed there were two shipments. He did not know how much tubing was left in Melbourne for HFN or how much of the tubing was sent to Poly Optics. He said Poly Optics had a substantial quantity but he did not know whether it was two thirds or three quarters or 90% of the total. He said that at the end of conducting experiments on behalf of HFN, he did not think that any tubing material was left over or, if there was, it was a very small quantity. 17. Mr Joseph was then asked to look at the four invoices addressed to Poly Optics, all of which were dated 12 December 2004. He could not explain why all four invoices were issued on the same day. Mr Joseph explained that what Poly Optics did with the tubing was to fill it with its monomer mixtures in an attempt to turn empty tubing into finished optic fibre. Mr Joseph was then asked whether the work done by Poly Optics was for the benefit of Poly Optics or was Poly Optics performing that work for somebody else. He responded: I don't understand who the somebody else is. Mr Evans then asked Mr Joseph whether Poly Optics was doing this work for another client and Mr Joseph answered: I am not even sure how to answer that. We've done the work for other customers over the years in trying to develop better products. So always I've had an open mind that if we could develop some new technology we would apply to any customer that needed it. So we didn't say, "Well, let's do this Poly Optics work on the aerogel tubing wholly and solely for - for the benefit of Hadrian Fraval Nominees". Our goal was to develop the technology, do the work, and see if there were applications for it anywhere. 18. Mr Joseph was then taken to paragraph 42 of his first witness statement where he said that Translight invoiced Poly Optics a total of $553,694 in 2004 for aerogel coated tubing which was purchased by Poly Optics from Translight. He agreed that of that sum, $199,041 or approximately $200,000 of that material was actually purchased by Mosquito Free. Mr Joseph was asked why he had made no mention of the purchase by Mosquito Free of some $200,000 of tubing in his witness statement when discussing the purchase of tubing by Poly Optics. He said: Because it formed part of the tubing that - Poly Optics took possession of the tubing from Translight and that was part of it. There was no discussion about Mosquito Free at that - at the time of writing the statement. We didn't discuss why the debt was transferred. It was part of the purchase that Poly Optics had to reconcile. When it was explained to Mr Joseph that it was not a purchase made by Poly Optics, Mr Joseph avoided directly answering the question stating that he could not do so because it did not make sense to him. When asked why Poly Optics subsequently agreed to assume liability for the $200,000 debt owed by Mosquito Free to Translight, he said_: It was part of the business relationship that we had with Translight and with Rofin_. 19. Mr Evans then put to Mr Joseph that setting aside the $200,000 worth of work performed for Mosquito Free, approximately $300,000 worth of materials remained at Poly Optics' site. Mr Joseph disagreed. Mr Evans explained that the material appeared to have been split three ways. There appeared to have been material used for the HFN R & D project, material used for Mosquito Free's R & D project and leftover material. Although Mr Joseph agreed that material was used for the HFN R & D project and material was used for the Mosquito Free R & D project, he maintained that all of the tubing had been consumed. When Mr Evans asked Mr Joseph whether work was performed for anybody else, he responded: Not as such but we had in the back of our minds, if we could make it work we could find many other people to do work for but we never got to that step. Mr Joseph was asked directly to identify anybody else for whom Poly Optics was performing work, and he responded: We don't have anyone else. 20. Mr Evans then asked why it was that Poly Optics paid about $300,000 for more tubing and he responded: I'm sorry, I'm confused. Mr Joseph was then taken through each of the invoices other than the invoice for $199,041 which he said was the Mosquito Free debt taken up by Poly Optics, and asked whether the tubing to which those invoices related was used for HFN and he said it was. He was then asked why Poly Optics was buying the material if the work was for HFN. Once again, Mr Joseph avoided answering questions stating he was confused. After Mr Evans repeated the question a number of times, Mr Joseph responded: Well, it was to be used for Poly Optics' benefit as well. I don't understand why we would have no benefit if we - as I said, if we could get a successful outcome and make good end emitting tubing we had multi-millions of dollars' worth of benefit available. 21. Curiously, after the luncheon adjournment, Mr Joseph said he had referred to his notes during the lunch break and that he had been confused with the questioning immediately prior to lunch. He then explained... I was getting a little confused with your questioning. We received approximately $1.2 million worth of tubing from Translight, and I've just gone back through some of our accounting records.... but I did check my notes and my notes show that we received around $1.2 million worth of tubing from Translight, of which the 553,000 approximately Translight invoice, which included the 199,000 for the Mosquito Free project. The - there was about $640,000 approximately of tubing which was the Hadrian Fraval Nominees tubing which we weren't invoiced for by Translight, so we used that material for the HFN work, and we did some other project work with the balance of the $553,000. There were several other things that we were working on at the time, so I was getting a bit confused on this morning's invoices. So the answer is: the HFN work was done on the tubing that was the other $640,000, not the 553,000 in the invoices. 22. Mr Joseph then briefly explained what some of those other projects were. He claimed these projects were being performed for other parties. When Mr Evans put to Mr Joseph that the invoices were for precise amounts, for example, the invoice for $56,493, and that the invoice might therefore have related to a particular project, Mr Joseph and said: no. He also explained that he could not recall the details of those invoices stating that he had an accounts team which look after that. He then said: I tried not to get involved in the accounts. 23. Mr Joseph was asked whether he was involved in relation to an R & D tax offset claim by Mosquito Free. It was put to him that he liaised directly with the ATO about Mosquito Free's R & D tax offset and, responding the same way as he did the previous question, Mr Joseph said: In what way? When the question was put to him again he agreed that he had contact with AusIndustry but not the ATO. He was then referred to a letter from Mr Peter Scott of Mosquito Free in which it was said: I confirm you can discuss my business affairs with Eddy Joseph and Sachlan Fraval with regard to all R&D carried out by Poly Optics. Despite that, Mr Joseph could not recall having discussions with the ATO regarding Mosquito Free's R & D tax offset claim. 24. Mr Joseph was also asked whether he was involved in any R & D projects with
Dr Bennett from R & D Consulting. He said he could recall only one project with
Dr Bennett. He was also asked whether he was involved with Dr Bennett in an R & D project involving the Scallan Wall. He said he wasn't involved with Dr Bennett in that project but that he knew the Scallan Wall very well. When asked whether Mr Sachlan Fraval was involved in the project with the Scallan Wall, he said: Again, I think you would have to ask Sachlan but we all knew each other very well. What Sachlan's involvement directly with the Scallan Wall is I don't know the extent. They certainly knew each other and we had conversations together. I do recall a time when Ian Bennett and Sachlan Fraval came to the Gold Coast and we met with Pat Scallan but I was introducer more than the participant. I took them out to a building site where Scallan Wall had some of their prototype systems and I would introduce Scallan to the person whose premises the construction work was done on so that was my involvement in facilitating people. 25. Mr Joseph was also asked how many R & D projects in which he or Poly Optics was involved included participation by Mr Sachlan Fraval. He answered: I just can't recall. Bear in mind at the time Sachlan was a director and shareholder of Poly Optics and he was involved in looking after the financial management of Poly Optics and assisting in supervision to our accounting staff before accounting figures went to our accountants who were KPMG at the time. So Sachlan would have had an accounting involvement in everything that Poly Optics did but I can't recall how many were R&D and how many weren't and what things were and weren't R&D. Mr Joseph also agreed that he was aware of the project which R & D Consulting was undertaking regarding a totally environmentally friendly house. He said his involvement involved a few minor things and that he came down to Melbourne on one trip going to Geelong with Dr Bennett and Sachlan Fraval. 26. Mr Joseph's evidence was disturbing. I cannot accept that following the luncheon adjournment he referred to his notes, which were not produced, and was able to recall that Poly Optics conducted experimental work on the aerogel coated Ionimer tubing for clients other than HFN and Mosquito Free. His evidence prior to the adjournment was, emphatically, that it did not. He did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the precise figures in the three invoices (excluding the invoice to Mosquito Free) which were issued by HFN. I do not accept that he was confused by the questioning prior to the luncheon adjournment, which was simple and straightforward. Furthermore, his statement that about $640,000 worth of aerogel coated Ionimer tubing was the tubing on which Poly Optics worked for HFN was remarkable. It just so happens that HFN's statement of financial position at 30 June 2005 records the $640,000 sum as a liability and it was
Mr Sachlan Fraval's evidence that this was made up of the two invoices which Translight gave to HFN for the acquisition of its tubing. 27. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this evidence and the evidence given by Mr Sachlan Fraval is his pervasive influence in a number of discrete entities, all of which have R & D tax concession claims. Furthermore, the evidence discloses that while these companies invoiced each other for materials or services, the invoice descriptions being vague although for substantial sums, payments generally appeared to be by way of set-off or, in one case, a convertible note. While it is not possible for me nor is it desirable that I should say anything further about this, I must say that the evidence most certainly does not encourage a finding that HFN has discharged its onus in this regard. 28. The amount claimed by HFN in the 2004 income year was $443,669 which, converted to American dollars is US$306,135. It will be recalled that this sum was invoiced together with an amount of US$25,000 for the licence fee and was the subject of a convertible note under an agreement between HFN and Translight said to have been made on 8 July 2003. For reasons I have already explained when dealing with the licence fee, the issue of the convertible note extinguished HFN's liability to pay a pecuniary sum to Translight for the aerogel coated Ionimer tubing. Furthermore, even if I were to accept that the convertible note was subsequently transformed into a loan, that would not assist HFN because, as its accounts clearly state, that expenditure was capitalised. Having treated that expenditure as the acquisition of a capital item, it could not be expenditure which was deductible against the revenue account. While I accept that capital items may generally be depreciated and that depreciation may be deducted against revenue, given that the evidence was that the tubing was all used up in experimentation, it would be artificial to treat it as a depreciating asset. In fact the artificiality of this entire transaction is underscored by the fact that the tubing is subsequently recorded in HFN's balance sheet as an intangible asset, which is plainly a misdescription. However, it is not my role to correct misdescriptions in the accounts. For the reasons I have set out above, I find that the claimed tubing acquisition expenditure of $443,669 was not incurred by HFN in the 2004 income year. 29. The $166,246 claim in the 2005 income year was not subject to the convertible note.
Mr Sachlan Fraval's evidence was that in the 2005 financial year HFN purchased more aerogel tubing from Translight. He said he prepared the invoice in that amount and gave it to Dr Fraval on or about 11 December 2004. By way of contrast, when Dr Fraval was asked when he received the invoice for $166,246, he said it was in about June 2005. This was obviously a reference to the second invoice but there was no indication he had received the 2004 invoice in the same amount. Mr Sachlan Fraval said the sale price of that tubing was calculated by using an estimate of the aerogel tubing that had been used by HFN in its project as a proportion of the total amount of aerogel tubing that had been originally shipped to Australia. Dr Fraval also referred to the proportion of tubing remaining and he estimated that the amount received was about 7000 feet. When asked how this tubing was used, he said: Most of this was used by Poly Optics to do various things that they had been asked to do. This was already at Poly - at Poly Optics at that stage. 30. I should also briefly mention that there was some controversy about the amount of tubing which Dr Fraval in fact used in his experiments as opposed to what was consumed by Poly Optics. The total value of aerogel tubing delivered to Australia from Translight was claimed to be $1,129,520 (US$849,263). HFN claimed that it had paid a total of $646,153 for tubing and that figure was calculated on the proportion of the total tubing it acquired. In other words, it acquired some 57% of the total length of tubing delivered from Translight which Sachlan Fraval calculated as being some 37,000 feet. On that basis, it is reasonable to infer that HFN consumed approximately 21,000 feet of aerogel coated Ionimer tubing in the course of conducting its experiments by Dr Fraval and Poly Optics. 31. In re-examination Dr Fraval said that he used about 3000 feet in his experiments. In further cross-examination by Mr Evans, it was put to Dr Fraval that in working through his notes of the experiments he conducted, he calculated that Dr Fraval used approximately 70 m of tubing in his experiments. He was asked to explain why he claimed he used approximately 1000 m. His response was that it was not a complete record of everything that he did as he was doing this work in his spare time. Given that Dr Fraval agreed with questions from me that his experiments did not require large lengths of tubing at any one time - he suggested 10 m; I have considerable doubt as to whether Dr Fraval in fact used 1000 m of tubing in the course of his experiments. Given that the length of the tubing which could convey sunlight was critical in determining whether this product could be commercialised, I have no doubt that in the course of the experiments Dr Fraval conducted, he recorded the lengths of tubing on which he experimented. There would have been no point in him recording a satisfactory or an unsatisfactory experiment without stating the length of tubing he had used. 32. Dr Fraval was also asked how HFN intended to pay for the invoice. He said: It was - it was - it was not paid for, and it was - it was on Rofin's books - sorry - on HFNs books as a loan. When asked how HFN intended to repay the loan he said: HFN intended to pay part of it through the R&D tax concession, and part of it out of its own funds, or from my mortgage, basically. He was then asked whether the loan remained outstanding and he answered: That loan was paid by a - an amount of money I paid personally back to Rofin. I can't remember the exact amount, but I think it was 75,000 in one year, and a further amount of about 120,000 later, more recently. So there is still an amount outstanding, but I have paid some of it. 33. The first point to make about Dr Fraval's answers regarding the payment of the $166,246 is that it appears that the only means of repayment was through the receipt of the R & D tax offset. As with all of the loans between the related entities, nothing has been committed to writing and there is no way of determining, with any degree of certainty, the obligations to repay. By way of example, Mr Sachlan Fraval said in his amended witness statement that during the 30 June 2005 year, Translight transferred all of its assets and liabilities to Rofin. I had in evidence a statement of financial position (balance sheet) for Translight as at 31 December 2004. It disclosed non-current liabilities in the amount of US$885,374 said to be shareholders' loans (I make no comment about why shareholders would be lending the company money when they have in fact already paid for a capital interest). There were no current liabilities. At this point in time, the only shareholders in Translight were Rofin and Mr Hanafi Fraval. Putting aside the legal problems of assigning liabilities, one might logically question how Translight's liability to repay loans to Rofin can be transferred to Rofin. Although Mr Sachlan Fraval referred to the June 2005 trial balance for Rofin, there is no entry in that trial balance which discloses how the liabilities of Translight were accounted for in Rofin's accounts. 34. Mr Sachlan Fraval testified that he prepared the accounts for HFN for the 2005 financial year. In his witness statement Mr Sachlan Fraval said that the $166,246 was not paid for by way of convertible note. He said that $160,000 of this sum for inventory was paid by way of loan owed by Translight to Rofin. He said the remaining $6246 was paid by way of two amounts: $4231.50 through a credit to HFN's cashbook and $2014.57 through a credit to Dr Fraval's loan account with HFN. 35. There is no loan documented in respect of the $160,000 sum. There was no evidence regarding the terms of that loan or when repayment was due. In its statement of financial position as at 30 June 2005 HFN has recorded an increase in non-current liabilities of $160,000 which has been added to the previous $480,000. The balancing entry on the debit side of the ledger is an increase in what is described as intangible assets by $160,000. As I have already said above, HFN appears to have treated the acquisition of this portion of the aerogel coated Ionimer tubing as a capital item. It is therefore not deductible against revenue. It is not a loss or outgoing of a revenue character. In fact, it is not even clear on the objective evidence that HFN has become liable to pay a pecuniary sum to either Translight or Rofin. 36. As for the remaining amounts of $6246.00 and $2014.57, I was unable to find any such entries in the printouts of HFN's general ledger for the 2005 or 2006 income years. The $6246 figure is recorded in the trial balance as at 30 June 2005. I am not able to reconcile that with its absence in the general ledger. 37. In my opinion, HFN has not satisfied the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that it incurred expenditure for the acquisition of aerogel coated Ionimer tubing in the 2004 or 2005 income years.
s. 73 BC which essentially provides that a deduction will be allowed under s. 73 BA if an eligible company is entitled to a deduction under s. 40-25 of ITAA 1997. Insofar as it is relevant to HFN's claim, s. 40-25 provides:
(1) You can deduct an amount equal to the decline in value for an income year (as worked out under this Division) of a depreciating asset that you held for any time during the year.
(2) You must reduce your deduction by the part of the asset's decline in value that is attributable to your use of the asset, or your having it installed ready for use, for a purpose other than a taxable purpose.
...
(7) A taxable purpose is:
(a) the purpose of producing assessable income; or
Dr Fraval's loan account with HFN although the general ledger would not balance if there was not a credit entry in another account. There is also insufficient evidence for me to establish that these liabilities were definitively incurred as stated in the accounts. In that respect, I must again find that HFN has not discharged the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that these expenditures were incurred in the income years stated.
R & D project in the 2004 income year. The Commissioner allowed Dr Fraval's expenses amounting to $6885 but refused the remainder. Despite the fact that Dr Fraval's diary entries of this travel indicate that it was undertaken in the 2003 income year, the Commissioner allowed this expenditure except for an amount referred to as travel allowance which, although not described by the Commissioner in his reasons for decision on the objection decision, appear to be for daily living expenses including food. While it is not clear to me why the expenditure was allowed at all, as it was not incurred in the claimed year of income, I do not see it as my duty to overturn that decision. The definition of research and development expenditure in s. 73B makes it clear that the expression means expenditure incurred by the company during the year of income. For that reason alone, I cannot accept that the claimed balance, $1320, was expenditure incurred in the year of income being the 2004 income year. That is despite the fact that the general ledger records travel expenses of $8205.49 as at 30 June 2004. It is simply incorrect on Dr Fraval's evidence.
(1) You are liable to an administrative penalty if:
(a) you or your agent makes a statement to the Commissioner or to an entity that is exercising powers or performing functions under a taxation law; and
(b) the statement is false or misleading in a material particular, whether because of things in it or omitted from it; and
(c) you have a shortfall amount as a result of the statement.
3 Your shortfall amount or part of it resulted from a failure by you or your agent to take reasonable care to comply with a taxation law
(a) a taxpayer has a tax shortfall for a year; and
(b) the shortfall or part of it was caused by the failure of the taxpayer or of a registered tax agent to take reasonable care to comply with this Act or the regulations;
the taxpayer is liable to pay, by way of penalty, and additional tax equal to 25% of the amount of the shortfall or part.
This court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of the provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.
... Reasonable care suggests an objective test, but the particular (and subjective) circumstances relevant to the taxpayer are to be considered in applying the test. So the taxpayer must exercise the care that a reasonable person would be likely to have exercised in the circumstances of the taxpayer.
It follows as a matter of principle that the reasonable care test calls upon a taxpayer to exercise the care that a reasonable person would be likely to have exercised in the circumstances of the taxpayer in fulfilling the taxpayer's tax obligations. The test looks to whether such a person would have foreseen, as a reasonable probability or reasonable likelihood, the prospect that the action or step or the failure to act or take an affirmative step would result in a shortfall amount and in determining that question, a relevant factual enquiry is whether the taxpayer made the reasonable attempts a person in the position of the taxpayer ought to have taken so as to comply with the provisions of a taxation law.
...Therefore, one question to be answered in determining whether the taxpayer and its advisers took reasonable care is whether, on the facts, there are steps that the taxpayer ought to have taken but did not take or steps that it did take that it ought not to have taken.
... Hill J observed at [53] that "a taxpayer who relies upon expert advice as here where the advice is held generally in the industry and does not conflict with any statement made by the Commissioner... is not required to obtain a ruling to guard against an allegation that the taxpayer has not exercised due care".
R & D contract work bears little resemblance to the terms of the contract. Furthermore, the invoices issued by R & D Consulting were not in accordance with the contract. The amount claimed to be invoiced by Dr Bennett was the astonishing amount of approximately $273,464. In fact the sums of money invoiced were substantially in excess of the contract and despite the large sums invoiced, the invoice statements simply contained a one sentence description referring to consultancy and project management in relation to the development of natural sunlight into buildings. Also, HFN did not make any payments towards those invoices but rather, some of this expenditure was said to have been set off against expenditure owed to other entities, all of which were involved in R & D claims. 6. It will also be recalled that at the time these astonishing sums were invoiced by R & D Consulting, HFN had not managed to develop a light guide which was functional in terms of its intended purpose. The most that can be said about the work conducted by
R & D Consulting is that it claimed to have evaluated the concept of creating conduits within the Scallan Wall. No work was done with the light guides themselves as there were no light guides to work with. The description on the invoices issued by R & D Consulting bear no resemblance to the registered R & D activities. Finally, the expenditure said to have been incurred was said to have been discharged by a set-off arrangement as a result of what appears, in an unexplained way, to have been an arrangement between R & D Consulting and Poly Optics to provide aerogel tubing to Poly Optics. With respect to Dr Fraval, his experience with R & D activities would, in my opinion, have alerted him to the very doubtful nature of these transactions particularly regarding the substantiation of the expenditure said to have been incurred. I find that HFN did not take the care a reasonable person in its position would have taken when making an R & D claim for this expenditure. 7. Regarding the licence fee and cost of aerogel tubing expenditure, Dr Bender again submitted that HFN had objective documentary evidence, including invoices and accounting records of Translight and Rofin, to support the existence of the licence fee expenditure and the tubing expenses. He also referred to the fact that there was a contemporaneous report by AusIndustry to support the evidence given by Dr Fraval and Mr Sachlan Fraval that there was an issue with the licence fee which caused them to alter their R & D concession claim for the 2004 income year and to claim part of the fee in the 2005 income year. Dr Bender submitted that HFN took reasonable care because it took a recent approach to the deductibility of this expense. 8. With respect to Dr Bender, I cannot agree with this submission. The first point to make regarding the licence fee is that the only evidence of an assignment of the aerogel patent to Translight from Enterprise Development Corporation was Dr Fraval's oral evidence. The agreement granting a licence to HFN to use the patent was executed only by HFN. That in itself gives rise to serious doubts about its enforceability. Furthermore, the document is, with respect to the draftsperson, a very poor example of an agreement if it can be properly described as such. Regardless, HFN appears to have relied on it to demonstrate there was such an agreement and yet it attempted to disavow the fact that it stated the licence fee, said to be US$25,000, was to be paid on a one-off basis. Subsequently, it was submitted that there were a number of variations to the agreement made orally despite the fact that the agreement itself contained a clause indicating such variation was impermissible. As Finn J said in GEC Marconi Systems, at [218]:
For an alleged subsequent variation to be contractually effective notwithstanding non-compliance with the written modification requirement, it must itself otherwise satisfy the requirements of the ballot contract, i.e. "the terms of the arrangement must be certain, and... There must generally be real consideration for the agreement"...
What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the considerations to be taken into account, it will often be necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant factors - and in this context I use this expression to refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider - are not expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which is in its terms unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard... By analogy, where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined by the terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act.
Fifth, the explanatory memoranda previously noted in this judgement support the conclusion that Parliament intended that the particular circumstances and compliance history of the taxpayer are of key importance in relation to the exercise by the Commissioner of his remission discretion. Reference in the Explanatory Memorandum 1992 to the flexibility of the Commissioner in relation to his remission discretion "to deal with hard cases that may arise" emphasises the exceptional nature of the exercise of the discretion, with reference to the circumstances of the taxpayer.
I declare that I am an officer of the applicant company authorised to make this declaration. The company, while undertaking the activities described in this application, has maintained contemporaneous records, including an R&D Plan in accordance with the IR&D Board's Guidelines on R&D Plans 2001, that substantiate the carrying on of the activities. I further state that to the best of my knowledge and belief the information in this application is true and correct in material details, and that the activities and corresponding expenditure described in this application meet all prescribed eligibility requirements for the R&D Tax Concession.
I certify that the preceding 303 (three hundred and three) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of
......[sgd]..................................................................
(2009) 239 CLR 27
(2011) 196 FCR 457
(2005) 191 FLR 385
(2009) 236 FLR 1
(1993) 176 CLR 640
(2010) 189 FCR 204
(2006) 228 CLR 1
(1990) 168 CLR 614
(1953) 88 CLR 492
(2012) 205 FCR 136
(2003) 128 FCR 1
(1995) 129 ALR 503
(1986) 162 CLR 24
(2002) 126 FCR 37
(1981) 144 CLR 616
(1963) 109 CLR 9
(2002) 121 FCR 1
(1987) 75 ALR 287