1. Ground A was amended to assert that the notice of appeal was without merit. Before the amendment, ground C already alleged that the grounds of the notice of appeal showed that the appeal was frivolous. When the word "frivolous" is used to describe a court proceeding, it means that the claim made in that proceeding is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed: Burton v Shire of Bairnsdale [1908] HCA 57; (1908) 7 CLR 76 at 92; Pridmore v Magenta Nominees Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 152, 161 ALR 458 at [24]; Von Stalheim v Anti Discrimination Tribunal [2009] TASSC 6 at [9]. By amending the interlocutory application to assert that the notice of appeal was "without merit", the respondent was therefore not making a new assertion. The appellant was therefore not prejudiced by that amendment.
2. Ground C was amended by deleting references to rr 258(1) and 259 of the Supreme Court Rules 2000. Those rules apply only to pleadings. A notice of appeal is not a pleading. A pleading, as referred to in those two rules, is a document filed in an action commenced by writ, in which a party sets out the grounds of its claim or its defence. A notice of appeal is something different. It was therefore appropriate to delete the references to the two rules. Although rr 258 and 259 do not apply to a notice of appeal, this Court has power under its inherent jurisdiction to strike out a notice of appeal on the ground that it is frivolous, vexatious, scandalous, or an abuse of the process of the Court, and its powers are exercised on precisely the same basis as if those rules applied to notices of appeal: Burgess v Stafford Hotel Ltd [1990] 3 All ER 222; von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Co Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 109. The deletion of the references to the inapplicable rules did not disadvantage the appellant since he had been on notice for some three months that the respondent contended that his notice of appeal was scandalous, frivolous and vexatious.
3. The addition of ground E did not disadvantage the appellant since he had been on notice for some three months of the respondent's application to have his appeal summarily dismissed on grounds that remained substantially unchanged since the filing of the interlocutory application.
4. The amendments did not change the respondent's contentions in any substantial way. There was nothing inappropriate about any of the amendments. The appellant had reasonable notice of them. He was not disadvantaged in his opposition to the interlocutory application by any of them. Having regard to those circumstances, I considered that the only appropriate course was to grant leave to amend the interlocutory application as sought.
5. The appellant's so-called grounds of appeal are five in number. They extend over several pages of his notice of appeal. They touch on all sorts of subjects, including the following:
   • Alleged bias on the part of administrative officers of the Supreme Court.
   • Alleged bias on the part of Holt AsJ.
   • Counsel for Mr Iles wanting to leave the Magistrates Court early on the first day of the hearing.
   • The fact that Wood J once worked in the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
   • An allegation that Wood J was trying to protect Ms Brooks.
   • An assertion that serious questions might arise regarding the fitness of Ms Brooks.
   • The chances of Wood J becoming Tasmania's next Chief Justice and Lieutenant Governor.
   • A comment by Wood J to the effect that she was not interested in the appellant's assertion that he had instituted a private prosecution against the magistrate.
   • The logistics of such a private prosecution.
   • Speculation that the magistrate could one day support his children by providing information to the media about what he had seen during his legal career.
   • A grievance about Wood J not having published her decision.
   • The appellant's standing as a political figure.
   • The appellant's implied right to freedom of political communication.
   • The absence of evidence as to the authenticity of an audio CD from the Magistrates Court that was played during the hearing before Wood J.
   • The fact that Wood J did not allow the appellant to give oral evidence before her.
   • An alleged improper political motive on the part of the Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment.
6. Rule 657(4) of the Supreme Court Rules applies to appeals from a single judge to the Full Court. That subrule reads as follows:

1. The appellant's notice of appeal does not comply with r 657(4)(b) as it does not specifically and concisely state the grounds of appeal. Under r 14(1)(a), this Court has the power to order that any proceedings that do not comply with the Supreme Court Rules be set aside, either wholly or in part. Because of the non-compliance with r 657(4)(b), the Court therefore has a discretion to order that the notice of appeal be wholly set aside.
2. If any contention in the grounds of appeal had any merit, that fact would weigh against the setting aside of the notice of appeal. However, for the reasons stated below, it is clear that none of the appellant's contentions have any merit.
3. Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal contains assertions that Wood J "showed bias towards protecting Ms Louise Brooks", and that "a perception of apprehended bias would arise in the mind of a fair-minded lay observer". The appellant is relying on both actual bias and apprehended bias. As to apprehended bias, a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that he or she might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that he or she is required to decide: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63, 205 CLR 337, per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [6].
4. The appellant contends that Ms Brooks laughed after he told the magistrate that he had no children that he knew of. For present purposes I will assume, without deciding, that she did. The appellant contends that the proceedings before the learned magistrate in relation to his goats were so serious that it was unprofessional of Ms Brooks to laugh when she did. He contends that Wood J dismissed his appeal because she wanted to protect Ms Brooks' reputation, or at least that a fair-minded lay observer might think that that might have been a motive for dismissing that appeal. He contends that Wood J had a reason to be biased because Ms Brooks is employed by the Crown, and her Honour once worked in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Because judges are appointed from the legal profession, it is very common for counsel to be well acquainted with a judge before whom he or she appears, or once to have worked in the same chambers or office as the judge. Such matters are not sufficient, without more, to give rise to a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the case that he or she has to decide: Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1308; (1996) 65 FCR 215; Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 272; Saxmere Company Ltd v Wood Board Disestablishment Company Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35; Saxmere Company Ltd v Wood Board Disestablishment Company Ltd (No 2) [2009] NZSC 122, [2010] 1 NZLR 76. In the proceedings before Wood J, Ms Brooks was not appearing as counsel. There is nothing in the material before the Full Court to suggest that her Honour and Ms Brooks were friends, or even acquaintances. At worst, Ms Brooks has been accused of forgetting her good manners for a second or less. The idea that in such a situation a judge would or might decide a case otherwise than in accordance with her conscience, her duty, and her judicial oath is preposterous. Ground 1 has no merit at all.
5. Ground 2 concerns an assertion made by the appellant to Wood J that he had commenced a private criminal prosecution against the magistrate in relation to his conduct on the day of the laughter. Her Honour responded to that assertion by saying, "I am sorry. I am going to interrupt you. What I am concerned with here is an assertion of reasonable apprehension of bias in the laugh. Now, what steps you've taken in relation to that are completely beside the point." The appellant contends that her Honour should not have stopped him from talking about the asserted private prosecution, and that her conduct in stopping him would give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of a fair-minded lay observer. I reject that. If the appellant has commenced a prosecution against the magistrate, and I am not saying that he has, that is irrelevant to the question whether the magistrate ever conducted himself in such a way that he should subsequently have disqualified himself. Her Honour was right to stop the appellant from telling her about the asserted private prosecution. Ground 2 has no merit.
6. Ground 3 concerns a grievance that, after dismissing the appeal from the magistrate, her Honour did not publish her reasons for that judgment. Apparently the appellant has stood for election to public office on past occasions and proposes to do so again. He contends that his prospective constituents should have been informed about the appeal that her Honour dismissed. Ground 3 must fail because the legislation that confers a right of appeal to the Full Court does not apply to decisions relating to the publication of a judgment.
7. The right to appeal to the Full Court from a decision of a single judge is conferred by s 40(1) of the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932. That subsection reads as follows:

(1908) 7 CLR 76

(1996) 65 FCR 215

(1986) 6 NSWLR 272