GSA -v- DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES [No 2] [2026] WASCA 36 (18 March 2026)

1. The appellant's application dated 30 December 2025 for review of a single judge's decision identifies that it is directed to:

Refusal of Summonses, Independent Speech Assessment, and imposition of Restraint on Filing.

1. This is consistent with the grounds for review raised by the appellant. We have previously summarised the substance of the grounds. In full they provide:

1. Error of Law and Improper Exercise of Discretion in Rejecting Summonses and Independent Assessment: The single judge erred in law by misinterpreting his powers under Sections 14(1)(i) and 40(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), leading to the blanket rejection of all thirteen (13) summonses for critical evidence and the refusal of an independent speech pathologist assessment. This constitutes an improper exercise of discretion and a denial of procedural fairness, as it prevents the Appellant from obtaining evidence crucial to proving alleged systemic misconduct, perversion of justice, and a miscarriage of justice.

2. Denial of Procedural Fairness and Error of Law in Restraining Future Filings and Denying Amended Submissions: The single judge erred in law and denied procedural fairness by verbally instructing the Appellant that he was not permitted to file any more applications or similar documents, and by explicitly stating that the Appellant would not have an opportunity to file an amended submission. These actions constitute a disproportionate and unjust limitation on access to justice, particularly for a self-represented litigant, and are contrary to established appellate practice and fundamental principles of natural justice.

3. Apprehension of Bias: The cumulative effect of the single judge's rulings and conduct, including his direct criticism of the Appellant's use of AI, his in-court statements claiming to know [Dr J] (a key witness against whom serious allegations are made), his dismissive tone, his strong reaction to the Appellant's comment about 'lawyers protect lawyers', his failure to address [the second respondent's counsel's] explicit admission of conflict of interest, and his blanket rejection of all summonses, would lead a reasonable, fair-minded observer to apprehend that the judge was not impartial.

1. Accordingly, the review application was directed to the dismissal of the appellant's application in an appeal dated 9 December 2025 (ie the rejection of the application seeking an order for an independent speech assessment of the second respondent) and the partial dismissal of the appellant's application in an appeal dated 16 December 2025 (ie the rejection of the application seeking leave to issue summonses for production).
2. After the filing of the appellant's application dated 30 December 2025 he sought to file numerous further applications and supporting affidavits. The appellant did so notwithstanding that, on 12 January 2026, the court (constituted by Hall and Archer JJA) ordered that the registrar must not accept for filing any further application in an appeal or affidavit in support of the review application without the leave of a judge. To the extent that, following the order of 12 January 2026, the appellant sought leave to file further materials in support of the review applications, those materials - and the question of leave to file them - was referred to the hearing on 16 March 2026.
3. We spent considerable time at the commencement of the hearing on 16 March 2026 going through the materials that were before the court on the review application. In doing so we identified the materials that had been accepted for filing and the materials that the appellant needed to obtain leave to file if they were to be received as additional evidence on and in support of the review application. Ultimately, in his oral submissions, the appellant only sought to rely on three affidavits - the appellant's affidavit of 16 December 2025 (as was before the single judge at the hearing on 22 December 2025 and in respect of which leave to file was not required) and the appellant's affidavits sworn 23 and 26 February 2026 (in respect of which leave to file was required).
4. In the circumstances, to the extent that the other materials had not been accepted for filing, we refused leave to file those materials. Other affidavits (sworn 31 December 2025 and 4 January 2026) had previously been accepted for filing. But the appellant did not rely on those affidavits in his oral submissions. Accordingly, while accepted for filing, the affidavits of 31 December 2025 and 4 January 2026 were not received as additional evidence on and in support of the review application.
5. The appellant relied on his affidavits sworn 23 and 26 February 2026 in support of the review application in his oral submissions as superseding all of his earlier affidavits (although, presumably, not the affidavit of 16 December 2025 on which the appellant continued to rely). Accordingly, we granted the appellant leave to file his affidavits sworn 23 and 26 February 2026, and those affidavits were received as additional evidence on and in support of the review application. For the avoidance of doubt this is the only permitted use of the affidavits. The affidavits have not been accepted as additional evidence in the appeal more generally.
6. In addition to the appellant's affidavits sworn 16 December 2025 and 23 and 26 February 2026, and other materials identified at the commencement of the hearing, the court received the appellant's written submissions dated 25 January 2026. The first and second respondents replied separately, opposing the review application, by written submissions dated 10 February 2026.

1. The court stated the applicable principles on an application to review the decision of a single judge of appeal in the recent decision of GXB v Tyson [No 3]:

The appellant invokes s 61(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) and pt 2 div 3 of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA). It is well established that such a review does not involve a hearing de novo. The review application is a rehearing and error on the part of the single judge of appeal must be shown. In the case of a discretionary decision - as was the decision the subject of the appellant's review application - error of the kind explained in House v The King must be shown. Also, special restraint must be exercised when the impugned interlocutory order is one concerning practice and procedure. See Traynor v Cunningham [No 2].[3] (citations omitted)

1. Error on the part of the single judge of appeal is not identified at large. It is for the applicant for review to identify the alleged error or errors on the part of the single judge of appeal. The alleged error or errors are to be identified in the grounds for review as provided for in the Form 13 (application for review of single judge's or registrar's decision) as provided for under the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA).
2. Accordingly, the appellant's application for review fell to be evaluated by the three grounds of review reproduced at [11] above - those grounds raising the contentions summarised at [2] above.
3. Ground 3 contended that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias that infected the single judge's decision. It is appropriate to start with this allegation of bias insofar as actual or apprehended bias strikes at the validity and acceptability of a hearing and its outcome: Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd.[4]

Ground 3 - the allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias

1. The principles applicable to reasonable apprehension of bias are summarised, in terms that we adopt, in Reynolds v Rayney[5] and Armet v Stephen Browne.[6]
2. In summary, reasonable apprehension of bias will be established if a fair‑minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the relevant judicial officer might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question he or she is required to decide. In applying this principle it is necessary to identify what is said might lead the judicial officer to decide a case other than on its legal or factual merits and to articulate a logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The reasonableness of the apprehension may then be assessed.
3. The test is objective and the fair‑minded lay observer is someone who is aware that the person who is being observed is a professional judicial officer whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require him or her to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial. However, the fair‑minded lay observer is cognisant of human frailty and understands that information and attitudes consciously and conscientiously discarded might still sometimes have a subconscious effect on even the most professional of decision‑makers.
4. The appellant's submissions did not develop ground 3 by reference to these applicable legal principles. Rather, as is apparent from the terms of ground 3, the appellant relied on the cumulative effect of the following:
   1. The single judge's rulings (including his 'blanket rejection of all summonses') and conduct (including his 'tone').
   2. The single judge's direct criticism of the appellant's use of artificial intelligence.
   3. The single judge's knowledge of Dr J.
   4. The single judge's reaction to a comment of the appellant that 'lawyers protect lawyers'.
   5. The single judge's failure to address the second respondent's counsel's alleged 'explicit admission of conflict of interest'.
5. The initial aspect of the appellant's contention in support of the allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias concerned the merits of the single judge's decision‑making - the appellant sought to establish apprehended bias based on the outcome of the decision‑making process. As to that, in the context of allegations of apprehended bias, it is well established that the principles of natural justice are not concerned with the merits of a particular exercise of power but rather with the procedure that must be followed in its exercise. The focus of attention must therefore be on the position as it stood before the impugned decision. See Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd;[7] G v W;[8] Zaghloul v Bradley Bayly Holdings Pty Ltd;[9] Lee v Brandis.[10]
6. Put simply, bias is not established - even arguably - by pointing to an adverse decision on the merits: Clark v Commonwealth Bank of Australia.[11] Accordingly, the circumstance that the single judge ruled against the appellant is not indicative of bias on the part of his Honour.
7. The appellant makes a wider complaint based on the single judge's conduct and tone. This is best examined, initially, from the lens of the appellant's specific complaints. The first of these is the single judge's alleged criticism of the appellant for his use of artificial intelligence. In this respect, following an adjournment, the appellant made submissions as to the court's power to make orders of the kind sought. The appellant then commenced to read from what he said was s 14(1)(b) of the Criminal Appeals Act (appeal ts 43).
8. The following exchange then occurred:

MAZZA JA: Where are you reading that from?

GSA: This is section 14(1)(b) of the - - -

MAZZA JA: Criminal Appeals Act?

GSA: Yes.

MAZZA JA: Well, I will read you what section 14(1)(b) says. 14(1)(b) says:

In deciding an appeal, the Supreme Court may do one or more of the following: (a) dismiss the appeal; (b) allow the appeal.

So where are you getting - is that something that you have got from AI, that text that you have just read me - read to me?

GSA: That's right, yes.

MAZZA JA: Well, it's just another example of how AI is deceptive.

GSA: Okay.

MAZZA JA: So that's not what section 14(1)(b) says.

GSA: Okay. If I can continue on, there's also an inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond the statutory powers.

MAZZA JA: Is this also from AI?

GSA: Yes. Well, it could - it could still well be true.

MAZZA JA: Well, it could be true. But I'm just asking you - it could - of course it could be true.

GSA: Yes.

MAZZA JA: And the court does have some inherent power.

GSA: Okay.

MAZZA JA: So I'm not disputing that everything that comes from AI is not accurate. But it needs to be - the source of your information needs to be disclosed. Now, go on. You have - - -

GSA: Okay. So beyond the statutory powers - - -

MAZZA JA: - - - told me what the source is (appeal ts 43- 44).

1. The single judge's criticism of the appellant's use of artificial intelligence was, in the circumstances, well justified. In any case nothing in the exchange is such that a fair‑minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the single judge might not bring an impartial mind to the applications before the court. The single judge did not suggest that every submission grounded in artificial intelligence was inaccurate. The single judge noted that, so far as the appellant had relied on artificial intelligence to quote s 14(1)(b) of the Criminal Appeals Act, the artificial intelligence source was deceptive. It was. The single judge otherwise accepted that a submission grounded in artificial intelligence could be accurate, but said that the appellant should disclose that the submission was derived from artificial intelligence. In the circumstances that statement was entirely appropriate.
2. As to the single judge's supposed knowledge of Dr J, the passage in the transcript reads:

MAZZA JA: All right. Then H. This is the summons to the [Redacted] Medical Centre. I know about [Dr J], and I know who she is.

GSA: Good (appeal ts 37).

1. The single judge was not saying that he knew Dr J in the sense that there was any prior association between his Honour and Dr J. The single judge was only explaining to the appellant that, having read the papers before the court, his Honour was aware of who Dr J was and the role of Dr J in the matters before the court. The allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias based on this particular is completely misconceived.
2. The fourth matter relied on by the appellant comes out of the following passage of the transcript:

GSA: You're not going to jail. [Second respondent's solicitor]? You're not going to jail.

[Second respondent's counsel]: Your Honour. I object to that.

MAZZA JA: Sorry, I didn't - you said something, [GSA], did you?

GSA: I just reminded [the second respondent's solicitor] he's not going to jail. He's relieved.

MAZZA JA: [GSA], that's entirely inappropriate.

GSA: It would be - - -

MAZZA JA: No, just listen to me.

GSA: It would be a follow-up - it would be a follow-up - - -

MAZZA JA: Just listen to me. It's entirely inappropriate for you to make such comments, either now - - -

GSA: I believe it's lawyers protecting lawyers.

MAZZA JA: No, just listen. It's entirely inappropriate to make those comments, and it's quite - - -

GSA: These are very valid documents [sic - comments].

MAZZA JA: No, listen. No. Do not argue with me. I have made a decision, and you have to abide by that decision, and what we need to do is we need to continue on, because there are things we need to deal with (appeal ts 55 - 56).

1. Two things should be observed. First, this exchange occurs after the single judge has dismissed the application seeking an order for an independent speech assessment of the second respondent and after the single judge has dismissed the application seeking leave to issue summonses for production. It cannot, in this respect, ground any reasonable apprehension that the single judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of those questions. Second, having regard to the nature of the inflammatory statements made by the appellant - comments directed both to the second respondent's solicitor and the single judge - the single judge's statements were measured and entirely appropriate. Far from exhibiting a reasonable apprehension of bias the single judge's response to the inflammatory statements of the appellant exhibits a quite commendable degree of tolerance under trying circumstances.
2. There is nothing in the exchange whereby a fair‑minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the single judge might not bring an impartial mind to the applications before the court.
3. The final complaint is concerned with the following interchange:

[Second respondent's counsel]: Yes. I was just flagging the ones of most relevance to - I will be blunt about it, to protect [second respondent's solicitor].

MAZZA JA: Yes. All right (appeal ts 53).

1. Here the single judge does no more than acknowledge having heard what underlies the reason for the second respondent's submission in opposing one of the summonses sought by the appellant.
2. We have focused on the matters above because they are the specific instances relied on by the appellant. We have, in addition, reviewed the whole of the transcript of the hearing on 22 December 2025. We acknowledge that, from time to time, the single judge interposes lines of questioning and expresses provisional views to the appellant for the appellant's response. It is, however, well settled that a judge may have to intervene in proceedings from time to time; and, moreover, that there may be added occasion to do so where a litigant is representing himself or herself. In Michael v The State of Western Australia Steytler P (McLure JA & Miller AJA agreeing) stated:

[I]t will often be necessary, particularly with self‑represented litigants, for a trial judge to intervene in order to stop irrelevant matters being raised and to prevent unnecessary delays or disruptions. In Johnson at [13] Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said:

'At the trial level, modern judges, responding to a need for more active case management, intervene in the conduct of cases to an extent that may surprise a person who came to court expecting a judge to remain, until the moment of pronouncement of judgment, as inscrutable as the Sphinx.'

Indeed, a trial judge who does not intervene to prevent undue delay and to ensure that the parties focus on the crucial issues may be criticised by an appellate court.[12] (citations omitted)

1. In any case, reading the transcript of the hearing on 22 December 2025 fairly and as a whole, we are well satisfied that the single judge's interruptions and indications to the appellant were justified and, indeed, calculated to better achieve a fair hearing.
2. Having read and considered the transcript of the hearing on 22 December 2025 in full, there is nothing in the conduct of the hearing which establishes any arguable foundation for the contention that the primary judge was either biased favourably towards the respondents or biased against the appellant. Put simply, nothing in the conduct of the hearing reveals any basis for a fair‑minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend bias on the part of the single judge. The allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias was entirely without merit.
3. Ground 3 failed.

Ground 2 - alleged denial of procedural fairness by restraining future filings and denying amended submissions

1. Ground 2 is misconceived. In the single judge's reasons, his Honour stated under the heading 'Further observations':

As mentioned, the appellant has already filed, or has attempted to file, a large number of applications in this appeal. The applications have been without merit. In the course of the hearing, I put the appellant on notice that if he continues to bombard the court with meritless applications, the court may make an order prohibiting him from filing any application in an appeal without first obtaining the leave of a judge of this court. To be clear, I have not made such an order. Hopefully such a course will not be necessary. However, in order for this court to protect its own processes, if the appellant continues to file meritless applications in an appeal, the appellant is on notice of the possible consequences [57]. (citations omitted) (emphasis added)

1. A similar statement was made in person at the hearing on 22 December 2025 (appeal ts 4 - 6).
2. The single judge merely foreshadowed the possibility of an order restricting the appellant from filing further applications in the appeal without first obtaining the leave of a judge. No such order was made. Ground 2 is misconceived insofar as it seeks to impugn an order that was not made. Any error in terms of ground 2 is not material to, and cannot sustain a successful review of, the dismissal of the appellant's application in an appeal dated 9 December 2025 and the partial dismissal of the appellant's application in an appeal dated 16 December 2025.

Ground 1 - alleged error of law as to the extent of the power of the court

1. By ground 1 the appellant alleged that the single judge acted on a wrong principle in as much as his Honour mistook the extent of the court's power under s 14(1)(i) and s 40(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act. In oral submissions the appellant also relied on s 40(1)(f) of that Act.
2. Ground 1 is plainly misconceived in relation to the single judge's dismissal of the appellant's application in an appeal dated 9 December 2025 (ie the rejection of the application seeking an order for an independent speech assessment of the second respondent). The single judge recorded that he doubted that the court had the power to make the order sought [36]. But this did not matter as:

[E]ven if I was to assume, favourably to the appellant, that such a power exists, I would not exercise it. Accepting that [the second respondent] had the temporary speech difficulties alleged by the appellant, there was no evidence before the magistrate, the primary judge, nor this court, other than the appellant's belief, that those difficulties could be in any way associated with the alleged sexual abuse of [the second respondent]. To make the order sought by the appellant would be a purely speculative exercise and plainly not in the interests of justice [36].

1. Accordingly, the single judge assumed, favourably to the appellant, that the court had power to make the order sought by the appellant's application in an appeal dated 9 December 2025. The single judge declined to do so as a matter of discretion. There was no error of the kind alleged by ground 1. In any case, even if there was such an error it was not material. The order would have been refused in any event.
2. Ground 1 was also advanced as to the partial dismissal of the appellant's application in an appeal dated 16 December 2025 (ie the rejection of the application seeking leave to issue summonses for production).
3. The single judge's reasons for refusing leave to issue the summonses were as follows:

It is clear that the appellant has the very firm, if not unshakeable, belief that [the second respondent] has suffered sexual abuse, or is likely to have suffered sexual abuse, at the hands of the persons referred to [earlier in the single judge's reasons]. His beliefs appear strongest concerning his sister and her daughter, GD. The appellant regards [the second respondent] as being in danger of continuing sexual abuse while not in his care.

The appellant's beliefs go further. As he put it in his submissions before me:

[M]y whole argument is about alleged systematic misconduct, suppression of critical evidence and perversion of the course of justice by officers of the court ... and State agencies.

The appellant had the opportunity to air and litigate these beliefs at trial. Indeed, the appellant made allegations to this effect at the trial. None of his allegations were substantiated.

Both before Howard J and this court, the appellant wants to relitigate them, as if an appeal under pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act was another trial, and a court exercising appellate jurisdiction under this Act fulfils the function of an inquisitor.

The appellant sees this court's role as being to investigate his allegations of 'systematic misconduct', etc, based on his firmly-held beliefs. Thus, the appellant seeks this court's leave to issue the summonses referred to ... He does so, it appears, in the hope that the documents that will be produced (if they exist) will support or substantiate those beliefs.

For the benefit of the appellant, it is necessary to repeat some basic propositions about the function of this court. This court is not a trial court. An appeal under pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act is concerned with the discernment of legal or factual error, or a miscarriage of justice, primarily based on the record of the court from which the appeal is taken. The role of the court is not to be a standing commission of inquiry, or an inquisitor. While the court has a power to admit additional evidence and to give leave to a party to issue a summons requiring a person or entity to produce documents, these powers must be exercised judicially in support of its appellate function.

It follows that before this court may give leave to a party to issue a summons requiring a person or entity to produce documents, there must be a proper basis, consistent with the appellate function of the court, for the production of any document.

As mentioned, each of the summonses the appellant seeks leave to issue is to produce documents which the appellant hopes will prove his firmly‑held beliefs to the effect that he has been the victim of 'systematic misconduct', etc, by a number of persons and government agencies. Beliefs of this kind, no matter how strongly or sincerely they are held, provide no proper basis upon which to grant leave to issue a summons to produce. In respect of each and every summons to produce the appellant seeks leave to issue, there is no proper factual basis to do so. Accordingly, I refused leave to issue the summonses to the persons and entities referred to ... [41] - [48].

1. We are comfortably satisfied that the single judge's decision refusing leave to issue the summonses for production was correct for the reasons given by the single judge.
2. It is readily apparent, from the nature, breadth and number of summonses for production that the appellant sought leave to issue, that the appellant seeks to conduct a wide ranging investigation that well exceeds the proper scope of the appeal. In that regard the single judge correctly identified that the appellant sought leave to issue summonses for the production of documents to investigate allegations that the appellant wished to pursue. For example, before the single judge, when it was said that the appellant was making allegations that should not be made, the appellant responded:

They need to be investigated. That's how you investigate systemic misconduct, is through the information ... (appeal ts 55).

1. More generally the purpose of the summonses was exposed by the appellant's expressed desire, in submissions before the single judge, for the court to order or facilitate forensic or other investigations (see eg appeal ts 37 ‑ 40, 42 ‑ 43). That desire is perpetuated in the appellant's affidavit sworn 26 February 2026. The appellant contends that a 'targeted forensic examination' represents a more cost-effective and efficient mechanism for uncovering the truth of alleged systemic misconduct and evidence suppression than a Royal Commission or other large-scale review (par 32). In arguing that this court should allow the issue of the summonses the appellant submits that 'the alleged systemic misconduct, evidence of suppression and perversion of justice are matters of profound public importance that demand authoritative guidance from' this court (par 35).
2. Ground 1, in its terms, is directed to whether the single judge mistook the extent of the court's power under s 14(1)(i) and s 40(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act. There is no merit in that contention. The single judge expressly acknowledged this court's power to admit additional evidence and to give leave to a party to issue a summons requiring a person or entity to produce documents [46]. However, his Honour then identified that there must be a proper basis, consistent with the court's appellate function, for the exercise of the power [47]. We agree that the power is subject to such a limitation.
3. The appellant relied on s 40(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act as the relevant source of power. This is a power to order the production of a record or thing 'that is or may be relevant to the appeal'. So stated the power is tethered to this court's appellate function - it is a power in aid of and ancillary to this court's appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is a power to be exercised for the correction of error. In the present context that is any error in the primary appeal before Howard J in the General Division. The power to grant leave to issue summonses for the production of documents is not a free ranging power for the investigation of every grievance that a litigant has as to the circumstances that gave rise to the primary proceedings; nor, all the more so, as to such grievances as to the conduct of other parties in relation to the primary proceedings.
4. As we have mentioned, in oral submissions the appellant directed attention to the terms of s 40(1)(f) of the Criminal Appeals Act - in particular to the statutory usage of the word 'investigation'. That word should not be read and construed as transforming the court's appellate function to one of conducting an investigation or transforming the court's role to one of an investigator. Stated in full, s 40(1)(f) provides that 'for the purposes of dealing with an appeal' the court may:

if a question in the appeal involves a lengthy examination of records, or a scientific or local investigation, that the court considers cannot be done conveniently before the court:

(i) appoint a special commissioner to inquire into and report on the question; and

(ii) act on the report so far as the court thinks fit.

1. Section 40(1)(f) of the Criminal Appeals Act is concerned with two specific circumstances. It empowers particular action where: (1) there is a question in the appeal which involves either (a) a lengthy examination of records or (b) a scientific or local investigation; and (2) that examination or investigation cannot be done conveniently before the court. Nothing in s 40(1)(f) enlarges the power in s 40(1)(a). Nor does it alter the nature of the court's appellate jurisdiction. Section 40(1)(f) simply provides a specific power which might be necessary or convenient in the exercise of the court's appellate function in particular circumstances as described in s 40(1)(f). In any event it could not be suggested that the power in s 40(1)(f) of the Criminal Appeals Act was potentially exercisable in the circumstances of the present appeal.
2. The single judge did not mistake the extent of the court's power to grant leave to issue summonses for the production of documents. This further aspect of ground 1 failed.

1. The appellant did not establish error in the single judge's decision. Accordingly, it was not necessary for this court to re-exercise the discretion as exercised by the single judge on 22 December 2025. Had it been necessary to do so it would have been necessary for the court to consider the circumstance that the appellant sought orders that exceeded the scope of the orders sought before the single judge. For example, by the time of the hearing of the review application the intended recipients of the summonses for production had increased in number. The appellant also sought further orders including his own forensic psychiatric assessment. See the appellant's affidavit sworn 26 February 2026 pars 54 ‑ 66. None of that arose for consideration in circumstances where the application for review was to be dismissed.
2. It was for these reasons that, on 16 March 2026, we made orders that:

1. The appellant has leave to file the following documents, which documents are to be accepted for filing, on the basis that the affidavits referred to are received as additional evidence on and in support of the appellant's application for review:

(a) the appellant's application in an appeal dated 23 February 2026 and the appellant's affidavit sworn 23 February 2026 in support thereof;
>
> (b) the appellant's application in an appeal dated 26 February 2026 and the appellant's affidavit sworn 26 February 2026 in support thereof.

1. The appellant's application dated 30 December 2025 for review of a single judge's decision is dismissed.
2. Other orders were made prior to hearing argument on the review application. Those other orders were uncontroversial. Accordingly, it is not necessary to set out those orders or restate the basis on which those orders were made.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] GSA v Chief Executive Officer, Department of Communities [2025] WASCA 196.

[2] GSA v Chief Executive Officer, Department of Communities [2025] WASC 375.

[3] GXB v Tyson [No 3] [2025] WASCA 116 [2].

[4] Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577 [2] - [3], [117].

[5] Reynolds v Rayney [2023] WASCA 144 [28] - [36].

[6] Armet v Stephen Browne [2024] WASCA 44 [56] - [59].

[7] Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd [2021] WASCA 25 [25] - [27].

[8] G v W [2021] WASCA 180 [62] - [64].

[9] Zaghloul v Bradley Bayly Holdings Pty Ltd [2025] WASCA 81 [80].

[10] Lee v Brandis [2025] WASCA 125 [68].

[11] Clark v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2025] WASCA 127 [17].

[12] Michael v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 100 [65].