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[2017] VCAT 1842
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2017-11-13
Mr J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Whether substantive orders as proposed by the respondent should be made before this proceeding is heard, against the wishes of the applicant, ending the proceeding - Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, s 75 - no power under s 75 to without consent set aside a decision under review - Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, s 51A - possibility of inviting the respondent to reconsider decision under review
Racing Victoria Racing Appeals and Disciplinary Board
Goodrich v Racing Victoria Racing Appeals and Disciplinary Board No.1 (Review and Regulation) [2017] VCAT 1842
An unusual scenario has arisen in this proceeding whereby the respondent seeks consent orders, by email dated 4 October 2017, setting aside the decision on penalty of the Racing Appeals and Disciplinary Board dated 10 March 2017 and that Racing Victoria pay the applicant's costs of this proceeding.
This is, on its face and subject to submissions, the optimal outcome in this proceeding which the applicant could achieve.
The question arises whether the applicant further pursuing issues in this proceeding is an abuse of process. In this circumstance, unless the parties agree consent orders beforehand, a directions hearing is required in this proceeding. It is not appropriate to at this time leave open the possibility of Racing Victoria being required to respond to a summons for documents, as foreshadowed the email on behalf of the applicant dated 9 October 2017.
75 Summary dismissal of unjustified proceedings
(1) At any time, the Tribunal may make an order summarily dismissing or striking out all, or any part, of a proceeding that, in its opinion -
(a) is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or
the power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried
It seems then that litigation may properly be regarded as vexatious for present purposes on either objective or subjective grounds. I believe that the test may be expressed in the following terms:
what constitutes an abuse of process must be a question of degree, and would depend on the circumstances of each case. The rationale behind the power to strike out a proceeding for abuse of process is to protect the interests of justice and preserve the integrity of the Tribunal's processes.[4]
Recently, the High Court of Australia in Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicolls reaffirmed what constitutes an abuse of process. They confirmed that what amounts to abuse of process is insusceptible of a formulation comprising closed categories. They cited with approval Ridgeway v R where Gaudron J noted that the concept extended to proceedings "instituted for an improper purpose" and to proceedings that are "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging" or "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment."
In Rogers v R, McHugh J summarised the categories of abuse as follows:
Inherent in every court of justice is the power to prevent its procedures being abused. Although the categories of abuse of procedure remain open, abuses of procedure usually fall into one of three categories: (1) the court's procedures are invoked for an illegitimate purpose; (2) the use of the court's procedures is unjustifiably oppressive to one of the parties; or (3) the use of the court's procedures would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Many, perhaps the majority of, cases of abuse of procedure arise from the institution of proceedings. But any procedural step in the course of proceedings that have been properly instituted is capable of being an abuse of the court's process.
[2] Wood v Calliden Insurance Ltd [2008] VCAT 1339 at [15].
[4] Cunningham v Hayden Real Estate (Geelong) Pty Ltd [2003] VCAT 41 at [32].
[5] With whom Neave and Harper JJA agreed.
Goodrich
Racing Victoria Racing Appeals and Disciplinary Board No.1
(1983) 154 CLR 87
(2012) 36 VR 130