Goguri v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 227

1. In the Decision, the Tribunal outlined the procedural history of the application for review (CB 193-4 [1]-[11]), as well as the statutory framework informing the Tribunal's review (CB 194-5 [12]-[16]).
2. In particular, the Tribunal noted the requirement that the applicant satisfy cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 of the Regulations and that the Tribunal have regard to Ministerial Direction No. 69 made pursuant to s 499 of the Act, which required the Tribunal to consider the applicant's circumstances in her home country and potential circumstances in Australia; the value of the course to the applicant's future; the applicant's immigration history; and any other relevant information provided by the applicant, or otherwise available to the decision maker.
3. After considering the applicant's claims and evidence (CB 195-198 [17]-[30]), the Tribunal arrived at the following conclusion in paragraph [31] of the Decision (CB 199):

... the applicant's overall lack of academic progress over a period of in excess of four years, her inconsistent submissions in relation to a number of matters, her breaches of her previous student visa conditions and her economic incentives to remain onshore cause the Tribunal to consider that the applicant is motivated by factors other than study and is using the student visa program as a means of maintaining residence in Australia. The Tribunal cannot be satisfied on the material and evidence before it that the applicant genuinely intends to stay in Australia temporarily.

1. The Tribunal found that it could not be satisfied that the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student temporarily as required by cl 500.212 of the Regulations. The decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant the visa was therefore affirmed (CB 199 [34]).

1. On 21 August 2019, the applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Decision.
2. The grounds of review identified in the application for judicial review were as follows:
   1. AAT decision is not acceptable. AAT member didn't consider my immigration history and bona fide track record of study in Australia. I applied student visa sub class 500 to do Diploma of Business. AAT should have seen this case in new perspective than affirming the decision of Department of Home Affairs. I fulfil the criteria and terms of condition on which I should have given approval of student visa 500 visa as I am a genuine student and have intention to return back to my home country. I have more incentives in my home country. I am the only child of my aging parents, which makes me more genuine student who will return to her home country after completion of course. Clause 500.212 does apply in my case as my financial and social condition gives me great incentives in my home country. I want federal circuit court to intervene in this matter and review the decision of AAT, which is full of discrepancies.
   2. AAT decision was not taken in fairly manner. AAT decision is legally unreasonable.
   3. I am not happy the decision of AAT. In decision AAT simply affirm the decision of department of home affairs. AAT didn't give any weight to my strong position and incentives in my home country.
   4. Affidavit is attached to support my appeal application.
3. The application for review was accompanied by an affidavit affirmed by the applicant on the same day. In the affidavit the applicant said:
   1. I want to appeal in Federal Circuit Court to review the decision of AAT.
   2. That AAT just affirmed the decision of DOHA without doing any further investigation.
   3. Decision was not taken in fairly manner. AAT should have look into this case in new perspective. AAT simply affirm the decision of department of home affairs, which is totally based on prejudice. I want review in this case.
4. No further particulars were given of the grounds of review.
5. On 4 March 2020 and again on 20 February 2025, registrars of the Court directed that the applicant file and serve any amended application, written submissions and any affidavit evidence on which she might seek to rely 28 days before the date of the final hearing. The applicant did not file or serve any amended application, written submissions or further affidavit in support of her application for judicial review before the final hearing.
6. The final hearing of the application for judicial review took place before this Court in person at Melbourne on 20 January 2026. The applicant appeared self-represented and was assisted by an interpreter of the Telugu and English languages.
7. Ms Roeger, solicitor, appeared for the Minister.
8. At the hearing, the Court confirmed that the applicant received a copy of the Court Book prepared by the solicitor for the Minister and a copy of the Minister's written outline of submissions dated 23 December 2025.
9. As the applicant was unrepresented, the Court explained the nature of the proceedings and the procedure to be followed at the hearing. The Court explained that the applicant must identify a jurisdictional error or a mistake as to law by the Tribunal. This mistake must also be sufficiently material enough to warrant the decision being set aside and decided again by a reconstituted Tribunal. The Court reiterated that the hearing was not a review of the merits of the Decision, nor does the Court have the capacity to grant the applicant a visa. Finally, the Court gave the applicant the opportunity to elaborate and further particularise her grounds for review and identify an error made on the part of the Tribunal.
10. Further, in the application for judicial review, the applicant sought only an order to quash the Tribunal's decision and did not seek a writ of mandamus requesting the matter be remitted to the Tribunal to be heard in accordance with law (CB 4). An application that fails to seek a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or an injunction, has the result of not properly invoking the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to s 476(1) of the Act (see FRA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 2287 [15] and [21] per Judge Driver). Noting that the applicant was unrepresented and may not have appreciated the importance of this technicality, and noting that solicitors for the Minister have not raised this issue in the written submissions made on behalf of the Minister, the Court will order that the application dated 1 February 2019 is amended to seek a writ of mandamus. The Court has the power to do so, even on its own motion (see Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 889 [44]-[51] per Judge Kendall). The Court finds that it is in the interests of justice and the overarching purpose of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules) to dispense with non-compliance with the Rules, for the purpose of amending the originating process in this proceeding.

1. In response to the invitation to elaborate and articulate her claims that the Tribunal erred, the applicant was unable to identify any error by the Tribunal in making the Decision, nor was she able to expand on the grounds specified in the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit. The applicant said that she was currently undertaking training as a chef and, 'I need an opportunity to finish my training'. After further questioning by the Court, the applicant stated 'I would like to fix the mistakes I made in the past. I would like to complete a course and then I would like to leave'. The applicant was unable to provide a substantive response to the invitation to further identify error by the Tribunal, instead stating that she had nothing further to say.
2. The applicant did not seek to rely on any further evidence, submissions or documentation for the purpose of supporting her application for judicial review.

1. Ms Roeger, on behalf of the Minister, relied on the outline of written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister dated 23 December 2025.
2. It was submitted that the applicant's claims in ground one and three of the grounds in the application for judicial review (that the Tribunal failed to consider or give sufficient weight to the applicant's incentives to return home, immigration history and study record), require the Court to undertake impermissible merits review of the Tribunal's decision. Complaints about the 'weight' given by the Tribunal to particular matters, does not reflect an error on the part of the Tribunal, but rather reflects its capacity to give whatever weight it considers appropriate to the evidence before it (Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27] per French J). Furthermore, it is apparent from the decision record that the Tribunal directly considered the applicant's study and immigration history, her incentives to return to India or remain in Australia and her circumstances in both countries.
3. With regards to ground two of the grounds in the application for judicial review (the Tribunal failed to provide the applicant with procedural fairness and the decision was legally unreasonable), these claims were also said to be unfounded. The applicant was invited to attend a hearing, in which she was supported by a migration agent representative and assisted by a Telugu interpreter, despite her request to proceed in English. The applicant was put on notice of the key issue in the matter, whether she is a genuine temporary entrant, and was given the opportunity to meaningfully address the Tribunal's concerns in the hearing (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152 at [35]). In terms of the claim that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable, it was submitted that this claim cannot succeed as it lacks any meaningful particulars. Furthermore, the conclusion that the applicant was not a genuine temporary entrant for the purposes of cl 500.212(a) was logically and rationally open to the Tribunal on the basis of the evidence and information available to it.
4. For these reasons, no jurisdictional error can be said to have been established in the Tribunal's decision and that the application should be dismissed with costs.

1. The applicant did not make any further submissions in reply to the submissions made on behalf of the Minister.

1. The application for judicial review must be dismissed because the applicant has failed to identify a material jurisdictional error in the Decision and no error is apparent from the Tribunal's reasoning.
2. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; 280 CLR 321 (LPDT), the plurality said at [3]:

[3]...Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.

1. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at [31], the High Court said:

...In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. This has been made clear many times in this Court. For example, it was said by Brennan J in Attorney General (NSW) v Quin:

"The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone."

1. Of the three grounds of review identified by the applicant in the application for judicial review filed 21 August 2019, the applicant has been unable to explain to the Court why the Tribunal erred as alleged.
2. The first ground of review is not established because the Decision records that the Tribunal did consider the applicant's immigration history and history of academic progress by reference to the evidence presented (CB 196-8 [18]-[29]). The Tribunal did undertake an independent review of the delegate's decision but was not satisfied on the evidence (including the applicant's evidence at the Tribunal hearing) that she intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily. Therefore, her application did not satisfy cl 500.212 of the Regulations. The Court is not permitted to undertake merits review and reconsider the evidence given by the applicant or the weight given to that evidence by the Tribunal. No discrepancies in the reasoning of the Tribunal have been identified and none are apparent. The Decision reflects a conventional or orthodox approach to the review of a delegate's decision to refuse a student visa especially where there has been interrupted and incomplete academic progress by the applicant.
3. The Decision is also not legally unreasonable. In Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550 at [26], the Court said:

A requirement of legal reasonableness in the exercise of a decision-maker's power is derived by implication from the statute [Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at 362 [63]], including an implication of the required threshold of unreasonableness, which is usually high [Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541 at 551 [11], 564 [52], 575 [89], 586 [135].]. Any legal unreasonableness is to be judged at the time the power is exercised or should have been exercised [ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34; (2020) 94 ALJR 928 at 953-954 [101]; [2020] HCA 34; 383 ALR 407 at 437.]. It is not to be assessed through the lens of procedural fairness to the applicant [Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475 at 491 [67]. See BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; (2019) 93 ALJR 1091 at 1099 [34]; 373 ALR 196 at 204-205_._]. Instead, whether the implied requirements of legal reasonableness have been satisfied requires a close focus upon the particular circumstances of exercise of the statutory power: the conclusion is drawn "from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power" [Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at 367 [76]].

1. Here the decision to affirm the delegate's decision to refuse the visa was reasonably open to the Tribunal on the available evidence. It was not a decision that no reasonable decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. It was not a decision that was irrational, illogical, arbitrary, capricious or unconscionable (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [131] per Crennan and Bell JJ). It was also one fairly made after providing the applicant with an opportunity to participate in a meaningful hearing and to present evidence and argument. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal assisted by a registered migration agent and interpreter. No procedural unfairness or irregularity is apparent on the face of the Decision or from the documents contained in the Court Book. The applicant could not identify any unfairness in the Tribunal's conduct of the review.
2. The applicant was not in a 'strong position' as is asserted in the grounds of review and the Decision was one within the freedom of the Tribunal to make. The Decision does reflect that the Tribunal undertook an independent review of the application for the visa and was not satisfied that the applicant met the requirements of the Regulations and after considering the guidelines in Ministerial Direction No. 69. The Decision was not a simple copy and paste of the delegate's decision but took into account and gave weight to the applicant's further evidence at the hearing on 22 July 2019. Further, no prejudice or bias is apparent from the Tribunal's reasoning. The assertions contained in the applicant's affidavit affirmed 21 August 2019 are not made out.
3. This Court has also scrutinised the Decision for jurisdictional error after considering the materials in the Court Book and the applicant's request to be given an opportunity to complete her current training as a chef. The Court has done so noting the obligation of the Court to reasonably assist self-represented litigants as stated in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [77], [100], [112]-[114]. No material jurisdictional error could be identified.
4. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

1. The Minister submitted that in the event that the application for judicial review is dismissed, that the first and second applicants be ordered to pay the Minister's costs fixed in the sum of $4,200.00, which is less than the sum prescribed by item 3 of Sch 2, Pt 3, Div 1, to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth). That sum is fair and reasonable in the circumstances, and it is appropriate that costs follow the outcome of the proceeding.

1. The name of the first respondent is to be amended to 'Minister for Immigration and Citizenship', which is the current Ministerial title that changed on 13 May 2025.

I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Corbett.