GODWIN -v- KEET [2026] WASC 105 (2 April 2026)

1. The Member recognised that the respondent carried the burden of establishing that it was fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case for him to be awarded an amount against the appellant. After outlining the parties' respective positions,[7] the Member addressed the legislative framework applicable to costs orders in the SAT Act, and identified the applicable principles.[8] In exercising the discretion under s 87(3) of the SAT to make an award of costs, the Member:

(a) had regard to the nature, history and complexity of the dispute;

(b) considered it was reasonable for the appellant to make an application to the Tribunal to challenge the strata manager's contract in that, even though the appellant was not successful on the question of whether the strata manager's contract had been terminated, the application to the Tribunal was 'somewhat supported by the conclusion reached by the Tribunal where it held that the council was not properly constituted in two years';[9]

(c) considered it was reasonable for the respondent to participate in the proceeding to put forward his position and to protect his and the Strata Manager's interests, and the respondent's position was strongly supported by the Tribunal's substantive decision to the effect that the strata manager's contract had not been terminated;[10]

(d) considered that the respondent acted reasonably in the proceedings,[11] but found that the conduct of the appellant 'unnecessarily prolonged the final hearing on the primary issue', which caused the respondent to 'expend a significant amount of his time to read the voluminous number of documents, to prepare for, and attend the numerous directions hearings requested by Ms Godwin and the final hearing to put forward his position and to protect [the Strata Manager] and his interests';[12]

(e) concluded that the respondent was the successful party in the proceeding and addressed the question whether, in all of the particular circumstances or the realities of the case, it would be fair and reasonable for the successful party to be deprived of his costs, or part of those costs;[13] and

(f) assessed the reasonable costs of the respondent as being confined to a loss of time of the respondent for undertaking work to respond to the proceedings, in the amount of $3,337.50,[14] and parking fees in the amount of $118.39, both of which fell within the ambit of s 87(3) of the SAT Act.[15]

1. The Member ultimately formed the view, 'taking into consideration all the circumstances of this case including the conduct of the parties, the nature of the dispute and the legislative purpose of the SAT Act', that that purpose:[16]

...will be served by [the respondent] receiving his reasonable costs under s 87(3) of the SAT Act for his expenses and costs including for loss of time in connection with the proceeding in the Tribunal, after making adjustments in the particular circumstances of this case, where it would be fair and reasonable for [the respondent] to be deprived of part of his costs.

1. The Member concluded that, having regard to the objectives of the Tribunal and in the interests of justice, it was fair and reasonable that the appellant be ordered to pay a contribution towards the respondent's reasonable costs for his expense and loss in connection with the proceeding in the Tribunal, fixed in the amount of $3,000.[17]

The appeal to this court Section 105 of the SAT Act

1. Pursuant to s 105 of the SAT Act, an appeal such as the present one can only be brought on a 'question of law' and only if this court gives leave to appeal. Section 105 relevantly states:
   1. Appeal from Tribunal's decision

(1) A party to a proceeding may appeal from a decision of the Tribunal in the proceeding, but only if the court to which the appeal lies gives leave to appeal.

(2) The appeal can only be brought on a question of law.

1. The principles governing the grant or refusal of leave to appeal are well established: Medical Board of Australia v GLP.[18] The Court of Appeal recognised in that case that the ultimate issue is whether the grant of leave is in the interests of justice, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case. However, in many cases it may be necessary for an applicant for leave to appeal to show that there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the Tribunal's decision to justify the grant of leave to appeal, and that to allow the error to go uncorrected would impose substantial injustice.
2. In Silkchime Pty Ltd v Valuer-General,[19] the Court of Appeal explained the nature of an appeal on a question of law as follows:

As has been explained in many cases, while termed an appeal, the 'appeal' is in the nature of judicial review. The function of the court is, and is only, to examine what the Tribunal has done for legal error.

Where, as here, an appeal lies 'on a question of law', the question (or questions) of law is the entirety of the subject matter of the appeal. If, on proper analysis, the question raised by a litigant is not a question of law, linguistic gymnastics in the formulation of the grounds of appeal cannot convert it into a question of law.

1. The Court of Appeal then referred to the principles set out by Buss JA, as his Honour then was, in Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board,[20] which it noted had been adopted on numerous occasions since that decision:

(1) A question of mixed fact and law is not a question of law within s 105(2).

(2) A ground of appeal which asserts the decision is against the evidence and the weight of the evidence does not raise a question of law.

(3) A tribunal does not commit an error of law merely because it finds facts wrongly or upon a doubtful basis.

(4) A ground of appeal that a tribunal has made a finding which is manifestly unreasonable, in the sense that no reasonable tribunal could have made that finding, alleges an error of law.

(5) A ground of appeal that a tribunal has failed to take into account a consideration which, in the circumstances, it was bound to take into account alleges an error of law.

1. The foregoing principles must be applied by this court in the determination of the present appeal. Indeed, to emphasise the importance of identifying a 'question of law', prior to the first directions hearing in this matter the court emailed the parties in the following terms:

His Honour directs the parties' attention to s 105 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), the effect of which is that an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal may only be brought with leave on a question of law. It is essential that the question of law relied upon for the purposes of s 105 be identified with precision. The question of law is not simply to be distilled from the grounds of appeal and the submissions: Lourey v LSCC [2023] WASCA 90 [9] and [21].

As matters stand, his Honour notes that he is presently unable to readily discern a 'question of law' in the materials filed thus far by the appellant. Prior to the directions hearing scheduled for 11 December 2025, the appellant ought give consideration to this question and be in a position at the hearing to articulate the nature of the 'question of law' in respect of which leave is sought.

1. There have been several interlocutory steps in the appeal to this court which should be briefly documented in these reasons.
2. First, the court scheduled a directions hearing for 11 December 2025 to provide the parties with an opportunity to briefly outline the issues arising in the appeal, and for the court to make directions to facilitate the final hearing. At the directions hearing, which ran for about one hour, it became apparent that the parties were supportive of the appeal being heard and determined on the papers. On 7 January 2026, the court made orders to facilitate that being done. As the matter was the subject of an initial hearing on 11 December 2025, and the parties were supportive of the appeal being heard on the paper, the orders were not made pursuant to the regime in O 65 r 4 and r 7 RSC.
3. Second, the respondent to this appeal did not file a notice of respondent's intention within the seven day time period required by O 65 r 12(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC). An extension of time to file such a notice was required. The respondent applied for leave, which was opposed by the appellant.
4. Having considered the application, the court made an order on 7 January 2026, granting the respondent's application for an extension of time. The court granted leave on the basis of the matters detailed in the respondent's affidavit sworn on 17 December 2025,[21] and having regard to the relatively short delay involved, the good explanation for the delay, and the absence of material prejudice to the appellant caused by that delay.[22] In addition, having the benefit of a contradictor on this particular appeal, given the course of the proceedings in the Tribunal and the dense factual material, struck me as a compelling factor in favour of the grant of the extension of time. The order was made notwithstanding the points in opposition explained by the appellant in her affidavit sworn 22 December 2025[23] and her submissions dated 22 December 2025.[24]
5. Third, on 29 January 2026, the appellant filed an application and a supporting affidavit[25] seeking leave under the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (WA), and under the court's inherent jurisdiction, to have several other matters pending in the Tribunal transferred to this court. That application was wholly misconceived. On 5 February 2026, the court ordered that the application be dismissed.
6. Fourth, on 17 February 2026, the appellant sought to challenge the costs decision which had been made by the Member on 11 February 2026. That costs decision was made in the same substantive proceedings which led to the present appeal. The court made directions to facilitate the hearing and determination of the appeal against costs in conjunction with the substantive appeal.[26]

1. The core documents which have been filed by the appellant and which are relevant to the appeal grounds (leaving aside the material filed during the interlocutory stages) are the notice of appeal filed 26 September 2025 (Appeal Notice) and the appellant's submissions filed in this court on 9 December 2025 and on 22 January 2026 (which I will refer to as AS1 and AS2 respectively).[27]
2. I have also had regard, in particular, to the statement of issues, fact and contentions which was filed by the appellant in the Tribunal proceedings, to which are attached several witness statements.
3. For its part, the respondent filed detailed submissions in this court in opposition to the appeal, on 3 February 2026 (RS1).[28]
4. On the costs appeal, the appellant has filed several documents to which the court has had regard, namely:

(a) the appellant's application to appeal the costs order filed 27 February 2026;[29]

(b) the appellant's affidavit sworn 17 February 2026, to which was attached a set of submissions as Attachment A (AS3);[30]

(c) the additional submissions filed by the appellant on 28 February 2026 (AS4);[31] and

(d) the final submissions filed by the appellant on 13 March 2026 (AS5).[32]

1. The court has also been provided with submissions filed by the respondent dated 24 March 2026 (RS2).[33]
2. Additionally, this court has before it a voluminous amount of material arising from the proceedings at first instance before the Tribunal which includes documentary evidence, witness statements, written submissions and the transcript of proceedings. This material consists of Matter Book 1, which comprises three volumes, and Matter Book 2 which comprises five volumes. For the disposition of this appeal, it has not been necessary to refer to all of this material. To the extent that a party has expressly referred to one of the documents before the Tribunal, that has been considered in the determination of this appeal.

Appeal in relation to the Primary Decision Overview

1. The appellant challenges all of the orders made by the Tribunal.
2. Speaking broadly, at the conclusion of her Appeal Notice, the appellant submits that the owners are now in a situation 'where they are without justice' and 'have no hope of having their homes and building fixed correctly'. The appellant says this will cause the owners 'financial distress, loss of property value and in the future may severely impact the stability of the building'.[34]
3. The appellant is unrepresented and so it should be no surprise the grounds of appeal themselves have not been articulated in the manner in which a lawyer might draft them. The court should take care so as not to unfairly misinterpret the grounds based on a purely legalistic reading of them, and due allowance should be given in this regard. The respondent accepted as much in his submissions.[35]
4. The grounds of challenge were described by the appellant in different ways in the Appeal Notice and across her two sets of substantive submissions (being AS1 and AS2). I have included an extract from the Appeal Notice in Attachment B to these reasons, which demonstrates how the grounds were initially drafted by the appellant.[36]
5. For ease of identification, I have attempted to draw together the appellant's concerns into thematic grounds, whilst still primarily using the language which was employed by the appellant in formulating her grounds and in her submissions. The appellant's contentions may thus be summarised in the following manner, which I have labelled as the 'Restated Grounds' to avoid confusion between the numbering used by the parties.

1. A fundamental and core aspect of the appeal is the appellant's contention that the Tribunal misunderstood and misconstrued her application, and ignored the alleged contraventions of the law which she said had been committed by the Strata Manager. This is the essence of the matters which are set out in [34] to [36] of the Appeal Notice, which I have extracted in Attachment B.
2. This contention is described by the appellant in the following ways in her documents:

(a) the Tribunal and has allowed the respondent to make the matter about himself instead of the owners and the many contraventions of law committed by the respondent;[37]

(b) the Tribunal has only decided part of the matter and has ignored the many contraventions of law committed by the respondent which have caused and are causing distress, detriment and harm to the owners and the appellant;[38] and

(c) the Tribunal has ignored relevant material in deciding the matter as set out in the Primary Decision.[39]

1. The Tribunal has included in its decision submissions by an owner which were not served on the appellant.[40]

1. The Member erred in law by exhibiting bias against the appellant and favouritism towards the respondent.[41]

1. The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdictional authority and as a result the orders made in the Primary Decision are ultra vires.[42]

1. The Member failed to deliver the decision in accordance with the timeframe allocated in the SAT Act.[43]

1. The Tribunal erred in law by coming to an incorrect conclusion by failing to declare that the AGM held on 30 January 2024 was invalid.[44]

1. The Tribunal erred in law by failing to declare that the AGM held on 17 December 2024 was invalid despite that meeting failing to elect a valid council of owners.[45]

1. The appellant was defamed by the inclusion of comments made by the respondent in the Primary Decision at [194].[46]

1. The Tribunal failed in the exercise of its statutory duty by refusing to terminate the contracts despite more than 25% of the owners of Waterfront Apartments requesting it.[47]

1. The orders in the Primary Decision impact the ability of the owners of the Waterfront Apartments to obtain legal representation in another matter before the Tribunal, being matter CC/195/2024.[48]
2. I will now address each of these restated grounds of appeal.

1. The appellant contends the Tribunal misunderstood and misconstrued her application to the Tribunal. It is asserted that the Tribunal incorrectly limited its analysis to whether the agreements had been terminated through the notice of termination issued to the Strata Company.
2. Instead, the appellant says the Tribunal ought to have found the agreements were terminated as a result of numerous contraventions of the ST Act by the Strata Manager, and the Tribunal failed to consider those contraventions.
3. The appellant specifically submits that:[49]

[2] ...this case is about contraventions of law committed by the respondent which deem the contract between Strata Asset Services and the Owners Waterfront Apartments Stage 1 SP69486, terminated.

[3] The Member in this matter has failed to understand the issues. The Member has chosen to ignore more than 50 contraventions of law by the respondent, which deem the contract terminated.

...

[10] The Member has in essence allowed the strata manager to make this matter his own by refusing to acknowledge the 50 plus contraventions of the Act which deem the contract by law terminated. The Member made the decisions and orders based on the strata managers submissions regarding the validity of the general meetings and not the contraventions of law committed by the respondent, or the issue as defined by Senior Member O'Sullivan 4 February 2025. The Tribunal has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and the statutory power under which the decision is made. If a Member incorrectly interprets a statutory provision and then proceeds to make a decision based on the facts as found using a mistaken interpretation, it is an error of law.

1. The respondent points out that the appellant's approach on this ground is based on a misconception.[50] The misconception is that a breach of a provision of the ST Act by a strata manager will automatically terminate a strata management contract, or at least empower the Tribunal to terminate the contract. The respondent submits, correctly in my view, that this is not the case.
2. Further, the respondent has observed that a strata management contract may be terminated pursuant to the terms of the instrument, such as on the expiration of the agreement through effluxion of time, and any contractual mechanisms identified within the agreement.
3. I accept that if the appellant is able to demonstrate that the Tribunal 'misunderstood and misconstrued' her application, that is likely to constitute a material error of law which, if uncorrected, would cause substantial injustice to the appellant. However, I do not accept that the Member misunderstood or misconstrued the application. In my view, the Member determined the application in the manner contemplated by the directions made in February 2025 and in the manner contemplated by the ST Act. Some brief explanation is required in this regard.
4. At the outset, it should be noted the appellant brought her proceedings in the Tribunal pursuant to s 47 of the ST Act. Section 47 concerns the manner in which a strata company and other persons may seek to enforce the by-laws applicable to a strata scheme. The provision requires that the appellant demonstrate one of the grounds in s 47(4) of the ST Act. Relevantly, the appellant was required to demonstrate that she had given notice to the respondent as required by s 47(1)(a) of the ST Act, that the contravention had 'serious adverse consequences for a person other than the person alleged to have contravened the scheme by-laws', or the person had 'contravened the particular scheme by-law on at least 3 separate occasions'.[51]
5. The section relevantly provides:
   1. Enforcement of scheme by-laws

(1) A strata company may -

(a) give a written notice to a person alleged to have contravened the scheme by-laws; or

(b) apply to the Tribunal under this section for an order enforcing scheme by-laws if -

(i) the contravention has had serious adverse consequences for a person other than the person alleged to have contravened the scheme by-laws; or

(ii) the person has contravened the particular scheme by-law on at least 3 separate occasions; or

(iii) the person has been given notice under paragraph (a) and has contravened the notice.

(2) A written notice given by a strata company to a person alleged to have contravened the scheme by-laws must -

(a) specify the particular scheme by-law that is alleged to have been contravened; and

(b) specify the particular facts relied on as evidence of the contravention;

(c) specify the action that must be taken or refrained from being taken in order to avoid a continuing or further contravention of the particular scheme by-law; and

(d) contain an explanation of the effect of this section in terms set out in the regulations.

(3) An application may also be made to the Tribunal for enforcement of scheme by-laws by -

(a) the owner of a lot in the strata titles scheme; or

(b) if the scheme is a leasehold scheme - the owner of the leasehold scheme; or

(c) a mortgagee of a lot in the strata titles scheme; or

(d) an occupier of a lot in the strata titles scheme.

(4) An application can only be made under subsection (3) on the grounds that -

(a) if a person other than the strata company is alleged to have contravened the scheme by-laws - the person has been given notice under subsection (1)(a) and has contravened the notice; or

(b) the contravention has had serious adverse consequences for a person other than the person alleged to have contravened the scheme by-laws; or

(c) the person has contravened the particular scheme by-law on at least 3 separate occasions.

(5) The Tribunal may, if satisfied that a person has contravened the scheme by-laws, by order require the person to do 1 or more of the following -

(a) pay a specified amount to the strata company by way of penalty for the contravention;

(b) take specified action within a period stated in the order to remedy the contravention or prevent further contraventions;

(c) refrain from taking specified action to prevent further contraventions.

1. Next, it should be observed that the ST Act provides a mechanism for the termination of a strata management contract. This can be found in s 151 of the ST Act.
2. In effect, s 151(1)(a) to (f) set out the various grounds on which a strata company may terminate a strata management contract. If satisfied there are proper grounds, termination can take effect by giving the strata manager 28 days' written notice. Before a contract is validly terminated, the strata manager must be given a written show cause notice by the strata company stating that it proposes to terminate the contract, the ground or grounds for termination, and any evidence relied on. The notice must be compliant with the requirements in s 151(4).
3. In response, the strata manager then has the opportunity to make submissions under s 151(5), and proper consideration must be given to these submissions by the strata company within the period specified in the show cause notice.
4. The section relevantly provides:
   1. Termination of the strata management contract

(1) There are proper grounds for termination of a strata management contract by a strata company if -

(a) the strata manager has contravened this Act; or

(b) the strata manager has contravened the contract; or

(c) the strata manager is, according to the Interpretation Act 1984 section 13D, a bankrupt or a person whose affairs are under insolvency laws; or

(d) the strata manager is a Chapter 5 body corporate within the meaning given in the Corporations Act 2001 (Commonwealth) section 9; or

(e) the strata manager, or a director or chief executive officer of the strata manager, is convicted in this State of an offence punishable by imprisonment for 12 months or longer and the strata company is satisfied that the offence affects the strata manager's suitability to perform the strata manager's functions; or

(f) the strata manager, or a director or chief executive officer of the strata manager, is convicted outside this State, in Australia or elsewhere, of an offence that, if it had been committed in this State, would be punishable by imprisonment for 12 months or longer and the strata company is satisfied that the offence affects the strata manager's suitability to perform the strata manager's functions.

(2) If a strata company is satisfied that there are proper grounds for termination of a strata management contract, the strata company may terminate the contract by giving the strata manager written notice of termination -

(a) specifying the date (being not less than 28 days after the date of the notice) on which the termination will take effect; and

(b) informing the strata manager of the right to apply to the Tribunal for review of the decision to terminate the contract.

(3) Before a strata company terminates a strata management contract under subsection (2), the strata company must give the strata manager a notice (a show cause notice).

(4) A show cause notice must -

(b) state that the strata company proposes to terminate the strata management contract; and

(c) specify the grounds on which it is proposed to terminate the strata management contract; and

(d) set out particulars of the facts relied on as evidence of those grounds; and

(d) invite the strata manager to make written submissions to the strata company as to why the strata management contract should not be terminated; and

(f) specify the period (being at least 14 days after the date of the notice) within which the written submissions must be received by the strata company.

(5) A strata company must give proper consideration to any written submissions made by the strata manager within the period specified in the show cause notice.

(6) Nothing in this section affects the operation of section 115 in relation to a strata management contract or any other right that the strata company may have to terminate the contract.

83 Section 115 of the ST Act is headed 'Power to terminate certain contracts for amenities or services'. Section 115(1) provides that there 'is implied in every contract to which this section applies a provision that the strata company may terminate the contract, by written notice to every other party to the contract, after 5 years have passed since the contract was made'. The circumstances in which the section applies are set out in s 115(4). Those circumstances do not arise here, and so the provision has no application.

1. As can be seen from the terms of s 151, termination pursuant to this provision is not automatic. Rather, it is first necessary for a show cause notice to be issued by the strata company under s 151(3) of the ST Act. Only once this process is followed may the strata company terminate the strata management contract by giving the written notice contemplated by s 151(2), which must be based on the 'proper grounds' identified in s 151(1).
2. The evidence before the Tribunal included the termination notice issued by the appellant on 29 January 2024, which is set out in the Primary Decision at [139]. The termination notice was issued by the authority of a decision made by the Strata Company at the EGM held on 23 January 2024, and the resolutions passed at the council meeting held on the same day.
3. The show cause notice issued on 29 January 2024 relevantly stated as follows:

'Show cause notice'

There are numerous breaches of the Strata Titles Act by [Mr] Keet of Strata Asset Services WA whilst manager of the property waterfront apartments stage one SP 69486, that are being submitted to the State Administrative Tribunal however, to serve the show cause notice today in line with the Strata Titles Act, below is one of the breaches listed in the application.

17 January [2022] [Mr Keet] held an AGM whereupon he declared two owners of council this was Peet Ltd (the developer) and [Ms] Manderson of unit 12. This is a breach of the Alkimos Pty [Sch 1 by-laws 16, 17 and 18.1] that states ... The council will have a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 7 members. A quorum of the council will be 3 members, if there are less than 3 owners, each owner will be a member of the council ... three owners are required to be elected at the AGM in order for a council to be legally constituted. The [ST Act] further states that when there is no council nominated at the AGM that ALL the owners are then the council and furthermore any spending of the [s]trata [c]ompany funds needs to be done by making requests to ALL the owners in addition 50% of the owners must agree in the spending of those funds and for the purpose of the expense.

THIS DID NOT TAKE PLACE. Therefore, [Mr Keet] has used the [s]trata [c]ompany funds without authority, the budget was not agreed upon, the matter for the owners at the [Tribunal] was handled by an owner which is a very serious breach of the State Administrative Tribunal Act[.]

1. The Member ultimately found the EGM held on 23 January 2024 was invalid and all resolutions passed at the meeting were invalid: Primary Decision [124] and [132]. The Member also concluded that the council meeting held on the same day was invalid and any resolutions passed at that meeting were invalid: Primary Decision [136].
2. Quite apart from these difficulties, the Member concluded that the termination notice and the show cause notice issued by the appellant, which were issued in tandem on 29 January 2024 rather than in the sequential manner contemplated by s 151, were themselves invalid as being inconsistent with the substantive requirements in s 151(2) and s 151(4) of the ST Act, as explained by the Member at [142] and [148] of the Primary Decision.
3. The notices issued by the appellant on 29 January 2024 were the only termination notices or show cause notices issued by the Strata Company in respect of the Strata Manager. Once the notices issued by the appellant were found to be invalid, and given the expiry date of the 2023 Agreement, the conclusion that the 2023 Agreement had not been terminated was inescapable, with respect. As the respondent has correctly submitted, there were no other test that the Member 'could have or was bound to apply in such an instance'.[52]
4. The respondent makes the following further points in answer to this ground, with which I respectfully agree.
5. First, not only was it necessary for the Tribunal to determine the validity of the relevant council appointments given the potential impact this would have on the 2021 Agreement and the 2023 Agreement, it was also the subject of the appellant's initial application to the Tribunal and was identified in the appellant's statement of issues, facts and contention.[53]
6. Second, the respondent accepts the Tribunal was empowered to make orders terminating the 2021 Agreement and the 2023 Agreement, pursuant to the power in s 200 of the ST Act. That provision vests a broad discretion in the Tribunal, to 'make any order it considers appropriate to resolve the dispute or proceeding'. A decision by the Tribunal not to exercise such a power does not amount to a question of law, however, and there are no matters which the Tribunal was bound to take into account in deciding whether to make an order under s 200 of the ST Act.
7. In my view, this ground has no reasonable prospects of success and does not raise a proper question of law. It should be emphasised that the approach adopted by the Member in determining the SAT Application was consistent with the directions made by the Senior Member in February 2025, as further explained to the parties by the Member at the commencement of the substantive hearing, as set out above at [17] and [18].

1. This ground asserts a denial of procedural fairness in connection with submissions which were filed with the Tribunal by a lot owner (Mr Perkins).[54] The appellant says these submissions were not served on her. The appellant asserts this owner was assisting the respondent and the submissions were adverse to her interests.
2. This ground is without merit.
3. The appellant accepts in her submissions that although the document had not been formally served on her, she read the submissions in question before the conclusion of hearing, albeit belatedly. Further, but perhaps less significantly, the directions made by the Tribunal did not allow for responsive submissions to be filed by the appellant in any event.
4. While the ground raises a question of law, the ground has no reasonable prospects of success.

1. It may be accepted that a core element of procedural fairness is the independence and impartiality of the tribunal which decides a matter. A challenge in this regard may involve circumstances of actual bias or apprehended bias on the part of the tribunal.
2. The appellant's submissions do not assert the type of bias which is relied upon. Rather, the appellant raises a broad challenge against the decision below, on the basis the Member was biased against her and displayed favouritism towards the respondent. In general terms, the appellant makes reference to perceived double standards in treatment of the appellant by the Member, remarks said to be prejudicial, and the selective treatment of evidence during the proceedings, among other matters.
3. The appellant appears to point to conduct on the part of the Member showing favouritism by applying different rules or standards to the owners compared to the Strata Manager. For example, the Member declared the general meetings invalid due to procedural oversights, but when the Strata Manager made errors convening the 2024 AGM, the Member accepted his testimony under oath that these were simply 'mistakes' and did not declare his meeting invalid.
4. Further, during the hearing, the appellant complains that the Member accused the appellant of coercing the witness statements provided by 25% of the owners. The appellant submits there was no evidence to support this accusation, which she says demonstrates that the Member held a preconceived notion against her and lacked impartiality.
5. The tests for detecting and establishing actual bias and apprehended bias may be summarised as follows.
6. First, actual bias requires the person asserting it to prove that the decision maker was so committed to a conclusion already formed that they had closed their mind to the possibility of persuasion: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng.[55] The decision-maker must have prejudged the case against the applicant, or acted with such partisanship or hostility as to show that the decision-maker had a mind made up against the applicant and was not open to persuasion in favour of the applicant. Such an accusation must be distinctly made and clearly proved.[56]
7. Second, the test for apprehended bias requires examination of whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision maker might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the matter: Charisteas v Charisteas.[57] The test involves a two-step process which first requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. Then, there must be articulated a 'logical connection' between that matter and the feared departure from the judge deciding the case on its merits.
8. As the respondent observes, the appellant's allegations of bias appear to amount to a 'disagreement with the Tribunal as to the conclusions, orders, and declarations that should have been made'. The respondent submits that allegations that a 'decision is against the evidence or the weight of the evidence, or that a Tribunal made findings of fact upon a doubtful basis, do not amount to question of law'. I respectfully agree.
9. None of the matters identified by the appellant come close to making good the propositions that the Member was either actually biased against her, or that a circumstance of apprehended bias can be sustained. The statements made by the Member represent conclusions or procedural approaches in the proceeding which were adverse to the appellant. In a proceeding in which there is considerable animosity between the parties, and allegations of improper conduct made by each party, the tribunal member may well form views adverse to one party. In doing so, the member may well reject submissions made by the party and, indeed, accept the criticisms of the party made by another party. It is not to be supposed that such an outcome demonstrates on its own the existence of bias, whether actual or apprehended. It is simply a necessary party of the evaluative and decision-making process required of the Tribunal member.
10. While the ground raises a question of law, the ground has no reasonable prospects of success.

1. The appellant contends the Tribunal failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, refers to a 'mandatory statutory requirement', and submits the Member chose not to apply the law.[58] In essence, this ground raises the same complaint as Restated Ground 1, although it is styled as a jurisdictional question.
2. This ground has no reasonable prospects of success. The Tribunal acted in accordance with the jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal by s 197 and s 199 of the ST Act. Pursuant to s 197(4), an application for resolution of a 'scheme dispute' can be made to the Tribunal by a party to that dispute. There is no question this dispute was a 'scheme dispute', as defined in s 197(1). See, in particular, s 197(1)(g) which describes a 'scheme dispute' as included:

(g) a dispute between a strata manager, or former strata manager, of a strata company and the strata company about -

(i) a matter arising under Part 9; or

(ii) the strata management contract; or

(iii) the performance of, or the failure to perform, a function conferred or imposed on the strata manager;

1. Turning then to the powers of the Tribunal, s 199(1) empowers the Tribunal to make declarations concerning a matter in the proceeding instead of any order the Tribunal could make, or in addition to any order the Tribunal makes, in the proceeding. Section 199(3) identifies, in a non-exhaustive manner, various declarations which may be made by the Tribunal. As the respondent observes in his submissions, the majority of the declarations made by the Member in this case are expressly contemplated by s 199(3).[59]
2. Declarations as to the validity of strata management contracts are not expressly mentioned in s 199(3), but such declarations are not, in substance, different from the types of declarations contemplated by the legislature. I see no basis to conclude that the declarations made by the Member were beyond the jurisdiction or power of the Member.
3. Further, the additional orders made in the Primary Decision, which required the Strata Manager to convene an EGM in a particular manner, are the types of orders which the Tribunal is empowered to make, in order to remedy the dispute in question. The relevant dispute was the failure to have a properly constituted council at certain times.

1. The appellant asserts that the Member failed to deliver her reasons for decision in accordance with the timeframe allocated in the SAT Act. The ground has no merit.
2. Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the SAT Act concern the reasons to be published by the Tribunal, and provide that:
   1. Time limit for reserved decision

If the Tribunal reserves its decision in any proceeding, whether or not it is a final decision, it is to give its decision and the reasons for the decision within the period of 90 days after the day on which it reserved its decision or within an extension of that period given by the President

(1) The Tribunal is to give its reasons for a final decision.

(2) Reasons that the Tribunal gives for a final decision have to include the Tribunal's findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings are based.

(1) If the Tribunal makes a decision, whether or not a final decision, without having reserved its decision and does not give its reasons for the decision in writing, a party may, within the period of 28 days after the day on which the decision is given, request that the Tribunal give its reasons in writing.

(2) The Tribunal is to give written reasons that a party requests under subsection (1) within the period of 90 days after the day on which it receives the request or within an extension of that period given by the President.

1. In the present case, the Tribunal ordered on 23 May 2025 that the decision was to be reserved from the date the last written submissions were received. Initially, this was contemplated as 1 July 2025, but further orders were made allowing for the filing of submissions by the parties by 28 July 2025. The final submissions were received on 30 July 2025.
2. The Tribunal Member handed down her Primary Decision on 11 September 2025. From the date on which submissions were originally expected (being 1 July 2025), this is a period of 72 days. Further, from the date the last submissions were in fact received by the Tribunal, this is a period of 43 days.
3. Accordingly, there seems little doubt in my mind that the Tribunal complied with the timeframe for the provision of its reasons as found in s 76 of the SAT Act. In any event, this ground does not disclose an error of law or a question of law for determination by this court.
4. The ground has no reasonable prospects of success and should be dismissed.

1. The appellant contends the Tribunal erred in law by coming to an incorrect conclusion by failing to declare that the AGM held on 30 January 2024 was invalid.
2. The appellant complains that the Member did not declare this particular meeting to be invalid, 'when in fact it was invalid which deemed everything undertaken at this meeting invalid including the appointing of the [Council of Owners]'.[60] At [14] of AS2, the appellant refers to various factual matters which she says demonstrate the AGM was invalid.
3. There is no question of law raised by this ground. As explained in Paridis, a ground of appeal which asserts the decision is against the evidence and the weight of the evidence does not raise a question of law.

1. The appellant contends the Tribunal erred in law by failing to declare that the AGM held on 17 December 2024 was invalid despite that meeting failing to elect a valid council of owners.[61] Again, the appellant refers to various factual matters which she says demonstrate the AGM was invalid (at AS2 [17]). As with Restated Ground 6, these matters do not raise a question of law.

1. In the Primary Decision at [194], the Member referred to the submissions made by the respondent and quoted a passage from those submissions which was highly critical of the appellant. The respondent ascribed certain motives to the appellant and complained that several accusations made by the appellant had not been raised prior to the proceedings.
2. The Member referred to this passage as part of her concluding statements concerning the disharmony within the strata scheme, particularly between the appellant and the respondent, and some of the owners. Prior to the passage, the Member quoted statements made by the appellant about the respondent's competence and behaviour, which were themselves sternly, perhaps aggressively, worded.
3. The appellant alleges she has been defamed by the inclusion of these comments, submitting that: [62]

None of the accusations comments or statements made in that paragraph were proven during the Hearing and yet the Member has included these comments in a published decision. My name is written in the document and can be viewed by anyone who googles my name, I am denied natural justice and my name is now slandered all over the internet.

1. The ground has no merit. As framed, the ground provides no basis to challenge the Member's decision. In any event, the publication of material in the Tribunal's reasons for decision attracts the absolute privilege found in s 27 of the Defamation Act 2005 (WA).
2. The ground has no reasonable prospects of success and should be dismissed.

1. The appellant contends the Tribunal failed in the exercise of its statutory duty by refusing to terminate the agreements despite more than 25% of the owners requesting it. The appellant refers to s 103E and s 39A of the ST Act in support of the proposition that 25% of owners in a strata scheme may request an order from the Tribunal that a strata management agreement is terminated.
2. Both s 39A and s 103E were repealed with effect from April 2020, and had no continuing effect or application to the present dispute.
3. Section 39A formerly provided as follows:

39A. Power to terminate certain contracts for services

(1) There is implied in every agreement to which this section applies a provision that the strata company may terminate the agreement, by notice in writing to every other party to the agreement, after 5 years have passed since the agreement was entered into.

(2) No cause of action against any person arises from the exercise of the power referred to in subsection (1).

(3) An agreement shall not exclude the operation of subsection (1) and to the extent that it purports to do so it is of no effect.

(4) This section applies to an agreement if -

(a) it relates to the provision of services to the strata company or the proprietors, including the services of an agent in connection with the management of the common property or the performance of the functions of the strata company; and

(b) it is made after the commencement of section 41 of the Strata Titles Amendment Act 1995; and

(c) either -

(i) it was entered into by the strata company when any proprietor held 50% or more of the aggregate unit entitlement of the lots; or

(ii) the State Administrative Tribunal has, by order made on the application of a proprietor, determined that the agreement is unfair to the proprietors of 25% or more of the aggregate unit entitlement of the lots.

(5) The State Administrative Tribunal may, on the application of any person made in respect of an agreement, by order extend the period of 5 years provided for by subsection (1), so far as it applies to that agreement, if satisfied that the agreement -

(a) is fair to all proprietors; and

(b) will remain fair to all proprietors during the extended period.

(6) An extended period under subsection (5) is not to exceed the term specified in the agreement or a period of 10 years from the time when the agreement was entered into, whichever is the lesser.

(7) The provisions of Part VI apply to an application made to the State Administrative Tribunal under subsection (4)(c)(ii) or (5) and to an order made by the State Administrative Tribunal in the same way as they apply to an application and an order made under that Part.

103E. Order for termination of contract for services to strata company

(1) A strata company for a scheme, or a proprietor of a lot in a scheme, may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for an order under this section.

(2) An order under this section is an order -

(a) terminating; or

(b) shortening the term of,

an agreement to which this section applies made between the strata company and another person.

(3) On the making of an application under subsection (1), the State Administrative Tribunal may make an order under this section if satisfied that the agreement -

(a) is unfair to the proprietors of 25% or more of the aggregate unit entitlement of the lots in the scheme; or

(b) is for an excessively long term.

(a) it relates to the provision of services to the strata company or the proprietors; and

(b) it is made before the commencement of section 77 of the Strata Titles Amendment Act 1995.

(5) An order under this section may include an order for the payment of money by any party to the agreement to another party for the purpose of adjusting the position or rights of the parties consequentially on the termination or shortening of the term of the agreement.

1. As the respondent correctly points out, these statutory provisions have not been in force since 1 May 2020. They have no relevance to the matters in dispute, or this appeal. The appellant's reliance on s 39A and s 103E is misplaced.
2. The ground has no reasonable prospects of success and should be dismissed.

1. This ground is not easy to follow. In terms, the appellant asserts that the orders made by the Tribunal will impact the ability of the owners to obtain legal representation before the Tribunal in another matter, being CC 195/2024.
2. Certainly, the final orders made by the Tribunal in the Primary Decision required an EGM to be convened at which a new council was to be elected and the decisions of the invalidly constituted councils must either be confirmed or set aside.
3. As the respondent correctly submitted, any future decisions of the Strata Company will not be impacted by the orders made by the Tribunal which form part of the Primary Decision. It will be a matter for the Strata Company whether it resolve to seek legal representation or advice.
4. The ground has no reasonable prospects of success and should be dismissed.

1. The submissions filed by the appellant on the costs issue undertake a detailed, paragraph by paragraph challenge to the Costs Decision published by the Member.[63]
2. On the basis of the appellant's criticisms of the reasons, the appellant repeats many of the contentions which she raised in the substantive appeal, and further contends that:[64]

(a) the Member has made a costs order 'based on fictitious and erroneous claims by the respondent';

(b) the Member has 'not considered the financial situation submitted by the applicant' and the Member has 'failed to consider paragraph 9 of the submissions regarding the costs application which outlines the financial difficulty being suffered by the applicant/s';

(c) whilst the Member has identified the provisions within the legislation and case law 'to try and justify' the costs order, 'it is not usual procedure to make Costs Orders in the domain of the Tribunal'; and

(d) the Member has displayed 'favouritism toward the respondent by accepting the claims made by the respondent despite the inconsistencies and by making the false statement that the respondents conduct during the proceeding' met the requirement of s 9 of the SAT Act.

1. The appellant contends that the Costs Decision and the costs order made by the Member confirm the fact that the Member erred in law by reason of the 'many times' the Member stated that the issue as to 'whether the strata managers contract had been terminated was the primary issue', when the appellant says it was not the primary issue.[65]
2. The appellant ultimately submits as follows:[66]

I ask the Supreme Court of Western Australia to overturn and dismiss the Costs Order made by Member Petrucci due to the fact that Member Petrucci has erred in law, in misunderstanding the issue, in showing favouritism, bias and prejudice, in not following due procedure and making false allegations and statements regarding the applicant.

The compensation claim by the respondent is clearly a false, fictitious, manufactured, erroneous claim and Member Petrucci has failed to ascertain this fact, rather the Decision shows she is supporting it.

I further request a Supreme Court Order that Member Petrucci recuse herself from all other matters pertaining [to] the strata company, the owners and myself.

On the above grounds I seek Leave to Appeal the Costs Order issued by Member Petrucci.

1. The appeal against the costs order is opposed by the respondent.
2. There is a further discrete point raised by the appellant in AS4 which was filed on 23 February 2026, concerning the apparent attendance of a member of the public at a directions hearing and then at a mediation held during the Tribunal proceedings.[67] The grievance asserted by the appellant is directed at the person's attendance at the mediation. The point goes nowhere, with respect. The person in question was the owner of Lot 12 of the Waterfront Apartments.[68] Whether or not the person attended at a private mediation, apparently without objection from any party, had no impact on the determinations made by the Member which are the subject of either appeal to this court. This issue can safely be put to one side, in my view.
3. Doing the best the court can in order to properly understand and comprehend the appellant's submission, for my part I cannot discern a question of law which would support the appeal. Rather, the complaints raised by the appellant are matters directed at the discretion exercised by the Member pursuant to s 87(3) of the SAT Act. A challenge to the exercise of the discretion in this manner does not raise a question of law, for the purposes of s 105 of the SAT Act.
4. In any event, it is apparent the Member's reasons for decision which explain the costs order are thorough, considered, and canvass the various issues which are accepted by the authorities as being the relevant considerations for the purposes of exercising the costs discretion in s 87(3) of the SAT Act. The exercise of the discretion is well-explained within her reasons, which include the Member's assessment of the heads of costs claimed by the respondent, why the Member considered one of those heads was not compensable, and why another should be significantly reduced in the circumstances.
5. I therefore reject the various criticisms of the Member's reasons.
6. To the extent to which the submissions filed by the appellant raise the same issues which are the subject of the substantive appeal (such as the complaints concerning the primary issue and the assertions of bias), I have addressed them already earlier in these reasons.
7. I would therefore refuse leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal against the costs order.

1. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that leave to appeal on each of the proposed grounds of appeal against the orders made as set out in the Primary Decision should be refused, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
2. Further, I am of the view that leave to appeal should be refused in respect of the appeal against the order set out in the Costs Decision, and that appeal should also be dismissed.
3. I will hear from the parties as to whether any further orders are sought to dispose of the appeals.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

A council of five members was elected at this AGM. The Tribunal noted that it was common ground that the council elected at this AGM was validly constituted: Primary Decision [44].

The minutes from this AGM document a decision by the council to employ SAS as the new strata manager. A motion was passed to formalise a contract for a one-year term, commencing on 19 June 2021. The Tribunal noted that it was common ground that the council elected at this AGM was validly constituted: Primary Decision [46].

The 2021 Agreement was executed by council members and the directors of SAS between 15 and 19 June 2021, having a commencement date of 19 June 2021 for a one year term.

A resolution was passed for the council to consist of four members, but only two valid nominations were received. The other nominations were deemed invalid because one candidate was not nominated by his co-proprietor and the other was 'unfinancial' at the time of the meeting: Primary Decision [51], [58].

The Tribunal concluded that the council was not validly constituted following the meeting: Primary Decision [63]. As the scheme's by-laws require a minimum of three members for a quorum, the legal consequence was that, pursuant to s 138 of the ST Act the strata company itself (i.e. all owners in a general meeting) became the de facto council: Primary Decision [71].

Despite this governance defect, a resolution was passed at the meeting to extend the appointment of SAS for a further one year term.

A resolution was passed for a council of five members, and valid nominations were received. The Tribunal found that a valid council was constituted, comprising of these members.

Further, it was resolved to appoint SAS as strata manager for a further one year term: Primary Decision [82].

The 2023 Agreement was not executed until December 2023, having a commencement date of 19 June 2023. Council members Ms Roslyn Manderson and Ms Rachel McDonald, along with directors from SAS, formally executed the 2023 Agreement.

The Tribunal decision highlights a discrepancy, namely that the executed contract stipulated a two year term, which directly conflicts with the one year term term resolved by the owners at the 2023 AGM: Primary Decision [6], [175].

This meeting was convened by a group of owners (chaired by the appellant). Purported resolutions were passed to remove all current council members and to terminate the agreement with SAS.

A council meeting was held later that day. The appellant chaired the meeting at which resolutions were purportedly passed to remove the current council and terminate the agreement with SAS.

The Tribunal declared this meeting and all its resolutions invalid: Primary Decision [132]. The Tribunal cited several key reasons for this finding, including a failure to provide proper written notice to the validly constituted council and a failure to achieve the required quorum of 50% of lot owners entitled to vote.

Following the invalid EGM held on 23 January 2024, the appellant issued a Notice of Termination of Contract and a Show Cause Notice to the respondent by way of email.

The Tribunal found both of these notices to be invalid, as they failed to comply with the strict procedural requirements of s 151 of the ST Act. Specifically, the termination notice failed because it did not: (1) specify a termination date at least 28 days after the notice, and (2) inform the strata manager of their right to apply to the Tribunal for a review of the decision: Primary Decision [141]-[142).

An AGM was held on this date. A resolution was passed for a council of three members, and three candidates self-nominated and were elected. The Tribunal found that the council was validly constituted with three elected members: Primary Decision [87]. This meeting re-established a legally constituted council for the strata company.

The appellant filed proceedings in the Tribunal, being CC 907/2024

The appellant sought an order for the enforcement of scheme by-laws.

The Tribunal found that the council was not validly constituted. Similar to the 2022 AGM, a resolution was passed to have a council of three members, but only two candidates were validly nominated, failing the three-member quorum requirement: Primary Decision [92]. This again created a governance vacuum.

Directions made by Senior Member O'Sullivan in the Tribunal

Senior Member O'Sullivan issued orders that streamlined the proceedings, directing the parties to focus their submissions and evidence on the 'primary issue': namely, whether the strata manager's agreement had been terminated.

A four-day hearing took place before Member Petrucci.

Member Petrucci published her reasons for decision, finding that the agreements with SAS had not been terminated but declaring there had been an invalid election of councils of the Strata Company in 2022 and in December 2024, and ordered that SAS convene a new general meeting to elect a new council and review the decisions of the invalidly appointed councils.

Member Petrucci published her reasons for decision and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the proceeding, fixed in the amount of $3,000.

[1] Proceedings CC 907/2024 in the Tribunal; application dated 16 December 2024.

[2] ts 2 (Proceedings in SAT on 4 February 2025).

[4] Orders made by the Member on 23 May 2025.

[14] Not the amount of $16,687.50 as claimed by the respondent.

[15] The Member rejected the claim of $1,650 for printing costs.

[18] Medical Board of Australia v GLP [2025] WASCA 87 [39] - [41].

[19] Silkchime Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2023] WASCA 114 [71].

[20] Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97 [53] - [57] (Buss JA, Wheeler and Pullin JJA agreeing) (Paridis).

[22] See the analogous principles in Engwirda v Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728 [2019] WASCA 190 [97] (Vaughan JA, with whom Murphy and Mitchell JJA agreed).

[26] The costs appeal is GDA 2 of 2026.

[27] Folios 12 and 19. The first of these submissions was filed ahead of the directions hearing on 11 December 2025. The second of these submissions is headed 'Final Submissions Leave to Appeal'.

[32] Folio 7 in GDA 2 of 2026 (noting that these submissions are also directed to the substantive appeal, but address the costs issues at [8] in particular).

[37] See Appeal Notice [34]; AS1 [1] - [8], [22], [23], [33]; AS2 [2], [3], [7], [9], [13], [21] - [25].

[39] See AS1 [13] - [19], [21] - [24]; AS2 [7], [8], [12].

[40] See Appeal Notice [39]; AS1 [9] - [11], [29].

[41] See AS1 [20], [21], [27]; AS2 [16], [20].

[42] See AS1 [28]; AS2 [10], [20], [22].

[43] See Appeal Notice [38]; AS1 [30]; AS2 [14].

[44] See AS1 [25] - [26]; AS2 [14], [16].

[51] See s 47(4)(a), s 47(4)(b) and s 47(4)(c) of the ST Act.

[53] See the appellant's statement at [64] and [75].

[54] The owner's submissions were filed on 14 July 2025, and are referred to in the Primary Decision [163].

[55] Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 [36] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J) (Jia Legeng).

[57] Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 273 CLR 289 [11] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ).

[58] AS1 [28] and [30]; AS2 [22].