Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) - Self-represented parties - Costs of parties - Strata manager's claim for preparation time, review of documents, attending directions hearings and final hearing, photocopying, parking fees - Section 84(3) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) - Onus on party seeking costs for expenses or loss resulting from the proceeding - Nature of dispute - Conduct of parties - Objectives of Tribunal - How costs are to be considered in the exercise of discretion conferred on Tribunal - Broadbrush approach as a matter of impression and without attempt at mathematical precision - Turns on own facts

Legal Profession (Solicitors Costs) Report 2021 (WA)

Legal Profession (State Administrative Tribunal) Determination 2024 (WA)

Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA), s 25, s 25(1), s 25(9)

Strata Titles Amendment Act 2018 (WA)

State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 87, s 87(1), s 87(2), s 87(3), Div 5

Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA), s 47(3), Sch 5, cl 30(1)

Victorian Civil and Administrative Act 1998 (Vic)

Godwin and Keet [2025] WASAT 93

Lee v Law Complaints Officer as the Delegate of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2023] WASCA 60

McLerie and Koleszko [2014] WASAT 160 (S)

Michael v Monitronix Ltd (Unreported, WASC, Library No 920044, 20 February 1992)

Noonan David v Boroondara City Council [2001] VCAT 1548

Re Bertini; Ex parte Bertini [No 2] [2010] WASC 86

Reakes v Johnson [2018] WADC 76

Springmist Pty Ltd and Shire of Augusta-Margaret River [2005] WASAT 143 (S)

Wainwright v Barrick Gold of Australia Limited [No 2] [2012] WADC 126

Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32; (2016) 213 LGERA 81

1. The decision in Godwin and Keet [2025] WASAT 93 (the substantive decision) was reported by the Tribunal on 11 September 2025. The first applicant, Ms Godwin made an application under s 47(3) of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (ST Act) seeking the enforcement of scheme by-laws. Early in the proceeding, the Tribunal made orders for the parties to file documents in support of their position, confined to one question - whether the strata manager's, Strata Asset Services (WA) Pty Ltd (SAS), contract has been terminated (primary issue). The first respondent, Mr Keet is a director of the second respondent, SAS. Ms Godwin was unsuccessful in respect of the primary issue. This was because the Tribunal held that SAS' contract had not been terminated.
2. On 3 October 2025, Mr Keet applied to the Tribunal for an order to be paid $18,455.89 by Ms Godwin for his expenses or loss resulting from the proceeding in the Tribunal concerning the primary issue.
3. In response, Ms Godwin urges the Tribunal to dismiss Mr Keet's application for costs against her because it is '... not only excessively extravagant but [it is] unreasonable and outrageous'[.]
4. The only issue for my determination is whether, in the particular circumstances or realities of this case, it is fair and reasonable that the party claiming his costs, Mr Keet, should be reimbursed for the expenses or loss claimed, and if so, in what amount? Mr Keet has the burden or onus of establishing that it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case for him to be awarded an amount against Ms Godwin.
5. As Ms Godwin commenced the proceeding under the ST Act in the Tribunal on 16 December 2024, that is after the major amendments to the ST Act,[1] the provisions of the ST Act apply to the determination of Mr Keet's application (cl 30(1) of Sch 5 of the ST Act).
6. For the reasons set out below, it is fair and reasonable in all of the particular circumstances or realities of this case to make a final order under s 87(3) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) that requires Ms Godwin to pay a contribution to Mr Keet's claim for costs fixed in the amount of $3,000 within 30 days of the order, or some other timeframe as agreed in writing by the parties. The orders are set out later in these reasons (see below following [76]).

1. Mr Keet and Ms Godwin are a long way apart in respect of the appropriate orders as to costs.

1. In his application, Mr Keet states:[2]

The proceeding involved the submission of thousands of pages of documentation by the [first] applicant, which required extensive review and response. As a self-represented party, I incurred significant costs in the form of time and effort to engage with the material and prepare appropriate responses to the Tribunal.

I contend that the volume of documents lodged was unnecessary for the subject matter of the case. The [first] applicant lodged a wide range of applications to the tribunal in connection with the case for urgent hearing, recusal of the sitting member, etc, etc, that were made with apparent little reason.

The actions of the [first] applicant caused unnecessary excessive inconvenience and delay in the proceedings.

I seek compensation for the time I spent reviewing and responding to the documentation and attending hearings. While I am not a legal practitioner, I request that the Tribunal consider a reasonable hourly rate for my time, consistent with the principles outlined in the Legal Costs Committee's Determinations[.]

1. Mr Keet's claim against Ms Godwin of $18,455.89 comprises three aspects:[3]
   • $16,687.50 for 133.5 hours at $125 per hour to attend to the proceeding including reviewing documents, filing documents and responses and attending numerous directions hearings and the final hearing at the Tribunal;
   • $1,650 for printing 7,500 pages of documents (at 22 cents per page); and
   • $118.39 for parking costs to attend the final hearing at the Tribunal (over four days).

1. Ms Godwin opposes any costs order. The main reasons for this are, in summary:[4]

(a) Mr Keet did not 'win' the substantive decision but rather he was 'found to be incompetent and held general meetings for the strata company that were invalid, twice';

(b) the exorbitant fees claimed by Mr Keet are exaggerated in that he is not a legal professional and cannot charge at the same hourly rate as a fully qualified legal professional. Mr Keet's daily wage rate would have been the more honest submission for time;

(c) Mr Keet is making a claim for the amount of time he spent on the documents submitted, however the transcript shows that he did not read any of the documents by his own statement;

(d) if the Tribunal was to grant the clearly excessive costs, that would be adding to the financial burden on the owners in the strata scheme created by Mr Keet whose actions outside of law are already a burden; and

(e) the claim is not only excessively extravagant but is unreasonable and outrageous.

1. In summary, Ms Godwin submits that it is not fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this case for Mr Keet to be awarded any amount and therefore, in her view, Mr Keet's application should be dismissed.

1. Mr Ross Perkins on 17 November 2025 filed a written submission that the issue of costs claimed by Mr Keet is left 'in [the Tribunal's] capable hands and [the Tribunal's] knowledge of these situations'.[5]
2. No separate written submissions were filed by the strata company.

1. It is useful to start by considering Div 5 of the SAT Act which is comprised of s 87 to s 89. Division 5 is headed 'Costs'.
2. Section 87(1) of the SAT Act provides that unless otherwise specified, parties bear their own costs in a proceeding of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, by s 87(2) of the SAT Act, the Tribunal may make an order for the payment by a party of all or any of the costs of another party, unless otherwise specified in the enabling Act. In this case, the enabling Act is the ST Act and that Act does not limit the Tribunal's powers under s 87(2) of the SAT Act.[6]
3. The Tribunal's power in s 87(2) of the SAT Act, includes, by s 87(3) of the SAT Act, the power to make an order for the payment by a party of the costs of another party for an amount:

... to compensate the other party for any expenses, loss, inconvenience, or embarrassment resulting from the proceeding or the matter because of which the proceeding was brought.

(Emphasis added)

1. In Springmist Pty Ltd and Shire of Augusta-Margaret River [2005] WASAT 143 (S) (Springmist), the Tribunal, after examining the operation of similar legislation in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Act 1998 (Vic) held in regards to s 87(3) of the SAT Act at [64] to [65] that:
   1. The effect of s 87(3) is that the expenses that may be recovered are not limited to the traditional notion of legal costs, but can include other expenses and loss in connection with the conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal. For example, the costs may include the costs of a non lawyer advocate, the expenses of a party having to travel to a hearing or some amount which compensates a party for the inconvenience or expense of its participation in the proceedings.
   2. Section 87(3) does not provide a basis upon which compensation, in the nature of damages, can be awarded because of some negligence or failure on the part of the decision-maker to perform its function diligently and timeously, or because a decision-maker's conduct falls short of the usual expectations of those who seek some consent, approval or permit.

1. The above confirms that the Tribunal may make an order for a party to pay the costs of another party which goes beyond the traditional notion of legal costs that a self-represented party cannot recover as costs, compensation for time spent by him or her in preparing and conducting the case unless permitted by statute (see decision of the High Court in Cachia v Hanes (1994) CLR 403).
2. An example of where a Tribunal has awarded such costs is the decision in Noonan David v Boroondara City Council [2001] VCAT 1548. There, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ordered for the payment of fees of a non-legal advocate who had appeared at the hearing on the basis that those fees fell within the expression 'to compensate ... for expenses, loss ... resulting from the proceeding'.
3. In Re Bertini; Ex parte Bertini [No 2] [2010] WASC 86 (Bertini) the Court had to consider the powers under s 25 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) (the MC (CP) Act) to award costs.
4. Section 25(1) of the MC (CP) Act provides:

The Court may order a party to a case to pay the whole or a part of another party's costs in the case.

1. Section 25(9) of the MC (CP) Act provides that costs may be awarded to self-represented parties in the following terms:

If the Court orders the costs of a self-represented party to be paid by another party, the Court may order that the whole or a part of the expenses or losses incurred by the self-represented party in or in connection with conducting the case be included in the costs.

(Emphasis added)

1. In Bertini the following was stated at [30] to [31]:
   1. In my view, having regard to the words of [s 25(9)], it is plain that s 25(1) and it work together. Section 25(9) requires a magistrate to first consider whether a self represented party is entitled to costs pursuant to s 25(1). If the court decides that the party is entitled to a costs order then the court may exercise an additional but separate discretion to order the whole or a part of any expenses or losses incurred by the party be included in the costs provided they were incurred in or in connection with the conduct of the case.
   2. The words 'expenses' and 'losses' are not defined in the MC (CP) Act. ... However, I am satisfied that because of the use of the word 'losses' in addition to the word 'expenses', the court, in its discretion may award a self represented party more than out of pocket expenses. It may well be that the word 'losses' includes costs for lost time. (Emphasis added)
2. Further, in Bertini at [36] to [38] the court, after referring to Michael v Monitronix Ltd (Unreported, WASC, Library No 920044, 20 February 1992) which held that a self-represented party cannot recover as costs, compensation for time spent by him or her in preparing and conducting the case unless permitted by statute, held that s 25(9) of the MC (CP) Act is a statutory exception to the extent that it gives the Magistrates Court a discretionary power to award any self-represented party costs for their expenses and losses incurred or in connection with the conduct of the case.
3. In Reakes v Johnson [2018] WADC 76 (Reakes), a self-represented party claimed costs for lost time under s 25 of the MC (CP) Act. The self-represented party was retired and claimed costs by way of various invoices totalling $5,352.29 on the basis of a $60 hourly rate for his time. The Court held at [29] that there was no legitimate basis to have claimed his time at that hourly rate (as he was retired). Nonetheless, the Court concluded at [30] that the approach of the Magistrate in awarding the self-represented party a nominal allowance was the correct approach in the exercise of the wide discretion available under s 25(9) of the MC (CP) Act. Finally, by reference to Wainwright v Barrick Gold of Australia Limited [No 2] [2012] WADC 126 at [13] the Court stated:
   1. Costs are discretionary and they do permit a flexible approach and the overriding consideration must be the need to do justice between the parties.

1. The use of the terms 'expenses' and 'loss' in s 87(3) of the SAT Act are similar to the use of those terms in s 25(9) of the MC (CP) Act and therefore, in my view, the Tribunal may award a self-represented party costs for their expenses and losses incurred or in connection with the conduct of the case.
2. Returning to s 87(3) of the SAT Act. In Lee v Law Complaints Officer as the Delegate of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2023] WASCA 60 (Lee), s 87(3) of the SAT Act was considered by the Court in the context of an appeal against a decision of the Legal Professional Complaints Committee (LPCC) to dismiss Mr Lee's complaint against former lawyers in failed defamation proceedings. Mr Lee alleged breaches of contract and duty against the former lawyers and made complaints about solicitors to the LPCC. Without limiting the scope of s 87(3) of the SAT Act, the Court explained at [33] that the reference to 'proceeding' in s 87(3) of the SAT Act is to the Tribunal proceeding and that the 'matter because of which the proceeding was brought' was the decision of the LPCC to dismiss Mr Lee's complaint as against his former law firm. Ultimately, the Court found that the relevant proceeding was the proceeding in the Tribunal and the relevant matter was the decision of the Pharmacy Board to impose conditions on Mr Lee's registration as a pharmacist, which lead to the conclusion that the power in s 87(3) of the SAT Act does not extend to losses in the nature complained of by Mr Lee arising from the defamation action, which were, in effect, damages (by breach of contract or negligence).
3. Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32; (2016) 213 LGERA 81 (Questdale) at [49] to [51] confirms that the discretion to make a costs order is to be exercised by the Tribunal only if it is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case to do so and that the onus is on the party that is seeking a costs order in its favour.
4. In summary, the Tribunal takes a pragmatic approach in framing the costs order and this will naturally involve an impression and evaluation of not only the importance of the matters but also the time occupied and ambit of the submissions. However, it is unrealistic to expect mathematical precision in deciding what amount to award for costs.
5. I turn now to set out the history of the proceeding in the Tribunal in some detail. Following that I will consider the nature of the dispute, the conduct of the parties and other matters in order to determine whether or not it is fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances or realities of this case to exercise the Tribunal's discretionary power under s 87(3) of the SAT Act to make an award for costs in favour of Mr Keet, and if so, in what amount.

1. At the first directions hearing, on 17 December 2024, the Tribunal dismissed Ms Godwin's application for an interim injunction in relation to Ms Roslyn Manderson. Further, at that directions hearing, the Tribunal referred the matter to mediation on 19 December 2024. Apart from Ms Godwin withdrawing her application for an urgent interim injunction against Mr Keet, the parties were not able to resolve their dispute or narrow down the issues during the mediation process.
2. On 4 February 2025, the Tribunal made an order confining the question to be determined to - whether the respondent strata manager's contract has been terminated (primary issue). From this, the Tribunal ordered Ms Godwin to file by 10 February 2025, her statement of issues, facts and contentions (SIFC), along with an indexed and paginated bundle in a chronological or other logical order of the documents on which she relies and a list of the persons who she proposes to call to give evidence at the final hearing, together with a short summary of the evidence to be given by each such person. The Tribunal ordered Mr Keet to file his SIFC, documents and list of persons to call to give evidence along with a short summary of the evidence by 28 February 2025.
3. On 20 February 2025, the Tribunal listed the matter for a final hearing of the primary issue on 30 April 2025.
4. At a directions hearing on 7 March 2025, I made orders extending the time for compliance with the orders made on 4 February 2025 to 10 March 2025 for Ms Godwin and to 13 March 2025 for Mr Keet. Further, I made orders for Ms Godwin to file written submissions by 21 March 2025 in support of her application that I recuse myself from hearing and determining this matter and a related matter, CC 663 of 2021 - Sidhu & The Owners of Waterfront Apartments Stage One Strata Plan 69486 and Danmar Homes Pty Ltd (recusal application). Further, I ordered Mr Keet to file by 28 March 2025 written submissions in reply to the recusal application. On 10 April 2025, I delivered my decision and reasons for decision orally for the recusal application.
5. On 27 March 2025, Ms Godwin filed a request (comprised of 14 pages with attachments) for a directions hearing. I held the directions hearing on 14 April 2025 where I ordered Mr Keet to file by 18 April 2025 a copy of each strata management contract, and a written statement of the names and addresses of the members of the council. Further, I ordered Mr Keet to file by 23 April 2025 a copy of each signed proxy form used by the strata manager from the date of engagement as the strata manager. In addition, I ordered Ms Godwin to file by 23 April 2025, a written statement identifying the documents that she considers irrelevant to the primary issue as set out in order 1(a) of the orders made by the Tribunal on 4 February 2025.
6. At the end of final hearing on 30 April 2025, the parties required further time to present their evidence. Consequently, I made the order, with the parties' consent, to extend the final hearing to include 1 May 2025 and for one-half day on 2 May 2025.
7. At the end of the hearing on 2 May 2025, I made an order requiring the parties to file their unavailable dates to attend the Tribunal in order to conclude the parties giving their evidence. In addition, I made a notation to the orders with reference to the list of documents referred to by the parties during the hearing on 30 April 2025, 1 May 2025 and 2 May 2025. The list was attached to the orders of 2 May 2025.
8. On 13 May 2025, after receiving the parties' unavailable dates, I made an order for the matter to be adjourned to a hearing on 23 May 2025 to conclude hearing the evidence on the primary issue.
9. At the end of the hearing on 23 May 2025, I made orders for the parties to file closing written submissions by 30 June 2025 and to inform the Tribunal if the list prepared by the Tribunal accurately reflected the documents referred to by them during the final hearing.
10. At a further directions hearing on 3 July 2025, I dealt with various issues raised by the parties and I extended the time for the filing of closing writing submissions to 14 July 2025.
11. On 4 July 2025, Ms Godwin requested an urgent directions hearing. I held this on 9 July 2025 where I made orders making minor amendments to earlier orders. The date for final written submissions was extended to 28 July 2025.
12. On 30 July 2025, the Tribunal received the final written submissions and subsequently, on 11 September 2025, the Tribunal reported the substantive decision.
13. I now turn to consider the sole issue for determination as set out above at [4]. That is, whether in the particular realities or circumstances of this case, is it fair and reasonable that Mr Keet should be awarded an amount under s 87(3) of the SAT Act, and if so, in what amount?

Exercise of Tribunal's discretion under s 87(3) of the SAT Act

1. A relevant consideration to the Tribunal's exercise of its discretion to make an order under Div 5 of the SAT Act, is the nature of the dispute. In considering the nature of the dispute this will require a consideration of the history of the dispute as well as the complexity of the dispute.
2. The primary issue - whether the strata manager's contract has been terminated - is a complex issue which required hearing evidence and working through many documents. This occurred over some three and one-half days (rather than just one day for which the matter was originally listed).
3. In view of the challenges facing the strata complex - including a long-standing building dispute which is currently before the Tribunal - it was reasonable for Ms Godwin to make an application to the Tribunal to challenge the strata manager's contract. Even though Ms Godwin was not successful on the question of whether the strata manager's contract had been terminated, Ms Godwin's application to the Tribunal is somewhat supported by the conclusion reached by the Tribunal where it held that the council was not properly constituted in two years.
4. It was also reasonable for Mr Keet to participate in the proceeding to put forward his position and to protect his and SAS' interests. Mr Keet's position is strongly supported by the substantive decision where the Tribunal held that the strata manager's contract was not terminated.

1. The conduct of parties to the proceeding is also a relevant consideration to the Tribunal's exercise of its discretion to make an order for costs including for expenses and losses resulting from the proceeding. In this regard, it is necessary to consider, whether, and to what extent a party has established that the conduct of the other party has impaired the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act. That is, to have the proceedings determined fairly and in accordance with the substantial merits, speedily and with as little formality and technicality as possible, and in a way which minimises the costs to the parties.
2. Both Mr Keet and Ms Godwin are self-represented parties.
3. The dispute has been in the Tribunal approximately nine months. During that time, Ms Godwin requested an interim injunction in relation to Ms Manderson, requested an urgent interim injunction against Mr Keet, requested several urgent directions hearings and requested that I recuse myself from the proceeding and from another two matters before the Tribunal. This resulted in Mr Keet having to expend time reading voluminous documents,[7] preparing for and attending the numerous directions hearings and the final hearing to put forward and defend his position and that of SAS.
4. The time engaged by Mr Keet is set out in the schedule attached to his application wherein he states that he reviewed 9,379 pages but limits his claim to 133.5 hours of his time to review the documents, to prepare for and to attend the numerous directions hearings and the final hearing. Mr Keet's position is strongly supported by the substantive decision where the Tribunal held that the strata manager's contract was not terminated.
5. Mr Keet generally complied with the orders of the Tribunal in a timely manner and thereby assisted the Tribunal to achieve its objective of acting speedily in the resolution of the primary issue as set out in the substantive decision and to minimise the costs to the parties. In the circumstances, I am satisfied and find that Mr Keet acted reasonably in his conduct in the proceeding.
6. While I accept that the role of the Tribunal is to provide accessibility to justice, in my view, the following conduct by Ms Godwin unnecessarily prolonged the final hearing on the primary issue and which caused Mr Keet to expend a significant amount of his time to read the voluminous number of documents, to prepare for, and attend the numerous directions hearings requested by Ms Godwin and the final hearing to put forward his position and to protect SAS' and his interests:
   • (a) the interim injunction sought by Ms Godwin against Ms Manderson which was dismissed;
   • (b) the urgent interim injunction sought by Ms Godwin against Mr Keet, which was later withdrawn;

(c) the numerous urgent directions hearings requested by Ms Godwin;

(d) the voluminous number of documents filed by Ms Godwin, most of which were not relevant to the determination of the primary issue; and

(e) the conduct of the final hearing which was extended from one day to three and one-half days where much of the cross-examination by Ms Godwin was not relevant to the primary issue.

1. As already stated, and repeated here, in assessing costs under Div 5 of the SAT Act, the Tribunal takes a relatively broadbrush approach as a matter of impression and without any attempt at mathematic precision. In doing so, the costs awarded are compensatory and not punitive.
2. In assessing what is fair and reasonable as to what amount, if any, to be awarded against Ms Godwin in favour of Mr Keet, I have had regard to:

(d) the conduct of Mr Keet and Ms Godwin in the proceeding; and

(e) the outcome where Ms Godwin was ultimately unsuccessful on the primary issue.

1. In my view, it was entirely appropriate and reasonable for Mr Keet to attend the numerous directions hearing, many of which were requested by Ms Godwin on an urgent basis, and the final hearing to make submissions to defend his position and to protect SAS' and his interests. The fact that Ms Godwin was unsuccessful on the primary issue - whether the strata manager's contract had been terminated - supports the finding that Mr Keet had a very strong basis for challenging the application made by Ms Godwin.
2. Further, in my view, the conduct of Mr Keet was generally reasonable and appropriate in the conduct of the proceeding and therefore did not impair the attainment of the objectives of the Tribunal as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act.
3. On the other hand, in my view, the conduct of Ms Godwin impaired the attainment of the Tribunal objectives, as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act, which weighs in favour of an award of costs for Mr Keet under s 87(3) of the SAT Act. In particular, the matters set out above at [53] unnecessarily prolonged the final hearing and required Mr Keet to expend much of his time in reading voluminous documents, much of which was not relevant for the primary issue and preparing for and attending directions hearings, often at short notice, and the final hearing which was extended to three and one-half days instead of the one day that the final hearing was listed for.
4. Ms Godwin was unsuccessful on the primary issue. However, as stated in Questdale at [58], the legislative purpose of the SAT Act will be served by the claimant in an application for costs receiving its reasonable costs of obtaining the compensation that is the claimant's due. It is therefore still necessary, to consider, in all of the particular circumstances or the realities of the case, whether it would be fair and reasonable for the 'successful' party to be deprived of its costs, or part of their costs.

Expense for Mr Keet's time in reviewing documents, preparing for and attending the directions hearings and the final hearing

1. Mr Keet acknowledges that he is not a legal practitioner, but seeks an order for costs against Ms Godwin for the time he expended on the matter on the principles outlined in what Mr Keet refers to as the 'Legal Costs Committee's Determinations'. Mr Keet claims 133.5 hours, or about 15 hour each month over the period from 16 December 2024 to 11 September 2025 inclusive, to review, prepare for and to attend directions hearings and the final hearing. This equates to $16,687.50. The breakdown of this amount is set out in detail in the schedule to Mr Keet's application.
2. In the circumstances of the nature of the application before the Tribunal under the ST Act, I will start by noting that the Legal Profession (State Administrative Tribunal) Determination 2024 (1 July 2024 onwards) (Current Determination) sets the maximum allowable hourly rate ranging from $187 for a clerk/paralegal to $484 for a senior legal practitioner. Following McLerie and Koleszko [2014] WASAT 160 (S) at [22], the Current Determination is used as a guide by the Tribunal 'because it reflects the maximum rates which may be charged by a legal practitioner in the absence of a written costs agreement. There is no scale of costs applicable to the Tribunal'. As Mr Keet is not a legal practitioner, the Current Determination is of little assistance in this case.
3. Ms Godwin contends the 'fees' (hourly rate) claimed by Mr Keet is 'exorbitant' and 'exaggerated' and submits that Mr Keet's daily wage rate would have been the 'more honest submission for [his] time [expended]'. However, Ms Godwin's contention is of little assistance because she fails to make any submission as to what that daily wage rate of a strata manager, such as Mr Keet, is and what would be a reasonable amount of time (hours) to review, prepare for and to attend the directions hearings and final hearing.
4. The burden or onus is on Mr Keet, who has made the claim, to establish that it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case for him to be awarded the amount claimed of $16,687.50 to review, prepare for and to attend directions hearings and the final hearing. Mr Keet has failed to substantiate the claimed hourly rate of $125. In such circumstances, without going into a detailed scrutiny of the hourly rate or number of hours claimed, but rather using a broadbrush approach, I have used a nominal amount of $25 per hour, without making any adjustment to the 133.5 hours claimed, to calculate the claim for the loss of time spent reading documents, preparing for and attending the numerous directions hearings and the final hearing. This equates to $3,337.50.

1. In regards to the printing cost of $1,650, no invoice or receipt was provided by Mr Keet to support the claim made for his out of pocket expense.
2. However, Mr Keet refers to the Legal Profession (Solicitors Costs) Report 2021 (WA) to support his claim of $0.22 per page for 7,500 pages. That report does not appear to reflect a photocopy charge of $0.22 per page. Rather, that report has a charge of $0.165 per page for '[c]opies where reasonably necessary, including of documents for which allowance is otherwise made in this Determination'.
3. I accept that it may not be possible to review the voluminous number of documents, or some 7,500 pages, on a computer screen and that some printing of documents may be required. However, I am not satisfied on the evidence before the Tribunal, that there is an expense whereby Mr Keet is out of pocket.
4. Consequently, on the evidence before the Tribunal, I am not satisfied that any of the amount claimed of $1,650 by Mr Keet is an expense arising from the proceeding.

1. In regards to parking fees of $118.39 claimed by Mr Keet, this amount is supported by four invoices to cover the final hearing held on 30 April, 1 and 2 May and 23 May 2025. As the first respondent, it was necessary for Mr Keet to attend the numerous directions hearings and the final hearing to give evidence and to cross-examine Ms Godwin on her evidence.
2. Following Springmist, the expenses of a party having to travel to a hearing may be claimed under s 87(3) of the SAT Act. Therefore, in my view, the $118.39 for parking fees is an expense in connection with the proceeding in the Tribunal in respect of the primary issue.

1. Following Springmist, Bertini, Reakes, Lee and Questdale, in my view, Mr Keet's cost for loss of time in reviewing the voluminous documents, preparing for and attending the numerous directions hearings and the final hearing totalling $3,337.50 falls within the ambit of s 87(3) of the SAT Act as it is in connection with the proceeding in the Tribunal in respect of the primary issue.
2. Parking fees of $118.39 also fall within the ambit of s 87(3) of the SAT Act as an expense in connection with the proceeding in the Tribunal in respect of the primary issue.
3. Printing costs may also fall within the ambit of s 87(3) of the SAT Act as an expense in connection with the proceeding in the Tribunal in respect of the primary issue. However, in this case, there is no evidence before the Tribunal that Mr Keet was out of pocket for the printing cost.
4. The overall result is that, in my view, the amount claimed for costs under s 87(3) of the SAT Act is to be adjusted to $3,455.89 ($3,337.50 + $118.39).
5. On balance, in my view, taking into consideration all the circumstances of this case including the conduct of the parties, the nature of the dispute and the legislative purpose of the SAT Act will be served by Mr Keet receiving his reasonable costs under s 87(3) of the SAT Act for his expenses and costs including for loss of time in connection with the proceeding in the Tribunal, after making adjustments in the particular circumstances of this case, where it would be fair and reasonable for Mr Keet to be deprived of part of his costs: Questdale at [58].
6. As already stated, but repeated here, in fixing costs, the Tribunal does not subject the costs to a detailed scrutiny. Rather, taking a relatively broadbrush, flexible and pragmatic approach in framing the costs order, looking at the realities of the case, and as a matter of impression and without any attempt at mathematical precision, I am satisfied, in assessing what is fair and reasonable in this case, with the overriding consideration to do justice between the parties, that a total amount of $3,000 (out of the total amount claimed of $18,455.89) ought to be recovered by Mr Keet from Ms Godwin.
7. In conclusion, having regard to the objectives of the Tribunal and in the interests of justice, it is fair and reasonable, for all of the forgoing reasons, that Ms Godwin be ordered to pay a contribution of Mr Keet's reasonable costs for his expense and loss in connection with the proceeding in the Tribunal fixed in the amount of $3,000 pursuant to s 87(3) of the SAT Act within 30 days of these orders, or as otherwise agreed in writing by Mr Keet and Ms Godwin.

1. Pursuant to s 87(3) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), the first applicant (Laurine Godwin) must pay to the first respondent (Paul Keet) a contribution of the first respondent's costs fixed in the amount of $3,000 to be paid within 30 days of these orders, or some other timeframe as agreed in writing by the first applicant and the first respondent.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] Prior to 1 May 2020, the Tribunal could not make an order for the payment of costs concerning a proceeding under the ST Act except in two circumstances. The first circumstance arose where the applicant was given leave by the Tribunal to amend their application to compensate persons (for example, the respondent) for time unnecessarily spent in connection with the application. The only other circumstance was concerning a variation to unit entitlements. Following the major amendments to the ST Act, which came into operation on 1 May 2020 under the Strata Titles Amendment Act 2018 (WA), the Tribunal is now not so limited in making orders for the payment of costs concerning a proceeding under the ST Act.

[2] Mr Keet's application filed on 3 October 2025, page 1.

[3] Mr Keet's application filed on 3 October 2025, page 2.

[4] Ms Godwin's submissions filed on 13 November 2025.

[5] Written submission of Mr Ross Perkins filed 17 November 2025.

[7] See the substantive decision at [12].