GMA18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1179

1. Before this Court is an application for judicial review of a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal).
2. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (as the Minister was then called) (Delegate), to refuse to grant the Applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa (Protection Visa).
3. This proceeding was brought pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The application was filed within the 35-day time period prescribed under the Act.
4. This matter was:

(a) allocated to the Court as presently constituted on 10 June 2025

(b) listed for hearing on 11 June 2025, and

(c) heard on 24 July 2025 and proceeded in person at the Court's Melbourne Registry.

1. To obtain relief from this Court, the Applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. For the reasons that follow, this Court has determined that no jurisdictional error arises from the Tribunal's decision.
2. The application for judicial review is, accordingly, dismissed.

1. The background to this matter is derived from the submissions of the parties and, unless otherwise indicated, does not appear to be in dispute.

1. The primary issue is whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error in affirming the decision of the Delegate refusing the Applicant a protection visa.

1. The Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 12 August 2014[1] as the holder of a subclass 600 visitor visa.[2]
2. On 11 September 2014, the Applicant lodged an application for a Subclass 866 Protection Visa (Protection Visa).[3]
3. The Applicant's protection claims can be summarised as follows[4]:

(a) Applicant has been involved in JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna), a political party, for a long time. Her Brother is also actively involved.

(b) JVP is opposed by the government and the government have been abducting and torturing JVP members since JVP withdrew from the coalition government.

(c) Applicant has experienced harm through verbal harassment and intimidation by villagers and colleagues.

(d) Her brother was abducted by the army in 1989 and was shot. This has traumatised her and caused psychological harm.

(e) Applicant fears that if she returns, she will be persecuted and tortured like her brother. She fears she will have to hide, may lose her job and not have the freedom of political opinion.

(f) The government and military groups will harm her on return to Sri Lanka; authorities will not protect her.

(g) The Applicant has a letter as evidence of her membership to the JVP.

1. On 11 November 2016, the Delegate requested the Applicant to attend an interview, scheduled for 5 December 2016.[5] The Applicant did not to attend.[6]
2. On 7 December 2016, the Delegate refused to grant the Applicant a Protection visa.[7] The Delegate made the following findings[8]:

(a) The Applicant was involved in the JVP.

(b) Claims are vague and unsubstantiated - no specific details of the alleged incidents were provided, and no country information has been found to substantiate these claims.

(c) Willing to accept it is possible that the Applicant's brother may have been abducted in 1989, however, the claim holds no current validity, as there is no information to indicate that the Applicant's brother faced any further harm or mistreatment since 1989.

(d) The Applicant would not lose her job due to her political views, given she has been a teacher employed by the government for more than 10 years.

(e) Minority political groups including the JVP operate freely and contest elections.

(f) Based on recent country information, the political party that she claims to favour

(g) The Applicant's mental health has not been permanently damaged or scarred by her claimed past experiences in Sri Lanka. If the Applicant did have mental health issues, Sri Lanka has a robust healthcare system.

(h) No reason why JVP supporters would still be targeted in attacks by supporters of any rival political parties.

(i) Not satisfied the Applicant has a real chance of being persecuted for a Refugees Convention reason and not satisfied the applicant's fear is well founded.

(j) Given the claims lacked credibility and were not supported by country information, the Delegate was also not satisfied there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Applicant being removed from Australia, there is a real risk that the Applicant will be subject to significant harm.

1. The Delegate was therefore not satisfied that the Applicant had a real chance of being persecuted for a refugee convention reason under s 36(2)(a), nor that there was a real risk of significant harm for the purposes of complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa). The application for a Protection Visa was accordingly refused.
2. By operation of s 476(2)(a) of the Act, this Court has no power to review the decision of the Delegate.

1. On 23 December 2016, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision, assisted by Warna Legal.[9]
2. On 16 Jan 2017 and 4 April 2018, the Applicant's representative provided their updated contact details.[10]
3. On 12 July 2018, the Applicant was advised by the Tribunal that the matter would be allocated to a Tribunal member and that additional evidence to support their application should be provided.[11]
4. On 14 August 2018, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a hearing on 22 October 2018.[12] The hearing invitation requested the Applicant to provide any written submissions, witness statements and evidence by 15 October 2018.[13]
5. On 15 August 2018, the Applicant's representative provided a completed hearing invitation advising that the Applicant will attend without the representative, and the Applicant's brother would be a witness.[14]
6. On 22 October 2018, the Applicant attended the scheduled hearing in person, with the assistance of a Sinhalese interpreter.[15] The Applicant's brother gave evidence by telephone.
7. On 27 November 2018, the Applicant's representative provided their updated contact details.[16]
8. On 28 November 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision not to grant the Applicant the Protection visa.[17]

1. The Tribunal's decision is 11 pages long and spans 65 paragraphs.
2. At paragraphs 13 to 28 of their outline of submissions filed on 10 July 2025, the Minister's representative summarised the Tribunal's reasons. The Court as presently constituted has carefully read the Tribunal's reasons and accept the summary as comprehensive, fair and properly referenced. The Court adopts it for the purposes of this judgment.

13. The Tribunal set out the Applicant's claims for protection

1. She claimed she was at risk of harm as she was actively involved in the Janatha Vimuksthi Peramuna: People's Liberation Front' political party (JVP) which was the main party criticising the government of Sri Lanka. She claimed her brother was abducted in 1989. She claimed to have been harassed by villagers who were against the JVP.

2. She claimed if returned she should be tortured like her brother, would need to go underground to escape the torture and violence, and would be sacked from her job and suffer economic consequences. She claimed that JVP activists have been assaulted and tortured and she fears the same.

3. The Tribunal noted the Applicant gave evidence that she did not attend an interview with the delegate because she was not aware such an interview took place. The Tribunal accepted this as there was no interview invitation on file.

4. The Tribunal noted the Applicant did not have a written membership document for the JVP but claimed to have been actively worked in the party since the age of 17 or 18. She helped her brother and assisted family member's (Sagara Keerthi Batuvita Madivilage) local government election. She stated that her brother continues to live in Sri Lanka.

5. The Tribunal heard evidence from the Applicant's brother and accepted he was a member of the JVP, before accepting the Applicant's claims of involvement with the JVP. The Tribunal noted the Applicant's brother's evidence that the Applicant could not work as a teacher properly because of her involvement with the JVP, and also had problems because of the person she married. He gave evidence that his sister was about to be kidnapped.

6. The Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant left Sri Lanka in 2014 because of issues she experienced as a result of her JVP activities. The Tribunal found, having regard to evidence received at the hearing, that she travelled to Australia to be with a man named Sumidh Sanjeewa, with whom she had a relationship for two years. They married, but as he was already married, their marriage was invalid. Tribunal noted he travelled to Australia by boat.

7. The Tribunal noted the Applicant's evidence that Sumidh was a government contractor who worked with Blue Force, an unofficial organisation which carried out underworld activities in support of President Rajapaksa's son Nimal.

8. The Tribunal noted the Applicant's claim that Sumidh's wife threatened her by phone and told people at the school where she worked about her marriage to Sumidh. The Tribunal accepted that people at the school subsequently looked at her differently, and that she went to the police to complain about the problems in her personal life but was not assisted.

9. The Tribunal noted she feared living alone in Sri Lanka and could not go back to her old job and her family would not look after her. The Tribunal noted the Applicant's claim that Blue Force was a direct threat to her life, though she had not experienced any problems with them while in Sri Lanka.

10. The Tribunal accepted her family house was robbed, in 1989, for involvement with the JVP, and then in about 2009 to 2010, her family home was stoned. The Tribunal did not accept that she was refused assistance in relation to Sumidh's ex-wife by virtue of her political activities or support of the JVP. The Tribunal accepted that she experienced harassment but did not accept this was linked to her support for JVP, and was rather for reason of her relationship with Sumidh.

11. The Tribunal considered the claim that the event permanently harmed her psychological balance, accepting it may have been distressing but noting there was no evidence to suggest that she was diagnosed with any mental illness or condition, and found that there was not a real chance she would face harm for any reason relating to her mental health if returned to Sri Lanka.

12. The Tribunal found that the Applicant had a significantly lower profile than her brother, made no claim to suffer electoral or political motivated violence herself, and noted that her brother continued to support JVP.

13. The Tribunal considered the risk that the Applicant would be harmed by the Sri Lanka authorities as a result of her activities to be 'remote given the isolation and sporadic occurrences of political violence in Sir Lanka'. The Tribunal did not accept there to be a real chance the Applicant would be subjected to kidnapping, torture, violence, or any other form of harm if she returns to Sri Lank for reasons of her support for the JVP or her political opinion.

14. The Tribunal considered that the risk the Applicant faced by members of the Blue Force, should she return to Sri Lanka, to be merely speculative and did not accept there to be a real chance that the applicant will face harm from the Sri Lankan authorities, the Blue Force, or any other group for reasons of her actual or imputed political opinion or due to her past relationship with Sumidh Sanjeewa if she returns to Sri Lanka now or in the reasonable foreseeable future.

Fear of Harm for reasons of the relationship with Sumidh Sanjeewa

1. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant was in a relationship with Sumidh in the past and acknowledged the claim that she experienced violence in the relationship but found there was not a real chance she would suffer harm from him if returned to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal did not accept there to be a real chance his wife or other villagers or community members will seek to harm the applicant if she returns to Sri Lanka.

Claims of Economic Harm

1. The Tribunal did not accept there to be a real chance that she would be unable to find employment if she returns to Sri Lanka, nor that she would suffer significant economic hardship such as would threaten her capacity to subsist.

Cumulative Assessment

1. The Tribunal did not accept there to be a real chance that the Applicant will be target for harm by Sri Lankan authorities, opposition political parties, or any other person or group on the separate or cumulative bases of her actual or imputed political opinion as a JVP support or for reasons of her former relationship with Sumidh Sanjeewa.
2. On complementary protection, the Tribunal referred to its earlier findings from and concluded that section 36(2)(aa) was not met.

1. Based on the findings made by the Tribunal it was not satisfied that the Applicant was a person whom Australia owed protection obligations to and did not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision to refuse the Applicant the Protection visa.

1. The Applicant filed an Originating application (Application) for judicial review on 13 December 2018. The application is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Act. The Applicant seeks that the decision of the Tribunal be quashed, remitted to the Tribunal to be determined according to law, and an order prohibiting the Minister acting upon or giving effect to the Tribunal's decision.
2. The Applicant lists two grounds of alleged error. The Applicant's grounds of review, extracted from her initiating application, are as follows (reproduced without alteration):
   1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not afford me procedural fairness
   2. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal applied the wrong legal test

1. On 19 February 2019, the First Respondent (Minister) filed its response and opposed the making of the orders sought by the Applicant. The Minister submitted that in absence of any particularisation, the application failed to articulate or establish any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. On 11 November 2020, the Minister filed a bundle of relevant documents (Court Book).
3. On 22 October 2020, a Registrar of this Court issued an Order (Registrar's Order) directing the:

(a) Applicant to file any amended application with proper particulars, written submissions and further evidence 28 days before the hearing and,

(b) Minister to file any written submissions in reply 14 days before the hearing.

1. The Applicant did not file an amended application and nor did she provide further particulars of the grounds for judicial review, despite being invited to do so.
2. The Applicant filed written submissions on 17 December 2020 and on 24 October 2024. Rather than being submissions that address the grounds of review, both documents recount the background of the matter and explain the Applicant's claims for protection. Both documents invite the Court to engage in impermissible merit review. The submissions do not establish how the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error.
3. On 18 June 2024, Orders were made by a Registrar of this Court, to list the application for final hearing.
4. On 10 July 2024, the Minister complied with the Registrar's Order by filing written submissions.
5. Therefore, the materials before the Court are as follows:

(a) the application for judicial review filed 13 December 2018,

(b) the Affidavit deposed by the Applicant filed 13 December 2018,

(c) a Court Book numbering 220 pages filed 11 November 2020 (marked as Exhibit R1),

(d) written submissions filed by the Applicant on 17 December 2020

(e) written submissions filed by the Applicant on 24 October 2024

(f) written submissions filed by the Minister on 10 July 2025

1. At the hearing before the Court on 24 July 2025 the Applicant attempted to file further documents/evidence. The Applicant explained the documents were "some health documents" and "mental health documents". The Applicant conceded that the documents had been obtained subsequent to the Tribunal hearing. The Minister opposed the Court receiving the documents.
2. The circumstances in the present matter are like those in Doan v Minister.[18] In that matter his Honour Judge Lucev observed,

17 Ms Doan's affidavits were not before the Tribunal at the time the Tribunal made the Tribunal Decision. Much of the evidence in Ms Doan's affidavits might arguably be said to have been presented to invite the Court to make new factual findings contrary to those made by the Tribunal. Such a course is not permissible upon judicial review: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Tesic [2017] FCAFC 93; (2017) 251 FCR 23; (2017) 350 ALR 47 ("Tesic") at [55] per Reeves, Robertson and Rangiah JJ (from which an application for special leave to appeal was refused by the High Court: Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCASL 271 at [1] per Bell and Nettle JJ). Further, if any of the affidavit evidence does not bear on any jurisdictional error alleged by Ms Doan (as to which see grounds 1 and 2 at [23] and [34] below), nor any jurisdictional error otherwise: SZJMG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1145 at [27] per McKerracher J, the affidavit evidence is not admissible on this Judicial Review Application as it is irrelevant: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ("Evidence Act"), s 56(2).

18 Ms Doan seeks to have the Court consider the new evidence in the affidavits for the purposes of this Court considering her Judicial Review Application. Courts considering judicial review applications generally resist the introduction of new evidence in judicial review proceedings.

19 In MZXLD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1912 ("MZXLD") at [10]-[11] per Gordon J the Federal Court observed as follows:

10 The resistance to the admission of fresh evidence in judicial review proceedings is well established by the authorities: see Waterford v The Commonwealth [1987] HCA 25; (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 77-78 (per Brennan J); Servos v Repatriation Commission (1995) FCR 377 at 385-386 (per Spender J); Phillips v Commissioner for Superannuation [2005] FCAFC 2 at [29]- [31] (per Spender, Madgwick and Finkelstein JJ); and SZINB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1627 at [23] (per Cowdroy J). The function of judicial review is a process by which legal error might be corrected, leaving the primary decision maker as wholly responsible for determining questions of fact or the merits of any application. The danger in acceding to a request to admit further evidence on review is that the court will necessarily need to revisit findings of fact: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259.

11 Additional evidence not before the RRT may, however, be admitted in exceptional cases where the material is required to make good a contention that raises a question of law, as distinct from a question of fact: see Phillips at [31] (per Spender, Madgwick and Finkelstein JJ); and see STKB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 546 at [15] and [21]-[22] (per Selway J); M211 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 660 at [30] (per Crennan J); NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24 at [54] (per Beaumont, Lindgren and Tamberlin JJ). A failure to provide a party with natural justice is a contention of the type that may, in the discretion of the reviewer, be subject to further material: Percerep v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) FCA 1088 at [15]- [16] (per Weinberg J).

20 There is not, however, an absolute prohibition on evidence being admitted in judicial review proceedings. In Chandra v Webber [2010] FCA 705; (2010) 187 FCR 31; (2010) 270 ALR 393; (2010) 116 ALD 126; (2010) 187 FLR 31 (a case concerning the validity of appointments to a committee set up pursuant to statute) at [40]-[42] per Bromberg J the Federal Court observed that:

40 The admissibility of evidence on an application for judicial review of an administrative decision will depend on the ground of review and the circumstances of the case: McCormack v The Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 1700; (2001) 114 FCR 574 at [38]- [40] per Sackville J. The touchstone for the determination of admissibility will usually be relevance. That is, is the evidence sought to be adduced relevant to the ground of review sought to be relied upon. Ordinarily there is no reason, in a case involving judicial review, for any evidence to be placed before the court, apart from evidence of what was before the decision-maker at the time of the decision: Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 1707; (2005) 148 FCR 446 at [442] per Weinberg J. However, the admissibility of evidence not before the decision maker depends upon the grounds of review on which the application relies: Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs [1989] FCA 202; (1989) 23 FCR 536 at 539-540 per Lockhart J; Australian Retailers at [455]; Attorney-General (NT) v Hand [1988] FCA 272; (1988) 16 ALD 318 at 319-320 per Wilcox J; and Saint v Holmes [2008] FCA 987; (2008) 170 FCR 262 at [54] per Siopis J.

41 Authorities dealing with ADJR Act challenges have recognised that in relation to particular grounds of review, evidence beyond the evidence that was before the decision maker may be relevant and admissible. Without seeking to suggest that the following list is exhaustive, evidence beyond that which was before the decision maker may be relevant where the following grounds of review are raised:

• the unreasonable exercise of the power given to the decision maker: Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs at 539-40; Australian Retailers at [458]; Hand at 320; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169;

• excess of jurisdiction because of the absence of a jurisdictional fact: McCormack at [38]-[40]; Attorney General for the Northern Territory v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs at 539-540; and

• a breach of the rules of procedural fairness: Percerep v Minister for Immigration [1998] FCA 1088; (1998) 86 FCR 483 at 495 per Weinberg J; McCormack at [38]; Hand at 320.

42 The position at common law is similar, if not the same. As Denning LJ said in R v Northumberland Compensation Tribunal, ex parte Shaw [1951] EWCA Civ 1; [1952] 1 KB 338 at 352:

"When Certiorari is granted on the ground of want of jurisdiction, or bias, or fraud, affidavit evidence is not only admissible, but it is, as a rule, necessary."

See further, Ex parte Mulle_n; re Hood_ [1935] NSWStRp 34; (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 289 at 296 per Jordan CJ and R v Chairman of General Sessions at Hamilton; Ex parte Atterby [1959] VicRp 101; [1959] VR 800 per Lowe, O'Bryan and Smith JJ.

1. Having regard to the above authorities, which are respectfully adopted, the Court as presently constituted declined to receive the documents sort to be tendered by the Applicant. The material was ruled inadmissible because it was material which post-dated the Tribunal Decision and with effectively invited the Court to undertake impermissible merits review.[19]

1. At the hearing, the Applicant appeared before the Court without legal representation. They were assisted by a Sinhalese interpreter. The Minister was represented by Rogan O'Shannessy, a solicitor at Mills Oakley.
2. The Court confirmed with the Applicant that they had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
3. To assist the Applicant, the Court explained that this Court can only turn its attention to the issue of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The Court explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort, however, they most commonly include (but are not limited to) the following categories:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question: Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 ("Craig") at 198;

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material: Craig at 198;

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material: Craig at 198;

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at [207]- [208];

(e) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias: SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]; and

(f) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]- [28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44].

1. It was also explained to the Applicant that this Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal's decision or grant the Applicant the visa they seek. Rather, the role of the Court is restricted to determining if the Tribunal made a material error in arriving at the decision it arrived at: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
2. The Applicant indicated to the Court that she had some command of the English language. In any case the explanations provided to the Applicant were interpreted. Based on the Applicant's responses the Court is am confident they properly comprehended the scope and purpose of the hearing.
3. Noting that the Applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave the Applicant an opportunity to elaborate on her grounds of review and to outline any other concerns she might have with the Tribunal's decision. This is now the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 600 at [7].
4. Before this Court, the Applicant made submissions in support of the grounds set out in their application. Those submissions are considered below.
5. The Minister made submissions consistent with the outline of written submissions filed by the Minister on 10 July 2025.
6. After the Minister made their submissions, the Court invited the Applicant to respond to what the Minister's representative had said. The Applicant made further submissions also considered below.

THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

1. Bhasker v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[20] his Honour Judge Fary summarised the role of the Court in judicial review proceedings:

48. Section 476 of the Migration Act provides that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under s 75(v) of the Constitution.

49. Section 75(v) of the Constitution provides that the High Court has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Thus, subject to the statutory exceptions provided for in s 476 of the Migration Act, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Further, s 474 of the Migration Act does not preclude judicial review of decisions under the Migration Act where jurisdictional error is alleged.[21]

50. "The task of the Court [in an application for judicial review] is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it." The court neither consider the merits of the decision nor remakes it.[22]

51. The Court may grant relief if it is satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error.[23] Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision maker may manifest itself in a variety of ways. Recognised categories of jurisdictional error include "misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness".[24] Different kinds of error may overlap.[25] The categories are not closed.[26] The critical question is whether the decision maker has exceeded the authority or power conferred by the statute.[27]

52. In most but not all cases, for an error to be jurisdictional, the error must be material to the decision being challenged. The test is whether there is a "realistic possibility" that the decision that was made "could" have been different, but for the error.[28] This is to be determined as "a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts that have been determined".[29] It has been described as an "undemanding" standard.[30]

1. The Court as presently constituted respectfully adopts his Honour's summary of the task before it.
2. Further, disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error.[31]

1. At the hearing before the Court, the Applicant was invited to make submissions about:

(a) why she believes the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error; and

(b) each of the two grounds of review.

1. To the extent that the Applicant made submissions in relation to the specific grounds, they are summarised below in the context of considering each of the grounds. To the extent that the Applicant made more general submissions, those submissions largely invited the Court to engage in impermissible merits review of the Tribunal's decision. As this Court explained to the Applicant at the hearing, the Court cannot consider for itself whether the Applicant meets the criteria for a Protection visa. To the extent that the Applicant's submissions invite the Court to engage in merits review, they do not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.
2. The Minister submitted that the decision of the Tribunal was not affected by jurisdictional error. The Court as presently constituted incorporates (without repetition) paragraphs 32 to 51 of the Minister's outline of submissions.

*** The Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not afford me procedural fairness**

1. At the hearing, the Applicant was asked what she meant by this ground. The Applicant explained that she had stated her "true story" to the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal hads a duty to look into her claims "more deeply".
2. At the hearing, the Court as presently constituted took the Applicant to page 134 of the Court Book to confirm she had made an application with the Tribunal on 23 December 2016. The Applicant then confirmed before the Court that:

(a) On 14 August 2018 she was invited to a hearing, and

(b) On 22 October 2018 she attended a hearing, where her brother provided evidence.

1. The Applicant had nearly 2 years from the date of application to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision until the Tribunal hearing, to put forward any evidence that she wanted to rely upon. The Applicant had ample opportunity to do so. Further, there is no evidence that the Applicant sought additional time to provide further information or evidence.
2. The process undertaken by the Tribunal, provided the Applicant every opportunity to put her case to the Tribunal. The contention that the Tribunal did not afford her procedural fairness must be rejected.
3. In so far this ground, contends that the Tribunal did not properly consider the Applicant's claims or ignored relevant claims these contentions also lack merit. At the hearing, the Applicant was asked what claims the Tribunal missed. The Applicant explained that she was not afforded an opportunity to provide documentary proof that she was a member of the JVP. As the Minister's representative correctly observed the provision the party membership card would not have made a difference to the Tribunal's decision. This is because the Tribunal already accepted:[32]

(a) she was a member of the JVP,

(b) she assisted her brother, and

(c) her brother's involvement with the JVP

1. However, the Tribunal did not accept the Applicant's claim that she left Sri Lanka in 2014 due to problems she was experiencing due to her JVP activities.[33] This was a finding that the Tribunal was open to make, after comprehensively considering the Applicant's evidence. [34]
2. Accordingly, this ground does not establish jurisdictional error and is dismissed.

*** The Administrative Appeals Tribunal applied the wrong legal test**

1. At the hearing, the Applicant was asked what she meant by this ground. The Applicant asked the Court what it meant by "wrong legal test?" The Court as presently constituted indicated that is the question it wanted her to answer. The Applicant said replied "I have no idea."
2. The Minister submitted that,

44. On her imputed political opinion, the Tribunal made detailed findings as summarised above from (CB, 187-190 [39] to [48]) concluding at (CB, 190 [48]) she had a significantly lower profile than her brother and she did not claim to suffer politically motivated violence herself, before finding that any risk of harm was 'remote'.

45. On her relationship with Sumhid, the Tribunal considered the domestic violence claim and her claim to fear harm as he was related to Blue Force. The Tribunal made findings in relation to Blue Force at (CB, 190 [49]), ultimately rejecting the claim on the basis of a lack of evidence and country information.

46. Detailed findings on the identified family violence claim were made at (CB, 190 [52]). The Tribunal noted the Applicant was no longer in a relationship with him, that she did not suggest he continued to threaten or harm her, and that she had no fear of ongoing harm from him. The Tribunal noted her evidence that she believed he was granted a protection visa in Australia, and considered if this were likely that it was unlikely he would return to Sri Lanka.

47. On the nature of the Applicant's relationship with Sumidh Sanjeewa's wife, the Tribunal noted 6 years had passed since that relationship, that the relationship was over, and that she did not have any ongoing contact with his wife. The Tribunal did not accept there to be a real chance his wife or other villagers or community members will seek to harm the applicant if she returns to Sri Lanka (at (CB,190 [53])).

48. On her psychological balance, the Tribunal made findings at (CB, 189 [44]), noting no medical evidence was provided of her mental state.

49. On economic hardship, the Tribunal made findings at (CB, 189 [47]) and again at (CB,191 [54]). The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant may not be able to return to her old school as a teacher after her relationship was disclosed, but noted she holds a Diploma of Primary Teaching and worked in several government schools and did not accept she would be unable to find employment. The Tribunal also noted her family remain in Sri Lanka, and found she would not be alone, or unsupported.

50. The Tribunal then made findings against the complementary protection criteria from (CB, 191-192 [57] to [61]) as summarised above, making findings at (CB, 191 [60]) as to why the claimed harm did not constitute 'significant harm'. We discern no issues in relation to its assessment.

1. The Court agrees with the Minister's submissions. It is apparent on the face of the Tribunal's decision that it applied the correct legal test and fulfilled its statutory task as follows:

(a) outlined the relevant law s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994,[35]

(b) considered all the claims and evidence put forward by the Applicant and made findings,[36] and

(c) ultimately was not satisfied that the Applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations to and did not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

1. Accordingly, this ground does not establish jurisdictional error and is dismissed.

1. At the hearing, the Applicant was given a final opportunity to say something in support of her application. The Applicant explained that there has been "subsequent" threats to her life.
2. These matters, as challenging as they are, invited the Court to engage in impermissible merits review.[37] While this Court is sympathetic to the Applicant regarding these matters, they cannot be considered by the Court as presently constituted.
3. Accordingly, do not establish any jurisdictional error.

1. For the reasons set out above, this Court is satisfied that the Tribunal's reasons were not affected by jurisdictional error.
2. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed. The Court will hear the parties on costs.

I certify that the preceding seventy (70) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

[18] for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1119.

[19] Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ; Tesic at [55] per Reeves, Robertson and Rangiah JJ; MZXLD at [10] per Gordon J.

[20] [2025] FedCFamC2G 620

[21] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[22] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 Allson CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ at [17].

[23] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[24] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 418 ALR 152 (LPDT) at [3].

[25] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323 at [82].

[27] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 at [82].

[29] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506 per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [38].

[30] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80 per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ (at [33]).

[31] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [40].

[37] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272; NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10].