GLU18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 2035

1. On 12 December 2018, the applicant filed an application for judicial review, pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) dated 20 November 2018. The IAA affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent refusing to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV) under s 65 of the Act.
2. For the reasons that follow, the application to this Court is dismissed.

1. In June 2013, the applicant, a citizen of Bangladesh from the city of Jessore, arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival.
2. On 6 September 2016, the applicant, after being invited by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department), lodged an application for a SHEV, claiming to fear harm if he returned to Bangladesh.
3. On 29 June 2018, a delegate of the first respondent, after interviewing the applicant on 11 April 2018, made a decision refusing to grant the applicant a SHEV.
4. On 4 July 2018, the matter was referred to the IAA for review under Part 7AA of the Act (as it then was).
5. On 25 July and 6 August 2018, the applicant's representative provided further evidence to the IAA.
6. On 20 November 2018, the IAA made a decision affirming the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a SHEV.

1. As stated above, in July and August 2018 the applicant's representative provided further evidence to the IAA. In light of s 473DD of the Act, the IAA at [4]-[6] considered whether it could consider the further evidence. The IAA concluded that it could not consider the further evidence.
2. The IAA at [7] summarised the applicant's claims for protection. The applicant's principal claims were:

(a) He had difficulties in Bangladesh because he was a BNP supporter and feared harm on return to Bangladesh for this reason.

(b) In 2016 he converted from Islam to Christianity and feared harm on return to Bangladesh for this reason.

1. The IAA at [8]-[41] considered whether the applicant satisfied the refugee criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. In relation to this issue:

(a) The IAA at [26]-[27] accepted the applicant was a low level BNP supporter, but was "not satisfied there is a real chance the applicant will suffer harm from the AL as a result of low level involvement with the BNP seven years ago".

(b) The IAA at [31]-[37] accepted the applicant converted to Christianity in 2016 and would seek to continue to practise Christianity if he had to return to Bangladesh, but was "not satisfied there is a real chance the applicant will suffer serious harm from ... anyone in his extended family because he switched religious adherence from Islam to Christianity" and, although there have been occasional assaults against Christian converts, was "not satisfied that the level of harm is such that it rises to a real chance".

(c) The IAA at [39]-[41] considered whether the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm as a failed asylum seeker returning to Bangladesh and was "not satisfied there is a real chance the applicant will suffer any harm because he is a failed asylum seeker and returnee".

(d) Following from the above, the IAA at [42] concluded that "the applicant does not meet s 36(2)(a)".

1. The IAA at [43]-[47] considered whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The IAA at [47] concluded that "the applicant does not meet s 36(2)(aa)".

Judicial review application and steps up to hearing on 4 November 2025

1. On 12 December 2018, the applicant filed in this Court an application for judicial review of the IAA's decision (Application) which contained the following two grounds (as written):
   1. The IAA failed to apply the relevant test.

The IAA considered when assessing under the refugee convention regarding applicant's family's likely future reaction and concluded that the applicant could relocate to Chittagong or Dhaka (para 35). The IAA failed to consider the above (IE- Forward-looking test of his family's future reaction) under the complementary protection and failed to consider whether it is reasonable for him to relocate to Chittagong due to his mental health issues and his Muslim name.

1. The IAA failed to consider relevant considerations and failed to engage in realistic consideration of the claim.

Particulars

1. The applicant noted in his entry interview that he was a supporter of the Jamaat-e-lslami and said Jamaat members face harm in Bangladesh. Though applicant did not mention in his Department interview or in statement to the department that he was a Jamaat supporter and said he would be perceived as a BNP supporter, the applicant made a claim in his entry interview on the basis of Jamaat and the IAA failed to consider the claim. The Department provided entry interview to the IAA and therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the applicant has submitted his claim on the basis of his political opinion supporting the Jamaat-e-lslami.
2. The IAA failed to consider the applicant's claim he made in his statement to the IAA and in his representative's submission (dated September 2016 at para 123), namely, that he would face harm on the basis that his action would amount to apostasy (para 11 of the statement) which is separate claim and not necessarily equated with his claim on the basis of his conversion to Christianity. According to Cambridge Dictionary, apostasy means that someone who has given up his or her religion. Though, the IAA considered applicant's claim on the basis of Christianity conversion, however, it is submitted that the IAA failed to consider applicant's claim on the basis that he would be considered as an apostate, (IE: a person who has abandoned Islam).
3. The IAA failed to consider forced conversion under the Complementary protection to assess whether it would amount to degrading and inhuman treatment.
4. The applicant's representative in his submission dated 10 April 2018, noted that due to growing influence of Islamic state (ISIS) that the applicant would face harm. (Para 11, para 13). The applicant's representative in his submission in September 2016, also submitted that the applicant would face due to growing influence of Islamic state. (See Para 43). The IAA failed to consider the applicant's specific claim that he would face harm from ISIS.

1. Following a long period of inactivity, on 6 June 2025 a registrar of the Court made procedural orders, including that, upon the matter being listed for hearing, the applicant file and serve at least 28 days before the hearing a written submission, any amended application and any additional evidence on which the applicant sought to rely.
2. On 23 September 2025, the registry of the Court notified the parties that the matter was listed for hearing on 5 November 2025.
3. On 20 October 2025, the first respondent filed a written submission (RS).
4. On 5 November 2025, before the commencement of the hearing in this Court, the applicant provided a written submission.

1. At the hearing in this Court on 5 November 2025, the applicant appeared unrepresented, assisted by a Bengali interpreter. Greg Johnson of counsel appeared for the first respondent.
2. The applicant brought to the hearing a copy of the Court Book, filed by the first respondent in February 2019, which contained the IAA's decision and documents before the IAA. At the commencement of the hearing, I directed the applicant's attention to the IAA's decision. I explained that the Court's role was limited to considering whether there was a jurisdictional error, which I described as a significant error or mistake, in the IAA's decision. With reference to the IAA's decision, I explained the main categories of jurisdictional error. I explained that, for the applicant to win the Court proceeding, he must persuade the Court there is a jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision.
3. Mr Johnson tendered a copy of the Court Book (CB). The applicant did not seek to tender additional evidence.
4. I invited the applicant to make oral submissions. The applicant stated he loves Jesus, and that his family in Bangladesh are strongly Muslim and will force him to convert back to Islam if he returns to Bangladesh. I reminded the applicant that the Court's role was limited to considering whether there was a jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision. I asked the applicant if there was an error or mistake in the IAA's decision. The applicant replied that he has seen a psychologist and, when he tries to sleep, he has nightmares about someone chasing him and trying to harm him.
5. Mr Johnson made oral submissions which supplemented the first respondent's written submission filed in October 2025.

1. The applicant claimed that in 2016 he converted to Christianity and, as a result, if he was required to return to his home city of Jessore, he faced a real chance of serious harm from his family who adhered strictly to Islam.
2. The IAA at [31] "accept[ed] the applicant was baptised into the Salvation Army in November 2016 and since that date ... he has been an active and public member of the Salvation Army congregation". The IAA at [32] was "also willing to accept as genuine the applicant's claim ... that despite his fear he would seek to continue to practise as a Christian if he had to return to Bangladesh". However, the IAA at [34] was "not satisfied there is a real chance the applicant will suffer serious harm from his father, or anyone else in his immediate or extended family, because he switched his religious adherence from Islam to Christianity". The IAA at [35] added:

Even if I am wrong about the applicant's family's likely future reaction, having regard to the very high population density and size of Bangladesh, and the limited resources of the applicant's father who is a teacher, I consider it highly unlikely that the applicant would be located by his cousin in the capital of Dhaka which has a population of over 17 million, or by his brother in a major city like Chittagong. I find that the applicant could safely relocate to the capital Dhaka or another sizeable city in Bangladesh where he has no relatives. As a consequence, I am satisfied that if a real chance of persecution by his family did exist, it would not relate to all areas of Bangladesh.

1. The IAA's findings at [35] involved consideration of s 5J(1)(c) of the Act which provides:

(1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution if:

(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

1. In considering whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion for a protection visa, the IAA at [45] stated:

I have accepted that as a result of having converted to Christianity the applicant may suffer some distance from and ostracism by his family and some societal discrimination on return to Bangladesh. While I appreciate that this may be upsetting for the applicant, I am not satisfied that such ill-treatment rises to the level of significant harm. I am not satisfied on the evidence that if he returned to Bangladesh the applicant would be at real risk of being subjected to significant harm because he is a Christian convert.

1. The applicant complains in the particulars to ground 1 that the IAA, in considering whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion for a protection visa, "failed to consider the ... forward-looking test of his family's future reaction" and "failed to consider whether it is reasonable for [the applicant] to relocate to Chittagong".
2. However:

(a) First, the IAA in the first sentence of [45] adopted its findings at [34] concerning his family's likely future reaction upon the applicant's return to Bangladesh and thereby considered the forward-looking test of his family's future reaction.

(b) Second, it was not necessary for the IAA to consider whether it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Chittagong, since the IAA at [45] was not satisfied that the ostracism and societal discrimination the applicant may suffer on return to his home city of Jessore "rises to the level of significant harm".

1. It follows that ground 1 does not identify a jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision.

1. Particular (a): The applicant stated in an entry interview in June 2013 with an officer of the Department (CB 8) that he supported the political party "Jamat Islamia" and a reason he left Bangladesh was because "the opposition party people tortured Jamat Islamia Party supporters", although the applicant was not tortured or harmed by the opposition party.
2. It is contended in particular (a) that "the applicant made a claim in his entry interview on the basis of Jamat and the IAA failed to consider the claim". For the following reasons, this contention does not identify a jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision:

(a) By letter dated 7 July 2016, the applicant was invited to apply for a protection visa (CB 19). In response to the invitation, in September 2016 the applicant, assisted by a representative, lodged an application for a protection visa, which included a submission of 123 pages by the representative (CB 21-143). This was followed by the provision of further materials to the Department, including a statutory declaration of the applicant, in March and April 2018. Despite the voluminous materials, the applicant did not state that he supported Jamat Islamia, or claim that he feared harm or faced a risk of harm because he supported Jamat Islamia.

(b) That the applicant stated in an entry interview in June 2013 that he supported Jamat Islamia and a reason he left Bangladesh was because "the opposition party people tortured Jamat Islamia Party supporters" does not appear to me to be a claim by the applicant that he feared harm from the opposition party if required to return to Bangladesh, in contrast to an explanation by the applicant as to why he decided to leave Bangladesh. Alternatively, if these answers by the applicant recorded in the entry interview could be construed as a claim, as stated in BYR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1324 at [51], the IAA "is not obliged to conduct a review in relation to claims that have been abandoned or which are no longer pressed". As correctly stated by the first respondent at RS [15]-[18], the applicant abandoned, or did not press, the claim associated with Jamat Islamia in his protection visa application lodged in September 2016.

1. Particular (b): One of the applicant's claims associated with his conversion to Christianity was that people in Bangladesh would consider him an apostate and seek to harm him on this basis. For example, the applicant's agent stated in a submission dated 5 September 2016: (CB 143)

The applicant's feared persecutors would consider the applicant as an apostate who has abandoned Islamic norms and engaged in anti- Islamic activities by his conversion to Christianity.

Also, the applicant added in his protection visa claims: (CB 175)

If I go back to Bangladesh, I would be targeted and killed due to my religious beliefs and practices. I would be considered as an apostate and will be killed by the Islamic extremists ...

1. The IAA at [17] expressly recorded this claim in the following terms:

In the SHEV application the applicant claimed he fears if he goes back to Bangladesh he will be targeted and killed due to his religious beliefs and practices. He will be considered as an apostate and will be killed by his family and relatives or Islamic extremists.

1. The IAA at [21] again recorded the claim made in the applicant's statutory declaration dated 3 April 2018 that "he also claimed he will be targeted or killed due to his religious beliefs and practices; he will be considered as an apostate and killed by Islamic extremists or his family and relatives ...".
2. The IAA at [36]-[37] addressed the claim in the following terms:

[36] The applicant's representative also submitted that, in addition to his family, he is at risk of persecution from Islamic extremists or more conservative elements in Bangladeshi society because of his religious conversion from Islam to Christianity, and that he is also at risk of being forcibly re-converted to Islam.

[37] I accept that over the past two years there have been a couple of outbursts of violence, or thwarted attacks, against individuals who have converted to Christianity or who are Christians. However I consider the number of assaults directed at both Christians and Christian converts has decreased significantly since 2016 when the government cracked down on Islamic extremists following a series of targeted attacks against a range of religious minorities in Bangladesh. And having regard to the nature and frequency of the attacks, I am not satisfied that the level of harm is such that it rises to a real chance.

1. It is contended in particular (b) that "the IAA failed to consider the applicant's claim ... that he would face harm on the basis that his action would amount to apostasy" and this claim is separate to the applicant's "claim on the basis of his conversion to Christianity". However, it is clear from the IAA's reasons at [17], [21], [36] and [37] that the IAA considered and addressed the applicant's claim that he would face harm on the basis that his conversion from Islam to Christianity amounted to apostasy. The IAA's findings at [36]-[37] cover the applicant's claim that he would be considered an apostate and harmed on this basis.
2. Particular (c): It is contended in particular (c) that "the IAA failed to consider forced conversion under the complementary protection to assess whether it would amount to degrading and inhuman treatment". As explained in paragraph 35 above, the IAA at [37] found that it was not "satisfied there is a real chance the applicant will be forcibly re-converted to Islam". In considering (at [43]-[47]) whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion for a protection visa, the IAA at [45] implicitly adopted the findings it made at [37] when it stated:

I have accepted that as a result of having converted to Christianity the applicant may suffer some distance from and ostracism by his family and some societal discrimination on return to Bangladesh.

1. The IAA at [45] thereby adopted its finding at [37] that there was no real chance the applicant would be forcibly re-converted to Islam.
2. As stated in MZYXS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 614 at [31], the IAA "was entitled to rely on its finding that there was no real chance of the relevant harm alleged for Convention purposes in assessing whether there was a real chance of significant harm for complementary protection purposes, when the same essential claims and facts were being relied on in each aspect of the applicant's case".
3. Since the IAA was not satisfied there was a real chance the applicant would be forcibly re-converted to Islam, it was not necessary for the IAA to consider whether forced conversion amounted to degrading and inhuman treatment. It follows that particular (c) does not identify a jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision.
4. Particular (d): It is contended in particular (d) that the applicant's representative made a submission that "due to growing influence of Islamic State, ... the applicant would face harm", and "the IAA failed to consider the applicant's specific claim that he would face harm from ISIS".
5. At the hearing on 5 November 2025, I asked the applicant to explain where, in the extensive materials provided by the applicant's representative to the Department as part of his protection visa application, this claim appeared. The applicant did not answer my question. It is unclear where this claim appears in the materials provided by the applicant's representative. The clearest reference to Islamic State appears in a submission from the representative dated 10 April 2018 which, as the first page of the submission indicated, addressed whether the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm "due to his religious conversion" (CB 210.9) from Islam to Christianity. The representative wrote at CB 222:

... we submit the following:

...

e. security analysts say there has been growing evidence for months of a rising tide of violent Islamic extremism in Bangladesh.

f. Sunni Islamic extremists including Taliban and ISI target individuals and organizations who had supposedly offended Islam.

1. The IAA, in paragraph 36 of its decision (set out in paragraph 35 above), addressed the risk of harm to the applicant from "Islamic extremists" because of the applicant's conversion from Islam to Christianity. Islamic extremists include the group named Islamic State. It follows that I reject the applicant's complaint to this Court that the IAA failed to consider the applicant's claim concerning Islamic State in connection with his conversion from Islam to Christianity.
2. If the applicant, in particular (d), contends the IAA failed to consider a broader claim by the applicant concerning Islamic State, for example that he faced a risk of harm from Islamic State more generally, I do not accept that the applicant made such a claim, either expressly or clearly arising from the materials: see NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1 at [58]- [63].
3. It follows that particular (d) does not identify a jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision.
4. It follows from the above that the Application must be dismissed.

1. At the conclusion of the hearing, I invited submissions from the parties on costs. Mr Johnson sought an order that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs in the amount of $9,097.93, which was less than the first respondent's solicitor/client costs.
2. The applicant stated that, although he works in paid employment, if he loses this case, he may lose the right to work, in which case he will not be able to pay the first respondent's costs. In Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; 265 CLR 164 at [26] and [27] the High Court stated that "the impecuniosity of an unsuccessful party, without more, is not a sufficient reason for depriving a successful party of its costs" and "the statutory power to order costs affords the successful party necessary protection against unmeritorious litigation; and unmeritorious litigation is no less unmeritorious because it is pursued by a person who is poor or who is a litigant in person". The possibility that the applicant may become impecunious in the future is not a reason to deprive the first respondent of its costs. The applicant, by filing and progressing the Application to hearing, has forced the first respondent to incur legal costs.
3. I consider the amount sought by the first respondent is reasonable. I will make an order in this amount.

I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Zipser.