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[2013] NSWSC 1960
Supreme Court of NSW
2013-08-12
Simpson J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment 1By Statement of Claim filed on 1 September 2011 the plaintiff, Benjamin Giovannetti, claims damages against the State of NSW arising out of the publication of an email communication which he asserts conveyed imputations defamatory of him. 2The email in question is dated 15 September 2010. It was written by Colin Moore, then an Inspector of Police and State Co-ordinator of the Youth Command of the NSW Police Force ("the Youth Command"). It was directed to "Chris Gardiner", who was the Chief Executive Officer of an incorporated organisation at the relevant time called Police and Community Youth Clubs NSW Ltd ("PCYC"). The email was copied to Superintendent Allan Harding, who was, in 2010, the Commander of the Youth Command, and the officer to whom Inspector Moore reported. 3The email was given the subject title "Banning Notice to Benjamin Giovannetti", and its importance was categorised as "High". The substance of the email was, in full, in the following terms: "Chris, See Incident report number 2648A/2010 This person - Benjamin Giovannetti DOB: [-], [address] -Lismore PCYC should have his membership revoked immeditely [sic] he is extreme risk to PCYC. PLease advise your Manager @ Lismore PCYC. I will adivse [sic] Police. Col" 4The plaintiff asserts that the email conveyed the following imputations, each of which was defamatory of him: "(a) The plaintiff is an extreme risk to the PCYC; (b) The plaintiff should be banned from the Lismore PCYC because of his involvement in incident number 2648A/2010; (c) The plaintiff should have his membership of the Lismore PCYC revoked immediately because of his involvement in incident number 2648A/2010; (d) The plaintiff should be reported to Police because of his involvement in incident number 2648A/2010." 5Two months later, on 15 November 2010, Mr Gardiner forwarded the email to Grant Courtney. Senior Sergeant Courtney was an ancillary zone commander of the Youth Command. Mr Gardiner sent the email to him in response to a request made on behalf of the plaintiff under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 ("the GIPA Act"). The plaintiff pleads that forwarding the email constituted a republication, and was a natural and probable consequence of the original publication. 6The plaintiff's claim against the State of NSW is based upon the provisions of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983, pursuant to s 8 and s 9 of which the State of NSW accepts responsibility for relevant torts committed by, inter alia, members of the Police Force. By an Amended Defence filed on 9 July 2012 the State of NSW admits that it is vicariously liable for any tortious conduct proved against Inspector Moore, but denies that Inspector Moore committed any actionable tort of defamation. 7The State of NSW has raised a number of defences. In the first instance, it denies that the matter complained of in its natural and ordinary meaning bears or is understood to bear or is capable of bearing the imputations pleaded, and denies that any such imputations are or are capable of being defamatory of the plaintiff. (Except in one limited respect, these pleas were not pursued at the hearing.) 8The specific defence upon which the State of NSW relies are: (i)qualified privilege at common law; (ii)statutory qualified privilege (Defamation Act 2005, s 30); (iii)substantial truth (Defamation Act, s 25); (iv)triviality (Defamation Act, s 33). The State of NSW also asserts that the matter complained of was published in circumstances whereby the plaintiff authorised and/or assented to and/or acquiesced in its publication. Although this was pleaded in relation to the original publication, on 15 September, no argument, factual or legal, was advanced to support it. Finally, the State of NSW asserts that the subsequent publication of 15 November (the asserted re-publication) was the consequence of an express request (and therefore consent) by the plaintiff pursuant to the GIPA Act and is protected by s 113 thereof. 9Subscribed to the Amended Defence are particulars of qualified privilege, substantial truth and consent asserted against the plaintiff. 10By Reply to the Defence, the plaintiff asserts, in respect of the pleaded defences of qualified privilege, that publication of the matter complained of was actuated by express malice. The particulars of malice subscribed in the Reply attribute malice in various respects to "the defendant" - the State of NSW. The particulars assert knowledge of the falsity of the imputations, ill will towards the plaintiff, lack of honest belief in the truth of the imputation, desire to damage the reputation of the plaintiff, reckless indifference to the truth or falsity of the imputations, excessive language, and denial of authority. They do not identify any servant or agent of the State of NSW who is said to have the relevant knowledge, or to have harboured the feelings of ill will towards the plaintiff which they assert. It may be assumed that these are attributed to Inspector Moore.
Factual background 11With those preliminaries, I will now turn to the relevant facts, with which I will deal, so far as possible, in chronological order. 12The plaintiff was born in June 1976. He grew up in Sydney, completed his Higher School Certificate and began a mechanical engineering course at Sydney University which he did not complete. In about 2005 he moved to live in the north of NSW, in a town about 1 hour out of Lismore. His interests included weight lifting, gymnastics and dancing. 13From 2002 he had various encounters with Police in different locations, including Sydney. On at least one occasion, he was charged, but was not convicted. 14The PCYC may be described (non technically) as an agency of the NSW Police Service/Force. It is, however, an independent entity operating under its own Constitution. Its objects are expressly stated in cl of the Constitution as: "3.1 ... to promote the welfare of children and young people and the development of children and young people as responsible citizens with a particular emphasis on undertaking and supporting individual and social activities that address the disadvantage and other risk factors that harm young people and their development." The clause then itemises specific means by which it is sought to achieve that object. PCYC establishes clubs in various locations to promote these objectives. One such club was established in Lismore, in the north of NSW. 15PCYC clubs operate under the supervision of Senior Police in the Youth Command. In 2010 the Senior Officer was Superintendent Allan Harding. The State Co-ordinator was Inspector Moore, who was second-in-charge to Superintendent Harding. 16Individual PCYC clubs are staffed by both Police officers and civilian employees. In September 2010 the Police officer on duty at the Lismore PCYC club was Senior Constable Amanda Bazley. The civilian employee was Ms Sharon Irwin who was then a permanent part-time employee, in the role of senior activity officer. 17At about 5.30pm on 14 September 2010 the plaintiff attended at the Lismore PCYC club. He completed a membership form and paid the modest joining fee, and a further sum to enable him to participate in weightlifting. He spoke to Ms Irwin, who was then on duty. In order to obtain membership he acknowledged a "Club Member Agreement" which required him to accept a Code of Conduct set out in the Club Membership form. He repeated this acknowledgement in a form specifically related to his participation in weightlifting activities and exercises. 18The details of what occurred thereafter on the afternoon of 14 September are the subject of some controversy but it is common ground that a verbal altercation took place between the plaintiff and Ms Irwin. Put neutrally, that altercation occurred because the plaintiff signalled his intention of going to an upstairs area of the premises, in order to watch a gymnastics class. 19Gymnastics classes are limited to participants between the ages of 6 and 16 years, and, in this case, the participants are predominantly female. Only instructors and parents are permitted to be present. Ms Irwin told the plaintiff that he was not allowed to watch the gymnastics. 20The following day, 15 September, when Senior Constable Bazley was on duty, Ms Irwin told her of the confrontation with the plaintiff, and handed her his completed membership form. Senior Constable Bazley went to the nearby Police station where she accessed, in respect of entries concerning the plaintiff, a database entitled the Computerised Operational Policing System ("COPS"). She returned to the PCYC and told Ms Irwin that she did not want the plaintiff to be a member of the Lismore PCYC, and that, if he returned, Ms Irwin was to advise Senior Constable Bazley. Acting on Senior Constable Bazley's instruction, Ms Irwin completed and submitted, via an Intranet communication system, an Incident Report Form (Ex 5). The Incident Report was assigned the number 2648A/2010. The report records the "incident number" referred to in imputations (b), (c) and (d). It was a PCYC internal report. Relevantly, Ms Irwin wrote: "At approximately 5:20pm a 34-yo male entered the club & enquired about membership & use of the weights room. The person filled out a membership form & weight user decalration [sic] form, produced identification, and was given membership of the club at 5:38pm. The person then purchased a weight room subscription and proceeded to the weight room. At this time the person appeared to be behaving in a normal manner. Approximately 15 minutes later the person was seen to be heading upstairs to where the gymnastics class was being held. I asked him where he was going, as only the gymnastics instructor, participants and their parents are permitted in the mail hall whilst gymnastics is on. He said that he was going to do gymnastics, and I informed him that the gymnastics was only for children 16 yrs and under. He then said that he wanted to go and watch the class, and I informed him that that also would not be possible. He became quite insistent that he should be allowed to either take part in the gymnastics class or watch it. I was concerned about his behaviour, particularly with regard to this activity involving young people, so I asked him to leave the club premises, which he did. This morning, 15/09/10, I asked the club Police Officer, S/C Amanda Bazley, if she could do a Police check of the person as I was concerned about his behaviour last night. S/C Bazley, whilst not disclosing the content of the Police check, strongly recommended that his membership be refused, and that he not be permitted to attend the Club for any reason. A Police information report was generated by S/C Bazley. - I-42475229." This was Ms Irwin's initial account of the altercation to which I have referred above. She repeated it, in more detail, in oral evidence. The plaintiff's account was somewhat different. Ms Irwin provided the plaintiff's name, date of birth, address and telephone number. 21Senior Constable Bazley also prepared a report for use within the COPS Intelligence Information System. Her report was given the number I42475229 (Ex D). The substance of it was as follows: "About 5:30pm on Tuesday the 14th of September, 2010 the POI [person of interest] attended the Location and completed a membership form as he wished to utilise the weights room. (which is located in the downstairs area of the club). At approximately 6pm the POI was seen walking up the stairs to the second level of the location. He was verbally stopped by the Witness [Ms Irwin] who informed the POI that due to gymnastics running upstairs he was not able to attend. The POI stated, 'I just want to join in.' The Witness informed the POI that only parents and children under the age of 16 years could be present upstairs. To which the POI replied, 'I'll just go up and watch then.' The POI then asked, 'Where can I go and do Gymnastics in the area?' The POI was informed that the only other place that ran Gymnastics was the 'North Coast Gymnastics Academy. Due to the POI's persistance [sic] and suspicious behaviour he was asked to leave the location. The North Coast Gymnastics Academy was contacted and the coach, Alex was informed that the POI may attend the location. Due to the POI's history there are concerns that he may be trying to infiltrate youth related activities within the Lismore area." It is clear that Senior Constable Bazley was not present at the time of the incident involving the plaintiff and Ms Irwin, and this report was the result of what had been told to her by Ms Irwin. 22The report made by Ms Irwin within PCYC very quickly came to the attention of Inspector Moore, who was then the Senior Officer on duty, Superintendent Harding being out of the office. Inspector Moore contacted Senior Constable Bazley. His evidence of that conversation is as follows: "I said 'What's going on?' She said, 'There's been an incident here with a gentleman, Mr Giovannetti, who has signed up for a membership. Went into the weights room, then made his way into the gymnastics room and he was approached by a staff member, Sharon Irwin, who asked him not to go in there.' There was a conversation between those two. To the best of my recollection he was, Mr Giovannetti was instructed that the gymnastics area is for under 16s only and their parents and the instructors and he was asked to remove himself from there to which he then became agitated. To which he then made a claim that he wished to participate in the gymnastics. Which he was then told it was for under 16s only and asked to leave the premises due to the fact that Miss Irwin was getting concerned about his behaviour ... Further to that I asked had she completed any checks, police checks as part of the process. And she indicated to me, well, she said, Bazley said, 'There's links to paedophilia'." 23As a consequence of the information conveyed to him by Senior Constable Bazley, Inspector Moore accessed the COPS database, searching for references to the plaintiff. That produced a number of entries (Ex 11). 24The opening page of the plaintiff's file in the database contains three warnings, one dated November 2002, suggesting that he may be "mentally challenged"; another dated January 2009 with, in double asterisks, the word "paedophile" and the notation "stalks female children/adolescents, behaviour around children/schools/youth events to be monitored and recorded"; and the last dated December 2009, reading "Argumentitive [sic] and irrational. Has strong dislike of police". 25Within the file are a number of descriptions of "events" involving the plaintiff, going back to 2002. These include:
The defences 54I have set out above the four separate defences upon which the State of NSW relies. In addition, it contends that imputation (d) was not conveyed. A distinction was drawn between the indication in the email that police would be "advised", and the accusation that the plaintiff should be "reported". Although with some reservations, I have concluded that that imputation was conveyed, by reason of the reference to the incident report and the concluding line of the email in which Inspector Moore told Mr Gardiner that he would advise police. There is no relevant distinction between "advising" police and "reporting" to police. 55There was no issue that each imputation was defamatory of the plaintiff. 56I then turn to the specific defences raised. (i) qualified privilege at common law 57The defence of qualified privilege at common law is attracted when a communication is made by one person to another (or others) in circumstances where the person making the communication has a duty, whether legal, social, or moral, to provide information to the recipient, and the recipient has a corresponding interest or duty in receiving such information: Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309; Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 Cr M & R 181; 149 ER 1044; and see Aktas v Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd [2010] HCA 25; 241 CLR 79. 58Where such a communication is made, the occasion of the communication is a privileged one. Protection is afforded even to an otherwise defamatory statement made in the course of the communication. The privilege is lost if the occasion is misused, that is, is used for a purpose other than that for which the protection is provided. Use of an occasion of qualified privilege for an extraneous purpose is held to constitute malice, whereupon the defence is defeated. 59To illustrate the way in which the defence operates, there can be no clearer case that the present. The email written by Inspector Moore concerned the welfare of young people using the facilities of the Lismore PCYC. Having informed himself of the plaintiff's conduct, and of the contents of the COPS database, Inspector Moore had a duty to inform the CEO of PCYC that the plaintiff represented a risk to the organisation. Had he not done so, he would have failed in his duty. Mr Gardiner, the CEO, had the requisite corresponding duty to receive such information. Superintendent Allan Harding, to whom the email was copied, as Commander of the Youth Command of the NSW Police Force, had an equal interest in receiving the information, and, no doubt, a duty to do so. 60In final submissions, counsel for the plaintiff made no attempt to argue against the proposition that the elements of the defence of qualified privilege at common law were made out. Instead, he focussed his argument on the issue malice. Malice is an issue on which the plaintiff bears the onus of proof. 61Counsel for the plaintiff pointed to two circumstances as evidence of malice. One was a sentence in the incident report made by Ms Irwin, as follows: "Senior Constable Bazley, whilst not discussing the content of the Police check, strongly recommended that his membership be refused, and that he not be permitted to attend the Club for any reason." The second was the use of the adjective "extreme" in the email itself, when Inspector Moore described the plaintiff as an "extreme risk to PCYC". 62The submission was made that the language used exceeded what was permissible for a communication on the occasion of qualified privilege. Reliance was placed upon the decisions of the NSW Court of Appeal in Goyan v Motyka [2008] NSWCA 28; [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-939 and Skalkos v Assaf [2002] NSWCA 14; [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-644. I have, in Megna v Marshall [2010] NSWSC 686 considered the conclusions to be drawn from those decisions: but see Megna v Marshall [2013] NSWCA 30. 63It is only necessary to read the outline of the communications in Goyan and Assaf to appreciate that there is a world of difference between the floridity of the language used in those cases, and the language used in the report by Ms Irwin (reciting a recommendation by Senior Constable Bazley) and the email sent by Inspector Moore. The language used does not remotely diminish the strength of the defence of qualified privilege. 64Although a good deal of the plaintiff's evidence appeared to be directed to establishing that various members of the NSW Police Force (as well as others) were ill disposed towards him, this was not pursued in final submissions. Malice has not been established. 65The defence of qualified privilege at common law succeeds. (ii) statutory qualified privilege: Defamation Act 2005, s 30 66Section 30 of the Defamation Act 2005 relevantly provides: "(1) There is a defence of qualified privilege for the publication of defamatory matter to a person (the recipient) if the defendant proves that: (a) the recipient has an interest or apparent interest in having information on some subject, and (b) the matter is published to the recipient in the course of giving to the recipient information on that subject, and (c) the conduct of the defendant in publishing that matter is reasonable in the circumstances. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a recipient has an apparent interest in having information on some subject if, and only if, at the time of the publication in question, the defendant believes on reasonable grounds that the recipient has that interest. (3) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the conduct of the defendant in publishing matter about a person is reasonable in the circumstances, a court may take into account: (a) the extent to which the matter published is of public interest, and (b) the extent to which the matter published relates to the performance of the public functions or activities of the person, and (c) the seriousness of any defamatory imputation carried by the matter published, and (d) the extent to which the matter published distinguishes between suspicions, allegations and proven facts, and (e) whether it was in the public interest in the circumstances for the matter published to be published expeditiously, and (f) the nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates, and (g) the sources of the information in the matter published and the integrity of those sources, and (h) whether the matter published contained the substance of the person's side of the story and, if not, whether a reasonable attempt was made by the defendant to obtain and publish a response from the person, and (i) any other steps taken to verify the information in the matter published, and (j) any other circumstances that the court considers relevant. (4) For the avoidance of doubt, a defence of qualified privilege under subsection (1) is defeated if the plaintiff proves that the publication of the defamatory matter was actuated by malice. (5) However, a defence of qualified privilege under subsection (1) is not defeated merely because the defamatory matter was published for reward." 67In respect of this defence also, it was not disputed on behalf of the plaintiff that the essential elements spelled out in sub-s (1)(a) and (b) were made out. Focus was upon the reasonableness of Inspector Moore's conduct (sub-s (1)(c) and sub-s (3)) and malice, as provided in sub-s (4). The same two arguments were advanced as evidencing unreasonableness - that is, so called excessive language in the email, and the so called excessive strength of the recommendation by Senior Constable Bazley. For the same reasons as I have given above, I reject that argument also. There was nothing unreasonable in Senior Constable Bazley making her recommendation in the terms that she did; there was nothing excessive, and therefore unreasonable, in the terms used by Inspector Moore in his email. 68The defence of qualified privilege pursuant to s 30 of the Defamation Act succeeds. (iii) substantial truth: Defamation Act, s 25 69Section 25 of the Defamation Act provides as follows: "It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that the defamatory imputations carried by the matter of which the plaintiff complains are substantially true." 70Evidence of the content of the COPS database was admitted as material available to Inspector Moore in determining what course to take in respect of the plaintiff's membership of PCYC, and therefore relevant to the qualified privilege defences. The evidence was expressly not admitted as truth of the contents of the various reports contained in the database. 71Whether:
Republication 77The plaintiff also relied upon the republication of Inspector Moore's email on 15 November 2010. This was done by Mr Gardiner in response to the plaintiff's request for information under the GIPA Act. Section 113(1)(a) of the GIPA Act provides; "(1) If government information is disclosed pursuant to a decision under this Act, and the person by whom the decision is made believes in good faith, when making the decision, that this Act permits or requires the decision to be made: (a) no action for defamation ... lies against the Crown ... by reason of the making of the decision or the disclosure of information ... (b) ... (2) ..." 78I am satisfied that, in forwarding Inspector Moore's email to Senior Sergeant Courtney in response to the plaintiff's request for information under the GIPA Act, Mr Gardiner believed in good faith that the GIPA Act permitted or required the disclosure of the information. 79Accordingly, this aspect of the claim must fail.
Damages 80The success of the defences of qualified privilege have the inevitable consequence that the Statement of Claim must be dismissed. However, it is appropriate to make an assessment of damages that would be awarded had the plaintiff succeeded. Those damages are insubstantial. The extent of publication was extremely limited. Even allowing for some "grapevine effect", the extent to which the plaintiff's reputation could be affected was very small. I accept that, as a direct consequence of Inspector Moore's email, Mr Gardiner acted on his recommendation and terminated the plaintiff's membership of the Lismore PCYC. That, I accept, would sound, although to a limited extent, in damages. 81I assess the damages that could be awarded at $2000. 82It is arguable that the plaintiff's real complaint lies in the decision to exclude him from the Lismore PCYC, rather than the means by which the decision was communicated: see Stanton v Fell [2013] NSWSC 1001. In my opinion claims in defamation ought not to be used as a substitute for, or a back door means of, seeking appropriate review of administrative or other decisions.
Orders 83The orders I make are: (i)The Statement of Claim is dismissed; (ii)The plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs of the proceedings.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 07 January 2014
Giovannetti
State of New South Wales