1. In this complaint the applicant says that the Attorney General failed to provide services to her because, while he did respond to the letter, his response did not address the issues raised in the letter in full. He was said also to have failed to provide her with services by failing to establish the various inquiries in accordance with her request. I am not satisfied that a failure to adequately respond to correspondence is a failure to provide services to the applicant, nor am I satisfied that an Attorney-General, in establishing commissions or inquiries, is providing services to an individual. In my view, a commission or an inquiry established under the Judicial Commission Act 1994 is not the provision of a service to the person who has sought the inquiry. The Judicial Commission Act is designed to uphold the administration of the justice system generally - not to provide a service to, or for, an individual. Likewise the Inquiries Act 1991 establishes a system for the holding of inquiries for the interest of the public generally - not for the benefit of an individual. It is not a service provided to or for an individual.

1. In this complaint, the applicant says that the tribunal and its members discriminated against her when dealing with, and making decisions about, disciplinary action brought by the ACT Law Society against her husband. I am not satisfied that there is any relevant sense in which members of the tribunal or the tribunal itself, was providing services to the applicant. I have some doubt as to whether a member of the tribunal, or the tribunal when it is hearing a matter, can ever be said to be providing services to or for an individual. I think the more appropriate characterisation of the work of the members of the tribunal and the tribunal itself, is that it provides services for the broader administration of justice. In this case, there is no way that, in dealing with an application relating to her husband; Mr Loftus or Mr Stefaniak, or the other members of the tribunal dealing with the matters before it, or the tribunal itself, could be said to have refused to provide services to the applicant, or to have put any terms or conditions on the way in which it was providing services to her, or to be acting in any way that was relevant to the provision of services to, or for, her. I accept that the decisions of the ACAT and its members have affected the applicant, but the provisions of the Discrimination Act 1991 do not recognise that as a relevant area of discrimination.

The respondents have also relied on an exemption provided by section 30 of the Discrimination Act. Because of the view that I have formed of this matter,

I have not considered whether that exemption applies in this matter. Prima facie I think that it does, but it is not an issue that I feel necessary to consider in detail.

The applicant's representative provided other detailed and broad ranging arguments designed to elucidate the basis of her grievances and the impact of those matters upon her and those connected to her, as well as on the broader community of people of her identified race. I have not considered, and will not comment, on those broad ranging arguments. I do not wish to be seen as being dismissive of them simply because I have not dealt with them. I have not dealt with them because it is not necessary for me to do so.

I accept that the applicant has a sense of genuine grievance about the things that have occurred to her. I accept that the matters raised by her representative have caused her significant distress and, indeed, grief. However, even if these complaints had proceeded to a full hearing, the tribunal could not have made some of the orders that the applicant is seeking.

She sought orders in relation to each complaint for various declarations relating to discrimination towards, and breach of domestic and international rights of herself, her husband, her family and people of her race. She sought a written apology for herself, her husband and her family. Initially, she sought punitive damages in the sum of twenty million dollars. That was later amended to a claim for damages of thirty million dollars for herself, her husband and her family, excluding punitive damages.

I do not accept that the tribunal has power under section 53E of the Human Rights Commission Act to provide declaratory relief.

To the extent to which the applicant indicated she was seeking orders for the benefit of other people or other groups and that she was seeking orders in respect of things other than the matters dealt with in her complaint, and by this I include vilification; I emphasise that the tribunal is only authorised to deal with the matters that are before it. Those matters concern her and an allegation of unlawful discrimination on the basis of the attribute that she identified in her complaint, in the area that she referred to in her complaint. The tribunal can only exercise the powers that are given to it under the relevant authorising law. Regardless of the outcome of these applications, it would have been impossible for the tribunal to make orders providing apologies to, or compensation for damage or loss suffered by people other than the applicant.

The tribunal does not have the power to order punitive damages. Section 53E of the Human Rights Commission Act makes it clear that the tribunal's power is limited to orders for compensatory damages. The applicant's representative raised an interesting argument in relation to a general power to give orders for damages arising from sections 6 and 7 of the ACAT Act. It was an argument that exercised my mind somewhat, but it is clear that sections 6 and 7 of the ACAT Act are not sources of power for the tribunal.

These sections establish the objectives of the tribunal and the principles on which the tribunal must exercise the powers given to it. They are not in themselves sources of power from which an implied power to make orders so as to do justice between the parties can be derived. A reading of his Honour Refshauge J's decision in the matter of The Appellants v The Law Society and the Legal Practitioner makes it clear that the Supreme Court would take a dim view of an attempt by the tribunal to exercise such a broad ranging power as that advocated by the applicant's representative.

10. The respondent's representative submitted that a costs order should be made against the applicant pursuant to the power given by section 48(1) of the ACAT Act. It was argued that costs should be awarded against the applicant because she should have known from the outset that she had no prospects of success, because the allegations made against the respondents were intemperate and, in some instances, scandalous.

11. I declined to exercise the discretion to make an award for costs against the applicant under section 48(1) of the ACAT Act because I am satisfied that the applicant genuinely believes that she has been the subject of discrimination.

I am satisfied that it was not her intention or motivation to annoy, harass, or to do anything other than to pursue what she perceives to be her legitimate grievance.

12. The applicant's representative sought a costs order against the respondents because, he submitted, of the way in which the respondents' representative presented the strike out applications. He said that he was required to put a large amount of material and cases before the tribunal because the respondents' case was not adequately prepared. I also declined to exercise any discretion to make a costs order against the respondents.

FULL REPORT ( ) CASE NOTE ( ) UNREPORTED DECISION ( )

[1] see sections 8(1)(a) and 7(1)(h) and (n) of the Discrimination Act 1991

[2] see Jackson v Sterling Industries [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 162 CLR 612 per Deane J; also Parsons v Martin [1984] FCA 408; (1984) 5 FCR 235 at 241

[3] [2008] FCA 923 at [9].

[4] [1996] QCA 37; [1996] 2 Qd R 218.

[6] See for example ACT Department of Education and Training v Prendergast [2000] ACTDT 6; Firestone v Legal Aid Office (ACT) [2007] ACTDT 3; Brooks v ACT Government [2008] ACTDT 5; McCormack v Charles Sturt University [2008] ACTDT 4; IF v Commissioner for Housing [2004] ACTDT 1

[7] [1996] VSC 78

[8] [1999] VCAT 628

[9] The Human Rights Act 2004 defines "court" to include the ACAT; section 40, given below, defines "public authority":

(1) Each of the following is a public authority :

(2) However, public authority does not include -

(b) a court, except when acting in an administrative capacity.

[10] See Schedule 1A, Oaths and Affirmations Act 1984; Schedule 1, ACAT Act