1. Application to extend time refused.
2. Application for review dismissed.

Dog Control Act 2000; ss 54, 59;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020; s 76;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2021; r 5, 11.

OT v Asbestos Compensation Commissioner [2024] TASCAT 209;

Ghimire v Karriview Management Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1108;

Hunter Valley Developments v Cowen [1984] FCA 176.

1. On 17 September 2025, the applicant, Mrs Gearman, filed a general review form with the Tribunal seeking to review a decision of the General Manger of the Kingborough Council dated 14 August 2025 to refuse to grant her a kennel licence pursuant to the provisions of the Dog Control Act 2000 (the DCA).
2. The applicant has applied for an extension of time to file the review with the Tribunal beyond the 14-day period prescribed in s 59(1)(a) of the DCA if such an application for extension of time is required.
3. This extension of time is made pursuant to r 11 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2021 (the TASCAT Rules).
4. Council has opposed the applicant's application for an extension of time and has applied for the applicant's review of the decision to refuse to grant her a kennel licence to be dismissed.
5. For the reasons which follow I refuse to extend the time for the filing of the applicant's review and dismiss it.

1. On 27 February 2025, the applicant made an application for a kennel licence pursuant to the provisions of the DCA.
2. After undertaking a review of this application and otherwise complying with the provisions of the DCA in relation to it, on 9 July 2025 the General Manager of the council made a decision to refuse the grant of the kennel licence to the applicant pursuant to s 54(1)(b) of the DCA on the basis that it was not in the public interest to grant her the licence.
3. The Council's decision of 9 July 2025 was provided to the applicant under cover of a letter dated 17 July 2025.
4. There is dispute as to when the applicant received this letter, the details of which, and my findings in relation to which, are set out subsequently in this decision.
5. By a letter dated 26 August 2025 to the Kingborough Council, which was received on 27 August 2025, the applicant sought to "appeal" the decision of the Council not to grant her the kennel licence.
6. By a letter to the applicant dated 28 August 2025 the Council advised the applicant that she had 14 days to seek a review of the Council's decision to refuse to grant her kennel licence and that the avenue of review was not to the Council but rather to the Tribunal.
7. On 17 September 2025, the applicant lodged her general review of the Council's decision to refuse to grant her a kennel licence with the Tribunal.
8. Due to the application for review not containing all relevant information, the Tribunal corresponded with the applicant seeking further information which she provided to the Tribunal on 3 October 2025.
9. In response to a direction to the Council by the Tribunal pursuant to s 76(2) of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (the TASCAT Act), on 27 October 2025 the Tribunal received all of the relevant documentation the Council asserted based its decision to refuse to grant the kennel licence to the applicant.
10. On 28 October 2025, the Tribunal also received a statutory declaration from a Mr Mark Garvey deposing to the service of the documents provided to the Tribunal by the Council on 27 October 2025, to the applicant on 28 October 2025.
11. In accordance with the usual Tribunal processes an initial telephone conference before a Senior Case Officer in the Tribunal was arranged for 7 November 2025. It was at this telephone conference that the Council asserted that the applicant's review application to the Tribunal was out of time and directions were given for the Council to provide the evidence upon which this assertion was based along with any further submissions it wished to make.
12. On 20 November 2025, the Tribunal received:

(i) The Council's submissions in relation to its application opposing the extension of time for the applicant to file her review; and

(ii) A statutory declaration from a Council employee, a Ms G Turner, sworn on 19 November 2025 setting out the evidence upon which the Council relied.

1. During a telephone conference before a Senior Case Officer on 24 November 2025, the applicant confirmed having received this material on Friday 21 November 2025.
2. As the applicant was self-represented, a directions conference by Teams was listed to occur before the Tribunal on 15 December 2025.
3. At this directions conference after I discussed with the applicant the matters requiring a determination by me, being her application to extend the time for the filing of her review of the Council's decision to refuse her kennel licence, the applicant indicated that she did not have any further evidence she wished to provide to the Tribunal. The Council's representative took a similar approach.
4. As a consequence of these indications, I reserved my decision.

1. Having considered the material contained within the applicant's application for review dated 17 September 2025 and also the further materials she provided in her correspondence with the Tribunal on 3 October 2025, along with a consideration of the evidence provided by the Council, being the statutory declaration of G Turner dated 19 November 2025, I make the following findings of fact:

(i) The applicant's kennel licence application was made on 27 February 2025.

(ii) The decision to refuse her kennel licence by the General Manager of the Council was dated 9 July 2025 and was advised to the applicant in a letter from the Council dated 17 July 2025.

(iii) The applicant clearly had this correspondence of 14 August 2025 as evidenced by her letter to the Council dated 26 August 2025 (received by the Council on 27 August 2025), advising she wished to appeal the Council's decision to reject her kennel licence application.

(iv) I find that the applicant's assertion of first having seen Council's correspondence to reject her kennel licence application dated 9 July 2025, being 14 September 2025, is not factually correct.

(v) The Council advised the applicant in correspondence dated 27 August 2025 that the appeal avenue of the Council's decision to refuse to grant her a kennel licence was not to the Council but to the Tribunal and that it was to occur within 14 days.

(vi) Advice of the appeal period and that any appeal should be lodged with the Tribunal is set out in the Council's correspondence to the applicant of 17 July 2025, which I am satisfied was served on her on 14 August 2025.

(vii) The 14-day period for the applicant to lodge her appeal expired by no later than 29 August 2025.

(viii) The applicant was clearly aware of the need for her to file her appeal against Council's decision with the Tribunal and not with the Council by 17 August 2025 at the latest.

(ix) The applicant's general review notice was received by the Tribunal on 17 September 2025 and was perfected by her on 13 October 2025.

1. Pursuant to s 59(1)(a) of the DCA, an applicant has 14 days from the receipt of notification of the General Manager's decision to not grant a kennel licence, to apply to the Tribunal for a review of that decision.
2. Rule 5(4)(a) of the TASCAT Rules provides that a review must be made to the Tribunal within the period specified in the relevant Act.
3. Rule 11 of the TASCAT Rules does however provide the Tribunal with a general discretion to extend or abridge the time to take such action.

1. It is clear that pursuant to r 11 of the TASCAT Rules, the Tribunal has a general discretion in determining whether to extend or abridge the time for the filing of an application such as this.
2. I am grateful for the Council's submissions which correctly set out the principles to be considered when determining whether an application for an extension of time should be granted.
3. The decision of Senior Member Chandler in OT v Asbestos Compensation Commissioner [2024] TASCAT 209 (18 December 2024) at [15] stated:

It is apparent that the legislation invests the Tribunal with a general discretion in determining whether time be extended. In such circumstances some guidance upon the matters to be considered is provided by Colvin J in Ghimire v Karriview Management Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1108.

4. Colvin J in Ghimire v Karriview Management Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1108 at [8] when considering to grant an extension of time, stated the matters to be considered:

"Speaking broadly, special circumstances need not be shown but the Court must be positively persuaded that it is proper for there to be an extension. As to particular matters: > > (1) There should be an adequate explanation for the delay. Generally, mere ignorance of the time limit is not a satisfactory explanation for the delay. A party wanting to appeal may be expected to investigate or inquire about the procedure and the time limits for bringing an appeal. > > (2) The extent to which the applicant has taken steps to challenge or to dispute the relevant decision in the intervening period will be considered. > > (3) If the outcome can be confidently predicted at the leave stage, it will seldom be in the interest of justice to grant leave where an appeal has little or no prospects of success because of the considerable additional cost and the impact on the other litigants who have abided by time limits and are waiting for their appeals to be heard. However, the merits should be examined at a reasonably impressionistic level. The Court does not go into the merits in great detail and assesses the merits in a fairly rough and ready way. > > (4) The Court's view as to the strength of the claim may itself be a matter that is to be weighed with other matters so the fact that the claim may be viewed at the time of the application for an extension to be strong or weak is relevant. > > (5) Prejudice to the respondent, including prejudice that will be occasioned by having to defend the proceedings, is a material factor against the grant of an extension. The extent of that prejudice (which may vary depending upon the financial and other circumstances of the respondent) must be considered with some care. > > (6) Consequences for third parties should be brought to account, particularly more wide ranging effects that might flow if an appeal were allowed despite a period of delay. > > (7) These matters are not exhaustive and they are not rules to be rigidly applied. Also it must be kept in mind that the Court has a general discretion to be exercised by reference to the particular circumstances of each case.

5. With regard to prejudice to the respondent, in Hunter Valley Developments v Cowen [1984] FCA 176 at [20] Wilcox J stated:

Any prejudice to the respondent including any prejudice in defending the proceedings occasioned by the delay is a material factor mitigating against the grant of an extension. However, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension. In this context, public considerations often intrude. A delay which may result, if the application is successful, in the unsettling of other people or of established practices is likely to prove fatal to the application. The merits of the application are properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted.

1. On none of the material before me, has the applicant given any adequate explanation for her delay in the lodgement of her application for review/appeal of the Council's decision not to grant her the kennel licence.
2. I have found as a fact that the applicant had the Council's correspondence of 9 July 2025 advising of the determination not to grant her the kennel licence by no later than 14 August 2025. I have found as a fact that the applicant was incorrect that she did not receive this correspondence until 14 September 2025.
3. I am also satisfied that by no later than 14 August 2025 the applicant was aware that she had 14 days from that date to seek a review of the Council's decision to refuse her a kennel licence and that such a review/appeal was not to be made with the Council but to the Tribunal. This was clearly stated in the Council's correspondence of 9 July 2025 which she had by 14 August 2025.
4. A 17-day delay in the lodgement of a review application/appeal is not of itself a significant delay, and as the Council's submissions indicate, may not amount to a significant prejudice to the Council. However, as was stated by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments v Cowen the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of the extension of time and the merits generally of the application for review (should it proceed), are to be properly taken into account when considering whether an extension of time should be granted.
5. Having considered all of the material before me, it is apparent that the applicant faces significant difficulties in establishing grounds for her appeal as it is clear that the General Manager has exercised a statutory obligation pursuant to s 54(2) of the DCA to consider whether a nuisance would occur if a kennel licence was granted.
6. There was clear evidence that the merits and the strength of the applicant's application for review is not strong in circumstances where the Council had received six objections, which is significant, and which indicate a significant element of public nuisance and hence public interest should the licence be granted.

1. For all of these reasons I refuse to extend the time for the applicant to file her review of the Council's decision to reject her kennel licence. The applicant's application for the review of the Council's decision not to grant her the kennel licence is dismissed.