[2025] NSWCATAD 76
General information, not legal advice.
NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity
2025-03-31
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) by not permitting certain persons to engage in child-related work, and
(b) by requiring persons engaged in child-related work to have working with children check clearances.
4 Safety, welfare and well being of children to be paramount consideration
The safety, welfare and well being of children and, in particular, protecting them from child abuse, is the paramount consideration in the operation of this Act.
(1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:
(2) For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision.
(3) In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide:
(a) to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or
(b) to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or
(c) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or
(d) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.
27 Applications to Civil and Administrative Tribunal for administrative reviews of clearance decisions
(1) A person who has been refused a working with children check clearance by the Children's Guardian may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the decision within 28 days after notice of the decision was given to the person.
(2) A person whose clearance is cancelled by the Children's Guardian under section 23 may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the decision within 28 days after notice of the decision was given to the person.
(1) OCG failure to satisfy basis requirement of relevant Acts and their own guidelines in making decision of cancellation.
(2) OCG failure to perform assessment with procedural fairness. Examples of procedural unfairness include deliberate disregard and / or suppression of evidence favourable to me.
(3) Every adverse reason and conclusion of OCG suffers from lack of plausible evidence and / or acceptance and adoption of faulty information provided by PES.
(4) On the basis of the above and many other reasons, the decision is unfair and unreasonable.
27 Applications to Civil and Administrative Tribunal for administrative reviews of clearance decisions
(1) A person who has been refused a working with children check clearance by the Children's Guardian may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the decision within 28 days after notice of the decision was given to the person.
(2) A person whose clearance is cancelled by the Children's Guardian under section 23 may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the decision within 28 days after notice of the decision was given to the person.
(3) A person who is subject to an interim bar imposed by the Children's Guardian may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the decision, but only if the interim bar has been in force for more than 6 months.
(4) An applicant must fully disclose to the Tribunal any matters relevant to the application.
(7) Section 53 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 does not apply to a decision that may be reviewed by the Tribunal under this section.
(8) The Tribunal must not, on a review of a decision under this section, make a stay order in respect of the decision unless the Tribunal is satisfied that there are appropriate arrangements in place for the supervision and enforcement of the conditions (if any) of the stay order by the person's employer.
(1) The Tribunal must consider the following in determining an application under this Part:
(a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar,
(b) the period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred,
(c) the age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred,
(d) the age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim,
(e) the difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person,
(f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child,
(h) the seriousness of the person's criminal history and the conduct of the person since the matters occurred,
(i) the likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition,
(i1) any order of a court or tribunal that is in force in relation to the person,
(j) any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application,
(j1) any relevant information in relation to the person that was obtained in accordance with section 36A,
(k) any other matters that the Children's Guardian considers necessary.
'42 One does not define risk as meaning minimal risk. One would ...exclude fanciful or theoretical risk but what one is looking for is whether, in all the circumstances, there is a real and appreciable risk in the sense of a risk that is greater than the risk of any adult preying on a child. One, however, must link the word "risk" with the words that follow, namely, "to the safety of children". ...'
A reference in this Act to a risk to the safety of children is a reference to a real and appreciable risk to the safety of children.
(1) Exhibit 'A 1': the application for administrative review,
(2) Exhibit 'A 2': bundle of documents Parts 1-5 with 10 annexures filed 17 June 2024.
(3) Exhibit 'A 3' Further material indexed 38 pages filed 22 August 2024.
The applicant also filed detailed written submissions and submissions in reply. GDZ also filed an unsigned 'opening statement to the Tribunal' at hearing.
(1) Exhibit 'R 1' documents produced under s 58 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (2 volumes - pages 1-820 and pages1179-1226 - total of 867 pages) filed 21 May 2024.
(2) Exhibit 'R 2' further documents produced under s 31 of the Act filed 9 July 2024 (11 pages).
(3) Exhibit 'R 3' Summons Material filed 2 September 2024 at hearing.
The respondent also filed detailed written submissions on 8 August 2024, and submissions in reply on 17 October 2024. In these reasons GDZ's circumstances are referred to in general terms so as to prevent constructive identification of him in the context of his complaints including identification of schools, students and others.
(GDZ) 17/7/2019 11:51hrs "My God, you are distracting!!!!!! (3 x Emoji)'
(GDZ 17/7/2019 19:58hrs 'When I give you a huge compliment and you don't reply you make me worry. Sorry of I overstepped the mark! (Emoji)'
(Student 17/7/2019 20:35hrs 'I'm sorry I just wasn't sure what to say'
(a) The seriousness of the offences to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar.
(b) The period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred.
(c) The age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred.
(d) The age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim.
(e) The difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person.
(f) Whether the person knew or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child.
(h) The seriousness of the person's criminal history and the conduct of the person since the offences occurred.
(i) The likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition.
(i1) Any order of a court or tribunal that is in force in relation to the person.
(j) Any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application.
(j1) Any relevant information in relation to the person that was obtained in accordance with section 36A.
(k) Any other matters that the Children's Guardian considers necessary.
29. In Commissioner for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111, Young JA (with whom Hodgson JA and Handley AJA agreed) expressed some concern about the reference to Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336 ("Briginshaw") in the above passage from IK (at [68]). I share his Honour's misgivings. Briginshaw warns about the use of "inexact proofs" in the context of making serious findings of fact (at p 362 per Dixon J). It is difficult to envisage how it applies to a party seeking to disprove a negative assessment of the risk they pose to children in the future. Further, the principles in Briginshaw were enunciated in the context of civil proceedings in a court, not administrative review proceedings in a body that is not required to apply the rules of evidence (CAT Act, s 38(2); see [63]). It is not necessary to decide whether a failure by NCAT to have regard to Briginshaw's admonitions might give rise to an appeal on a "question of law". It suffices to state that NCAT would be well advised to have regard to them if it was considering making a positive finding that an applicant sexually abused a child in circumstances where they were not convicted of doing so (see R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Bott [1933] HCA 30; 50 CLR 228 at p 256 per Evatt J).
30. Fifth, significant guidance as to the approach to be adopted in such cases can be derived from the High Court's decision in M v M [1988] HCA 68; 166 CLR 69 ("M v M"). In M v M the Family Court found that it was not satisfied that a father had abused a child but was also not satisfied that the father had not abused the child. Instead the Family Court found "that there was a possibility that the child had been sexually abused by the [father] and that in the interests of the child [the Court] should eliminate the risk of such abuse by denying access" (M v M at p 70).
31. In M v M the High Court accepted that a positive finding that an allegation of sexual abuse is true should not be made "unless the court is so satisfied according to the civil standard of proof, with due regard to the factors mentioned in Briginshaw" (M v M at p 76). The Court also stated (at p 77 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ):
"It does not follow that if an allegation of sexual abuse has not been made out, according to the civil onus as stated in Briginshaw, that conclusion determines the wider issue which confronts the court when it is called upon to decide what is in the best interests of the child.
No doubt there will be some cases in which the court is able to come to a positive finding that the allegation is well founded. In all but the most extraordinary cases, that finding will have a decisive impact on the order to be made respecting custody and access. There will be cases also in which the court has no hesitation in rejecting the allegation as groundless. Again, in the nature of things there will be very many cases, such as the present case, in which the court cannot confidently make a finding that sexual abuse has taken place. And there are strong practical family reasons why the court should refrain from making a positive finding that sexual abuse has actually taken place unless it is impelled by the particular circumstances of the case to do so.
In resolving the wider issue the court must determine whether on the evidence there is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if custody or access be granted and assess the magnitude of that risk. After all, in deciding what is in the best interests of a child, the Family Court is frequently called upon to assess and evaluate the likelihood or possibility of events or occurrences which, if they come about, will have a detrimental impact on the child's welfare. The existence and magnitude of the risk of sexual abuse, as with other risks of harm to the welfare of a child, is a fundamental matter to be taken into account in deciding issues of custody and access. In access cases, the magnitude of the risk may be less if the order in contemplation is supervised access. Even in such a case, however, there may be a risk of disturbance to a child who is compulsorily brought into contact with a parent who has sexually abused her or whom the child believes to have sexually abused her. But that is not the issue in this case."
32. The Court held that the relevant test was that access to a child by a parent will be denied if there exists "an unacceptable risk that the child would be exposed to sexual abuse if the husband were awarded custody or access" (M v M at p 78).
33.The above passage from M v M contemplates a court finding that a risk of abuse exists but that the possibility of it materialising can be mitigated by measures such as supervised access, with the result that the risk is not unacceptable and the parent is not denied access. As I have observed no such mechanism is proffered by the Working with Children Act. It is not concerned with "unacceptable risks" but "real and appreciable" risks (V supra). Further, in cases such as this the onus is upon the plaintiff. However subject to those two matters and the caveat about the applicability of Briginshaw noted in [29], the reasoning in M v M is applicable to fact finding and the process of risk assessment that NCAT undertakes. Thus in such cases it may be that NCAT can be satisfied that an allegation of sexual abuse against an applicant is established. Equally, NCAT may be affirmatively satisfied that the relevant incident did not occur, in which case it can be put aside. However, in a context where the welfare of the child is paramount and the question being posed concerns the risk of harm to children, NCAT may not be satisfied that an allegation of abuse has been made out, but nevertheless conclude that the circumstances surrounding a particular incident or course of conduct means that there is a risk to a child or, more correctly, that the existence of a risk has not been disproven.
56. With great respect to Harrison J and to the Tribunal in BSR, there is no basis for any conclusion that an open finding or "a lingering doubt or suspicion" counts against the defendant. It is simply a matter to be considered when all of the evidence is weighed up in assessing whether the defendant poses a risk to the safety of children.
46. In the High Court the allegations of sexual abuse were treated as "central to the case" (p 71). The Court recognised, however, that (in circumstances where the relevant legislation enjoined the court to regard the welfare of the child as "the paramount consideration"), the court could not be "diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegations of sexual abuse" (p 76). In that context, the Court said (p 77):
"No doubt there will be some cases in which the court is able to come to a positive finding that the allegation is well founded. In all but the most extraordinary cases, that finding will have a decisive impact on the order to be made respecting custody and access. There will be cases also in which the court has no hesitation in rejecting the allegations as groundless. Again, in the nature of things there will be very many cases, such as the present case, in which the court cannot confidently make a finding that sexual abuse has taken place. ...
In resolving the wider issue the court must determine whether on the evidence there is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if custody or access be granted and assess the magnitude of that risk."
294. It is true that the Tribunal addressed in its conclusions, particularly at [147]-[148], aspects of allegations 2, 3 and 4. However the analysis was confined to, largely, whether CXZ was engaged in particular conduct described in those allegations and not as to the risks posed to children from these findings (although the Tribunal recognised that the children witnessing the violence was detrimental to them). Of even greater significance was the failure of the Tribunal to evaluate the cumulative weight of its various findings, that I have found were made, as to risk (the third stage of the inquiry) for allegations 2, 3 and 4 in its concluding assessment as to risk (or perhaps even as to the particular risks that I have found the Tribunal to have considered when dealing with each allegation individually).
295. This is not to suggest that the concluding remarks do not give consideration to the assessment of risk based on current circumstances as discussed in [148] based on, for example, the approach taken by the Family Court (or later the opinion of experts as to current risk) but this does not bring to account what aspects of the earlier allegations' and findings as to risk in that respect should count for in the mix of these factors. For example, the Tribunal refers in [148] to the violence between CXZ and his second wife as being "no longer ongoing" (which specifically relates to allegation 3 and the second element of allegation 4), but does not address how any risks said to arise in that context are to be evaluated cumulatively or otherwise in the final conclusions. The focus of attention appears to be on whether the allegations were made out and whether there are current factors which would indicate the absence or mitigation of risk.
'42 One does not define risk as meaning minimal risk. One would ...exclude fanciful or theoretical risk but what one is looking for is whether, in all the circumstances, there is a real and appreciable risk in the sense of a risk that is greater than the risk of any adult preying on a child. One, however, must link the word "risk" with the words that follow, namely, "to the safety of children". ...'
(1A) The Tribunal may not make an order under this Part which has the effect of enabling a person (the affected person) to work with children in accordance with this Act unless the Tribunal is satisfied that:
(a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the affected person that was not directly supervised by another person while the affected person was engaged in any child-related work, and
(b) it is in the public interest to make the order.
(1) The decision of the respondent dated 15 March 2024 to refuse the applicant's Working with Children Check Clearance is affirmed.
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.
GDZ
Children's Guardian [2025] NSWCATAD 76
ADV v Commission for Children and Young People [2012] NSWADT 8
AYU v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 69
BFC v The Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 90
BFX v Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 115
BJB v Office of the Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 111
BJB v The Children's Guardian (No. 2) [2014] NSWCATAD 164
BKE v Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34: 60 CLR 336
Children's Guardian v CKF [2017] NSWSC 893
Children's Guardian v CXZ [2019] NSWSC 1083
Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949; 56 NSWLR 476
Commissioner for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111
CXZ v Children's Guardian [2020] NSWCA 338
Office of the Children's Guardian v CFW [2016] NSWSC 1406
(1979) 46 FLR 409