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[2022] FCA 652
Federal Court of Australia
2022-06-02
Colvin J
Original judgment source is linked above.
A. In these orders: (a) Bankrupt means Mr Michael George Fotios whose bankrupt estate is being administered by the applicants. (b) Entitlement means any Unpaid Present Entitlement as defined in the Experts' Report as may be ultimately established (but only where that term is capitalised). (c) Experts means Mr Martin Bruce Jones and Mr Thomas Donald Birch of KPMG appointed as experts by this Court on 30 November 2020. (d) Experts' Report means the Experts' report annexed to the Affidavit of Thomas Donald Birch sworn 30 May 2021. (e) Trust means the Michael Fotios Family Trust created by a deed dated 29 October 1986. (f) Property means property of the Trust. (g) Receivers means the receivers appointed as the joint and several receivers of the Trust by orders made on 6 September 2021 in these proceedings.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
COLVIN J: 1 Mr Michael Fotios was formerly the trustee of the Michael Fotios Family Trust (Trust). He was made bankrupt. His trustees in bankruptcy (Trustees in Bankruptcy) claim that creditors of his estate are subrogated to rights to seek exoneration from the assets of the Trust and can pursue his associated right of indemnity. On the basis of those rights, the Trustees in Bankruptcy have brought claims against the current trustee of the Trust, Helios Corporation Pty Ltd (Helios). Helios is in administration. It is unclear whether there is a deficiency in assets of the Trust to meet all claims against the property of the Trust. 2 The Court has made orders appointing joint and several receivers of the property of the Trust (Receivers). They have taken control of the property of the Trust. The Receivers have sought judicial advice concerning certain matters arising in the ongoing conduct of the receivership of the Trust. 3 In December 2021, I made orders as to certain aspects of the application for judicial advice. After a subsequent hearing as to the remaining aspects of the application, reasons were given and the parties were invited to provide a minute of proposed orders to give effect to the reasons: Francis (Trustee), in the matter of Fotios (Bankrupt) v Helios Corporation Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 199. It was proposed that the orders would replace the orders made in December 2021 so that there was a single set of orders on the application. A draft of the orders that might be made was provided to the parties for their consideration. 4 The parties have submitted proposed orders. There are two matters of controversy that arise in respect of the draft orders. First, the priority to be afforded the costs of the external administration of Helios. Second, the priority as between parties claiming against the assets of the Trust based upon rights of exoneration and recoupment.
Priority of the costs of the external administration 5 An issue arises because the Receivers are also the voluntary administrators of Helios. The orders for their appointment were made by consent and were informed by the practical advantages and cost savings to be achieved if the same persons held the two offices each of which required steps to be taken in respect of the assets of the Trust. Reflecting that position, orders were made at the time of the appointment to provide for a cap on the overall costs to be incurred in both capacities. The orders made in December 2021 also reflected the fact that the costs were being treated, in effect, as a single set of costs. 6 On the basis that the work of the administrators was for care, preservation and realisation of assets, that treatment was appropriate and is appropriate up until this point. Work of that kind is appropriately treated as having the same status as the work of the Receivers. 7 However, it is possible that in respect of future costs, there may be costs of the administration that do not relate to such matters. There is no reason why those costs should be afforded the same priority as the cost of the receivership. Therefore, the orders should reflect that position in respect of any future costs that exceed the limits that have already been approved. The treatment of any such costs should be considered at the time of any application to further increase the cap.
Competing priorities between rights of exoneration and recoupment 8 The Trustees in Bankruptcy contend that the appropriate priority between rights of recoupment and exoneration in respect of the assets of the Trust is that the rights of recoupment trump the rights of exoneration. 9 As I sought to state in my earlier reasons, the advice being sought is confined to the position of the Receivers when it comes to making payments from the fund comprising the property of the Trust. It is no concern of the Receivers as to how those funds might be dealt with by the Trustees in Bankruptcy or an administrator in insolvency of Helios. The distributions to be made out of those administrations will depend upon principles that include whether there have been preferences. This is reflected in the approach adopted by the Receivers on the application. 10 The issue for advice is confined to whether the assets of the Trust in the hands of the Receivers should be applied first to meet claims based upon the trustee's right to reimbursement and then to meet claims by creditors based upon subrogation to the trustee's right of exoneration. There appear to be no authorities on the point so it must be approached as a matter of principle. 11 The point has significance for two interrelated reasons. First, it is possible that there may be an insufficiency in the trust assets in the hands of the Receivers to meet the claims by subrogation to the claims of the trustee of the Trust to both exoneration and reimbursement. Second, as explained in my earlier reasons, the pool of creditors who may make subrogated claims based upon the trustee's right of exoneration do not include general creditors of the trustee. Therefore, in circumstances where the relevant trustee is insolvent, the question of priority may determine whether assets of the Trust in the hands of the Receivers flow to those creditors with claims in respect of liabilities of the Trust or to all creditors of the trustee. Further, if the general creditors are large in quantum an equal priority may mean that a large part of the assets end up in the hands of general creditors (noting the possibility of hotchpot claims by exoneration creditors against general assets of the trustee of the Trust). 12 It is suggested that I could provide advice on the basis that relevant creditors have been notified and no creditors appear to oppose the proposed orders which would give priority to reimbursement creditors. However, in my view, such an approach would not be appropriate. This is not an instance where the Court has some form of discretion to exercise (or is asked to provide advice concerning the proposed exercise by the trustee of a discretion) nor is it a case where the Court is entrusted with a power to determine what may be appropriate. The advice to be given is not affected by whether parties with a particular interest take the trouble to appear and argue their position. The advice to be provided must reflect the Court's view of the relevant law. 13 It is further suggested that as orders were made in the terms proposed in December 2021 that I should not now revisit that advice. However, the orders made in December 2021 were made to allow the Receivers to proceed, particularly to be able to incur costs knowing that they could be recovered. At that time I reserved other issues for later argument. There is no suggestion that the earlier orders have been acted upon in any way insofar as they concerned the question of priorities. In circumstances where other issues on the application were reserved for later consideration and those issues focussed attention on matters that exposed the significance of the question of competing priorities, I am satisfied that the Court can and should revisit the earlier orders given by way of advice. They were not a final adjudication of rights. They were made in the exercise of the special jurisdiction to provide judicial advice. 14 In the course of further oral submissions it was proposed that if the order of priorities was not to give preference to the reimbursement creditors then it ought to provide for any right of reimbursement in respect of a liability satisfied by the trustee to rank against the trust assets in the same way that the right of exoneration would have ranked had the liability remained unsatisfied. In the circumstances of the present case I am satisfied that an order in those terms would give effect to the principle of equality that should apply as between the two types of claims that may be made by the trustee. I do so recognising that other principles of equity may assume significance in another case. 15 For those reasons and my earlier reasons, I have today made orders by way of advice in terms that consolidate the earlier orders, deal with the issue of priorities and make adjustments for certain infelicities in expression so that the advice to the Receivers is contained in a single order. I certify that the preceding fifteen (15) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Colvin.
Francis (Trustee), in the matter of Fotios (Bankrupt)
Helios Corporation Pty Ltd