FQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 394

1. In this matter the applicant is challenging a migration decision under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (the Tribunal) dated 27 March 2023. In that decision the Tribunal affirmed two decisions not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visas (SHEV).

1. The applicant, a Bangladeshi citizen, arrived in Australia at the Territory of Ashmore and Cartier Islands on 12 November 2012. In his entry interview, he said he had left Bangladesh because of threats and extortion, and that returning to Malaysia, where he had previously lived unlawfully, would also expose him to harm.
2. He was classified as an Unauthorised Maritime Arrival (UMA) and became subject to the s 46A bar. He was granted a Subclass 449 visa and considered barred by s 91K of the Act. On 21 December 2015, the Minister lifted the s 46A bar, allowing him to apply for a TPV or SHEV.
3. The applicant lodged his first SHEV application on 29 February 2016, claiming involvement with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). He alleged political harassment by Awami League members, including death threats, police complicity, and a severe beating after attending a party meeting. A delegate refused this application on 28 April 2017.
4. Believing it to be a fast-track reviewable decision, the application was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA), which affirmed the refusal on 11 December 2017.
5. The applicant sought judicial review. The Minister conceded that application on the basis that it was affected by DBB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 178. The effect of that decision was that the applicant was not a UMA nor a 'fast track applicant' and the delegate's decision should not have been referred to the IAA. Instead, the delegate's decision was a Part 7-reviewable decision which was reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
6. The Department renotified the delegate's decision on 23 March 2019 to the applicant, and the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review on 17 April 2019.
7. On 4 September 2020, the Department advised that the first SHEV application was invalid under s 91K. The Minister subsequently lifted the ss 91K and 48A bars on 18 September 2020.
8. On 27 September 2020, the applicant lodged a second SHEV application repeating the same claims. A delegate refused this application on 14 December 2020, and the applicant sought Tribunal review on 4 January 2021.
9. Following Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CBW20 [2021] FCAFC 63, the Tribunal found s 91K of the Act did not apply to people arriving at Ashmore and Cartier Islands, meaning the first SHEV application was valid and the April 2019 review application to the Tribunal was also valid. As a result, the Tribunal determined that there were two valid review applications and combined them under s 427(2) of the Act.
10. On 11 October 2022, the applicant attended a hearing at the Tribunal in respect of both applications with a Bengali interpreter and provided written submissions.
11. On 3 January 2023, the Tribunal invited the applicant to comment on several issues likely to form reasons for affirming the refusals, as well as on updated DFAT country information. The applicant responded to that request in detail on 22 January 2023.
12. On 7 March 2023, the Tribunal invited the applicant to resubmit any submissions previously given to the IAA. No response was received from the applicant to this request.
13. On 27 March 2023, the Tribunal affirmed both delegate decisions.

1. After setting out the background to the review, the Tribunal set out the claims and evidence in detail. It summarised the applicant's evidence from his entry interview, his first and second SHEV applications, and the evidence given during the combined review hearing. It also referred to the procedural history concerning the IAA review.
2. Next the Tribunal set out the legal criteria for a protection visa, including the relevant provisions of the Act relating to the refugee criteria and the complementary protection criteria.
3. After determining that the applicant was a national of Bangladesh, it then considered whether the applicant satisfied the refugee criteria under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. In summary, it rejected the applicant's claims based on extensive adverse credibility findings, concluding that his evidence was "unreliable, substantially inconsistent and illogical."
4. The Tribunal identified numerous problems with the applicant's evidence, including inconsistencies regarding his reasons for leaving Bangladesh, the circumstances surrounding his travel documents, his claimed BNP profile, and how his alleged "social work" could elevate any adverse interest. It also found inconsistencies in his description of events, contradictions in his claims about the Awami League, issues relating to his two returns to Bangladesh in 2006 and 2012, and concerns about his evidence suggesting he had previously considered it safe to return. Additional concerns arose from his claims about attempts to seek help from authorities, his experiences in Malaysia, and the unreliability of his supporting documents. In all it set out thirteen detailed reasons for its adverse credibility finding.
5. The Tribunal found at Tribunal Decision (TD) [55] that
   1. ...Overall, the Tribunal's adverse credibility concerns in relation to the applicant are so extensive and numerous that when cumulatively considered, the Tribunal is unable to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. The Tribunal is not satisfied that he is a reliable witness or that his claims regarding his experiences in Bangladesh are factual.
6. Based on its adverse credibility findings, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was a BNP member, or that any involvement was more than minimal. It rejected his claims to have been threatened, harassed, or subjected to violence, and did not accept that he would face harm on return as a failed asylum seeker or due to his perceived wealth.
7. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant met the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. For the same reasons it found the applicant did not satisfy the refugee criteria, the Tribunal also found that the applicant did not satisfy the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa). Accordingly, it affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

1. The application for judicial review pleads one ground of review (reproduced as written):

1. Administrative Appeals Tribunal made jurisdictional error

1. At the hearing of this matter on 12 February 2026, the applicant was unrepresented. He was assisted at the hearing before me by a Bengali interpreter. Mr J Fyfe of Minter Ellison appeared for the first respondent. I allowed both parties to make oral submissions.

1. The issue before this Court is whether the Tribunal's decision contained a jurisdictional error; that is, a serious legal error that results in an administrative decision lacking any legal force: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610 at [2] (LPDT). To constitute jurisdictional error, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: LPDT at [32] and Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421.
2. As I explained to the parties, the Court does not consider the merits of the decision; nor does it remake the decision: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic).

1. The application for judicial review in this matter contains one unparticularised ground of review. It merely assets the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error, without more.
2. As the first respondent correctly submits, unparticularised grounds of judicial review are liable to be dismissed: see WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612 at [60], upheld in WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 969. See also WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35].
3. However, as Colvin J held in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [9] that:

...it will rarely be appropriate to dismiss an appeal ground (or a review ground) in a migration case for lack of particularisation where, as here, the appellant (applicant below) seeks relief in respect of a decision concerning an application for a protection visa and the person is appearing on his or her own behalf. In such cases, it is usually appropriate for the party to be afforded an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review) ground...

1. At the hearing I followed the procedure which Colvin J outlined in DQQ17. However, the applicant was not able to articulate any arguable jurisdictional error at the hearing before me, other than to tell the Court he was not satisfied with the outcome of the Tribunal decision and wanted to stay in Australia. He did not make any submissions about why he considered the Tribunal was wrong, or why he was not satisfied by the decision. Mr Fyfe summarised the Tribunal decision, outlined the basis for its credibility finding, which he submitted was central to its decision, and submitted that the Tribunal had not made any jurisdictional error.
2. I consider the sole ground of judicial review to be unmeritorious. The ground in the application is unparticularised. At the hearing the applicant did not articulate why the Tribunal had committed any error, or why he considered it had made a wrong decision.
3. As the applicant is unrepresented, I am required to consider whether any arguable substantive jurisdictional error in the decision sought to be reviewed arises from the material before me: see MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [112] and [113]. I am satisfied no arguable substantive jurisdictional error arises from my review of the Tribunal decision in this matter.

1. As the applicant has not established that the Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error, the application is dismissed.

1. The first respondent seeks costs fixed in the sum of $5,900. The applicant objected to the amount being sought but did not make any submissions about why he considered it was an inappropriate amount. Mr Fyfe submitted the amount sought was less than the amount the first respondent had incurred in the matter. The amount sought by the first respondent is for an amount that is less than scale. I consider the amount sought by the is reasonable for this type of matter. I will make an order for the amount sought by the first respondent against the applicant.

I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Cleary.