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[2020] NSWCA 100
Court of Appeal (NSW)
2020-05-15
Bell P, Basten JA, White JA, Darke J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Solicitors: n/a (Appellant) Cutri & Associates (First Respondent) William Roberts Lawyers (Second Respondents) File Number(s): 2019/363483 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Supreme Court of New South Wales Jurisdiction: Equity Division Citation: n/a Date of Decision: 6 September 2019 Before: Darke J File Number(s): 2018/184682
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] The appellant has previously challenged a decision of a judge of the Equity Division who dismissed the appellant's notice of motion to set aside orders made in her absence. That appeal was allowed in part although the orders of the primary judge were largely confirmed. Amongst those was an order for the appointment of trustees for sale of a property co-owned by the appellant and the first respondent. Consequential orders were made which included an order for the appellant to deliver vacant possession (order 6) and an order that the trustees be at liberty to obtain a writ for possession forthwith, not to be executed for 28 days (order 7). On 25 March 2020 the appellant forwarded an email to the judges of the court in which she sought the variation or setting aside of the order for possession and the related order concerning the obtaining of a writ of possession. That email was treated as an application under r 36.16(3A) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and is the subject of the present application. The appellant sought to vary or set aside orders 6 and 7 on the basis that the COVID-19 pandemic prevents her from seeking new accommodation and that various legislative and executive instruments prevent the trustees from requiring her to deliver up vacant possession. The issue before the court was whether those orders ought to be set aside or varied in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the governmental responses to it.
The Court of Appeal (Bell P, Basten and White JJA) unanimously rejected the application:
Per White JA (Bell P and Basten JA agreeing at [1] and [2] respectively): At no time has there been any legislation or Ministerial Order in force that would preclude the appellant from seeking new residential accommodation or which would preclude the execution of a writ for possession: [15], [20]. Evidence of the availability of other rental accommodation and the absence of evidence regarding the appellant's financial position does not justify a stay of the orders: [24], [25]. The provisions of the provisions Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) and the regulations made thereunder as they relate to COVID-19 do not apply to the appellant as she was not in possession pursuant to a residential tenancy agreement: [14], [17]. The appellant has not shown that she has been relevantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic to attract the operation of those provisions in any event: [16], [18], [19].
Judgment
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Foundas
Arambatzis