1. The tenancy commenced on 24 September 2020. The tenancy was initially for a fixed term of 12 months. The tenancy was extended on four occasions, with the final extension due to expire on 23 September 2025.
2. Under the final extension, rent was payable at $825 per week ($1,650 per fortnight). There is a bond of $3,300 for the tenancy. Under the tenancy agreement, Ms Jenkins is responsible to pay for all water use and supply charges.
3. The property is a semi-rural property. The terms of the tenancy agreement allowed Ms Jenkins to have the following animals present at the property:

1. Ms Marley Duncan attended at the property on 22 May 2025 for the purposes of conducting an inspection. Ms Jenkins did not allow access for the inspection to occur.
2. In effect, Ms Marley Duncan says that Ms Jenkins assaulted her and Ms Jenkins says that Ms Marley Duncan assaulted her.
3. Ms Jenkins vacated the property on 25 June 2025. Rent is paid to 25 June 2025.
4. Each party made two applications to the Tribunal about the tenancy:

a) Ms Jenkins made an application on 2 June 2025, apparently seeking an order terminating her tenancy early on the grounds of hardship.[3] That application was not referred to a hearing before she vacated the property on 25 June 2025, and so effectively that application became redundant when she vacated. > > b) On 22 May 2025, the landlord made an application seeking an order terminating the tenancy on multiple grounds.[4] That application was not referred to a hearing before Ms Jenkins vacated the property on 25 June 2025 and so effectively that application also became redundant when Ms Jenkins vacated the property. > > c) On 22 July 2025, Ms Jenkins made an application seeking compensation for breach of her right to quiet enjoyment. This was dealt with as part of the original Order. > > d) On 1 August 2025, the landlord made an application seeking compensation for rent loss due to Ms Jenkins vacating before the expiry of the fixed term tenancy. This was dealt with as part of the original Order.

a) made an order to terminate the tenancy on 25 June 2025; > > b) dismissed the landlord's application for compensation on the basis of the decision to terminate the tenancy because rent was paid up to that date, and the determination was that Ms Jenkins was not required to pay any further rent; > > c) awarded compensation of $5,000 to Ms Jenkins for breach of her right to quiet enjoyment, taking a broad axe approach.

6. The landlord disagrees with the original Order, and has sought a review. The landlord says that they are entitled to break lease costs, and Ms Jenkins should not be entitled to any compensation.

1. A residential tenancy agreement is merely a special form of contract.[5] Accordingly, ordinary principles of contract law apply, subject to the provisions of the RTA. It is a basic principle of contract law that a person who is in breach of a contract is liable to compensate another party to that contract if the other party has suffered loss as a result of the breach.
2. Where a party to a tenancy agreement is in breach of their obligations under the agreement or under the RTA, and as a result, the other party has suffered loss (or inconvenience), then the non-breaching party has a right to claim compensation for that loss (or inconvenience) and the Tribunal has the power to make an order for compensation under section 110(1)(c) of the RTA.
3. Where a tenant vacates a property before the expiry of a fixed term tenancy, the landlord may apply for compensation for losses incurred as a result of the tenant's breach. This is generally referred to as a claim for "break lease costs". Those costs usually include a proportion of any re-letting fee, a proportion of any advertising costs, and any rent loss.
4. In relation to a claim for rent loss, in broad terms, a tenant is liable to pay rent as a debt due up until the date on which they vacate the property, and after that, the landlord may claim compensation for rent loss up until the date the property is re-let (or the expiry of the term of the tenancy, whichever occurs first), but subject to the landlord taking reasonable steps to mitigate their loss.[6]
5. Section 65 of the RTA states that a tenant is entitled to quiet enjoyment of the property without interruption by the landlord and the landlord will not cause or permit an interference with the reasonable peace, comfort or privacy of the tenant in the tenant's use of the premises.
6. If a landlord is in breach of a tenant's right to quiet enjoyment, then the tenant may apply to the Tribunal for orders about that, including an order for compensation. The same general principles apply to a claim for compensation on this basis, however, there is some case law which is specific to these particular claims.

1. In determining whether the original Order is the correct or preferable order, the questions for determination are:

a) Was the Tribunal correct to make an order to terminate the tenancy on 25 June 2025? > > b) Was the Tribunal correct in dismissing the landlord's application for compensation; if not, is the landlord entitled to compensation - if so, what compensation should be payable to the landlord? > > c) Was the Tribunal correct in finding that the landlord was in breach of Ms Jenkins' right to quiet enjoyment of the property; if so, was the Tribunal correct in requiring the landlord to pay compensation of $5,000 - if not, what order should be made?

Question 1: Was the Tribunal correct to make an order to terminate the tenancy on 25 June 2025?

1. In the review hearing, the parties confirmed that Ms Jenkins vacated the property on 25 June 2025, and she posted the keys back by express post. The agent took back possession of the property on or about that date.
2. Section 79 of the RTA sets out various scenarios in which a tenancy will terminate by virtue of the particular events which have occurred.
3. Where a tenant chooses to leave a tenancy before the expiry of the term of the tenancy, then the tenancy is generally regarded as having terminated under either section 79(f) or section 79(h) of the RTA.
4. In these circumstances, the tenancy terminated automatically by virtue of the law, and therefore the original Order should simply have included a finding to the effect that the tenancy terminated on that date. Any consequences to flow from that, should properly be dealt with as issues relating to compensation.

Question 2: Was the Tribunal correct in dismissing the landlord's application for compensation; if not, is the landlord entitled to compensation - if so, what compensation should be payable to the landlord?

1. The original claim for compensation is for rent loss from 26 June 2025 to 8 July 2025. The amount claimed is $1,414.29 for rent loss. It is not disputed that for this tenancy, rent is paid to 25 June 2025. It is not disputed that a new tenant moved into the property on 9 July 2025 and is paying rent at the same amount as Ms Jenkins.
2. In the review hearing, Ms Jenkins said that during her heated discussions with Ms Marley Duncan on 22 May 2025, Ms Marley Duncan had said that she wanted Ms Jenkins to leave, and she would be taking steps to have her evicted. She said that in those circumstances, she considered that if she vacated early, she would not be required to pay any break lease costs (including rent loss).
3. Ms Marley Duncan denied that she had agreed that if Ms Jenkins vacated early, then she would be released from any break lease claims (including rent loss).
4. In my view in a matter such as this, where a tenant has vacated before the expiry of the term of the tenancy, then the mere fact that the landlord or their agent is aware that the tenant intends moving out, is not sufficient for the landlord to lose their right to claim for break lease costs. In order for that to occur, the landlord must have expressly stated (preferably in writing), that they agree to waive their right to claim break lease costs.
5. That did not occur.
6. As I said in Karamanlis v O'Sullivan[7] (which involved a consideration of whether a landlord had relinquished their right to claim break lease costs in a situation where they had agreed for a tenancy to end prior to the expiry of the tenancy):

In a situation where a tenant leaves a property prior to the expiry of a fixed term tenancy, the tenant is generally liable to the landlord for financial losses incurred by the landlord as a result of the tenant's breach (being the failure to reside in the property and discharge their obligations as a tenant for the entire term of the tenancy, and those obligations including the obligation to pay rent). > > A landlord is entitled to recover rent and water charges as a debt up until the date the tenant vacates the property, and after that, the landlord is entitled to claim losses for those costs as compensation (subject to taking reasonable steps to mitigate his losses). > > A landlord may also have incurred other losses, commonly a re-letting charge (by a property manager) and advertising costs. The landlord may claim those losses as well and the Tribunal will generally allow a proportion of a re-letting fee and a proportion of advertising costs ...[8] > > The RTA envisages that a tenant may vacate the property with the consent of the landlord. This will terminate the tenancy[9] but it will not necessarily follow that the landlord is not entitled to claim compensation for rent loss due to the early termination of the tenancy ...[10] > > My view is that in the absence of a clear agreement between the parties to the effect that Ms Karamanlis had forfeited her right to make a claim for compensation for rent loss on the basis of the break lease scenario, that right remains.

7. I am satisfied that even though Ms Marley Duncan made it clear that she welcomed Ms Jenkins' decision to vacate, and she would have sought an order requiring her to move out anyway, there was no agreement by Ms Marley Duncan to waive the landlord's rights to break lease costs (including a claim for rent loss).
8. Further, I am satisfied that the landlord has incurred a rent loss of $1,414.29. Due to the property being rented out to a new tenant very quickly, I am satisfied no issue arises as to mitigation of loss.
9. Therefore, I am satisfied that the landlord is entitled to compensation of $1,414.29 for rent loss.

Question 3: Was the Tribunal correct in finding that the landlord was in breach of Ms Jenkins' right to quiet enjoyment of the property; if so, was the Tribunal correct in requiring the landlord to pay compensation of $5,000 - if not, what order should be made?

1. Ms Marley Duncan submitted as follows in her written and oral submissions:

a) The order for compensation in the original Order was made solely in relation to the events which occurred on 22 May 2025, and on review, the Tribunal should not take into account the submissions of Ms Jenkins concerning any other allegations about the breach of her right to quiet enjoyment throughout the tenancy. > > b) As Ms Jenkins made a choice to vacate early, no compensation should have been awarded. > > c) Any claims for compensation arising from the alleged breach of section 48 RTA or the loss of income from agistment, are unfounded and should be disregarded. > > d) If the Tribunal did consider that there may be a breach of Ms Jenkins' right to quiet enjoyment, then the correct approach was not to take a "board axe" approach, but to: > > (i) apply an objective test;[11] > > (ii) take into account that the agent's attendance at the property for the inspection on 22 May 2025, was lawful and pursuant to proper notice; and > > (iii) only make an order for compensation where the breach and consequential loss/inconvenience is substantial.[12] > > e) The authorities referred to by Ms Jenkins in relation to her claim for compensation, were not particularly relevant.

2. Ms Jenkins submitted as follows in her written and oral submissions:

a) The original Order was correct in finding that the landlord was in breach of the obligation under section 65 of the RTA, and allowing her compensation because: > > (i) the order for compensation was made on the basis of the significant breach of her right to quiet enjoyment of the property due to the altercation at the property on 22 May 2025, but in addition, due to the multiple breaches of that right throughout the tenancy; > > (ii) this includes the landlord's actions in effectively denying her the right to earn income from horse agistment at the property; > > (iii) it also includes the breaches of her privacy throughout the tenancy (due to the landlord filming or taking photos of the property while Ms Jenkins was there); > > (iv) it extends to the unreasonable dealings she experienced with the landlord's agent during the tenancy: > > * The threats about her tenancy not being extended; > * The unreasonable requests to know who was staying at the property; > * The unreasonable requests to know who would be getting access on a regular basis for the agistment arrangements; > * The unreasonable increases in rent; and > * Threats of debt collection, being placed on a tenancy data base, and for the commencement of proceedings for eviction; > > (v) the "broad axe" approach of the Tribunal is consistent with the decision in Tronnolone v Edwards & Bryan;[13] and > > (vi) ultimately, her position is that the events of 22 May 2025 left her with no option but to re-locate, and through doing that, she incurred significant expense. > > b) In addition, the landlord (and/or agent) is in breach of the obligations under section 48 of the RTA. > > c) She considers that in making the original Order, the Tribunal was addressing the essential unfairness of the situation - she had made an application to the Tribunal seeking an order terminating the tenancy on the basis of undue hardship, and if that had been determined, then she may well have been released from her obligations under the tenancy agreement (including her obligation to pay rent).

1. When dealing with any claim for compensation under the RTA, the following issues arise:

a) Has there been a breach of a provision of the RTA or the tenancy agreement? > > b) Has the party claiming the compensation, suffered loss or inconvenience as a result of the breach? > > c) If the answers to those questions are: yes, then should compensation be payable - if so, how much compensation is reasonable, taking into account whether or not the claiming party has taken reasonable steps to mitigate their loss.

Issue 1 - Has there been a breach of a provision of the RTA or the tenancy agreement?

1. In my view, any dispute about arrangements concerning the agistment of horses (and any claim about loss of income arising from a change in those arrangements), is an arrangement which falls outside the scope of the RTA and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Any such arrangements should have been part of a separate arrangement between the parties.
2. In my view, the information provided by the agent on the tenancy agreement meets the requirements of section 48 of the RTA. If Ms Jenkins disagrees, then she should report this to the Commissioner - it is a compliance issue, not an issue which gives rise to a claim for compensation.
3. When considering a claim under section 65 of the RTA, as I have said previously, the following approach should be applied:[14]

There are two underlying principles that must be applied when dealing with any application about a claim that a person's right to quiet enjoyment has been breached:

• The test to be applied is an objective test; and
• The breach must be substantial.

(This approach applies the earlier approach of Justice Parker in Kingsley and Thorne v Living Choice Woodcroft[15])

1. I accept that it appears that in the original Order, the Tribunal has directed for compensation to be payable only in relation to the altercation incident, and the issues that followed that. However, I will consider Ms Jenkins' submissions about the breaches of her right to quiet enjoyment throughout the tenancy.
2. Ms Jenkins has referred to the following issues in support of her submission about a breach:
   • Excessive rent increases;
   • Threats not to extend the tenancy; and
   • General intimidatory and harassing behaviour - this includes -
     • Allegations that the landlord was stalking or carrying out surveillance on the property;
     • The requirement of the agent for Ms Jenkins to provide information about anyone residing at the property; and
     • The requirement of the agent for Ms Jenkin to provide information about persons who will be regularly attending at the property because they were agisting their horses there.
3. I accept that there were rude and unpleasant exchanges between the agent and Ms Jenkins throughout the tenancy. However, that is not sufficient to constitute a breach of Ms Jenkins' right to quiet enjoyment.
4. In dealing with a matter of this kind, I consider that there is a distinction between claims involving regular unannounced attendances at the property, or unnecessarily intrusive attendances or an unreasonable number of attendances on the one hand, and disputes predominantly arising from communications by email or text message. The nature of those communications is likely to lessen the impact of any unreasonable behaviour of the landlord or their agent because that form of communication creates some distance between the parties, which is absent when the landlord or agent attends at the property in person. This is directly relevant to a claim for breach of a tenant's right to quiet enjoyment.
5. Accordingly, I do not regard this matter as similar to that of Kearns v Phillips & Anor[16] in which I found that the actions of landlords who lived next door, in attending at the property on multiple occasions during a lengthy tenancy for various reasons, including to remove items from the property and to try to (unsuccessfully) carry out various repairs themselves, constituted a breach of the tenant's right to quiet enjoyment.
6. For similar reasons, the position in Moffat v Glen Saunders[17] was different. In that matter, the tenant claimed that on multiple occasions, the landlord had attended at the property without proper notice, the landlord had made inappropriate requests such as for her to pass on a message to her mother about her mother's rent arrears (her mother was also a tenant of the landlord), the landlord made inappropriate crude comments about the tenant to her boyfriend, and on one occasion when he attended for a routine inspection and the tenant did not answer the door, the landlord let himself in and found the tenant and her boyfriend in bed.
7. I also refer to the following principles which can be extracted from the decision in Bradley v Markos:[18]
   • It is unreasonable for a tenant to object to conduct which has occurred throughout the tenancy when the tenancy ends, if the tenant has not complained of that conduct when it occurred;
   • If a landlord regularly attends the tenant's property without proper notice, then that is likely to be a breach of the tenant's right to quiet enjoyment;
   • If a landlord tries to gain access without the tenant's authority, that is likely to be a serious breach of the tenant's right to quiet enjoyment;
   • A single incident may constitute a breach of quiet enjoyment if it is very serious.[19]
8. In this matter, I also consider that Ms Jenkins has failed to mitigate her loss because she had other options available to her:
   • In relation to the excessive rent increases, she could have brought an application to the Tribunal about these increases, or she could have chosen not to extend the tenancy;
   • In relation to the threats not to extend the tenancy, she could have decided not to extend the tenancy;
   • In relation to the claims about stalking or surveillance, there is insufficient evidence for me to find that this occurred or that it occurred to any significant extent, but I also note in this regard that the landlord was relying on reports from neighbours or others who lived nearby - there is nothing untoward about that.
9. In addition, some of the landlord's requirements were reasonable for example:
   • The requirement to provide information about any person residing at the property for any length of time - this is a common requirement and arises because the landlord will have approved the tenancy on the basis of information provided on the application form about who is residing there - if this changes, the landlord is entitled to know about that.
10. For all of the above reasons, I am not satisfied that there was a breach of Ms Jenkins' right to quiet enjoyment before the incident on 22 May 2025.
11. I now turn to consider the issue of the altercation which occurred on 22 May 2025, and subsequent events. I am not prepared to make a finding that either Ms Jenkins pushed Ms Marley Duncan, or vice versa. However, it is clear that Ms Jenkins denied access for Ms Marley Duncan to enter the property.
12. In my assessment, Ms Marley Duncan's response to Ms Jenkins' denial of access, was disproportionate at the property (for example, it should not have been necessary to call the police); and subsequently (for example, in sending correspondence about placing an adverse entry on a data base should Ms Jenkins fail to pay rent, and making threats about taking legal action, sending debt collectors and impacting on Ms Jenkins' credit rating).
13. In the circumstances, I consider that the incident on 22 May 2025 and the further communications with Ms Jenkins, amounted to a breach of her right to quiet enjoyment of the property.

Issue 2 - Has the party claiming the compensation, suffered loss or inconvenience as a result of the breach?

1. In her original application, Ms Jenkins identified multiple instances of harm which largely involved physical and emotional harm.[20] In the original Order, the Tribunal correctly identified that the Tribunal has no power to award compensation for (or deal with) such a claim.[21]
2. I also note the Tribunal's decision in Rebers & Wade v Swan[22] which involved a claim for compensation in which the landlord had unlawfully evicted the tenants, and in which the Tribunal stated as follows:[23]

The tenants claim compensation arising out of damage to their personal property during this incident, and also seek compensation for inconvenience. The tenants have given evidence of considerable emotional distress and disruption arising out of this incident and subsequent events, and Mr Wade alleges that he was subsequently the victim of an assault. > > Of those matters, the Tribunal may deal only with damage to property and compensation for inconvenience. It is clear that the Tribunal may not make an award for damages arising out of distress, although the line between inconvenience and distress is difficult to identify.[24] The Tribunal expressly does not have jurisdiction to order compensation for personal injury by s 110(2) of the Act. An alleged assault is a matter falling outside a tenancy dispute.

3. Effectively, Ms Jenkins' submission was that but for the altercation on 22 May 2025, she would not have moved, and because of the altercation, she had no choice but to move, which resulted in her incurring additional expense.
4. I consider it is notable that there was a shipping container at the property on that day, which Ms Jenkins was using to commence her packing up. The only conclusion that can be reached from that, is that Ms Jenkins had already anticipated that she would be vacating - i.e. before the altercation.
5. However, I accept that Ms Jenkins vacated in circumstances which were more rushed than the manner in which she would have otherwise vacated, and she was inconvenienced due to the need for her to respond to the agent's communications with her after the altercation.[25]

Issue 3 - Should compensation be payable - if so, how much compensation is reasonable, taking into account whether or not the claiming party has taken reasonable steps to mitigate their loss.

1. In determining an appropriate amount of compensation to be allowed, I will apply the approach I stated in Kearns, which is:[26]

In relation to a claim of compensation for inconvenience, the Tribunal does not apply a formula or other precise method of calculating compensation in these matters[27], but I consider it is reasonable for the Tribunal to provide a general explanation as to its reasoning for any compensation awarded. In relation to a claim for losses incurred as a result of a breach, there should be evidence to substantiate the claim.

2. In considering what would be an appropriate amount of compensation, I have considered each of the authorities mentioned above, and I have also considered the Tribunal's approach in Harris v Harradine.[28]
3. After giving this matter careful consideration, in my assessment, an appropriate amount of compensation for Ms Jenkins is $500.00.

1. For the reasons explained above, I will grant leave for the application for internal review to proceed and in doing so, I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances in this matter within the meaning of section 114A of the RTA.
2. I will make orders to give effect to my conclusions above. I will deduct the compensation payable to the tenant, from the compensation payable to the landlord, and then the balance of the compensation payable to the landlord will be paid from the bond. The balance of the bond will be refunded to the tenant.

1. I set aside the Tribunal order made on 16 October 2025 in matters numbered 2025/SH005721, 2025/SH006078, 2025/SH007930 and 2025/SH008360 and I substitute the following order instead:
   1. The bond of $3,300.00 (bond number 4366728) will be paid to the landlord (via the agent) in the sum of $914.29 and in the sum of $2,385.71 to the tenant.

[1] This is matter number 2025/SH008360.

[2] This is matter number 2025/SH007930.

[3] This is matter number 2025/SH006078.

[4] This is matter number 2025/SH005721.

1. [5] Tronnolone v Edwards and Bryan [2016] SACAT 27 at para 14.

[6] Residential Tenancies Act 1995 ("RTA") section 78.

[7] [2024] SACAT 22 at paras 28 - 37. Only relevant extracts included.

1. [8] The Tribunal's approach to determining the appropriate proportion of a re-letting fee and advertising costs to be allocated to the tenant is set out in a fact sheet on SACAT's website, and also on the Consumer and Business Services website.

1. [10] See: for example, RTA section 80(2)(d) which makes it clear that if a tenant vacates after a Form 2 notice of termination has been served, this does not prevent the landlord from making a claim for rent loss which is subsequently incurred by them.

[11] This was the approach taken by the Tribunal in Bradley v Markos [2025] SACAT 56.

[12] Bradley v Markos [2025] SACAT 56.

[13] [2016] SACAT 27.

[14] Bradley v Markos [2025] SACAT 56; See also South Australian Housing Authority v Ivancic [2020] SACAT 115.

[15] [2017] SACAT 16 - which dealt with an application by residents in a retirement village against the operator of the retirement village on the basis that the operator of the retirement village was in breach of their obligation to provide quiet enjoyment of their respective properties to the residents, due to the noise of other residents at social gatherings.

[16] [2024] SACAT 86.

[17] [2018] SACAT 20.

[18] [2025] SACAT 56.

[19] In that matter, compensation of $5000 was awarded.

[20] Paragraph 6.3 of her original submission.

[22] [2018] SACAT 44.

[24] Tronnolone v Edwards and Bryan [2016] SACAT 27 (Parker P).

[25] Even though some of those communications related to an inflammatory post placed on social media by Ms Jenkins' son.

1. [27] I observe here that in the original proceedings, there seems to have been some confusion concerning the basis on which a claim for compensation should be made - and there was a discussion about calculations to be made on the basis of a proportion of the house - I disagree with that approach.

[28] [2022] SACAT 95. In that matter, the Tribunal dealt with an application for compensation for breach of quiet enjoyment by a tenant on the basis of a series of late night phone calls from the landlord to the tenant, the landlord's attendance at her workplace to raise issues about the tenancy, and a phone call in which the landlord told her to move out, and in which he used profanities. The Tribunal said that harassing conduct of a landlord could constitute a breach of section 65 of the RTA, but only if it was substantial. The Tribunal ordered compensation of $100.00.