Farooq v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2025] NSWCATOD 73

1. Section 26 of the SI Act gives the Commissioner the power to revoke a security licence. Under s 26(1)(d) of the SI Act "a licence may be revoked... for any other reason prescribed by the regulations". Clause 25(1) of the Regulation states that for the purposes of s 26(1)(d), "a licence may be revoked if the Commissioner considers that it would be contrary to the public interest for the person to whom it is granted to continue to hold it".
2. Clause 25(2) of the Regulation states that in determining whether it would be contrary to the public interest for a person to continue to hold a licence:

the Commissioner may have regard to any criminal intelligence report or other

criminal information held in relation to the person that -

(a) is relevant to the activities carried on or under the class of licence held by the person, or

(b) causes the Commissioner to conclude that improper conduct is likely to occur if the person continues to hold the licence, or

(c) causes the Commissioner not to have confidence that improper conduct will not occur if the person continues to hold the licence.

1. The purpose of the MRA is to provide for the enactment of legislation applying uniformly in all states and territories for the recognition of regulatory standards regarding goods and occupations (ss 3 and 3A). Part 3 of the MRA deals with the ability of a person who is registered for an occupation in a state (the first State) to carry on an equivalent occupation in another state (the second State).
2. Section 17(1) of the MRA provides that a person registered in the first State for an occupation is entitled, after notifying the local registration authority of the second State for the equivalent occupation, to be registered in the second State for the equivalent occupation. That is the "mutual recognition principle". Under s 17(2), however, that does not affect the operation of laws that regulate the manner of carrying on an occupation in the second State, "so long as those laws: (a) apply equally to all persons carrying on or seeking to carry on the occupation under the law of the second State; and (b) are not based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on the occupation".
3. Pursuant to s 20(1) of the MRA, a person who lodges a notice under s 19(1) "is entitled to be registered in the equivalent occupation, as if the law of the second State that deals with registration expressly provided that registration in the first State is a sufficient ground of entitlement to registration".
4. Continuance of registration, however, is "subject to the laws of the second state, to the extent to which those laws: (a) apply equally to all persons carrying on or seeking to carry on the occupation under the law of the second State; and (b) are not based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on the occupation" (s 20(4)).

1. The respondent did not call oral evidence but instead relied on the documentary material, including the s 58 documents (exhibit R1), and on cross-examination of the applicant.
2. The applicant did not lodge a witness statement as directed by Ransome PM on 11 March 2025, despite the grant of an extension of time on 8 April 2025, but did lodge a quantity of printouts, screenshots and photocopies (exhibit A1).
3. Cross-examined by Mr Hall on behalf of the respondent, the applicant agreed that he had applied for an ACT licence on 12 January 2024 (exhibit R1, p 15) and that he had used his ACT address. Asked why he had answered "no" to the question "Do you reside more than 100 km from the ACT border?" he said that he had not understood the question but did live more than 100 km from the ACT, at his Sydney address. He had answered "no" because he did not understand the question, as he had already given his address. He admitted, however, that he had given his address as being the ACT address.
4. After receiving his ACT licence on 13 February 2024, he applied for a New South Wales licence on 28 February 2024 under the MRA (id., 1 - 4). Where the form required specifying all states in which he held an equivalent licence, he specified the ACT. He had to submit an amended application as the original document had not been witnessed by a person of one of the required categories. The amended form was lodged on 18 March 2024 (id., 8).
5. It was pointed out to him that under the heading "Personal Details" he had given his address as the ACT address (id., 1), although he had never lived in the ACT. He had been living at his Sydney address, but had planned to move to the ACT, though he was not living there at the time and had never lived there. The change of address form for his ACT licence (id., 37) which recorded the change from the ACT address to the Sydney address gave his "Previous physical address" as the ACT address. As he had never lived at the ACT address, he admitted that it was not his previous address. His email to SLED dated 28 June 2024 requested that the records be updated to show his current (Sydney) address, when in reality he had been residing there the whole time.
6. The show cause notice (id., 44) dated 8 November 2024 stated that he had declared a residential/mailing address that may have been false. Consequently he was required to provide proof of his residential and mailing addresses from the time of his application to the ACT until the date of the notice. In his response (id., 45) he had described the ACT address as a temporary one and said that he had not received any communication or notice from the ACT Security Licensing Authority regarding any issues with his address. He had since updated his permanent address to the Sydney address with both the ACT and New South Wales licensing authorities.
7. As he had never lived at the ACT address, it was put to him that his response was wrong. He replied that he was planning to start a business in both New South Wales and the ACT but he did not live in the ACT. The reference to it being his temporary address, he said, "might be a typo", but it had been part of his plan. The purpose of the licence was to establish a security business in both New South Wales and the ACT. He did not know why he had started by seeking an ACT licence. He asked for the question to be repeated, then said that it was part of his plan.
8. In his form he had said he had lived in the ACT because he planned to. "Technically, it's an error", he said. He agreed it was in both licence applications but repeated that it was part of his business plan.
9. Following the show cause letter on 8 November 2024, his New South Wales licence was revoked on 20 January 2025 (id., 54). The notification stated that "it is the opinion of the Commissioner you provided false information to the ACT in order to be granted a NSW security licence under Mutual Recognition principles from the ACT in order to deliberately avoid NSW licensing requirements" (ibid.).
10. He said he did not accept that statement, because although he had not lived there, there was no requirement for ACT residency. He saw that the notification said he had provided false information, but said it was not false as he was planning to move from Sydney. Again, in relation to the statement in his New South Wales application under MRA principles that his current residential address was the ACT address (id., 1, para 1.3), he said he had changed his address on 2 June. The statement in the form was "considered to be false", but he had planned to move.
11. In relation to his point that there was no residency criterion in the ACT, he was referred to the question in the ACT application "Do you reside more than 100 km from the ACT border?" (exhibit A2, p 7), and if the answer was "yes", a message popped up saying "A Security Employee licence is only valid whilst the applicant is employed by a licenced ACT security master. You will need to provide a declaration completed by your employer to endorse your application" (id., 8). If the question was answered "no", no message appeared. He said he did not remember giving the answer "no".
12. Similarly, the ACT application "Renewal/release receipt" recorded him as having given a "no" answer to the same question (exhibit R1, p 16), which meant he needed a declaration from an ACT employer. He agreed that "it looks like [he] selected 'no'" but said "Now I understand" about the need for an employer declaration and agreed "Yes, it looks like" he needed a declaration but had answered "no".
13. He was then referred to the passage in Mr Richard Esho's affidavit stating that his analysis of the TPG Telecom Ltd call charge records showed that his telephone had been recorded as being in the ACT on only three occasions between 1 November 2023 and 31 March 2024, namely 27 November 2023, 25 February 2024 and 22 March 2024 (exhibit R3, para 24). He agreed that the records showed that he had never lived in the ACT.
14. His ACT proof of identity card was issued on 29 November 2023 (exhibit R1, p 47), which meant that he had been in the ACT two days before the card issued. He agreed that he had travelled to the ACT in order to have his photograph taken for the ID card but said he did not recall giving his ACT postal address so that the card could be sent to him. It was put to him that the card was not proof that he had ever lived in the ACT, he replied that he was "not sure" as it was more than two years ago.
15. Asked whether that meant his applications gave incorrect addresses in the ACT and New South Wales, he said he could not answer and did not know. He said the questions were confusing and asked what the respondent was trying to prove. He understood the question but wanted to explain his position. He agreed that he had never lived in the ACT and acknowledged that the forms stated that he did. Nevertheless they were not false because it was part of his plan.
16. He had not applied in New South Wales because a friend (unnamed) had given him a contract in the ACT and he had not sought a New South Wales licence because he had no contact here. It was not because the ACT requirements were easier, but because he had the idea of operating in the ACT. He agreed that he had never previously applied for a New South Wales licence and when asked if he had been working in New South Wales, replied that he did not remember as it was two years ago. He had been employed, and it was his plan to move to the ACT.
17. When asked why he had given false information for his ACT licence, he replied that now he understood the purpose of the form. He had planned to move to the ACT to start a business, but had not done so as his plan had changed because of a problem that developed with his friend. He had been thinking about the move to ACT but had taken no steps in that regard.
18. His new plan had been to operate in New South Wales, but he had applied for an ACT licence and had it recognized in New South Wales. He had two options: obtain recognition in New South Wales or seek a new licence. He had thought he could not apply in New South Wales as it was like a driver license. He had not provided false information in his application.
19. He had received a Certificate II Security Operations (exhibit A2, p 3) from BG College of Vocational Education and Training. The ACT authorities required a Certificate II but he did not know that level II was a requirement for New South Wales registration. He had obtained the qualification to start a business. He had applied to enrol on 7 December 2023 (id., 4), but his class commencement date had been shown as 4 December 2023. Asked why he had enrolled on 7 December when the class began on 4 December, he replied that he had a problem obtaining emails and enrolling.
20. The documents the applicant had produced on summons (exhibit A1) included the BG student assessment requirements (id., 3) and the general instructions to students (id., 6). The applicant acknowledged that the course lasted two weeks, 9: 00 AM to 5:00 PM on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, from 4 December 2023. The course was online only. Item 9 of the general instructions stated that "The Assessment is to be attempted after completing the face-to-face training for this unit with the trainer and assessor". The applicant said the face-to-face training was online, using a link that he tried to access.
21. He had been absent on one or two days. He had participated using Google Classroom (id., 15). He had been unable to use the college's learner management system and had consequently used Google. There was a new link to a new system, but he did not know what it was. Asked how he could have satisfied the face-to-face requirement in item 9 of the general instructions, he explained that the assessment was online, with the trainer and two students. It was like a Zoom conference.
22. He had no documents about the different test that was used on the other system, but the trainer explained the material, like a lecture, and there was then a written assessment that he typed up in the different system. There were no documents about that system and therefore he had not submitted any. He had logged on but there were some missing tabs. There were three more tabs on the left (id., 23) which took you to the different system, where there was an online question and answer. The face-to-face material was on the different tabs on the learner management system (id., 12).
23. The "practical tasks" referred to in the "General instructions" consisted of such things as role-plays but he did not have to submit photographs (item 12), nor did the staff take photographs. The instructions included requirements headed "Provide first aid", including providing CPR on an adult resuscitation manikin (item A), but he had not performed a CPR exercise, the assessor had done so, but he did not. In relation to the requirement for infant resuscitation (item B), the assessor had demonstrated it but he did not recall anything more. He had not used a defibrillator on the course (item C). Similarly, the arm sling training was online (item D). He did not know what an EpiPen was (item F).
24. The witness had received the completion certificate dated 26 May 2025 (exhibit A2, p 29). He was then referred to the Commonwealth Government's Assessment Requirements for HLTAID011 Provide First Aid document (exhibit R2, pp 83 - 86), which lists criteria for performance evidence, knowledge evidence and demonstrating skills in an environment providing realistic, in-depth scenarios and simulations to assess candidates' skills and knowledge.
25. He admitted that he had never performed simulated CPR on a manikin, the trainer had done it. He was not sure about the process as it was more than two years ago, and asked how he could have done so when it was online. Nor could he do resuscitation or dressings. He could not use an EpiPen. He agreed that he had not produced any photographs. Referred to the summons to produce documents (part exhibit A1) schedule item calling for assessments completed by the applicant, he replied that no-one had asked him, nor had he produced any photographs. He could not recall the process as it was more than two years ago.

1. At the hearing the applicant tendered two written submissions, in the first of which (exhibit A4), after outlining the chronology leading up to the show cause notice, he pointed out that the adjudication officer had stated that in his application to ACT security licensing he had declared a false address and also requested proof of residential and mailing addresses from the time of his application to the ACT until 8 November 2024. As he had said in his submission on the show cause notice, he was a director of Aussie Eats Pty Ltd and had planned to start a security business in Canberra and New South Wales. He had met all the eligibility criteria set by the ACT Security Licensing Authority, and his application was approved in February 2024. In November 2024 he applied for an ACT master's licence.
2. He had mentioned that the ACT address was his temporary address. He had received no communication or notice from the ACT authority that he had provided a false address. He was sorry if he had missed anything but had given the authorities correct and honest information, and was dedicated to following all the rules.
3. His ACT photocard was issued on 29 November 2023 and delivered to the same address that he had provided to the ACT Security licensing authorities. On 20 January 2025 he received notification of the revocation of his New South Wales licence and on 28 January applied for an internal review. He successfully obtained the ACT Master licence on 8 January 2025 with no issue raised by the ACT authorities regarding a false address. There is no requirement of ACT Security licensing that the applicant must be a resident of the ACT.
4. He had not committed a crime, and the revocation of his licence has a direct impact on his character and career. He had followed all the laws as directed. He was very confused as ACT Security Licensing granted him the master licence and had not even raised any question about his address, but New South Wales had revoked his licence on the grounds of a false address given to the ACT authorities.
5. His New South Wales licence was granted on 2 August 2024. He had advice on 28 June 2024 to inform the Department of that change of address on the application. We are living in one of the most beautiful countries in the world, he wrote. We have no restriction on changing our minds at any time, even as we move from one place to another. He chose Australia for his home, having come to Australia in April 2018 and seeking asylum.
6. If a person holds a current security licence but does not meet new visa requirements, he could retain and renew his licence. However, he would not be eligible to reapply for a licence if his current licence expired, or is surrendered, revoked or ceases to be in force. Would his security licence be revoked if he did not hold an acceptable visa? No. If you hold a current security licence but don't meet the new visa requirements, you may retain and renew your licence. However, you won't be eligible to reapply for a licence if your current licence expires or is surrendered, revoked or ceases to be in force. He wishes he had the money to hire a high-profile lawyer like Special Counsel Helen Sims to protect his character from this allegation but unfortunately he had no financial resources.
7. There was no requirement of ACT Security Licensing to be a resident of ACT, even though he had visited Access Canberra for the photo ID which was not the requirement. He had been asked by the show cause notice to provide proof of residential and mailing addresses until 8 November 2024 and had provided an ACT photocard, a company certificate of registration and Medicare.
8. The New South Wales licensing authority had no jurisdiction to revoke his mutually recognized security licence because he had provided a false address to the ACT Security licensing. That issue had to be raised by ACT Security licensing, and not by New South Wales Security licensing. He had obtained the ACT security master licence, which was for his business purposes. He hopes the tribunal would consider that was the business plan. For him it was basic and common sense that if New South Wales licensing had postponed his application for five months to check for any false information, and after three months they interpreted that he had provided a false address to the ACT Security licensing. That was negligence on the part of New South Wales licensing department to grant him the licence with no issue.
9. He had followed the law, rules and procedures available on the website for the public. He had no regrets because he was satisfied that he had given honest information to the authorities, and they had interpreted it. He has had no criminal background before or after arriving in Australia. He asks why he is being punished for a sin that he did not commit.
10. In his second submission (exhibit A3) the applicant contended that SLED had acted beyond its statutory powers under the MRA and the SI Act. He noted the SLED Facebook post on 11 March 2025 that SLED had revoked 193 New South Wales Security Operative licences issued to ACT licensees under mutual recognition legislation since November 2024. The investigation had found that the ACT licensees had provided false addresses, or false declarations, to the authorities in either the ACT or New South Wales in the security licence applications. He understood that everyone's case was different.
11. The applicant submitted that by reason of s 22 of the MRA there was no power to revoke a licence once granted. The section allows a host state to postpone registration for up to 6 months if there are concerns that it contains materially false or misleading information. In this case SLED had exercised that power and postpone the applicant's registration from March to August 2024, yet raised no issues regarding the ACT address. Once the licence was granted on 2 August 2024, New South Wales could no longer invoke s 22 or revisit the application. The January 2025 revocation was therefore ultra v
12. Next, the applicant submitted that ss 17 to 20 of the MRA provided that once a person is registered in a "first State" (ACT), they are entitled to be registered and remain registered in the "second State" (NSW), even if they later ceased to hold the licence in the first State. That created an indefeasible entitlement to continued registration in New South Wales following a valid ACT licence. SLED had no lawful basis to revoke that entitlement, in the absence of NSW - specific misconduct.
13. Section 43 confirmed that state registration authorities had no judicial power under the MRA and could not usurp the ACT's licensing decisions, including its acceptance of the ACT address. The ACT authority, having issued and even renewed the licence (the master licence being granted on 8 January 2025), did not raise any address concerns. Further, s 33 mandates that disciplinary actions must mirror those taken by the home state. As the ACT authority took no action to cancel the original ACT licence, New South Wales had no power to initiate independent revocation.
14. Section 26(1)(b)(i) of the SI Act permits revocation only where the applicant provided false or misleading information in connexion with a New South Wales application. Here the false address allegation concerned the ACT application, not the New South Wales one. Therefore SLED lacked power under the SI Act to revoke the New South Wales licence on that basis.
15. The High Court in Kioa v West had established the requirement for decision-makers to provide timely disclosure of adverse material and a fair hearing. SLED failed to notify the applicant of any concern during the five-month postponement. Instead, it granted the licence in August and then, without warning, revoked it five months later in January 2025. That delay and lack of disclosure breached the duty of procedural fairness.
16. Section 36 of the MRA expressly states that residency or domicile in a particular state is not a prerequisite mutual-recognition registration. Thus any perceived inconsistency in the applicant's ACT address is legally irrelevant to the licensing powers of New South Wales.
17. In Victorian Building Authority v Andriotis [2019] HCA 22, the High Court had held that a host jurisdiction cannot refuse or revoke mutual-recognition registration on character or veracity grounds already considered by the home state. Once the home state grants registration, the host state must accept it without further reassessment of eligibility.
18. In oral submissions at the hearing the applicant reiterated those points, noting that his licence had been approved in February 2024 and he had made to the MRA application in March 2024. There was no residence requirement and he had planned to move to the ACT but had given his ACT address for courtesy. In November 2024 he had applied for a master ACT licence on the basis of his New South Wales address. His MRA application of 5 March 2024 had been postponed in New South Wales for five months to verify his statements, followed by grant of the licence. The ACT authorities had not said he had supplied false information. If it was false they should revoke the master licence, but it remains in force. He had supplied no false information, and this was two years ago. SLED had revoked his licence after eight months, although he had followed the regulations and there was no residence requirement.
19. He had given his Sydney address in his ACT master licence application (exhibit R1, pp 29 - 30) but there had been no query from the ACT authorities. He had followed the instructions available to the public and given honest information, but had wasted time and money. No document said he had to reside in ACT and the issue should be determined by the ACT authorities.
20. If there had been an issue, it should have been raised during the five-month postponement. He had emailed his address update before the licence had been granted. He had apologized in his internal review submission. His business plan had not been successful and the revocation had affected his career and financial situation.

1. Section 29 of the SI Act gives this tribunal jurisdiction to review decisions taken under the Act, including "the revocation or suspension of a licence granted to the person" (s 29(1)(b)).The tribunal carries out a review of the merits of the original decision, considering all the material taken into account by the original decision-maker, together with any further relevant material, so as to either confirm the original decision, vary it or set it aside and substitute another: "The duty of the Tribunal is to satisfy itself whether a decision in respect of which an application for review is duly instituted is a decision which, in its view, was objectively the right one to be made": Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60, 77. The tribunal is to make its own decision and there is no presumption that the Commissioner's decision is correct: McDonald v Director-General of Social Security [1984] FCA 57; (1984) 1 FCR 354, 357.
2. It is commonly accepted that there is no strict onus of proof in tribunal proceedings. In Hardy v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2006] NSWADT 167, Higgins JM explained that "It is well established that proceedings such as these are non-adversarial in nature and that there is no onus of proof in the sense that it applies to other legal proceedings" (at [12]).
3. In the context of licence revocation under the SI Act, however, it has been held that where the issue to be decided is whether circumstances have arisen that would justify licence cancellation or suspension, the onus of proving that such circumstances have arisen devolves on the accuser. In that sense the party alleging that change of circumstances has the onus of proving it: Habib v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2015] NSWCATOD 48, [81]. Further, the tribunal is required to base its findings of fact on logically probative material and not on "suspicion or speculation": Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 93, [5].
4. The standard of proof applying in these proceedings is the civil standard, that is, the balance (preponderance) of probabilities. The standards of proof in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 316 and s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 do not apply: Bronze Wing International Pty Limited v SafeWork New South Wales [2017] NSWCA 42, [89] - [91], [127]; Sterjovski v Director-General, Department of Transport [2002] NSWADT 10, [10] - [12]. They do, however, provide guidance for the tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction.
5. The civil standard applies even if the conduct in question may be criminal (Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 110 ALR 449). The tribunal is to take into account matters indicating criminal conduct even though the particular offences charged have not been proven or have been dismissed: Joseph v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2017] NSWCA 31, [62] - [64]. It is the conduct rather than the conviction that is of concern to the tribunal: Esterman v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2014] NSWCATOD 70, [30]. In taking criminal conduct into account, the tribunal may apply a lesser standard of proof than the criminal standard: Joseph, [60].
6. The Act establishes a scheme for licensing persons to carry on security activities. The objects of the Act and the public policy served by it were analysed in Ibrahim v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2009] NSWADT 245, [47]:

The discretion to issue a licence must be exercised keeping in mind the activities that the person will be engaged in if the licence is granted. Accordingly, the objects and purposes of the Act are relevant, that is, the regulation of the security industry to maintain public safety and to ensure that those who are licensed to operate in the industry are appropriately qualified and persons of integrity: O'Neill v Comissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2005] NSWADT 130. The security industry has a special role in ensuring that public order is maintained, safeguarding community assets and private property and ensuring that public venues are safe: Haining v Commissioner of Police [1999] NSWADT 6.

1. The ground for revoking the applicant's licences advanced by the respondent was that it was not in the public interest for the applicant to hold them.
2. In O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210, [13], the High Court held that the "public interest" imported a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the legislation might require. In Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9, [25], which dealt with the revocation of a security licence under the SI Act, the appeal panel described the public interest ground in the SI Act in the following terms:

[A]n inherently broad concept giving the appellant the ability to have regard to a wide variety of factors in choosing whether to exercise a discretion adversely to an individual. As the possibility of refusing an application on the ground of character is dealt with elsewhere in the same section, it is reasonable to infer that the Parliament intended that the public interest discretion operate in areas to which the character ground was not relevant or, possibly, in circumstances where an objection on character grounds would not be sufficient in its own right to warrant refusal.

1. The concept does include standards acknowledged to be "for the good order of society and for the well-being of its members": Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] VicRp 6; (1991) 1 VR 63. In Comalco Aluminium (Bell Bay) Ltd v O'Connor [1995] IRCA 540; (1995) 131 ALR 657, 681, the High Court said:

The purpose of the reference to public interest is to ensure that private interests are not the only matters taken into account: to make clear that the interests of the whole community are matters for the Commissioner's consideration. The effect of the reference is to amplify the "scope and purpose" of the legislation.

1. In the context of this regulatory scheme, the purpose and scope of the legislation are the attainment of a professional and safe security industry, free from persons who engage in unprofessional and irresponsible conduct. Paramount consideration is to be given to public safety_: Infarinato v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service_ [2004] NSWADT 43, [18]. That being so, the applicant's personal interest in retaining his licence cannot outweigh the public interest in maintaining full confidence in the professionalism of those involved in the industry. Nor should the decision-maker shy from exercising a discretion merely on the ground that the licensee may suffer hardship or inconvenience or both. All the circumstances of the conduct must be taken into account: Hill v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2002] NSWADT 218, [22]; Blisset v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2006] NSWADT 114, [32].
2. As the discretion in s 26(1)(d) and cl 25(1) must be exercised in light of the activities that the person will be engaging in, the Act's objects and purposes are relevant. They include the regulation of the security industry to maintain public safety and to ensure that those who are licensed to operate in it are appropriately qualified and persons of integrity: O'Neill v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADT 130. As was pointed out in Haining v Commissioner of Police [1999] NSWADT 6, the security industry has a special role in ensuring that public order is maintained, and that the public and public venues are safe.

1. Consideration of this matter requires an understanding of the course of events in the applicant's security licensing history. I find that the following is a chronology of the main facts and circumstances:

(1) 12 January 2024: the applicant applied for an ACT security licence of class 1A, 1C and 1E under the Security Industry Act 2003 (ACT), using the ACT address (exhibit R1, pp 15 - 20).

(2) 13 February 2024: the ACT licence was granted (id., 6).

(3) 28 February 2024: the applicant submitted an application for a security licence of the same classes in New South Wales under the MRA, also using the ACT address (id., 1 - 10).

(4) 19 March 2024: SLED informed the applicant that it was necessary to postpone his registration, exercising its powers under s 22 of the MRA _(id.,_13).

(5) 2 August 2024: the New South Wales licence was granted (id., 39 - 40).

(6) 8 August 2024: the applicant submitted a change of address form for the ACT licence. He registered the Sydney address as his new physical address and current postal address, and the ACT address as his previous physical address and previous postal address (id., 37 - 38).

(7) 8 November 2024: SLED issued the applicant with a notice to show cause in relation to his New South Wales licence on the basis of records showing that the address provided for the ACT licence may have been false (id., 44, 96 - 97). The notice required him to produce evidence of his residential and mailing addresses from the time of his application for the ACT licence until the date of the notice.

(8) 8 November 2024: on the same day, the applicant applied for an ACT master's licence using the Sydney residential and postal addresses (id., 29 - 32).

(9) 9 December 2024: the applicant responded to the show cause notice, stating that the ACT address was a temporary address, and he had now updated his permanent address to his Sydney address on both his ACT and New South Wales licenses (id., 45 - 46). He attached copies of his ACT ID card, a company certificate of registration, stating that Aussie Eats Pty Ltd was taken to be registered in New South Wales, and his Medicare card. He provided no evidence regarding his ACT residential or mailing address or both.

(10) 20 January 2025: his New South Wales licence was revoked under s 26 (1)(d) of the SI Act and cl 25(1) of the Regulation (id., 52 - 57). The licence was revoked on public interest grounds because he had failed to provide evidence of his ACT residential or mailing address, or both, history as required by the show cause notice and the delegate's opinion that the applicant had provided false information to the ACT in order to be granted the New South Wales licence.

(11) 31 January 2025: a delegate of the respondent affirmed the revocation decision: (id., 82 - 86).

(12) 5 February 2025: the applicant applied to this tribunal for review of the internal review decision.

1. It thus appears that the applicant provided false address information, namely that his address was the ACT address, in his application for the ACT licence and in his New South Wales application for a licence under MRA principles. In his change of address application of 8 August 2024 for the ACT licence he falsely stated that his previous residential and mailing addresses were the ACT address and in his response to the show cause notice he falsely said that the ACT address was a temporary address. He has provided no documents or information establishing that he resided in the ACT at the time he applied for the ACT licence.
2. In his application for the New South Wales licence, he provided the ACT address as a residential address and the Sydney address as a postal address. On 28 June 2024, he notified SLED of a change of residential address to the Sydney address. Records from the police COPS database and other government sources indicate an address history consistent with residing in New South Wales. That includes the analysis of the TPG Telecom Ltd phone call records indicating only three days spent in the ACT over the whole of the relevant period.
3. Australian Securities and Investments Commission records indicate that the current registered office and principal place of business of Aussie Eats Pty Ltd is the Sydney address, and before that another address in the metropolitan area (id., 85). He submitted that his reason for obtaining the ACT licence was to operate in the security business in the ACT and New South Wales as the director of Aussie Eats Pty Ltd, but the registered office and principal place of business of that company have only ever been in New South Wales.
4. The applicant submitted that he had not received any notice or communication from the ACT authorities suggesting that he had provided a false address and it was not necessary to be a resident of the ACT in order to obtain an ACT licence as there was no residency requirement.
5. At the hearing he conceded that he had never lived in the ACT but declared repeatedly that he had been planning to move there, with the intention of starting a security business operating in the ACT and New South Wales, in association with a friend who had a contract in the ACT but no contacts in New South Wales. No name or other information about the friend was given, but the applicant said that as his friend had withdrawn from the project, his plans had changed. His new plan had been to operate in New South Wales
6. Despite explicitly conceding that the information he had supplied giving the ACT address was incorrect, he rejected the suggestion that it was false as he had planned to relocate to the territory. When it was put to him that his applications were incorrect in relation to his addresses in the ACT at New South Wales, he said in cross-examination that he could not answer the question and did not know how to. He said the questions were confusing and asked what the cross- examiner was trying to prove. He then said he understood the question but that relocating to the ACT was his plan. He denied that he applied for the ACT licence because the requirements there were easier. He admitted he had never previously applied in New South Wales. When asked whether he had been working in the state he replied that he did not remember because it was two years ago, but it was his plan to move to the ACT.
7. Again, asked why he had supplied false information for his ACT licence, he replied that he now understood the purpose of the form. He had planned to move in order to start a business there, but then had a problem with the friend with the result that the plan changed. He admitted that he had taken no steps towards relocation. As to why he had not applied for a New South Wales licence directly, he answered that he had two options, either seek recognition or apply for a new licence.
8. The applicant's attention was then drawn to the affidavit of Harsimran Saini dated 20 May 2025 (exhibit R2) which explains that applicants completing the ACT Security Licence online application are required to answer a question stating "Do you reside more than 100 km from the ACT border?"
9. If the button marked "yes" is selected, then automatically a statement appears declaring that an employee licence is valid only while the applicant is employed by a licensed ACT security master. An applicant would need to provide a declaration completed by the employer to endorse their application. If "no" is selected, the applicant can continue with the rest of the application. The applicant in his application had selected "no".
10. When that was put to him, the applicant said he did not remember answering "no", but when his application was placed before him (exhibit R1, p 16) conceded that it "looks like" he selected "no". In relation to the resulting obligation to obtain an employer declaration, he replied "Now I understand" and again that it "look[ed] like" he had selected "no". The applicant's insistence that the information he provided was not false because there was no residency requirement for an ACT licence is thus not relevant.
11. Mr Esho's analysis of the applicant's TPG Telecom call records (exhibit R3) had concluded that the applicant's telephone was recorded as being in ACT suburbs or locations during the relevant period only on three dates, 27 November 2023, 25 February 2024 and 22 March 2024. In a sample of six other dates during the relevant period, his telephone was located in various Sydney suburbs.
12. The applicant conceded that he had been in Canberra on 27 November 2023 for the purpose of having his photograph taken for his ACT ID card (exhibit R1, p 47), which was issued on 29 November, only two days later. When it was put to him that the ID card was not proof that he had ever lived in the ACT, he replied that he was not sure and it was more than two years ago. Nevertheless, he agreed that the TPG records identifying only three dates in Canberra in 2023 - 2024 showed that he had never lived in the ACT.
13. As to why he had therefore claimed to reside in the ACT, he said he said "it might be a typo", but "technically it's an error" but it appeared in both ACT and New South Wales applications as it was part of his business plan. Similarly, his giving the ACT address in answer to question 1.3 in his New South Wales application (exhibit R1, p 1) was "considered to be false" but it was planned. He said he did not remember answering "no" to the question of the ACT application form about whether he resided more than 100 km from the ACT border (id., 16), but conceded that it looked like he had.
14. As to the requirement for an employer declaration in the ACT form, he said on three separate occasions that he now understood the form, but he had planned to move to the ACT, but not because the requirements there were easier. He insisted that the information was not false as he had planned to move. In his oral submissions he indicated that he had given the ACT address to the ACT authorities "as a courtesy". He admitted he had taken no steps towards moving to the territory.
15. The applicant's claims that the information was not false because of his intention, that he had not understood the meaning of the application form or that he did not remember giving a "no" answer to the question about residing 100 kilometres from the ACT, that he was "not sure" that the ACT ID card did not prove he had ever lived there, and it was more than two years ago, and indeed the applicant's oral evidence generally were less than convincing.
16. The applicant indisputably provided false and misleading address information in prescribed forms, and the fact that the material appears in three separate documents precludes the possibility that a "typo" or a failure to understand the questions on the forms was responsible. I find that he provided a residential address that he knew to be false.
17. The applicant submitted that s 26(1)(b)(i) permits licence revocation only if the information is provided in connexion with a New South Wales application. In these proceedings, however, the respondent relies on s 26(1)(d) and cl 25(1), which create the general public interest ground. It was also contended that because the respondent had failed to notify the applicant of any concerns during the five-month postponement and had revoked the licence five months after granting it constituted a denial of procedural fairness. But in merits review, as opposed to judicial review, an irregularity (if such had occurred in this case) at the level of the administrative body (SLED in this case) is of limited significance in determining the application.
18. Providing false information to licensing regulatory authorities has been held to be contrary to the public interest for the purposes of s 26(1)(d) of the Act. In Star Training Academy Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2025] NSWCATOD 6, [714], the tribunal said:

It is entirely contrary to the public interest for the Applicant to be able to alter records or submit misleading records for the purpose of complying with its obligations under the security industry regulatory scheme, or any other regulatory scheme. It entirely undermines public trust and confidence in the regulatory scheme being enforced, and in the regulator itself.

1. It is a mandatory minimum requirement that an applicant holds a Certificate II in Security Operations and the completion of the first aid course, which necessarily includes an in-person component. Documents supplied by the applicant include certificates purporting to show that he completed the required training in Victoria or South Australia with a training provider named BG College of Vocational Education and Training Pty Ltd (exhibit A1, p 29, exhibit R1 pp 22 - 23). An ASIC search indicated that BG College's registered offices are in Melbourne and Adelaide (exhibit R2, HKS-2, p 14). In response to a summons served on BG College on or about 8 May 2025, the college produced three documents: a copy certificate of completion for the applicant, a copy record of results for the applicant and a copy of an email from the college to the applicant (exhibit A2).
2. In oral evidence the applicant said he had obtained the certificate in order to start a business. It was required by the ACT authorities but he did not know whether it was also required in New South Wales. He had enrolled on 7 December 2023 although his class commitment had begun on 4 December, because he had a problem receiving emails and enrolling.
3. The course had run for two weeks, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays from 4 December 2023, from 9:00 a.m. to 5 a.m. The course was purely online, including the face-to-face segment required by item 9, which was accessed by a link in which he had participated (exhibit A1, p 6). He had participated through Google Classroom (id., 12) because he had been unable to use the college's learner management system.
4. The face-to-face segment was online, with a trainer and two students, like a Zoom conference. He had no documents about the other website, but it was like a lecture, followed by a written assessment that he typed up in the different system. The practical tasks referred to in item 11 (id., 6) included such matters as role-plays but he was not required to submit the photographs referred to in item 12, nor did the staff take photos.
5. The first-aid segment is required by the Commonwealth criteria (exhibit R2, p 32). In that segment (exhibit A1, p 7) he had not performed CPR (item A), but the assessor did. In relation to item B, infant resuscitation, the assessor had demonstrated it but he did not recall anything more. He had not used a defibrillator (item C) nor had he used arm slings (item D), and he did not know what an EpiPen was (item F).
6. The applicant's oral evidence raises serious doubts about whether he actually learned and was assessed on the required tasks. The course lasted two weeks, with a total of six teaching days, of which he missed three days by enrolling late and possibly one or two other days. Sessions described as face-to-face were actually online, with a trainer demonstrating the required skills. Assessment was on a different system from which he has no documentation and which he can no longer access.
7. He was not required to demonstrate the required first aid skills in the face-to-face sessions. On the other hand, he does hold a level II course completion certificate issued by an apparently legitimate training organization. On balance the evidence is insufficient to warrant a finding that he did not meet the training requirements for a security licence.

1. In his second submission (exhibit A3) the applicant submitted that once a New South Wales licence was granted under the MRA, the Commissioner had no power to revoke it or revisit the application. Mutual recognition is, however, subject to an exception that it does not affect the operation of regulatory laws in the second state. Section 17(2) provides:

(2) However, the mutual recognition principle is subject to the exception that it does not affect the operation of laws that regulate the manner of carrying on an occupation in the second State, so long as those laws:

(a) apply equally to all persons carrying on or seeking to carry on the occupation under the law of the second State; and

(b) are not based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on the occupation.

1. Again, s 20(4) stipulates that the continuance of registration is subject to the laws of the second State to the extent to which those laws apply equally to all persons carrying on or seeking to carry on the occupation under the law of the second State and are not based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on the occupation.
2. Under s 20(4A), a law imposing a public protection requirement is not a law based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on the occupation.
3. The continuance of the applicant's registration, therefore, was subject to s 26(1) of the SI Act and cl 25(1) of the Regulation, which are laws regulating the manner of carrying on the occupation of a security professional in New South Wales, they apply equally to all persons seeking to carry on that occupation under the Act and Regulation and are not based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on the occupation.
4. The applicant submitted that the High Court in Victorian Building Authority v Andriotis [2019] HCA 22, (2019) 268 CLR 168 had held that a host jurisdiction cannot refuse or revoke mutual-recognition registration on character or veracity grounds already considered by the home state. Once the home state granted registration, it must accept it without further reassessment of eligibility.
5. The High Court in that case had held that the provision in the Victorian Building Act 1993 (Vic) requiring an applicant for registration in the construction industry to be of "good character" was a law based on the possession of a qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on an occupation within the meaning of s 17(2)(b) of the MRA (at [79]). In Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADT AP 9 [25], the Appeal Panel held that as refusal of an application on character grounds is dealt with in s 15(1) of the SI Act, the power to refuse registration on public interest grounds in s 15(3) "is in circumstances where an objection on character grounds would not be sufficient in its own right to warrant refusal".
6. The power to revoke on public interest grounds under s 26(1)(d) and cl 25(1) is likewise intended to operate in areas in which character or fitness is not relevant would not be sufficient in itself to justify revocation. Thus the power to revoke on public interest grounds is not based on the possession of a qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on and occupation within the meaning of ss 17(2) and 20(4) of the MRA.
7. The respondent did not expressly rely on s 20(4A), which deals with laws imposing a "public protection requirement", but noted that laws dealing with "public protection" are not intended to be caught by s 20(4)(b), and I accept the contention that this provides further contextual support for the view that s 26(1)(d) and cl 25(1) are not laws based on the possession of a qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on an occupation. The central aspect of the revocation power is the protection of the public. Thus neither s 17(2) nor s 20(4) of the MRA precludes revocation under s 26(1)(d) and cl 25(1).
8. It is also relevant that the conduct which formed the basis for the licence revocation related to information that was not known to ACT licensing authorities at the time his ACT licence was granted, namely that he provided false information about his ACT residential address. Further, the revocation of the New South Wales licence was based on information and materials obtained after the ACT licence was created, including the applicant's failure to provide documents in response to the show cause notice establishing his residential history.
9. For the same reasons, the applicant's submission that the effect of ss 17 and 20 of the MRA was to create an "indefeasible entitlement to continued registration" also fails. His argument on this point effectively adopts an interpretation of the mutual recognition principle rejected by Edelman J, and other members of the Court in Andriotis. As his Honour pointed out, an obvious consequence of that interpretation would be "that it has the potential substantially to undermine many State provisions concerning disciplinary action across numerous occupations existing both at the time of enactment of the MRA and subsequently. This consequence is so stark that it casts significant doubt upon whether the second interpretation could have been intended by the Commonwealth Parliament" (at [171]). That view would in effect preclude second State authorities from ever being able to take disciplinary action against a person.
10. Again, the applicant submitted that under s 43 of the MRA the respondent has no "judicial power", and New South Wales authorities could not "usurp" the ACT's licensing decisions, including its acceptance of the applicant's residential address in the territory. Licence revocation on public interest grounds does not, however, exercise judicial power as defined in s 43(2) for the purposes of that section as meaning "the judicial power of the Commonwealth referred to in section 71 of the Constitution". In addition, as was noted above, under s 20(4) of the MRA the applicant's continued registration is subject to the operation of New South Wales laws, including s 26(1)(d) and cl 25(1).
11. The applicant also points to s 36 of the MRA, which provides that "Residence or domicile in a particular State is not to be a prerequisite for or a factor in entitlement to the grant, renewal or continuation of registration arising as a result of this Part". The revocation decision was not, however based on whether or not he resided in a particular state or territory, but on the fact that he provided false information to licensing authorities about his residential history, which justified revocation of the licence on public interest grounds.
12. Further, the applicant submitted that the effect of Andriotis is that a second state cannot refuse or revoke registration on character or veracity grounds and registration must be accepted without further assessment of eligibility. But as was stated above, revocation under s 26(1)(d) and cl 25(1) does not entail an assessment of fitness, propriety or character, but is based on a determination of whether it would be contrary to the public interest for a person to continue to hold the licence.

1. It is not disputed that the applicant gave incorrect address information in ACT and New South Wales prescribed forms. At the hearing the applicant admitted that he had never lived in the ACT but maintained that although the ACT address was incorrect, it was not "false" as he had intended to relocate to the territory in connexion with a security business to be operated by his company Aussie Eats Pty Ltd. His plans had changed, however, after his unnamed intended business partner withdrew from the project.
2. The New South Wales application form was quite specific, however. It directed applicants to "Provide your current residential address (NOT a PO Box) and your postal address (if different from your residential address)" (my emphasis). The form left no room for interpretations based on intention.
3. Moreover, the applicant was required to make a statutory declaration that the information was true and correct, but in two places still gave the Canberra address (id. 4). (The applicant indicated that the application in exhibit R1 was not the one used as it had not been properly witnessed. A fresh application was prepared, witnessed and accepted, and a copy of the page bearing the declaration in the second form is at exhibit R1, p 8. It still gives the false ACT address in two places.)
4. He admitted, however, that he had never taken any actual steps towards moving to the ACT. Further, the registered office and principal place of business of his company was the Sydney address, and before that another address in the metropolitan area. His claim of an intention to relocate to the ACT is thus less than plausible. Even if it were plausible, it would not alter the fact that he knowingly supplied false information that was calculated to mislead.
5. The delegate who decided the internal review concluded that the applicant had "deliberately applied for a licence in the ACT to avoid NSW licensing requirements" (exhibit R1, p 85). The applicant himself supplied a copy of a SLED Internet post recording that SLED had revoked 193 New South Wales security operative licences issued to ACT licensees under mutual recognition legislation since 2024. The directorate had revoked the licences on public interest grounds and was continuing to investigate "other potentially fraudulent mutual recognition applications" (part exhibit A3).
6. The delegate's conclusion seems well-founded, but as Dr Lucy SM pointed out in Sydney Training Academy Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2017] NSWCATOD 176, [121], it was not necessary to decide the issue as the evidence showing that the applicant deliberately attempted to deceive the Commissioner and the tribunal justified licence revocation. That case was decided on fitness and propriety grounds, but the reasoning applies to the public interest issue in this case also.
7. Public interest was, however, a basis for licence revocation in a recent case in which regulators' documents were falsified, in Star Training Academy, as was noted above. In that case the tribunal had this to say:

[T]he falsification of records submitted to the Applicant's regulators, for the purpose of misleading those regulators, is determinative of whether and how the tribunal should exercise its discretion. It is entirely contrary to the public interest for the applicant to be able to alter records or submit misleading records for the purpose of complying with its obligations under the security industry regulatory scheme, or any other regulatory scheme (at [714]).

1. The applicant submitted that revoking his New South Wales licence would injuriously affect his character, career and financial prospects. He did believe that his ACT licence would remain in force even if his New South Wales licence were revoked, but there must be doubt about that. At all events, it is clear that a licensee's private interests in retaining a licence cannot prevail over the public interest.
2. There is no doubt that the applicant supplied information to the ACT and New South Wales authorities about his address that was false and calculated to mislead. He also verified his New South Wales application by a statutory declaration that itself repeated the false address in two places. His contentions that the information was not false because he had planned to move to the ACT are implausible, given that he took no actual steps towards relocating, and even if accepted would not alter the false and misleading nature of the information supplied. He also supplied false information in his response to the show cause letter, stating that the ACT address was a "temporary" address.
3. The applicant's claimed inability to remember significant events only two years ago, or to understand plainly worded questions in prescribed forms or in cross-examination, his characterization of false statements as merely "considered to be false" or "technically it's an error", or perhaps resulting from a "typo", also do little to enhance the persuasiveness of his evidence. The discretion in s 26(1) and cl 25(1) should be exercised in favour of licence revocation. The decision under review is affirmed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.