austlii:cth/FedCFamC2G/2026/550
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC2G
2026-04-09
Original judgment source is linked above.
Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560;
Fair Work Ombudsman v Grouped Property Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 557
Fair Work Ombudsman v NSH North Pty Ltd (t/as New Shanghai Charlestown) (2017) 275 IR 148; [2017] FCA 1301
Kelly v Fitzpatrick (2007) 166 IR 14; [2007] FCA 1080
Plancor Pty Ltd v Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (2008) 171 FCR 357; [2008] FCAFC 170
Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2016) 239 FCR 336; [2016] FCAFC 4
Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited (1991) ATPR 41-076
Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Limited (Penalty) [2025] FCA 971
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
(a) The First Respondent contravened s 716(5) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) by failing to comply with the compliance notice given to the First Respondent on 19 December 2022 (Compliance Notice).
(b) The Second Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FW Act, in the First Respondent's contravention of s 716(5) of the FW Act, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FW Act, is taken to have contravened s 716(5).
(a) to pay the Applicant the remaining amount of $3,440.64 (Remaining Amount);
(b) to calculate any relevant superannuation contributions payable on the Remaining Amount and the amount of $1,000 paid to Dylan Foreman (employee), in accordance with the steps set out in the Compliance Notice and pay such contributions into the employee's nominated superannuation fund; and
(c) provide the Applicant with evidence of payments referred to in Order 1(a) and Order 1(b).
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
(a) Equifax Company Extract Current & Historical report for the second respondent dated 16 February 2026, with company status for the first respondent noted as "Strike-Off Action In Progress", marked "Exhibit A1".
(b) Statement of Agreed Facts between the parties filed on 1 August 2025 (Statement of Agreed Facts), marked "Exhibit A2".
(c) Affidavit of Nicole Andrea Harland affirmed on 4 September 2025.
(d) the first respondent contravened s 716(5) of the FW Act by failing to comply with the Compliance Notice given to the first respondent on 19 December 2022; and
(e) the second respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FW Act, in the first respondent's contravention of s 716(5) of the FW Act, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FW Act, is taken to have contravened s 716(5).
(a) pay the FWO the outstanding amount owed to the employee in relation to his unpaid salary and accrued annual leave, being $3,440.64;
(b) calculate any relevant superannuation contributions payable on the outstanding amount, in accordance with the steps set out in the Compliance Notice and pay such contributions into the employee's nominated superannuation fund; and
(c) provide the FWO with evidence of payments referred to in the preceding subparagraphs.
...the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) or an eligible State or Territory court may, on application, order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty that the court considers is appropriate if the court is satisfied that the person has contravened a civil remedy provision.
Relevant legal principles to the assessment of pecuniary penalties
(a) The primary (if not sole) purpose of a civil penalty is the promotion of public interest in compliance with the provisions of the FW Act by deterrence, both general and specific. The Court emphasised that this purpose is protective, not punitive, and is directed to securing future compliance through deterrence. The question is whether the penalty is "appropriate" in the circumstances of the case.
(b) The power to order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty is a discretionary one, which must be exercised judicially, congruently with the aims and purposes of the Act.
(c) In Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited (1991) ATPR 41-076 (at 52, 152 and 153) (CSR Ltd), French J (as his Honour then was) set out the following non-exhaustive list of relevant factors for assessing a pecuniary penalty of appropriate deterrent value:
(1) The nature and extent of the contravening conduct.
(2) The amount of loss or damage caused.
(3) The circumstances in which the conduct took place.
(4) The size of the contravening company.
(5) The degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market.
(6) The deliberateness of the contraventions and the period over which it extended.
(7) Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level.
(8) Whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the [Act in question], as evidenced by educational program[me]s or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention.
(9) Whether the company has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the [Act in question] in relation to the contravention.
(d) The Court must arrive at a figure to ensure that the penalty is not such as to be regarded as "an acceptable cost of doing business".
(e) It has been said that even if a company is in liquidation, it may still be appropriate to order that it pay penalties as a measure of the Court's disapproval of the contraventions, and the seriousness of the contraventions. The justification of any such order is not because of retribution but because a penalty in such circumstances can further the aim of general deterrence.
[C]areful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors, a yardstick.
(a) identify the separate contraventions involved, with each breach of obligation being a separate contravention, and each breach of a term of the Award being a separate contravention;
(b) consider whether each separate contravention should be dealt with independently or with some degree of aggregation for those contraventions arising out of a course of conduct, noting s 557 of the FW Act provides that two or more contraventions of a given civil remedy provision are to be taken to be a single contravention if committed by the same person and arising out of a course of conduct by that person;
(c) consider whether there should be further adjustment to ensure that, to the extent of any overlap between groups of separate aggregated contraventions, there is no double penalty imposed, and that the penalty is an appropriate response to what each respondent did (that is, 'common law course of conduct');
(d) consider the appropriate penalty in respect of each final individual group of contraventions, taken in isolation; and
(e) consider the overall penalties arrived at, and apply the totality principle, to ensure that the penalties for each respondent are appropriate and proportionate to the conduct which led to the contraventions when viewed as a whole, making such adjustments as are necessary (that is, the 'totality principle'): see Kelly v Fitzpatrick (2007) 166 IR 14; [2007] FCA 1080 at [30] per Tracey J; Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560; (2008) FCAFC 8 at [23] per Gray J, [71] per Graham J, and [102] per Buchanan J.
Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or a lower level
Whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the FW Act
Whether the respondents have exhibited contrition, taken corrective action and co-operated with the enforcement authorities
Step 1: Identify the separate contraventions and maximum penalty
Contravention of s 716(5) of the FW Act - failure to comply with the Compliance Notice
(a) 30 units for an individual: s 546(2)(a) and item 33, column 4 of s 539(2) of the FW Act; and
(b) 150 units for a body corporate: s 546(2)(b) and item 33, column 4 of s 539(2) of the FW Act.
Step 3: Consider whether further adjustment needs to be made to ensure no double penalty imposed as a result of overlap
Step 4: Consider the appropriate penalty in respect of each final individual group of contraventions
Step 5: Consider the overall penalties arrived at to ensure the penalties are appropriate and proportionate to the conduct
(3) The court may order that the pecuniary penalty, or a part of the penalty, be paid to:
(a) the Commonwealth; or
(b) a particular organisation; or
(c) a particular person.
(4) The pecuniary penalty may be recovered as a debt due to the person to whom the penalty is payable.
Given the legislative history of ss 539(2) and 546(3) of the FW Act, since the enactment of ss 44 and 45 in the pioneering 1904 Act, and the manner in which the "usual order" was articulated in such early cases as the Ve_hicle Builders' Employees' Federation_ case and Seymour, which is reflected in the Explanatory Memorandum, we consider that the power conveyed by s 546(3) is ordinarily to be exercised by awarding any penalty to the successful applicant. We accept that there may be cases (of which this is not one) where the penalty, or a part of the penalty, should be paid to another person in the circumstances described by Gray J in Plancor at [44] (as set out at [96] above).
The correct view is that the initiating party is normally the proper recipient of the penalty as part of a system of recognising particular interests in certain classes of persons (now specified in s 718 of the WR Act) in upholding the integrity of awards and agreements the subject of penal proceedings. Where a public official vindicates the law by suing for and obtaining a penalty, it is appropriate that the penalty be paid to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Otherwise, the general rule remains appropriate, that the penalty is to be paid to the party initiating the proceeding, with the Gibbs exception that the penalty may be ordered to be paid to the organisation on whose behalf the initiating party has acted.
(1) This section applies to an order (other than a pecuniary penalty order) under this Division in relation to an amount that a person was required to pay to, or on behalf of, another person under this Act or a fair work instrument.
(2) In making the order the court must, on application, include an amount of interest in the sum ordered, unless good cause is shown to the contrary.
(3) Without limiting subsection (2), in determining the amount of interest, the court must take into account the period between the day the relevant cause of action arose and the day the order is made.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kaur-Bains.
Fair Work Ombudsman
Drew and Schofer Real Estate Pty Ltd [2026] FedCFamC2G 550
(2008) 165 FCR 560
(2017) 275 IR 148
(2007) 166 IR 14
(2005) 228 CLR 357
(2008) 171 FCR 357
(2016) 239 FCR 336