Fair Work Ombudsman v Clark Projects Pty Ltd

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. On 28 February 2025 in Fair Work Ombudsman v Clark Projects Pty Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 24 (liability judgment), the Court made orders declaring that the respondent had contravened s 716(5) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) by failing to comply with a compliance notice issued to it by Fair Work Inspector Heidi-Marie Brown on 22 June 2023, requiring it to calculate and pay amounts payable to an employee. The Court also ordered the respondent to pay compensation to the employee.
2. The Court is now asked to make orders for the imposition of a pecuniary penalty upon the respondent for its contravention of s 716.
3. The matter was heard on 5 September 2025. Although the respondent had been given notice of the hearing, and had been given a fair opportunity to put evidence and submissions before the Court, it did not appear and did not advance anything by way of evidence or submissions.
4. In the event, the Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to impose a penalty of $25,000 and will so order.

1. At the hearing, the applicant relied on the following affidavits which were received into evidence without objection, or any cross-examination of the deponents:

(a) Affidavit of Service of Rebekah Maree O'Brien affirmed on 3 September 2024 (First O'Brien Affidavit);

(b) Affidavit of Rebekah Maree O'Brien affirmed on 17 October 2024 (Second O'Brien Affidavit);

(c) Affidavit of Rebekah Maree O'Brien affirmed on 25 October 2024 (Third O'Brien Affidavit);

(d) Affidavit of Rebekah Maree O'Brien affirmed on 27 June 2025 (Fourth O'Brien Affidavit);

(e) Affidavit of Leigh Pace affirmed on 13 November 2024 (First Pace Affidavit);

(f) Affidavit of Leigh Pace affirmed on 10 April 2025 (Second Pace Affidavit);

(g) Affidavit of Leigh Pace affirmed on 20 May 2025 (Third Pace Affidavit);

(h) Affidavit of Reeanna Jain Maloney affirmed on 18 August 2025 (Maloney Affidavit);

(i) Affidavit of Farishte Tehmasp Parekh affirmed on 19 August 2025 (First Parekh Affidavit); and

(j) Affidavit of Service of Farishte Tehmasp Parekh affirmed on 1 September 2025 (Second Parekh Affidavit).

1. The Court also received into evidence the following materials:

(1) A file note of a phone call to Nathan Lee dated 14 July 2025;

(2) An email copy containing a file note of a call between Ms Rebekah O'Brien and the respondent dated 31 October 2024;

(3) A copy of an email from Ms Rebekah O'Brien dated 18 August 2025 at 2.56pm to the respondent attaching the Maloney Affidavit and First Parekh Affidavit (although the email was not time-stamped I accepted from counsel that the email had been sent at that time);

(4) A copy of an email from Ms Parekh to the respondent dated 21 August 2025, notifying the respondent of the directions listing on 22 August 2025 and attaching a copy of the court book; and

(5) A copy of an email from Ms Parekh to the respondent dated 2 September 2025, notifying the respondent of the penalty hearing on 5 September 2025 and attaching a copy of the Second Parekh Affidavit.

1. Section 546 of the FW Act empowers this Court to order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty where that person has contravened a civil remedy provision in the FW Act. The section provides as follows:

(1) The Federal Court, the Federal Circuit Court or an eligible State or Territory court may, on application, order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty that the court considers is appropriate if the court is satisfied that the person has contravened a civil remedy provision.

Note: Pecuniary penalty orders cannot be made in relation to conduct that contravenes a term of a modern award, a national minimum wage order or an enterprise agreement only because of the retrospective effect of a determination (see subsections 167(3) and 298(2)).

Determining amount of pecuniary penalty

(2) The pecuniary penalty must not be more than:

(a) if the person is an individual - the maximum number of penalty units referred to in the relevant item in column 4 of the table in subsection 539(2); or

(b) if the person is a body corporate - 5 times the maximum number of penalty units referred to in the relevant item in column 4 of the table in subsection 539(2)

Payment of penalty

(3) The court may order that the pecuniary penalty, or a part of the penalty, be paid to:

(a) the Commonwealth; or

(b) a particular organisation; or

(c) a particular person.

(4) The pecuniary penalty may be recovered as a debt due to the person to whom the penalty is payable.

(5) To avoid doubt, a court may make a pecuniary penalty order in addition to one or more orders under section 545.

1. The maximum penalty for a contravention of s 716(5) of the FW Act (as at the time of the contravention) was 30 penalty units: s 539(2), Item 33. For a corporate contravenor, s 546(2)(b) of the FW Act (as at that time) provided that the maximum penalty was five times the maximum number of penalty units referred to in the table in s 539(2). Section 12 of the FW Act gives the term "penalty unit" the meaning given by s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). A "penalty unit" was $275 on and from 1 January 2023. It was indexed in accordance with s 4AA with effect from 1 July 2023. The value of a penalty unit from the date was $313, making $41,250 the maximum penalty for a body corporate for a contravention of s 716(5) prior to 1 July 2023, and $46,950 the maximum penalty for a body corporate for a contravention of s 716(5) after 1 July 2023.
2. The compliance notice the subject of the present proceeding was issued on 22 June 2023 and required compliance on 31 July 2023. Arguably the contravening conduct spanned two different maximum penalty amounts. Although I will treat the greater amount as the maximum, I will have regard to the fact that for some part of the period of non-compliance, a lower penalty was initially applicable consistent with the approach of Katzmann J in Fair Work Ombudsman v Grouped Property Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 557 at [394] - [401] and Rares J in Ahmed v Al-Hussain Pty ltd t/as The Cheesecake Shop (No 3) [2019] FCA 848. That is also an appropriate course in the present matter because in the applicant's communications with the respondent in July 2023 it cited the lower figure as the possible penalty for non-compliance with the notice.

1. The issue to be determined by the Court is the quantum of the penalty (if any) to be imposed upon the respondent for its contravention of s 716(5) of the FW Act. That issue is addressed, following the recitation of some relevant background facts below.

1. In around December 2022, a Fair Work Inspector commenced an investigation in respect of the employment of Mr Nathan Lee by the respondent and formed the belief that:

(1) the respondent had employed Mr Lee as a casual labourer between 3 August 2022 and 21 September 2022;

(2) the respondent had failed to pay Mr Lee amounts payable to him under the Building and Construction General On-Site Award 2020 (the Award) by:

(a) failing to pay him the appropriate casual minimum rate in respect of "ordinary hours" for the period between 3 August 2022 and 4 September 2022; and

(b) failing to pay him at all for hours worked between 5 September 2022 and 21 September 2022;

(3) the respondent had contravened various clauses of the Award by those failures.

1. On 22 June 2023, the Fair Work Inspector gave the respondent a compliance notice pursuant to s 716(2) of the FW Act requiring the respondent, by 31 July 2023, to:

(1) identify the hours worked by Mr Lee between 3 August 2022 and 21 September 2022;

(2) identify the amount the respondent in fact paid to Mr Lee in respect of that work;

(3) calculate the amount the respondent should have paid to Mr Lee in respect of that work;

(4) pay to Mr Lee the difference between those amounts; and

(5) calculate and pay any superannuation contributions payable as a consequence.

1. The compliance notice thereafter required the respondent to produce reasonable evidence to the applicant by 7 August 2023 of its compliance with the compliance notice.
2. The respondent did not undertake the steps required by the compliance notice, nor did it proffer any reasonable excuse for having failed to so comply, either to the applicant, or to this Court.
3. At the time the compliance notice was issued, in the period leading up to the time for compliance, and thereafter, the applicant repeatedly attempted to engage with the respondent about the compliance notice. It did so by emails to the respondent, and phone calls and text messages to the telephone of its director, Jackson Cartwright. In the Third Pace affidavit, Fair Work Inspector (FWI) Pace recites that FWI Brown:

(a) on 22 June 2023, sent an email enclosing and explaining the compliance notice, called Mr Cartwright's telephone and left a voicemail message about the compliance notice, and sent a text message advising about the compliance notice. Those communications invited Mr Cartwright to contact FWI Brown with any queries;

(b) on 28 June 2023 called Mr Cartwright's telephone and left a voicemail message, and sent a text message following up on the compliance notice invited Mr Cartwright to contact FWI Brown with any queries;

(c) on 3 July 2023, called Mr Cartwright's telephone and left a voicemail message offering assistance in relation to the compliance notice and inviting contact, and emailed Mr Cartwright attaching the compliance notice and inviting Mr Cartwright to contact FWI Brown with any queries;

(d) on 10 July 2023, called Mr Cartwright's telephone and left a voicemail message following up in relation to the compliance notice and leaving her telephone number, and emailed and sent a text message to Mr Cartwright reminding him of the compliance notice, warning him that the consequence of failure to comply could mean legal proceedings and penalties, and inviting Mr Cartwright to contact FWI Brown to confirm receipt of the notice or with any queries;

(e) on 17 July 2023, called Mr Cartwright's telephone and left a voicemail message following up in relation to the compliance notice and leaving her telephone number;

(f) on 25 July 2023, attempted to call Mr Cartwright's telephone four times (but the phone was disconnected before being answered), and emailed Mr Cartwright reminding him of the compliance notice, warning him that the consequence of failure to comply could mean legal proceedings and penalties, and inviting Mr Cartwright to contact FWI Brown to confirm receipt of the notice or with any queries;

(g) on 2 August 2023, called Mr Cartwright's telephone and left a voicemail message about the compliance notice, offering assistance and inviting Mr Cartwright to contact FWI Brown, and emailed Mr Cartwright attaching a copy of the compliance notice, observing that the time for compliance had passed and reminding him of the compliance notice, warning that the applicant may commence legal proceedings to recover outstanding monies and civil penalties, and inviting Mr Cartwright to contact FWI Brown with any queries;

(h) on 8 August 2023, called Mr Cartwright's telephone and left a voicemail message about the compliance notice and the lack of contact from Mr Cartwright, and requesting that he telephone FWI Brown, and emailed Mr Cartwright observing that the time for compliance had passed and that he had not contacted the applicant, and warning that the applicant would send a letter regarding the respondent's non-compliance and that failure to comply could result in legal proceedings and civil penalties, and inviting Mr Cartwright to contact FWI Brown with any queries;

(i) on 9 August 2023, wrote to the respondent, noting the respondent's non-compliance and inviting it to advise the applicant within seven days of any reasonable excuse for its non-compliance, advising that in the event of failure to provide such excuse the applicant may commence proceedings against the respondent, in which case the applicant would seek civil penalties and the recovery of outstanding monies. The letter, which was sent by express post, and recorded as delivered on 11 August 2023, strongly encouraged the respondent to seek independent legal advice.

1. As is apparent from the liability judgment, this proceeding was commenced on 19 August 2024. The respondent did not appear nor file any defence in the proceeding, even though, as set out in the liability judgment, I was satisfied that the respondent had been served with the originating process on 22 August 2024 (and had been emailed the documents on 20 August 2024).
2. On 1 November 2024, the matter was listed for a directions hearing. The day prior to that listing, Ms O'Brien received a telephone call from Mr Cartwright. Her file note of that telephone conversation recorded that Mr Cartwright explained that his wife was in hospital in the final stages of a terminal illness and that he was unable to attend Court the following day as he needed to look after his children at the hospital. Ms O'Brien invited Mr Cartwright to send an email to the applicant explaining his position so that the applicant could consider it.
3. Mr Cartwright did not send any email to the applicant explaining his position.
4. The following day, the Court set the application in a proceeding down for hearing on 22 November 2024, and made directions for the parties to file and serve any evidence and submissions prior to that date. The applicant's representative on that occasion informed the Court about Mr Cartwright's claim to have caring obligations due to illness that prevented him from appearing before the court on 1 November 2024, but did not explicitly convey the claimed seriousness of the situation.
5. The Court sent a sealed copy of the orders made that day by email to the email address that had been used by the applicant to correspond with the respondent. The respondent had not, at that stage, and has not subsequently, filed a notice of address for service in the proceeding.
6. The applicant subsequently filed an outline of submissions and a further affidavit on 13 November 2024, and wrote to the respondent by email on 14 November:

(1) serving the applicant's submissions and its affidavit filed on 13 November 2024 (sic);

(2) advising of the listing of the interlocutory application;

(3) reminding the respondent of the requirement to file and serve its evidence and submissions by 20 November 2024; and

(4) encouraging the respondent to seek legal advice.

1. The respondent did not appear at the hearing on 22 November 2024 and orders were made upon the respondent's default declaring its contravention, and requiring payment of amounts to Mr Lee, and into a superannuation account for his benefit.
2. Following the delivery of the liability judgment, the applicant advised the Court that the respondent had, on 14 November 2024, made a payment to Mr Lee of $4,583.18, being the amount that the applicant alleged should have been paid by the respondent to Mr Lee pursuant to the Award. That payment had not been brought to the attention of the applicant at the time of the hearing on 22 November 2024. The orders made when the liability judgment was delivered were later amended accordingly.
3. On 7 March 2025, the Court gave directions for the preparation of the matter for a penalty hearing and listed the matter for a hearing on that question (the 7 March 2025 orders). The 7 March 2025 orders included a direction that the respondent file and serve any affidavit evidence and submissions relating to penalties on or before 4 June 2025.
4. I am satisfied, having regard to the Fourth O'Brien affidavit, that the 7 March 2025 orders were brought to the attention of the respondent, first by email and then by the service upon the respondent of those orders by express post addressed to the respondent's registered office. In a covering letter from the applicant sent by email to the respondent on 7 March 2025, the applicant strongly encouraged the respondent to seek legal advice in respect of the matter.
5. On 14 April 2025, the Court made orders varying the orders made on 28 February 2025 to reflect the payment made by the respondent to the employee in November 2024, and amending the directions made for the preparation of the matter for a penalty hearing (the 14 April 2025 orders).
6. I am satisfied, having regard to the Fourth O'Brien affidavit, that the 14 April 2025 orders were brought to the attention of the respondent, first by email and then by the service upon the respondent of those orders by express post addressed to the respondent's registered office. In a covering letter from the applicant sent by email to the respondent on 15 April 2025, the applicant again strongly encouraged the respondent to seek legal advice in respect of the matter.
7. I am also satisfied, having regard to the Fourth O'Brien affidavit, that the applicant's outline of submissions filed with this Court on 21 May 2025 and the Third Pace affidavit were served on the respondent by email on 21 May 2025, and then by express post addressed to the respondent's registered office, which was delivered on 22 May 2025.
8. I am satisfied, having regard to the Third Pace Affidavit that the respondent has not, to date:

(a) paid interest in accordance with order 1(a)(i) of the orders made on 14 April 2025; or

(b) paid superannuation into an account for the benefit of Mr Lee in accordance with order 1(a)(ii) of the orders made on 14 April 2025.

1. The respondent remains registered as a corporation.
2. At the hearing on penalty 16 July 2025 the respondent did not appear. The applicant advised the Court of Mr Cartright's claim made the previous October that his wife had been seriously ill at that point. I determined to stand the matter over for further directions on 22 August 2025 (the 16 July 2025 orders) in order to ensure that the respondent had an opportunity to advance any case that was available to it in mitigation of penalty. The 16 July 2025 orders, gave the respondent a further opportunity to file evidence and/or submissions on the question of penalty, permitted the respondent to do so by witness statement (rather than by affidavit) and gave leave to the parties to appear at the directions hearing by audio-visual link if requested. Those directions were intended to give the respondent an opportunity to put any case it wished to advance on penalty in a way that would minimise the cost and other burdens of doing so.
3. I am satisfied, having regard to the Maloney Affidavit, that the 16 July 2025 orders were brought to the attention of the respondent, via service by email on 18 July 2025 at the respondent's last known email address, and at an email address for Mr Cartwright. The covering letter encouraged the respondent to seek independent legal advice.
4. The respondent did not appear at the directions hearing on 22 August 2025. At that directions hearing the respondent read the First Parekh Affidavit. That affidavit recited that the deponent had conducted various open-source searches as follows:

(1) Company searches that showed that the respondent has a director named Jackson Ray Cartwright who commenced that appointment on 8 February 2017, and that Cartwright Company Pty Ltd, ABN 35671982004, has a director named Jackson Ray Cartwright (appointed on 6 October 2023). The directors by that name are recorded as having the same date of birth and location of birth. Each company has the same registered office address. I am satisfied that they are one and the same person;

(2) A search on Linkedin for Jackson Cartwright, which showed a person of that name described as "Director at Cartwright Company". The narrative under the entry recorded that the subject, his wife and four children were exploring the country in their truck and caravan, and that he had started Cartwright Co (in October 2023) to help others do the same. The page included links for Instagram pages, the company's website and Facebook pages for both "The Cartwrights" (the family) and Cartwright Company;

(3) A search of the Cartwright Company website which contained a link to subscribe to a YouTube channel for "The Cartwrights";

(4) A search of the Cartwrights' YouTube channel. The deponent annexed screenshots for the homepage of the channel showing a series of video posts, including posts dated 27 October 2024, 10 November 2024 and 2 March 2025 apparently depicting outback family travels; and

(5) A search of the Cartwrights' Facebook page. The deponent annexed a number of entries from that page showing posts by the subjects apparently of their travels in outback and remote Australian locations over the period from October 2024 to March 2025.

1. I infer that the entries over the periods above, which are recorded as having been posted at remote locations, were not made during one-off trips to their locations and that in fact over the period from October 2024 to March 2025 that Mr Cartwright, the respondent's principal officer, was undertaking ongoing family travel in remote locations. I am satisfied having regard to that material that the respondent's director was not prevented from attending this Court on 1 November 2024 and 22 November 2024 because of family illness. I am satisfied that the Mr Cartwright was capable of travelling to attend Court at that time. I am satisfied that the respondent had been afforded a fair opportunity to appear before the Court to advance a case in respect of the penalty to be imposed upon it for its contravention.
2. On 22 August 2025, the Court made orders listing the matter for further hearing on the question of penalty on 5 September 2025 and afforded the respondent a further opportunity to file and serve any affidavit or outline of submissions (the 22 August 2025 orders).
3. I am satisfied, having regard to the Second Parekh Affidavit, that the 22 August 2025 orders were brought to the attention of the respondent, first by email and then by the service upon the respondent of those orders by express post addressed to the respondent's registered office. In the event, the respondent did not file any evidence or submissions and did not appear at the hearing on 5 September 2025.

1. The maximum penalty that the Court may impose on the respondent for his contravention of s 716(5) of the FW Act is $46,950, as set out above.
2. The applicant submits that the Court should order the respondent to pay a penalty in the range of $25,822.50 to $30,517.50 (being 55% to 65% of the maximum penalty), contending that the following matters support that conclusion:

(a) there is a need for specific deterrence because the Company has failed to cooperate with the FWO as the regulator, and by failing to comply with the Court's orders;

(b) there is a further need for specific deterrence because the Company remains a registered corporation, and thus may continue to employ individuals;

(c) there is a need for general deterrence because the failure to comply with a statutory notice is serious and required the FWO to expend public funds to bring this proceeding; and

(d) notwithstanding the Company's payment to the employee on 14 November 2024, the Company has shown limited contrition.

1. Civil penalties are imposed primarily, if not solely, for the promotion of the public interest in compliance with the statute by the deterrence of future contraventions: Australian Building and Construction Commission v Pattinson (2022) 274 CLR 450; [2022] HCA 13 (Pattinson) at [15]. The deterrence that is sought to be achieved by the imposition of a civil penalty should operate in relation to both the instant contravenor and other contravenors, in respect of contraventions of a like kind: Pattinson at [10].
2. A penalty should not be so low as to be capable of being regarded by the contravener as the mere cost of doing business (Pattinson at [17]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640; [2013] HCA 54 at [66]; Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012) 287 ALR 249; [2012] FCAFC 20 at [62]). Equally, the penalty should not be so great as to be of oppressive severity.
3. In determining an appropriate penalty, the Court will have regard to both the circumstances of the contravention, and the circumstances of the contravener.
4. In Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1990] FCA 521, French J (as his Honour then was) set out a list of factors which may inform the Court's assessment of the quantum of penalty. His Honour said at [42]:

The assessment of a penalty of appropriate deterrent value will have regard to a number of factors which have been canvassed in the cases. These include the following:

1. The nature and extent of the contravening conduct.

2. The amount of loss or damage caused.

3. The circumstances in which the conduct took place.

4. The size of the contravening company.

1. The degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market.
2. The deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended.
3. Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level.
4. Whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Act, as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention.
5. Whether the company has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention.

1. The list above is not to be regarded as a rigid or exhaustive checklist; in some matters one or more of the factors above may not be apposite, whilst in others different factors may emerge as relevant to the task of identifying the appropriate penalty.
2. It is a more difficult task to craft an appropriate penalty where the contravener has not taken the opportunity to appear before the Court and present any evidence or submissions. It is open to a contravener to seek to adduce evidence about its circumstances (including its size and its means), proffer an explanation about the circumstances of its contravening conduct, and advise the steps it has taken to remedy the contravening conduct and prevent any recurrence of such conduct. Such evidence will assist the Court to determine whether a penalty will serve the object of specific deterrence and whether a penalty of a particular quantum would be of crushing or oppressive severity. No such evidence was proffered in this matter.
3. In considering the nature and circumstances of the contravention it is relevant that the applicant engaged extensively with the respondent in respect of the compliance notice, including after the time for compliance had passed. The respondent's contravention could not have resulted from inadvertence or ignorance. No reasonable person receiving the regulator's correspondence and giving it the most basic level of attention could have failed to appreciate the consequences that would attach to ignoring the compliance notice.
4. The respondent did not, until the present proceeding had been commenced, take any step to deal with the obligations that arose under the compliance notice. In November 2024, sixteen months after the compliance notice required action, and only when the respondent was on notice that the applicant was moving for default judgment, the respondent paid the employee whose underpayment had led to the issue of the compliance notice. However, the respondent failed to notify the applicant of that payment, when the compliance notice had required not just rectification of the underpayment, but also provision to the applicant of evidence of the rectification. The failure of the respondent to advise the applicant of that payment, along with the respondent's failure to engage with this proceeding, indicates that the respondent has not grappled with the nature and consequences of its contravention.
5. The respondent's behaviour showed a disregard of its obligations. Relevant information about the nature of the notice and the consequences of non-compliance was provided with the compliance notice itself. The respondent had the option of seeking to demonstrate that it had a reasonable excuse for its non-compliance, or bringing an application to set aside the notice on the basis that it had not been properly issued, and it took neither step.
6. As a consequence of the respondent's failure, the employee the subject of the notice was delayed by some sixteen months in having the contraventions rectified. The amount the respondent ultimately paid in satisfaction of the obligations in the notice (exceeding $4,000) is a substantial amount for an employee to be put out of for such a period.
7. The absence of any evidence of prior contraventions by the respondent stands to its credit. In addition, the fact the respondent remedied the underpayment in November 2024 sounds in mitigation of the contravention. However, as observed above, the respondent did not take the step of notifying the regulator of that action. It is not clear that the respondent now understands and appreciates the nature of the obligations imposed by the compliance notice and the consequences of non-compliance. The respondent remains a registered company and may continue to engage employees. Those matters point to a need for the penalty the Court imposes to achieve the object of specific deterrence.
8. There is no evidence before the Court as to the financial position of the respondent. There is no basis to conclude that the penalty sought by the regulator would be one of oppressive severity.
9. The considerations discussed above indicate that a greater, rather than lesser, penalty, is appropriate to focus the respondent upon the serious nature of its obligations and the importance of compliance.
10. The penalty imposed in the present matter should also be sufficient to achieve the object of general deterrence; that is, to send a message to other like employers that compliance notices are serious, and the failure to respond to them carries serious consequences. There are a troubling number of such matters before the Court. Compliance notices play an important part in the regime established under the FW Act for ensuring that employees receive their entitlements under it, and neglect by employers of their obligations to respond to compliance notices may not be countenanced by the Court. That message must be clearly communicated, particularly to other employees in the same industry, being the construction industry, so that the efficacy of the statutory scheme is not undermined.
11. The fact that there is no evidence before the Court of any prior contravention by the respondent is taken into account in its favour.
12. In the final analysis, having regard to all of the matters above I am satisfied that it is appropriate to impose a penalty of $25,000, or slightly more than 50% of the maximum penalty. The applicant pressed for a penalty in a range commencing slightly above this amount, however, I am satisfied in all of the circumstances that a penalty of $25,000 will bring home to both the respondent and other like employers the need to comply with their obligations.
13. I will order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Doust.