Consideration - pecuniary penalties
16 Each of ss 323(1) and 325(1) is a civil remedy provision that attracts a maximum penalty of 60 penalty units for Mr Zahid and Mr Bhatti and 300 penalty units for the employer, where the contravention is not a serious contravention (ss 539(2) and 546(2)). Mr Ahmed did not make a claim that the contraventions were serious contraventions in the pleadings prepared by his lawyers and he did not submit that the contraventions were serious contraventions within the meaning of s 557A of the Act. That provision only commenced operation on 15 September 2017 and would have applied pecuniary penalties of up to 600 penalty units for Mr Zahid and Mr Bhatti, and up to 3,000 penalty units for the employer.
17 Under s 4AA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the amount of a penalty unit was $170 for the period between 28 December 2012 and 30 June 2015, $180 for the period between 1 July 2015 and 30 June 2017, and $210 from 1 July 2017.
18 Section 557(1) of the Fair Work Act provides:
557 Course of conduct
(1) For the purposes of this Part, 2 or more contraventions of a civil remedy provision referred to in subsection (2) are, subject to subsection (3), taken to constitute a single contravention if:
(a) the contraventions are committed by the same person; and
(b) the contraventions arose out of a course of conduct by the person.
19 In Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2017) 249 FCR 458 at 479 [90], Dowsett and Rares JJ said that:
The primary purpose of imposing a civil penalty is to deter the contravener and others from repeating conduct of the kind complained of. As French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ explained in Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 258 CLR 482 at [54]-[55]:
… a criminal prosecution is aimed at securing, and may result in, a criminal conviction. By contrast, a civil penalty proceeding is precisely calculated to avoid the notion of criminality as such.
No less importantly, whereas criminal penalties import notions of retribution and rehabilitation, the purpose of a civil penalty, as French J explained in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [(1991) ATPR 41-076 at 52,152], is primarily if not wholly protective in promoting the public interest in compliance:
Punishment for breaches of the criminal law traditionally involves three elements: deterrence, both general and individual, retribution and rehabilitation. Neither retribution nor rehabilitation, within the sense of the Old and New Testament moralities that imbue much of our criminal law, have any part to play in economic regulation of the kind contemplated by Pt IV [of the Trade Practices Act]. … The principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act. (footnotes omitted; emphasis added)
20 There is no evidence that any of the respondents previously has contravened the Act or any other legislation. It appears that the employer no longer carries on business. However, the employer has not provided any evidence of its financial position, assets or liabilities, other than the resale analysis that suggested it owed the franchisor over $34,000 following the termination of the franchise agreement.
21 As the employer and Mr Bhatti recognised in their written submissions on penalty, neither of them has shown any contrition. Mr Zahid has not appeared, but he has been aware of the proceeding and owns a half share of the employer.
22 In the principal reasons, I explained why I found that each of Mr Zahid and Mr Bhatti was involved and knowingly concerned in each contravention.
23 The employer employed Mr Ahmed under the 2014 and 2017 contracts. It failed to pay, in full, Mr Ahmed's wages and his superannuation and demanded that he make the cashback payments, each in contravention of ss 323(1) and 325(1) of the Act. Each of the underpayment and cashback contraventions of ss 323(1) and 325(1) arose out of a course of conduct by it and so each constituted only one contravention of each section under s 557(1) of the Act. The same applied to Mr Zahid and Mr Bhatti who each committed one contravention of each section.
24 The cashback contravention commenced with Mr Ahmed making a payment of $2,000 on 26 November 2015 and continued with many more payments until around 28 September 2017, although all of the respondents made demands on Mr Ahmed to pay $11,000 and more in the period immediately before his employment ceased on 26 November 2017. The course of conduct constituting the underpayment contravention commenced soon after 20 December 2014 but continued throughout Mr Ahmed's employment until 26 November 2017. That conduct occurred persistently (but with less financial detriment after the first period, because of the cashback contravention) over a course of nearly three years.
25 The employer's contraventions of ss 323(1) and 325(1) were deliberate and occurred in circumstances where Mr Zahid and Mr Bhatti, as its controlling mind or minds at the respective time of each occurrence, knew that the conduct was in breach of the 2014 and 2017 contracts.
26 The quantum of Mr Ahmed's wages and superannuation that the employer failed to pay in full in the first period was significant, amounting to nearly half his salary and superannuation entitlements.
27 All of the underpayment and cashback contraventions exploited Mr Ahmed's vulnerability by reason of his immigration status. Mr Zahid and Mr Bhatti made demands, coupled with the threat that the employer would no longer sponsor Mr Ahmed's visa if he did not comply with the demands and make the cashback payments. That threat materialised after Mr Ahmed stopped making cashback payments in around late September 2017. That is because the employer terminated his employment on 26 November 2017 and soon, thereafter, informed the Department on 7 December 2017. As I found in the principal reasons, the Department gave notice to Mr Ahmed on 20 April 2018 of its intention to cancel Mr Ahmed's visa. All of the contraventions were, therefore, at the higher end of the range of seriousness.
28 Indeed, each of the contraventions had all of the elements of a serious contravention within the meaning of s 557A. That is because each respondent, first, knowingly contravened each of ss 323(1) and 325(1) when, respectively, they failed to pay, or cause to be paid, in full Mr Ahmed's wages and superannuation and unreasonably required him to make each cashback payment and, secondly, engaged in that conduct as part of a systematic pattern of conduct relating to Mr Ahmed. However, because Mr Ahmed did not plead that the contraventions were serious contraventions under s 557A, I cannot find that they attract the higher penalties that the section imposed. In those circumstances, each of the contraventions falls at the higher end of the range of seriousness for the purposes of informing what are the appropriate pecuniary penalties, assessed under s 539(2), for the respondents' various contraventions of the Act other than under s 557A.
29 I reject the employer's argument that because Mr Zahid controlled it, it had no independent decision-making ability. Mr Zahid was the managing director of the employer until 8 June 2017. He controlled the employer and his acts were its acts: Hamilton v Whitehead (1988) 166 CLR 121 at 127-130 per Mason CJ, Wilson and Toohey JJ. The employer was the principal and Mr Zahid was knowingly concerned, and involved, in the employer's contraventions both before and after 8 June 2017: Hamilton 166 CLR at 127 (see the principal reasons at [73]-[78]). It is not wrong or oppressive to make the employer and the individual or individuals who is or are its controlling mind or minds, liable for what he caused the company to do, which amounted to a contravention of the Act, as Mason CJ, Wilson and Toohey JJ held (166 CLR at 128).
30 Each respondent's conduct in engaging in the contraventions (as I found in the principal reasons) was disgraceful and constituted a ruthless and deliberate exploitation of a vulnerable employee. In the first period of 9 months, the employer and Mr Zahid knew that they were paying Mr Ahmed half, and sometimes less than half, his wages. This was a flagrant contravention of s 323(1) of the worst possible kind.
31 In the second period, the quantum of underpayments reduced, but their net effect was increased by Mr Zahid's unreasonable demands for the cashback payments. Mr Ahmed was underpaid (after tax) $9,512.92 and made cashback payments of $45,000. Those sums totalled over $54,500, when Mr Ahmed's after tax salary over the 21 months should have been about $76,000. It is little wonder that Mr Ahmed had to work a second job to make ends meet with the assistance of his wife's income.
32 In the third period, for which Mr Bhatti has responsibility, Mr Ahmed was underpaid only his last 2 weeks' salary ($1,685) but made cashback payments of $5,000, effectively reducing his salary by $6,685 for the last 5.5 months of his employment.
33 Mr Bhatti's culpability is of a lesser order than Mr Zahid's. However, Mr Bhatti was well aware, from the time he commenced his involvement in June 2017, that Mr Ahmed was not being paid on time or at all at that stage, as I found in the principal reasons at [29]-[37]. Mr Bhatti had to arrange in late July and early August 2017 for Mr Ahmed to be paid over $2,900 to ensure that his group certificate for the previous financial year could issue in an amount that matched his salary under the 2014 contract. Mr Bhatti must have known that Mr Ahmed had not been paid wages for 4 or 5 weeks as at 27 June 2017. However, subsequently, during the third period, Mr Bhatti appears to have caused the employer to pay Mr Ahmed's wages regularly (except for the final fortnight) although the employer made no superannuation payments in the third period. Mr Bhatti, however, demanded and received cashback payments totalling $5,000 and made a demand that Mr Ahmed pay $11,000 that led to his termination when he refused to pay.
34 There is a need in this proceeding for both specific and general deterrence. I find that the employer's and Mr Bhatti's contraventions are close to the most serious possible for a contravention not amounting what would now be a serious contravention within the meaning of s 557A.
35 In Fair Work Ombudsman v Grouped Property Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 557 at [392]-[397], Katzmann J considered the effect of a change in the value of a penalty unit that straddled the period of a course of conduct for the purposes of determining the maximum penalty for a contravention under the Act based on that course of conduct. Her Honour followed what Jessup J had decided in Murrihy v Betezy.com.au Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 221 FCR 118 at 125 [22] and 127 [28], namely that the increased penalty did not apply retrospectively to a contravention that was complete in the period before which the new penalty came into force. However, Katzmann J held, following the reasoning of Gleeson CJ and Lee J in R v White (Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, unreported 25 July 1991), that it would not be inappropriate for a sentencing judge to determine that the level of penalty had increased over the period of a conspiracy and to put that consideration into effect in any sentencing: Gleeson CJ, with whom Allen and James JJ agreed, applied that reasoning in R v Annecchini (Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, unreported 24 April 1996, BC9601668 at pp.4-5).
36 Here, the penalty had increased twice over the course of the contravening conduct, from $170 per penalty unit until 30 June 2015, to $180 per penalty unit until 30 June 2017, and to $210 from 1 July 2017. The maximum penalty in force for the greater part of the course of conduct was $10,800 for the individuals and $54,000 for the employer. I have taken into consideration that most of the contravening conduct in the first period occurred when slightly lower maxima applied and that almost all of the contravening conduct in the third period occurred when the highest maxima applied: Annecchini (Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, unreported 24 April 1996, BC9601668 at pp4-5).