RE-EVALUATION OF THE EXISTENCE OR NOT OF STRONG GROUNDS TO REFUSE THE STAY
86 It will be apparent from our discussion as to the errors of principle made by the primary judge that it is our view a stay should have been refused. In addition to the matters raised above, we have come to the view that there are public policy considerations which (cumulatively) indicate strong reasons for this proceeding to remain in this Court, even if such considerations do not statutorily mandate the proceeding be heard in the Federal Court.
87 At the outset it is clear that a stay may be refused if the exclusive jurisdiction clause offends the public policy of the forum "whether evinced by statute or declared by judicial decision": Akai at 445 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). Epic relies upon this statement in Akai to assert that public policy considerations "override" the exclusive jurisdiction clause and mandate that the proceeding be heard in the Federal Court, an argument which is put (as noted above) on a separate basis to the strong reasons inquiry. Yet it is clear that the majority in Akai considered public policy as part of its inquiry into whether there are strong reasons against a stay (rather than as some special rule that necessarily trumps all other considerations). This can be illustrated by having regard to the statement in context (at 445):
In Huddart Parker Ltd v The Ship "Mill Hill" Dixon J referred with approval to English authority which indicated that, where there was a special contract of this nature between the parties, a foreign jurisdiction clause, the courts begin with a firm disposition in favour of maintaining that bargain unless strong reasons be adduced against a stay, it being the policy of the law that the parties who have made a contract should be kept to it.
A stay may be refused where the foreign jurisdiction clause offends the public policy of the forum whether evinced by statute or declared by judicial decision…
(Footnotes omitted).
88 Relevantly, the majority of the High Court (at 445, n 74) cited the decision of The "Bremen" v Zapata Off-Shore Co 407 US 1 (1972) at 15-16 as authority for the public policy ground of refusal, wherein the US Supreme Court held:
Thus, in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade we conclude that the forum clause should control absent a strong [reason] showing that it should be set aside…The correct approach would have been to enforce the forum clause specifically unless Zapata could clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for reconsideration. We note, however, that there is nothing in the record presently before us that would support a refusal to enforce the forum clause. The Court of Appeals suggested that enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of the forum under Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 75 S.Ct. 629, 99 L.Ed. 911 (1955), because of the prospect that the English courts would enforce the clauses of the towage contract purporting to exculpate Unterweser from liability for damages to the Chaparral. A contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision…
89 It is also significant that the majority in Akai went on to say (at 447):
…we note that considerations of public policy present in an Australian court may flow from, even if not expressly mandated by the terms of, the Constitution or statute in force in the Australian forum. Thus, the courts may disregard or refuse effect to contractual obligations which, whilst not directly contrary to any express or implied statutory prohibition, nevertheless contravene "the policy of the law" as discerned from a consideration of the scope and purpose of the particular statute. The Parliament has made particular legislative provision in the case of certain contracts of insurance and, to that extent, there may be curtailed or qualified in an Australian court what otherwise would be the freedom to choose a forum in which the Act has no application…
90 Before we explain why the exclusive jurisdiction clause offends the public policy of the forum by reference to the various provisions of the CCA and other public policy considerations, we will mention one specific argument relating to the operation of ss 86 and 138 of the CCA. It is sufficient if we concentrate our attention on s 86.
91 Epic submits that the Federal Court is the mandatory forum for this dispute as, on the proper construction of s 86, the Federal Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine and grant remedies in respect of a case under Pt IV. The primary judge found s 86(4) to be "a rule concerned with the distribution of jurisdiction" and as such it was "unlikely that it speaks to the position of foreign courts": at [58] J.
92 Epic submits that the primary judge erred in construing s 86(4) of the CCA, as the provision is not simply concerned with "the distribution of jurisdiction" domestically; it "vests" jurisdiction specifically in the Federal Court to the exclusion of all courts including foreign courts.
93 Epic points to s 4 of the CCA which provides that "the Court or the Federal Court" (noting the use of the definite article) means "the Federal Court of Australia". Section 86(1) then provides that "the Federal Court" has jurisdiction over "any matter arising under this Act". Section 86(4) also states this jurisdiction is "exclusive of the jurisdiction of any other court".
94 Epic then refers to Re Douglas Webber Events Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1544; (2014) 291 FLR 173, where Brereton J refused to stay the proceedings, and in doing so considered the meaning of "Court" as distinct from "court" in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). His Honour held at [34]:
… even if the forum's choice of law rules would otherwise permit a foreign statutory claim to be litigated before it [as to which see A.S. Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation, Oxford 2003, [3.111]], there is an additional obstacle where the statute confers jurisdiction only on a specified court or courts, not including a foreign court. Corporations Act, s 237, confers jurisdiction on "the Court". Section 1317H similarly confers jurisdiction on "a Court". Sections 232 and 233 likewise confer jurisdiction on "the Court". By s 58AA, "Court" means, relevantly, any of the Federal Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of a State or Territory of Australia, or the Family Court of Australia. No other court may exercise the powers given by those sections. Necessarily, that means that no foreign court may do so. (Where, under the Act, jurisdiction is not limited to a "Court" but given to any "court", it is at least arguable that a foreign court whose choice of law rules selected Australian law as applicable would be able to exercise such Corporations Act jurisdiction as is exercisable by any "court", as distinct from a "Court").
(Emphasis added.)
95 Despite Epic's submission, it can be accepted that two or more interpretations of s 86 are open, one functioning as a distribution of jurisdiction domestically, and one having the effect contended for by Epic. In view of our approach to the public policy considerations, and our decision that there are "strong reasons" to refuse a stay, we do not need to further address the issue of the proper construction of s 86 (or s 138) of the CCA. We will proceed to consider Epic's submission that even if s 86 is solely dealing with the domestic distribution of jurisdiction, the reasoning which underpins that distribution applies with even greater force in respect of foreign courts, and in this regard forms part of the indicia in the CCA that public policy requires the Federal Court to hear the proceeding.
96 We will address this issue by reference to this proceeding and the ambit of the claims being brought by Epic. The nature of the particular proceeding is the relevant focus of the inquiry as to whether public policy considerations constitute a strong reason not to grant a stay.
97 As the primary judge accepted, this proceeding involves serious issues of public policy and the effect of the proceeding below "will be particularly far reaching": at [57], [63] J. This is because the alleged contravening conduct has, and is continuing to, adversely affect the state of competition in markets in Australia and very large numbers of Australians. Apple and Google submit that there is nothing about the proceeding that is "unique" to Australian markets, and that in fact the proceeding is concerned with two global markets. This may be so, but there is no doubt that the proceeding will impact on Australian consumers and will involve the application of Australian substantive law.
98 We do accept that not every claim brought under the CCA benefits consumers even if successful. For instance, in Casaceli, it was found that the dispute in question was in substance a commercial dispute, and the claims under the Trade Practices Act (which were mostly claims for misleading or deceptive conduct, rather than Pt IV claims) were window dressing. At [50], Jagot J observed: "It seems to me that the applicants sought to surround their claims with an aura of important public policy issues when, in substance, the dispute is a commercial cause between two companies involved in the international furniture trade by which one company seeks damages from another". It is for this reason that it is important to look at the particular proceedings before the Court to determine whether public policy considerations relevantly apply.
99 However, some general comments can be made as to Pt IV of the CCA. As we will explain, there is a legislative policy that claims pursuant to Pt IV should be determined in Australia, preferably in the Federal Court. This public policy reflects the economic significance for Australia of conduct regulated by Pt IV and is reflected in the legislative intention that, with limited and carefully prescribed exceptions, Pt IV contraventions should be heard by this Court.
100 Part IV of the CCA prohibits a range of anti-competitive practices including: civil and criminal cartel conduct (Pt IV Div 1); exclusionary conduct (ss 45, 45E); misuse of market power (s 46); exclusive dealing (s 47); resale price maintenance (s 48); anticompetitive mergers (s 50); and secondary boycotts (ss 45D-45DD).
101 What each of these provisions has in common is a concern with the protection of competition in Australian markets. Competition promotes efficiency in the production, distribution and sale of goods and services. Through the promotion of competition, the CCA aims to enhance the welfare of Australians: see s 2 of the CCA. Australian consumers depend critically on competition to ensure that they receive the best, most innovative products and services, at the most efficient prices.
102 The distinguishing feature of Pt IV claims is that usually by their very nature they have a public dimension, whereas in a number of cases, ACL contraventions consist of private disputes either between a consumer and a business or between businesses.
103 This difference helps explain why under the CCA jurisdiction for Pt IV matters is conferred exclusively on the Federal Court, but jurisdiction for ACL matters is also conferred on state courts (including inferior state courts): s 138B of the CCA. Originally, the Federal Court also had exclusive jurisdiction for the consumer protection provisions contained in Pt V of the Trade Practices Act. Jurisdiction for federal consumer protection provisions was eventually conferred on state courts by the Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1987 (Cth).
104 There are clear advantages in having Pt IV claims heard in this Court: they can be determined by specialist judges with relevant expertise, the Commission can intervene if necessary, private parties can obtain the benefit of any factual findings and admissions, and the Court's ultimate judgment can contribute to the development of a single, coherent body of doctrine. If Pt IV claims are heard in a foreign court then these benefits will be lost.
105 It is important to recall that even private proceedings play an important role in supplementing the role of the Commission in enforcing the provisions of Pt IV of the CCA. Although the Commission has investigative powers that a private litigant does not possess and can seek relief that a private litigant cannot (most notably pecuniary penalties), in many respects, litigation commenced by private parties can achieve the same benefits. Private litigants can obtain injunctive relief under s 80 to stop the relevant conduct. Private litigation can also help develop and clarify the law, set guidelines for participants in industries, encourage industry participants to change their practices and deter future contraventions.
106 We do not accept that the public interest in having disputes concerning Pt IV of the CCA and s 21 of the ACL determined in the Federal Court is sufficiently safeguarded by the ability of the Commission to bring proceedings in the Federal Court free of any contractual constraint.
107 This proceeding itself illustrates the way in which private proceedings can present important opportunities for clarifying the law. Section 46 of the CCA, which regulates the behaviour of corporations with a substantial degree of market power, is a key provision in Pt IV. Epic's claim against Apple relies on the new s 46, which was amended with effect from 6 November 2017, and is yet to be the subject of judicial interpretation by this Court.
108 We have already referred to the platform provisions, which are of significant importance in the operation of the legislative scheme and specific relief that is available in this Court. Having regard to the issues in this proceeding, and the impact a determination by this Court will have on consumers in Australia, this is a very strong policy consideration that favours denying a stay of this proceeding.
109 We accept that a foreign court could apply the provisions of the CCA in a proceeding before it and that at a general level appropriate injunctions and declarations could be ordered: but the platform provisions would not be available.
110 Further, if contraventions of Pt IV of the CCA are determined by foreign courts they will be determined through the prism of expert evidence about the content of Australian law (as acknowledged by the primary judge at [63] J). This process is not the same as ascertaining and applying the law directly. One of the difficulties and uncertainties involved in proving foreign law is the risk that important aspects of the foreign law will be lost in translation. Matters of meaning and context may be overlooked or misconstrued. Similarly, just as a judgment of this Court applying the laws of the United States is unlikely to make a contribution to US jurisprudence, any judgment of a US court, applying Australian law, is unlikely to make a contribution to the body of doctrine on Pt IV.
111 In coming to the view that a stay should not be granted, we do not cavil with the proposition that exclusive jurisdiction clauses are a significant feature of global commerce, being a major tool in limiting jurisdictional risk and exposure: see, eg, Incitec at [43] (Allsop J (as his Honour then was)); Australian Health at [78]-[79] (Bell P, Bathurst CJ and Leeming JA agreeing). Undoubtedly, the enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction clauses stimulates commerce by preventing a multiplicity of suits arising out of the same dispute, and removing or reducing the risk of inconsistent factual findings: Australian Health at [75], [81], [92]; Incitec at [47], [52]-[56]; Global Partners at [67] (Spigelman CJ, with whom Giles and Tobias JJA agreed). As stated by Spigelman CJ in Global Partners at [67], "[t]here is a clear commercial interest in minimising the possibility of a dispute being determined by multiple tribunals, with the consequent prospect of divergent findings".
112 Avoiding inconsistent factual findings is a strong public policy consideration here, where both of the parties to the agreement containing the exclusive jurisdiction clause are engaged in global commerce and offer goods and services across international borders. Apple points out that this consideration is even more powerful where, as in this case, a group of companies carrying on business internationally institute several proceedings across a number of jurisdictions involving overlapping allegations of fact, including the existence of a global market, the technical aspects of the operation of the App Store, the circumstances of the removal of Fortnite, and some elements of the market analysis.
113 Apple also submits that the enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction clauses serves the public good of holding commercial persons to their promises. Parties who operate in international commerce and have agreed to an exclusive jurisdiction clause have decided, for whatever reason, that the forum specified in such a clause is acceptable to them. Apple submits the parties should appreciate the agreement they made and be held to it.
114 It is these matters that form the basis of Apple's submission that Epic's account of the public policy considerations is incomplete and overstates the public benefit in having claims under Pt IV of the CCA and s 21 of the ACL decided in the Federal Court, and that there are countervailing and competing policy considerations that must be taken into account.
115 We should address the point raised by Apple that even within the Australian context it is not the case that the Federal Court has unique standing when it comes to interpretation and enforcement of the CCA: it is said by Apple that courts other than the Federal Court are authorised to determine Pt IV claims and so the Federal Court is not the "sole arbiter" of matters under Pt IV of the CCA (even domestically) and no legislative intention to that effect can properly be inferred.
116 We recognise that other Australian courts may determine Pt IV claims, but within a limited compass and for specific reasons.
117 Just before we go to that matter, it is to be noted that the Australian Competition Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear applications including to grant or revoke authorisations permitting conduct and arrangements that would otherwise be prohibited under Pt IV of the CCA because of their anti-competitive effect and to review determinations by the Commission in relation to the issue of notices concerning exclusive dealing or resale price maintenance: ss 101-101A of the CCA. However, this is not the same thing as jurisdiction to hear claims in relation to contraventions of Pt IV of the CCA, which is what we are concerned with in this appeal. Further, the Australian Competition Tribunal is a branch of the executive, and has limited powers as prescribed by legislation.
118 Then there are three qualifications to the Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction that should be noted which permit other Australian courts to determine Pt IV claims. The first is for private claims under s 46, in respect of which jurisdiction is also conferred on the Federal Circuit Court: s 86(1A). This provision was introduced by the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Cth), and as explained in the accompanying explanatory memorandum (at [1.7]-[1.8]), was made to address concerns expressed about the costs and delays in bringing s 46 matters.
119 The second is s 4(1) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) ('CVA'), which relevantly vests the Supreme Courts of the states with jurisdiction that they would not otherwise have where the Federal Court has jurisdiction with respect to that civil matter. This provision confers jurisdiction even in respect of matters where another Act specifies that the Federal Court's jurisdiction is exclusive. However, this creates only a narrow exception, given that the CVA: (i) specifically excludes some provisions of Pt IV of the CCA from the conferral of jurisdiction (s 4(4)); (ii) otherwise designates a matter arising under Pt IV of the CCA as a "special federal matter" which absent "special reasons" must be transferred to the Federal Court (ss 3, 6(1), 6(3)); and (iii) in determining whether there are "special reasons" requires the court to have regard to the "general rule that special federal matters should be heard by the Federal Court …" (s 6(6)(a)).
120 The third is the Code, which allows claims under the Schedule version of Pt IV of the CCA to be determined by state courts. The Code was introduced by the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth) and corresponding state and territory enabling legislation. The purpose of the Code was to extend the competition conduct rules in Pt IV to unincorporated businesses which are mostly exempt under the CCA. The Commission would remain the sole enforcement agency, and all enforcement action would continue to be brought in the Federal Court. The original legislative scheme provided for the states and territories to confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court for matters arising under the Code. Insofar as the states purported to confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court, this scheme proved ineffective following the High Court's decision in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally [1999] HCA 27; (1999) 198 CLR 511, but it nevertheless evidences the collective legislative intention that the Federal Court was the appropriate court to determine Pt IV matters. Under the CCA (s 150D), the Federal Court may exercise jurisdiction conferred on it by law of the ACT or the Northern Territory in respect of matters under the Code, and under the CVA (s 3), such matters are designated as "special federal matters".
121 We do not accept that this Court (in relation to the proceeding now before this Court) has not been given the responsibility to determine the dispute before it, as contemplated by the legislative policy described above.
122 We do not need to rehearse what we have written already, other than to say that Epic was entitled to the legitimate forensic advantages presented by the CCA, and being required to litigate this proceeding in the US Court would deprive Epic of these advantages. The proceeding involves fundamental public interest issues in relation to conduct undertaken in an Australian sub-market, and involves an Australian company that is not itself a party to the exclusive jurisdiction clause. We also consider that there are considerations of public policy in relation to Pt IV claims that flow from the scope and purpose of the CCA in the sense contemplated by Akai (at 445, 447) and indicate this proceeding ought to be heard in this Court. The focus should not only be on the nature of competition law, but the significance of the statutory provisions which allow the Commission to intervene, private parties to get the benefit of factual findings and admission, and the relevance of the Federal Court being chosen by the legislature as the court of its choice. In these circumstances, notwithstanding the countervailing public policy considerations that Apple relies upon, there are strong reasons to refuse to grant a stay of Epic's proceeding and to decline to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction clause.