Mandatory transfer does not equal new substantive jurisdiction. Section 5 sets out mandatory transfer duties, but s 5(9) states explicitly that nothing in that section confers jurisdiction that the court would not otherwise have. That means a transfer may change forum but does not solve a jurisdictional shortfall: parties and practitioners must ensure that the transferee court has an independent basis to exercise the necessary jurisdiction beyond the fact of transfer (s 5(9); cf s 15 which requires the Act to be read so as not to exceed State legislative power).
Appeal bars are narrow but potent. Section 13 bars appeals from decisions about transfer or removal under the Act and from determinations about which rules of evidence and procedure apply under s 11(1). Section 7 also restricts some appellate routes between Federal Court, Family Court and State Full Courts. The combined effect is to make transfer and certain procedural decisions effectively final. Parties should not assume ready interlocutory appellate relief against a transfer decision rooted in the Act (s 13, s 7).
Notification requirement before retaining special federal matters. Section 6(3) allows the Supreme Court to retain a special federal matter only for "special reasons" other than convenience, but s 6(4) requires written notice to the Commonwealth and State Attorneys‑General and a reasonable time to elapse before such an order. Failure to comply with the notice requirement does not invalidate an inadvertent determination (s 6(8)), but failing to provide notice before intentionally retaining a special federal matter may expose the court to criticism and means the court cannot lawfully exercise the retention power without following the statutory process (s 6(3)‑(5)).
Practice rights after transfer are defined but limited to entitlement to practise. Section 5(8) grants practitioners the same entitlement to practise in relation to the transferred proceeding and related proceedings in the transferee court that they would have if the transferee court were a federal court exercising federal jurisdiction. That protects practitioner appearance, but it does not address fee structures, professional conduct differences, or other administrative or regulatory differences that may apply in a different jurisdiction. The entitlement is explicitly tied to being "entitled to practise as an Australian legal practitioner in a court" (s 5(8)).
Choice of law can be counterintuitive. Section 11(1)(a) directs a transferee court to apply the law in force where it sits including choice of law rules; but s 11(1)(b) requires a court to apply the written and unwritten law of another State or Territory when the matter is a right of action arising under that other State’s written law. Practitioners must therefore identify whether a cause of action is grounded in a State’s written law or whether the claim is governed by the forum State’s law. Mischaracterising the source of the right of action can produce unexpected choice‑of‑law outcomes (s 11(1)(a)‑(b)).
Special federal matter transfers can be partial. Section 6(1A) (inserted by amendment) instructs that the court must only transfer so much of the proceeding as is, in the court’s opinion, within the jurisdiction (including accrued jurisdiction) of the Federal Court or the alternative court (s 6(1A)). This can produce piecemeal transfers where only parts of a proceeding are moved, creating potential coordination and duplication issues.
Section 6A deviates from the general pattern where Commonwealth authorities act under State enactments. Section 6A can operate to keep related State proceedings together rather than mechanically sending the federal element to federal court. That is advantageous when related State matters are pending, but it requires careful analysis of the "interests of justice" and the definitions in s 6A(1) to establish applicability. Practitioners may mistakenly assume s 5 or s 6 automatically requires transfer in such cases; s 6A modifies that expectation and prevents mandatory operation of s 5 and s 6 in those precise circumstances (s 6A(2)‑(4)).
Suspension and revival governor powers require lead time. Section 16(1) allows the Governor to suspend operation of the Act by proclamation only on and from a day not earlier than three years after proclamation under s 2(2) unless the limited exception in s 16(2) is met. Section 16(2) requires at least six months’ notice by the Attorney‑General to the Commonwealth and other States before the Governor makes a suspension proclamation taking effect on a particular day. That timetable constraint is a compliance consideration for executive actors contemplating suspension (s 16(1)‑(2)).
Transitional application remains for some proceedings. Section 17 preserves the pre‑1992 version of s 6 for proceedings pending to which the former s 6 applied immediately before the 1992 amendments. Practitioners handling older proceedings should confirm which formulation applies to their case as the transitional saving may affect transfer obligations (s 17).
No penalties for non‑compliance by courts. The Act imposes duties but contains no express penalties against a court that fails to comply, and s 6(8) protects the validity of inadvertent determinations. Parties should therefore be cautious: procedural missteps by courts may not always translate into reversible error or sanctions. Appeal avenues may be narrow (s 13).