EOJ21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 2090

1. The applicants, citizens of Nepal, seek judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 17 November 2021. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the applicants a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (protection visa). This Court has jurisdiction to determine this matter pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
2. The issues for determination raised in this matter are as follows:

(a) Whether the Tribunal failed to comply with s 425(1) of the Act in failing to inform the first applicant of a dispositive issue in relation to country information.

(b) Whether the Tribunal failed to consider a claim or an integer of a claim being that the first applicant would be targeted by the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) because of both his claim based on political opinion (political profile) and his claim to be a member of a social group who was perceived as being wealthy due to his time overseas (perception of wealth).

(c) Whether the Tribunal misused country information as to the treatment of returnees.

1. For the reasons which follow, I find the applicants have not demonstrated jurisdictional error and I dismiss the application.

1. The first applicant is the primary applicant for the protection visa. The second and third applicants are the first applicant's wife and younger son respectively. They are members of the same family unit, whose claims are largely dependent on the first applicant's claims. In this judgment, reference will only be made to the first applicant as the primary applicant for the protection visa.
2. The first applicant arrived in Australia on 23 January 2009 on a student visa (Court Book (CB) 187). He completed an Advanced Diploma of Business Management in December 2010. He then completed an Advanced Diploma of Accounting and a Bachelor of Professional Accounting in October 2013 and June 2015 respectively in Australia. From July 2015 to August 2017, the first applicant stayed in Australia to work as a chef. The first applicant's most recent date of arrival in Australia was 27 February 2017 ([4] of the Tribunal's reasons).

1. On 7 September 2017, the first applicant applied for a protection visa (CB 23 to 102). The first applicant was assisted by Shamser Thapa & Associates in making his application (first applicant's representative).

1. The first applicant's claims were set out in his statement dated 7 September 2017 attached to his protection visa application (CB 101 and 102). The Tribunal at [5] of its reasons fairly summarised the claims as follows:

(a) In February 2017, the first applicant went to Nepal to visit his parents, friends and relatives in preparation for moving back to Nepal permanently after eight years in Australia.

(b) When the first applicant was in Nepal in 2017, the situation suddenly became too dangerous for him. The first applicant was going to Kathmandu from his home village to see his elder son who was studying in Kathmandu. Some people who called themselves supporters of the Maoists asked the first applicant for money. The first applicant said he was from an ordinary family and could not give them money. They threatened the first applicant and told him they knew him well, where he came from and his family background and that if he did not give them money, anything could happen to him and it would be his fault (2017 incident).

(c) Although the Maoists had joined the peace process and was in the government, it appeared to the first applicant that their behaviour had not changed. When they were fighting they used to come to the first applicant's home and give him and his parents trouble.

(d) The first applicant was a supporter of the Communist Party of Nepal. The Maoists usually targeted the supporters of other parties. The Maoists thought the first applicant had a lot of money because he was living in Australia.

(e) The first applicant tried to inform the police but the police did not register the first applicant's complaint. After this, the first applicant feared the police were protecting the Maoists who targeted innocent people like him.

(f) Because of what happened the first applicant came back to Australia earlier than he planned. Once the first applicant arrived in Australia he was thinking of applying for a protection visa for his safety but he was also waiting for his younger son to arrive in Australia.

(g) When the first applicant's son arrived, the first applicant thought he would continue his study and complete a Masters degree and return to Nepal after that if the situation was favourable.

(h) The first applicant then applied for a student visa with an offer letter for a Master of Professional Accounting as his visa was due to expire soon. The Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) considered that the application was invalid.

(i) The first applicant had no choice. He could not return to Nepal because of fears for his safety. The first applicant feared for his life after the 2017 incident outlined above and wished to apply for a protection visa.

1. By letter dated 26 November 2018 sent to the first applicant's representative, the Department requested the first applicant attend an interview on 20 December 2018 with a delegate of the Department to discuss his visa application and claims that he was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations (CB 120 and 121).
2. On 21 January 2019, the first applicant attended the protection visa interview with a delegate of the Department (CB 161).

1. On 22 January 2019, a delegate of the Minister refused the first applicant's protection visa application on the basis that the first applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations (CB 143 to 155). The delegate found that the first applicant had a right to enter and reside in India under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (No. 1302) (India/Nepal 31 July 1950) by virtue of his Nepalese citizenship, and therefore the first applicant had statutory effective protection in a third country. The first applicant would only require a passport to enter India and he had not taken steps to enter India. Accordingly, the first applicant had not taken all possible steps to exercise his right to enter and reside in India. Further, the delegate found that the first applicant did not have a well-founded fear that India would return him to a country in which he had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason or where there were substantial grounds for believing that the first applicant would be at real risk of suffering significant harm. The delegate did not make any express findings in relation to the first applicant's claims to fear harm in Nepal, but rather found the first applicant had statutory effective protection in a third country, being India.

1. On 15 February 2019, the first applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (CB 156 to 158).
2. By letter dated 19 February 2019 to the first applicant's representative, the Tribunal invited the first applicant to provide any material or written arguments in support of the application (CB 174 and 175).
3. By letter dated 18 August 2021 to the first applicant's representative, the Tribunal invited the first applicant to appear before it by video conference to give evidence and present arguments (CB 198 to 201). Further, the Tribunal invited the first applicant to provide all documents he intended to rely on to support his case and a written submission setting out all claims made and maintained to the Tribunal (CB 199). On 19 August 2021, the first applicant's representative sent to the Tribunal a completed "Response to hearing invitation" form signed by the first applicant (CB 214 to 217).
4. On 31 August 2021 (CB 220) and 1 September 2021 (CB 279), the first applicant's representative submitted the following documents to the Tribunal:

(a) additional written statement of the first applicant dated 26 August 2021, which repeated his earlier claims and provided additional reasons for not being able to enter and reside in another country such as India (CB 223 to 227);

(b) various newspaper articles with respect to returning to Nepal (CB 228 to 244);

(c) the Nepal 2019 Human Rights Report by the United States Department of State (CB 245 to 278); and

(d) written submissions in support of the application prepared by the first applicant's representative in which the first applicant's representative noted that the Department appeared to have accepted the first applicant would face persecution in Nepal and the only reason for refusal was that the first applicant had a right to enter and reside in India (CB 282 to 294). The written submissions addressed the issue of whether the first applicant had a right to enter and reside in India.

1. On 7 September 2021, the first applicant attended a Tribunal hearing by video conference, assisted by his representative, Mr Komal Khatiwada, and an interpreter in the Nepali and English languages (First Hearing) (CB 295 to 298).
2. On 15 September 2021, the Tribunal invited the first applicant to attend a second hearing scheduled on 5 October 2021 (Second Hearing) (CB 302 to 304) and provide all documents he intended to rely on to support his case and a written submission setting out all claims made and maintained to the Tribunal. On 20 September 2021, the first applicant's representative sent to the Tribunal a further completed "Response to hearing invitation" form signed by the first applicant (CB 306 to 312).
3. On 5 October 2021, the first applicant attended the Second Hearing by video conference, assisted by his representative, Mr Komal Khatiwada, and an interpreter in the Nepali and English languages (CB 319 to 321).

1. The Tribunal noted the first applicant's claims as set out in his protection visa application and in the statement accompanying his protection visa application at [5] of its reasons, which are reproduced at [7] of this judgment. The Tribunal recorded that on 21 January 2019, the first applicant attended an interview with a delegate of the Department and reiterated his claims ([6] of its reasons).
2. The Tribunal noted that the first applicant's representative sent to the Tribunal on 31 August 2021 written submissions, an additional statement from the first applicant, country information comprising newspaper articles and the Nepal 2019 Human Rights Report ([10] of its reasons), and the first applicant appeared before it on 7 September 2021 and 5 October 2021 to give evidence and present arguments ([13] of its reasons).
3. The Tribunal indicated that the primary issue for determination was whether the first applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations ([21] of its reasons). The Tribunal at [26] of its reasons outlined the first applicant's evidence given at the hearing as to the 2017 incident, at which time the first applicant provided more details as to what had allegedly occurred.
4. The Tribunal found aspects of the first applicant's evidence to be lacking in detail and implausible, which undermined his credibility, and found the first applicant's profile did not support his claims for fearing harm if he returned to Nepal in the foreseeable future ([23] of its reasons) for the following reasons:

(a) First, the Tribunal found that the first applicant had a generally low political profile, which might have increased moderately for a short period during election time in 1999 and 2008, but he was not a person of particular political influence in his village or anywhere else. The Tribunal was prepared to accept that the first applicant was involved in political activities in the village in the week leading up to the election in 1999 and 2008 but found that he was not active politically at any other time. The Tribunal accepted the first applicant's evidence that he did not have any problems with the Maoists as a result of his political activities prior to the alleged 2017 incident and had not been actively involved in politics in Nepal since leaving in 2009 ([32] of its reasons).

(b) Second, the Tribunal was prepared to accept that the first applicant encountered Maoists in his village in 1996 on four occasions, and the first applicant's parents cooked for the Maoists twice. The Tribunal was also prepared to accept that during the first applicant's interaction with the Maoists in 1996, the Maoists asked the first applicant to join them and he refused. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the first applicant was targeted by Maoists in 2017 because he refused to join them in 1996 ([33] to [40] of its reasons).

(c) Third, the Tribunal did not accept it as plausible that the Maoists would target people in secret so that they could keep their good reputation among the villagers ([41] to [44] of its reasons).

(d) Fourth, the first applicant's evidence about payment of money to the Maoists varied from his protection visa application claims and the Tribunal hearing, and the Tribunal found it implausible that after targeting him and threatening his life if he did not pay them, the Maoists did not contact him or anyone in his family to attempt to obtain the money ([45] to [51] of its reasons).

(e) Fifth, the Tribunal did not accept that the first applicant's past political involvement was the reason that he was allegedly targeted by the Maoists in 2017, given the Tribunal's finding as to the first applicant's low political profile, the claimed 2017 incident occurred a long time after the first applicant left Nepal and the first applicant having had no active political involvement since 2008 ([57] of its reasons). Further, in relation to the first applicant's claim that the possible reason he was targeted was because the Maoists thought he had a lot of money as he had been living in Australia, the Tribunal stated that it put country information to the first applicant, which suggested that while forced donation was quite regularly encountered in Nepal, country information did not support a claim that Nepalis who had spent time overseas were targeted simply for having worked in Western countries and being perceived as wealthy ([58] of its reasons). The Tribunal did not accept this claim because this was not supported by country information.

1. Ultimately, the Tribunal at [59] of its reasons stated that it did not accept the first applicant's claims about why he was targeted by the Maoists in 2017, or that he was targeted by the Maoists in 2017 for any other reason. The Tribunal found the first applicant had not been truthful in his account of the claimed events ([60] of its reasons).
2. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the first applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons set out in the Act or for any other reason, or that he was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act, and affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the first applicant a protection visa.

1. On 14 July 2025, the applicants' amended application for judicial review was accepted for filing and raised the following grounds (as per original):
   1. The Second Respondent made jurisdictional error by failing to comply with s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 and to inform the Applicant of the critical issues for determination.

Particulars

(a) The Second Respondent decided the matter on an entirely different basis to the Delegate.

(b) Further particulars will be provided when a transcript of the hearing becomes available.

(c) The Second Respondent did not place before the Applicant country information critical to his claims, relating to the perception of persons returning to Nepal after lengthy periods overseas.

1. The Second Respondent made jurisdictional error by constructively failing to exercise jurisdiction or alternatively failing to consider the component integers of the claim by considering the political opinion of the Applicant and his long period in Australia as separate claims when his claims related to both.
2. The Second Respondent made jurisdictional error at [68] and [58] by misusing country information relating to Nepalis who are targeted quite simply for having worked in Western countries and being perceived as wealthy when his claim was not as simple as that to which the country information related.
3. Additional grounds will be raised by way of an amended application when a transcript of the AAT hearing becomes available.

1. The first applicant was represented at the hearing before me by Mr J R Young of counsel (Mr Young). The Minister was represented by Ms Kerrie Pieri (Ms Pieri), a solicitor from MinterEllison.
2. The Minister tendered the Court Book, which was marked "Exhibit 1". The first applicant read his own affidavit affirmed on 11 July 2025 (First Applicant's Affidavit), which annexed the transcript of the Tribunal's Second Hearing (Second Tribunal Hearing Transcript) and an extract of the transcript of the Tribunal's First Hearing. Further, the first applicant tendered the DFAT Country Information Nepal 2019 Report (DFAT Country Information Report), which was marked "Exhibit 2".
3. The first applicant relied on Mr Shamser Singh Thapa's and Mr Young's written submissions accepted for filing on 14 July 2025 and 21 August 2025 and the Minister relied on his written submissions accepted for filing on 25 July 2025 and 15 August 2025. Mr Young and Ms Pieri also made oral submissions at the hearing.

1. Ground 1 alleged that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 425(1) of the Act in that the Tribunal failed to inform the first applicant of "critical issues for determination". The first applicant raised three particulars in relation to this ground. However, at the hearing, Mr Young submitted that particular (a), which alleged the Tribunal decided the matter on an entirely different basis to the delegate, was simply stating that fact. Mr Young did not press particular (b) and there were no further particulars provided in relation to particular (b). Mr Young submitted that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 425(1) in that it was required to raise with the first applicant the substance of the country information critical to his claims relating to the perception of persons returning to Nepal after lengthy periods overseas, but failed to do so, thereby denying the first applicant procedural fairness.
2. There is no issue that the delegate decided the matter on the basis that the first applicant had statutory effective protection in a third country, whereas on the other hand, the Tribunal decided the matter on the basis that it did not accept the first applicant's claims that he was targeted by the Maoists in 2017 due to his political profile. Further, the Tribunal did not accept the first applicant was targeted by the Maoists on the basis of perception of wealth because the country information did not support such a claim.

1. At the relevant time, s 425(1) provided that the Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. In SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63 (SZBEL) at [44], the High Court found that the obligation to invite the applicant to appear at a hearing to give evidence and present arguments relating to "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review" imports a procedural fairness obligation that the applicant would be given a sufficient opportunity to give evidence, or make submissions, about determinative issues arising in relation to the decision under review (per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).
2. The High Court at [34] of SZBEL found that "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review [for the purposes of s 425(1)] are to be identified having regard not only to the fact that the Tribunal may exercise all the powers and discretions conferred by the Act on the original decision-maker, but also to the fact that the Tribunal is to review that particular decision, for which the decision-maker will have given reasons".
3. At [35] and [36], the High Court in SZBEL said:
   1. The Tribunal is not confined to whatever may have been the issues that the delegate considered. The issues that arise in relation to the decision are to be identified by the Tribunal. But if the Tribunal takes no step to identify some issue other than those that the delegate considered dispositive, and does not tell the applicant what that other issue is, the applicant is entitled to assume that the issues the delegate considered dispositive are "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review". That is why the point at which to begin the identification of issues arising in relation to the decision under review will usually be the reasons given for that decision. And unless some other additional issues are identified by the Tribunal (as they may be), it would ordinarily follow that, on review by the Tribunal, the issues arising in relation to the decision under review would be those which the original decision maker identified as determinative against the applicant.
   2. It is also important to recognise that the invitation to an applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and make submissions is an invitation that need not be extended if the Tribunal considers that it should decide the review in the applicant's favour. Ordinarily then, as was the case here, the Tribunal will begin its interview of an applicant who has accepted the Tribunal's invitation to appear, knowing that it is not persuaded by the material already before it to decide the review in the applicant's favour. That lack of persuasion may be based on particular questions the Tribunal has about specific aspects of the material already before it; it may be based on nothing more particular than a general unease about the veracity of what is revealed in that material. But unless the Tribunal tells the applicant something different, the applicant would be entitled to assume that the reasons given by the delegate for refusing to grant the application will identify the issues that arise in relation to that decision.
4. At [47] of SZBEL, the High Court in relation to what steps would be sufficient for the Tribunal to take to identify additional dispositive issues said the following:

... there may well be cases, perhaps many cases, where either the delegate's decision, or the Tribunal's statements or questions during a hearing, sufficiently indicate to an applicant that everything he or she says in support of the application is in issue. That indication may be given in many ways. It is not necessary (and often would be inappropriate) for the Tribunal to put to an applicant, in so many words, that he or she is lying, that he or she may not be accepted as a witness of truth, or that he or she may be thought to be embellishing the account that is given of certain events. The proceedings are not adversarial and the Tribunal is not, and is not to adopt the position of, a contradictor. But where, as here, there are specific aspects of an applicant's account, that the Tribunal considers may be important to the decision and may be open to doubt, the Tribunal must at least ask the applicant to expand upon those aspects of the account and ask the applicant to explain why the account should be accepted.

1. Although the first applicant did not contend the Tribunal failed to raise as a dispositive issue that it may decide the matter on the basis that it did not accept the first applicant's claims that he was targeted by the Maoists in 2017, I note the Second Tribunal Hearing Transcript makes clear the Tribunal's statements and questions during the hearing sufficiently indicated to the first applicant that a dispositive issue maybe that the Tribunal did not accept his claims. From pp 13 to 23, the Tribunal questioned the first applicant as to aspects of his claim and raised with the first applicant that it had difficulty accepting parts of his story, which were as follows:

(a) At Tp13.12-15, the first applicant gave evidence that he believed the reason why the Maoists did not go back to his village two weeks after they had asked the first applicant for money was because some Maoists were "informed that [he hadn't] returned to the village, therefore they didn't come... But if [he] had returned there, definitely they would come". The Tribunal member said "[t]his sounds very speculative to me...(as) they were so keen to get the money from [him] (but) didn't come back to try to find [him] or speak to [his] family" for getting money (Tp13.17-21).

(b) When asked whether the Maoists ever contacted the first applicant to see where he was or where he had gone, the first applicant said they did not as he came to Australia and they did not know his mobile number (Tp14.5-6). When asked whether the Maoists contacted or pressurised his family in order to get money from the first applicant, and whether the Maoists were angry that the first applicant disappeared and wanted to "take some consequence" with his family (Tp14.13), the first applicant said his family was not contacted and the Maoists would not take revenge against his family as they had joined the peace process and this would "get the attention...from the public" (Tp14.9-11, 15-20). In response, the Tribunal member said he had "some difficulty or some doubts about whether all of that [was] true and whether it ma[de] sense" (Tp14.21-23).

(c) At Tp18.28-36, the first applicant gave evidence that the Maoists targeted him because he never supported Maoists or their cadres, and he opposed the Maoists' request for the first applicant's parents to cook for them. The first applicant said "all the time [he] used to oppose them". The first applicant also believed the other reason why the Maoists targeted him was because the Maoists would be greatly impacted if the first applicant returned to his village and became an active member of his own party. Further, the first applicant believed that the Maoists gave him a hard time by targeting him so that he would be staying in Australia and not go back to Nepal" (Tp19.1-7). The Tribunal found that "the reasons [he had] mentioned [were] quite speculative" and it appeared that the first applicant was not sure why the Maoists targeted him, which made it difficult for the Tribunal member to accept that there was any particular reason for the Maoists to target him (Tp19.9-14). Further, the Tribunal found that the reasons the first applicant gave were not "very plausible" as the first applicant was not extremely active in politics and "didn't attract any bad attention from the Maoists" which would cause the Maoists, who were then in Government, to worry about the first applicant's personal influence if he went back to Nepal (Tp19.28-36).

(d) In considering the answers given by the first applicant regarding what happened to the him when he opposed the Maoists' demands to join them, the Tribunal found that "some of that evidence to be inconsistent and some of it a bit vague", which "raise[d] some concerns...about whether or not, [he could] rely on it". The Tribunal also found there were "some aspects of [the first applicant's] evidence about the incident with the Maoists in Nepal...in 2017 that [he] might find hard to accept", and "[t]hose concerns might make it difficult for [him] to accept that [the first applicant's] claims to fear harm if [he] return[ed] to Nepal [were] genuine" (Tp21.33-Tp22.2).

1. In any event, I note that Mr Young at the hearing before me contended particular (a) of ground 1 was setting out the background to the matter but was not alleging a separate jurisdictional error (Tp27.35-45).

1. At [58] and [68] of the Tribunal's reasons, in relation to the first applicant's claim to be targeted by the Maoists as he was perceived to be wealthy, the Tribunal stated that it discussed with the first applicant during the hearing that:

"country information does not support a claim that Nepalis who have spent time overseas are targeted simply for having worked in Western countries and being perceived as wealthy".

1. The Tribunal footnoted the country information being DFAT Country Information Report at [5.36] and [5.37] (Exhibit 2), which stated the following:

TREATMENT OF RETURNEES

5.36 DFAT is not aware of credible evidence of mistreatment of returnees. There is a large, generally efficient movement of people in and out of Nepal each year. On this basis, DFAT assesses that returnees are unlikely to suffer any social stigma upon their return to Nepal or to suffer adverse treatment by their Government.

5.37 A large number of failed asylum seekers have returned to Nepal from various countries with host-government or international organisation assistance. DFAT is not aware of any difficulties being experienced by these failed asylum seekers on the basis of their asylum seeking history or otherwise.

1. At the First Hearing the Tribunal member said to the first applicant (First Applicant's Affidavit p 26 at [3]):

MEMBER: ... country information does not support a claim that Nepalis who have spent time overseas are targeted simply for that reason and for being perceived as wealthy. Is there anything you would like to say about that?

1. In response, the first applicant said the following (First Applicant's Affidavit p 26 at [3]):

APPLICANT: Yes member, because when I told them, when the incident happened, because they demanded me 3 million Nepalese rupees to give to the party, then I in a very normal way I called them because Look I am from the normal family I just went to Australia just for study purpose also. Then how I have that much money then how can I give. But they threatened me, anyway you have to give to us, we don't know anything. Anything can be happened, if you do not give this threat. Then I don't know, they definitely they targeted me to take the revenge only, I did not help them. I did not join their army group, and they used to fight at that time. Definitely because of that.

1. Mr Young argued that the Tribunal had an obligation under s 425(1), in order to accord procedural fairness to the first applicant, to either put to the first applicant the country information referred to at [37] of this judgment verbatim, or at least the substance of the country information. Mr Young contended that the Tribunal failed to do this and instead put its conclusion as to what the effect of the country information was to the first applicant.
2. When asked what the Tribunal should have said to the first applicant, Mr Young said:

if they wanted to deal with the particular report here, all they could say is that "we have one report from DFAT which does not mention anything about people who have spent time overseas being targeted simply for having worked in Western countries and being perceived as wealthy". That's as much as they could have said - that they had a particular report which did not mention that. (Tp21.1-6)

1. Further, Mr Young relied on the High Court decision of Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 68 ALD 257; [2002] HCA 30 at [30]:

The plaintiff, in argument, referred to a practice note of the tribunal which said that a person in his position would be given an opportunity to respond to any relevant and significant material by being provided with the substance of the material. This was said to create a legitimate expectation; one of the kind which may arise even where a person is unaware of the source of the expectation. It is unnecessary to enter into that area of debate. The practice note does not add anything to the common law requirement of procedural fairness. On the facts stated, the case is not relevantly distinguishable from Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah. It is not the submissions of the department, but the information referred to in them, or accompanying them, and the other adverse documentary material produced after the delegate's decision, that is significant. The stated fact that there was a failure to bring the substance of that material to the attention of the plaintiff, and the disadvantage that followed, entitles the plaintiff to succeed on this ground.

1. I accept that the Tribunal in this case, for the purposes of complying with s 425(1), to accord procedural fairness to the first applicant, was required to raise with the first applicant that a dispositive issue (which was different to that raised by the delegate) was whether or not it would accept the first applicant's claim to be targeted by the Maoists based on perceived wealth. I find that the Tribunal, from its questions referred to at [34(a)] and [34(b)] of this judgment, sufficiently put to the first applicant that it was having difficulty accepting his claim that the Maoists targeted the first applicant based on perception of wealth and that everything the first applicant said in relation to that claim was in issue. In my view, the DFAT Country Information Report properly described was going to a factual matter underlying an issue, being whether the first applicant's claim was supported by country information, rather than raising an issue of the kind identified in s 425(1). In any event, if I am wrong and the Tribunal in order to comply with s 425(1) was required to specifically raise that there was an issue with accepting the first applicant's claim to be targeted by the Maoists based on perception of wealth, then for the reasons set out in the following paragraph at [44] of this judgment, I find the Tribunal did raise such an issue with the first applicant.
2. The part of the transcript of the Tribunal hearing set out at [38] of this judgment reveals that the Tribunal did raise with the first applicant that country information did not support a claim that Nepalis who had spent time overseas were targeted simply for that reason and for being perceived as wealthy and asked the first applicant for comment. In my opinion, it was open to the Tribunal to read the first sentence at [5.36] of the DFAT Country Information Report (reproduced at [37] of the judgment) "DFAT is not aware of credible evidence of mistreatment of returnees" as applying generally to the mistreatment of returnees and not limited to the type of returnees identified in the following two sentences at [5.36], being returnees suffering social stigma or adverse treatment by their government. I find that it was open to the Tribunal to read the country information that way given the first sentence of [5.36] that appeared under the general heading of "TREATMENT OF RETURNEES". Further, I note there was no country information before the Tribunal which supported that returnees were targeted due to their wealth. Therefore, a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons at [58] and [68] is that the Tribunal rejected the first applicant's claims on the basis that no country information supported that returnees were targeted due to their perceived wealth. Therefore, I find that the Tribunal complied with the requirements of s 425(1) in raising the required dispositive issue (if it needed to be raised) which was to put to the first applicant that there was no country information which supported his claim that returnees were targeted for perception of wealth.
3. Accordingly, I find no jurisdictional error is disclosed in relation to ground 1.

Ground 2 - failure to consider combined claim or integer

1. By ground 2, the first applicant alleged that the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction in failing to consider a claim or an integer of a claim being that the first applicant would be targeted due to the combination of his political profile and perception of wealth. Mr Young submitted that at [68] of the Tribunal's reasons, the Tribunal confined its consideration to whether the first applicant would be targeted only because of perception of wealth, and that this is clear because the Tribunal used the word "simply" in the sentence "country information does not support a claim that Nepalis who [had] spent time overseas [were] targeted simply for having worked in Western countries and being perceived as wealthy" (emphasis added).
2. The Minister referred me to the decision of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DDK16 [2017] FCAFC 188 (Gilmour, Markovic and O'Callaghan JJ). In that case, the Full Federal Court considered whether the Immigration Assessment Authority had failed to cumulatively assess the risk said to confront the applicant in that case if returned to Iran. The Full Federal Court at [32] to [34] said the following:
   1. Counsel appearing for the respondent ultimately, and quite properly, did not seriously dispute the Minister's submission that no obligation to make a "cumulative assessment" arises where individual claims have been rejected as a factual matter, or have been the subject of findings that they did not or would not lead to ongoing problems for the visa applicant were he or she to return to a receiving country (and no claim is made that any of those individual findings were the subject of appellable error): see SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123; 140 ALD 78 at [135]- [136]; W352 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398 at [21]; Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2000] FCA 1478 at [31].
   2. Counsel for the respondent adopted as correct the following submissions made on behalf of the Minister:

Broadly speaking, it can be accepted that there is an obligation to consider the parts of a Visa applicant's claim for protection cumulatively. It can also be accepted that the same principles as to whether a visa applicant meets the criteria for protection as a refugee apply, by analogy, to the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the [Act] [citing MZZUG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2015] FCA 1151 at [47]].

The obligation to give cumulative consideration to a visa applicant's claims arises as part of the decision-maker's obligation to consider the case before them. In that context, a decision-maker is required to consider each integer of a visa applicant's claims, whether they are raised expressly or arise clearly on the material [citing Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136 at 139 [7]]. Further, as part of the decision-maker's duty to address the case raised by the material before them, the decision-maker must consider the whole of the case put forward by the visa applicant [citing Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2000] FCA 1478 at [31]]. There may be a combination of factors that create the profile of the person who meets (relevantly here) the complementary protection criteria [citing MZZUG at [47]], or causative factors that may not give rise to the relevant risk on their own, but may do so collectively [citing W352 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398 at [21]].

1. In our view, however, such considerations have no application in a case such as this and are of no assistance to the respondent. It seems to us, as a matter of inexorable logic, that if, as is common ground here, all individual claims or bases for establishing an entitlement to a visa are dismissed (here, dismissed as not giving rise a real or significant risk of harm upon return to the country of nationality or receiving country), then no amount of "cumulative consideration" of those rejected claims is capable of producing a different result. It follows, in our respectful view, that the primary judge was wrong to hold otherwise.

1. In this case, I find that the Tribunal considered the first applicant's individual claims as to why he thought he was attacked by the Maoists in 2017, those claims being that he was attacked due to his political profile and perception of wealth. As the Tribunal's reasons disclose as set out at [21(a)] to [21(e)] of this judgment, the Tribunal considered the individual claims. The Tribunal rejected that the first applicant's alleged political involvement was a reason why he was allegedly targeted by the Maoists in 2017, particularly given the claimed incident occurred a long time after he left Nepal and he had no active political involvement since 2008. The Tribunal also rejected the first applicant's claim that he was targeted by the Maoists in 2017 because of perception of wealth given this was not supported by country information. I find that it is well-established that the Tribunal has no obligation to make a cumulative assessment where individual claims have been rejected as a factual matter, or have been subject to adverse findings.
2. Further, I note that the Tribunal at [72] of its reasons stated that it had considered the claims "singularly and on a cumulative basis" and was not satisfied that the first applicant would face a real chance of harm if he returned to Nepal. It appears that the Tribunal considered whether the claims on a cumulative basis would give rise to a real chance of harm if the first applicant returned to Nepal. However, as said in the preceding paragraph, I find the Tribunal had no obligation to consider the claims on a cumulative basis.
3. Accordingly, I find no jurisdictional error is disclosed in relation to ground 2.

1. Ground 3 alleged that the Tribunal misused country information relating to the treatment of returnees from Western countries who were perceived as wealthy. Orders were made by this Court for the first applicant to file written submission in relation to this claim. Mr Young prepared two sets of written submissions, in which he did not develop ground 3 in any helpful way. It does not assist the Court or the fair and just resolution of matters if grounds are pleaded and then counsel fails to provide assistance by way of written submissions to support those grounds.
2. As a result of the first applicant's failure to provide substantive written submissions on ground 3, considerable time was spent at the hearing trying to understand precisely what error was alleged by ground 3. Mr Young first argued that the DFAT Country Information Report was "silent" as to the treatment of returnees from Western countries who were perceived as wealthy and the DFAT Country Information Report at [5.36] was speaking of whether returnees were likely to suffer any social stigma upon their return to Nepal or to suffer adverse treatment by their Government and at [5.37] the treatment of returning failed asylum seekers. Mr Young submitted that it was therefore misleading for the Tribunal to put to the first applicant that "the country information does not support a claim that Nepalis who ha[d] spent time overseas [were] targeted simply for that reason" as the country information was "silent" on that issue. For the reasons set out at [44] of this judgment, I find that the Tribunal did not misuse the country information in that it was open to the Tribunal to find as it did at [68] of its reasons that the country information did not support claims that Nepalis who spent time overseas were targeted simply for having worked in Western countries and perceived as being wealthy.
3. At the hearing, Mr Young then also argued that at [68] of the Tribunal's reasons, the Tribunal formulated the first applicant's claim as to whether he was targeted "simply" having worked in a Western country and perceived as being wealthy, but Mr Young said that the first applicant was "not a person whose claim is simply that he has worked in Western countries and being perceived as wealthy" (Tp48.45).
4. I am satisfied that the Tribunal's approach to the first applicant's claim disclosed no jurisdictional error because the Tribunal correctly considered the first applicant's claim that he was targeted by the Maoists in 2017 due to his political profile and rejected that, and then considered whether the first applicant might have been targeted by the Maoists in 2017 based on perception of wealth and rejected that claim at [68] of its reasons. Given that there was no evidence in the country information that returnees were targeted based on perception of wealth, the use of the word "simply" at [68] of the Tribunal's reasons does not disclose that the Tribunal did not understand the task it needed to engage in. All the Tribunal was fairly saying was the country information did not support the first applicant's claim that returnees were targeted on the basis that they had worked in Western countries and were perceived as being wealthy. As I have found at [44] of this judgment it was open to the Tribunal to make that finding.
5. Accordingly, I find no jurisdictional error is disclosed in relation to ground 3.

1. As no jurisdictional error has been disclosed, the application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kaur-Bains.