Environment Protection Authority v Warwick Ronald McInnes

Environment Protection Authority v Warwick Ronald McInnes - [2020] NSWLEC 147 - NSWLEC 2020 case summary — Zoe

[4]

Julie Terry - statement filed 3 July 2020

Julie Terry is the mother of Damien Terry. She provided a statement on behalf of Mr Terry as he is unable to do so himself due to his autism and global developmental delay. The Prosecutor tendered Mrs Terry's statement to which the Defendant did not object.
Mrs Terry explains that Mr Terry's autism and developmental delay means that he "operates as a toddler"; he requires full time care; is non-verbal; and finds it difficult to make his needs known given his limited capacity to communicate.
For context, prior to the incident, Coca Cola (Coke) had been one of Mr Terry's favourite beverages; his parents would occasionally buy it for him as a treat. If the family had visitors, they had to "guard" their drinks as Mr Terry was prone to drink them if they had Coke in them.
Upon finding the Coke bottle in the bathroom on the day of the incident, Mr Terry would have had no conception that a Coke bottle could contain anything other than Coke. He is incapable of understanding the danger of drinking something that is not provided for him and would not have been able to resist drinking one of his favourite drinks.
Soon after returning from the bathroom Mr Terry began vomiting a green colour, indicating that he had ingested something not provided for by his carers. It took over an hour to take Mr Terry to hospital on an ambulance as he was unfamiliar with the transfer process and his autism makes it difficult to adjust to change.
Unsure of what substance Mr Terry ingested, the hospital staff were informed that it was likely a non-toxic line-marking paint. As the vomiting eased following treatment with antiemetics, Mr Terry was discharged from hospital that same day.
However, later that day Mr Terry began vomiting again and his parents decided to take him back to hospital as his condition worsened. By this stage one of Mr Terry's carers had contacted the Defendant to ask about the contents of the Coke bottle. The Defendant stated that he thought it was Triquat. The carer then consulted the Poisons Information Centre who, upon description, suggested it was Paraquat and stated that it was critical for Mr Terry to return to hospital.
At the hospital, the attending doctor informed Mr Terry's family that the substance that Mr Terry had ingested was in fact lethal and "people don't survive from ingesting it. It takes 10-14ml to kill an adult". Mr Terry's family were told that he had possibly hours to live. In response, blood tests had to be performed and fluids administered. However, due to his fear of needles, Mr Terry had to first be sedated, a process requiring eight adults to hold him down, which led to Mr Terry being frightened and upset.
Mr Terry's family was informed that there was no antidote for poisoning by this pesticide. Mr Terry was re-admitted to hospital and moved to the ICU. Facing the prospect that Mr Terry may die, his siblings were informed and immediately arranged to travel from Perth and Canada, unsure whether they would return in time.
Mr Terry's kidneys began to fail two days after the incident. A dialysis machine was placed outside his ICU room as the doctors anticipated complete kidney failure.
Mr Terry's mouth, lips and anus showed significant ulceration from the chemical burn and his skin came away upon contact with a towel. Mr Terry refused to take anything orally, likely from the pain of the chemical burns.
Over the next few days Mr Terry's family waited in distress, anticipating a slow death. He was unable to take one of his usual medications as it did not have an intravenous alternative. The lack of usual medications caused side effects. Mr Terry's lungs were also impacted and a high-level dose of steroids was required in response. During this period Mr Terry continued to experience high levels of pain. He was becoming erratic and agitated each day, becoming aggressive with family members. It was difficult to encourage oral ingestion. Once he resumed eating, medication had to be ground up and hidden in food.
On 17 August 2020, Mr Terry was moved to the surgical ward. During the next few days Mr Terry became agitated as he continued to experience high levels of pain due to the chemical burns and was distressed as he continued to have difficulty with medication being administered by injections. The doctors informed the family that there may be damage to Mr Terry's gastrointestinal system and that he would need to be monitored for months as Paraquat could be stored in fatty tissue and released into the body again.
On 28 August 2017, Mr Terry was released from the hospital and taken home, marking the total length of his hospital stay as 18 days, the first 7 of those spent in the ICU. At home his breathing and oxygen saturation levels needed to be monitored. He was required to take 22 tablets and one capsule in the morning, one tablet at 2pm, and 12 tablets at night.
Since the incident Mr Terry's epileptic seizures have increased in frequency and intensity. His family continues to express concern for his long-term health.

[7]

Sentencing principles

Section 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (CSP Act) identifies the purposes of sentencing as being: 3A Purposes of sentencing The purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows- (a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence, (b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences, (c) to protect the community from the offender, (d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender, (e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions, (f) to denounce the conduct of the offender, (g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community. A sentence is to be determined taking into account these stated purposes of sentencing.
The determination of an appropriate sentence is to be undertaken bearing in mind that: A sentence should never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in light of its objective circumstances: Bentley v BGP Properties Pty Ltd (2006) 145 LGERA 234 at [162]. (citations omitted)
This concept of a proportional sentence indicates that a significant factor to be considered in sentencing is the objective seriousness of the offence. The objective seriousness of the offence fixes both the upper and lower limits of proportionate punishment: the upper, as a sentence should never exceed that which can be identified as proportionate to the gravity of the particular crime; and the lower, as an allowance for the subjective considerations can never produce a punishment that does not reflect the objective seriousness of the offence: Environment Protection Authority v Waste Recycling and Processing Corp (2006) 148 LGERA 299 at [139]-[140].
The relevant offence arises under the provisions of the Pesticides Act that, for the purposes of the consideration of sentence in these proceedings, relevantly includes as its stated objects: 3 Objects of this Act The objects of this Act are as follows: (a) to promote the protection of human health, the environment, property and trade in relation to the use of pesticides, having regard to the principles of ecologically sustainable development within the meaning of the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, (b) to minimise risks to human health, the environment, property and trade, (c) to promote collaborative and integrated policies in relation to the use of pesticides, (d) to establish a legislative framework to regulate the use of pesticides. These objects reinforce the public protective nature of the legislative regime, including (as is relevant in these proceedings) the protection of human health and the minimisation of the risks of pesticides to human health.
The offence is a strict liability offence and it carries a maximum penalty for an individual of $60,000: s 10(1). The strict liability nature of the offence and the quantum of the maximum penalty are indicators of the public expression by Parliament of the seriousness of the offence and the gravity of the offences as perceived by the community: Axer Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 113 LGERA 357 at 359; Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 at 698.

[8]

Statutory matters required to be taken into account in sentencing

Section 109 of the Pesticides Act dictates the following matters, where relevant, are to be taken into account in imposing a penalty: 109 Matters to be considered in imposing penalty (1) In imposing a penalty for an offence under this Act or the regulations, the court is to take into consideration the following (so far as they are relevant): (a) the extent of the injury, damage or harm caused or likely to be caused by the commission of the offence, (b) the practical measures that may be taken to prevent, control, abate or mitigate any such injury, damage or harm, (c) the extent to which the person who committed the offence could reasonably have foreseen the injury, damage or harm caused or likely to be caused by the commission of the offence, (d) the extent to which the person who committed the offence had control over the causes that gave rise to the offence, (e) whether, in committing the offence, the person was complying with orders from an employer or supervising employee, (f) in any case where the defendant is a corporation, the type of corporation concerned (eg whether it is a sole trader or a family-owned business), (g) whether the person who committed the offence complied with any relevant pesticide code of practice. (2) The court may take into consideration other matters that it considers relevant.
In the circumstances of this case, those factors, with the exception of s 109(1)(e) and (f), are relevant considerations.
In addition, for the purposes of sentencing in this matter the following factors as provided for in s 21A of the CSP Act are relevant: 21A Aggravating, mitigating and other factors in sentencing (1) General In determining the appropriate sentence for an offence, the court is to take into account the following matters- (a) the aggravating factors referred to in subsection (2) that are relevant and known to the court, (b) the mitigating factors referred to in subsection (3) that are relevant and known to the court, (c) any other objective or subjective factor that affects the relative seriousness of the offence. The matters referred to in this subsection are in addition to any other matters that are required or permitted to be taken into account by the court under any Act or rule of law. (2) Aggravating factors The aggravating factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence are as follows- … (d) the offender has a record of previous convictions (particularly if the offender is being sentenced for a serious personal violence offence and has a record of previous convictions for serious personal violence offences), … (g) the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was substantial, … (i) the offence was committed without regard for public safety, (ib) the offence involved a grave risk of death to another person or persons, … (l) the victim was vulnerable, for example, because the victim was very young or very old or had a disability, because of the geographical isolation of the victim or because of the victim's occupation (such as a person working at a hospital (other than a health worker), taxi driver, bus driver or other public transport worker, bank teller or service station attendant), … The court is not to have additional regard to any such aggravating factor in sentencing if it is an element of the offence. (3) Mitigating factors The mitigating factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence are as follows- … (b) the offence was not part of a planned or organised criminal activity, … (e) the offender does not have any record (or any significant record) of previous convictions, (f) the offender was a person of good character, (g) the offender is unlikely to re-offend, (h) the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation, whether by reason of the offender's age or otherwise, (i) the remorse shown by the offender for the offence, but only if - (i) the offender has provided evidence that he or she has accepted responsibility for his or her actions, and (ii) the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his or her actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both), … (4) The court is not to have regard to any such aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing if it would be contrary to any Act or rule of law to do so. (5) The fact that any such aggravating or mitigating factor is relevant and known to the court does not require the court to increase or reduce the sentence for the offence.
Where a Prosecutor contends that a particular sentencing consideration should be treated as an aggravating feature they must establish by evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, the presence of such aggravating factor. Where a Defendant contends for the presence of a mitigating factor in sentencing they must establish by evidence the presence of such factor on the balance of probabilities: R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270 at [27]; Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corp [2019] NSWLEC 100 at [131].

[10]

The extent of the injury, damage or harm caused or likely to be caused by the commission of the offence

In this case, there was significant actual injury and harm caused to Mr Terry by the commission of the offence.
Mr Terry's injuries were significant. The medical professionals who attended to him considered that it was likely that the ingestion of the pesticide would be fatal. Fortunately, Mr Terry did not die, however, he did suffer severe physical and mental trauma from the poisoning he sustained and the treatment he was required to endure. He continues to suffer the effects of the poisoning in his physical health and mental state.
The particular pesticide the subject of this charge was known to be extremely toxic. It was an agreed fact that the pesticide was decanted from a bottle that was required by the Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Code to be labelled with the cautionary statements: 1. DO NOT PUT IN DRINK BOTTLES 2. CAN KILL IF SWALLOWED 3. KEEP LOCKED UP
Contrary to such warnings the pesticide was decanted by the Defendant into a drink bottle, it was in the open in the disabled toilet and it was swallowed, and Mr Terry was at real risk of death as a consequence of the ingestion of the pesticide. Whilst the Defendant contended that the original bottle was degraded at the time of decanting the pesticide this does not take away from the inherent toxicity of the pesticide and the need to take care in the handling, use and storage of such substances.
The importance of avoiding storage of pesticides in drink bottles was identified in the Second Reading Speech of the Pesticides Bill 1999 in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly on 28 October 1999; it was clearly a known risk path for poisoning. The Honourable Bob Debus stated at page 2354: It is important that pesticides are stored in a container that bears the registered label for the pesticide to prevent accidental misuse. There have been incidents when pesticide users have stored pesticide solutions in soft drink bottles. This has led to pesticide poisonings. Clause 16 establishes an offence which aims to prevent the storage of pesticides in unlabelled and unsafe containers, such as soft drink bottles, buckets and other unidentified or household containers. I see this as a very important provision in the bill because it should go some way towards preventing avoidable accidents and injury with toxic pesticides. (emphasis added)
The injury and harm occasioned to Mr Terry were significant. The inherent qualities of the particular pesticide made the risk of harm of the type suffered by Mr Terry virtually inevitable if ingested. The manner of storage in a drink bottle was a significant breach of the purpose and objects of the Pesticides Act. Objectively, the conduct that gave rise to this offence was very serious.

[11]

Reasons for committing the offence and state of mind of the offender

As this offence is one of strict liability there is no mental element that forms an element of the offence, that is, the offence can be proven even if the Defendant did not intend for the breach of the Act to occur. There has been some deliberation over whether the offender's state of mind goes to the objective seriousness of the offence (as it is a matter relating to the offender) or a matter more generally available for consideration in sentencing independent from the determination of objective seriousness: Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168; Yang v The Queen (2012) 219 A Crim R 550.
The Defendant gave evidence that he does not know why he did not dispose of the pesticide at the time he decanted it into the Coke bottle. Nor does he assert that there was any necessary reason to retain the pesticide for use at the sports field. The reason for committing the offence is both an active action in decanting the pesticide into a Coke bottle and then a significant period of inaction in retaining and not disposing of the pesticide on the part of the Defendant.
The fact that the decanted pesticide was permitted to remain stored for a significant period of time in a drink bottle when it was not required for any use at the sports field indicates a lack of sufficient concern for the proper keeping of these dangerous substances. The failure to dispose of the pesticide was explained by the Defendant as likely him "being slack". This does not diminish the significant failure in the storage of the pesticide in a drink bottle and in a public place.
As was observed at [69] of McInnes (No 1): Having regard to the conduct of the Defendant in this matter it is apparent that the placement of the Pesticide into a Coke Bottle was extremely imprudent and contrary to the recommendations for the storage of pesticides and basic common sense. The Defendant has been prosecuted for those actions and, for the reasons outlined above, the offence of using (in this case by storing) pesticides so as to cause actual injury has been established… this failure to properly store the pesticide is objectively serious.

[12]

The extent to which the person who committed the offence could reasonably have foreseen the injury, damage or harm caused or likely to be caused by the commission of the offence

It was reasonably foreseeable that if the pesticide was ingested it was likely to cause a life-threatening event. It was also reasonably foreseeable that the likelihood of ingestion was significantly increased if the pesticide was stored in a drink bottle.
Further, it was reasonably foreseeable that the likelihood of ingestion was also increased if the bottle containing the pesticide was not store appropriately. The clear warnings that were required to be carried on such pesticides at the date of the offence make it clear that placing such substances in drink bottles increases the risk of unintentional ingestion. Therefore, it was reasonably foreseeable that placing the pesticide in the drink bottle would not be an action that would minimise the risk to human health in accordance with the objects of the Pesticides Act. This failure demonstrates that the nature of the offending is serious in this respect.
However, in McInnes (No 1) at [88] I found that the Prosecutor had not discharged its evidentiary onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was reasonably foreseeable that the disabled toilet would be accessed with an MLAK key. Therefore, the s 7 Charge relating to criminal negligence was dismissed. In this case, on the s 10 Charge, there is no element of the offence that requires proof of criminal negligence. However, the present offence as particularised, for which the Defendant is being sentenced, requires a determination of whether Mr Terry gaining access to the disabled toilet with an MLAK key and ingesting the inappropriately stored pesticide was reasonably foreseeable. As this is an aggravating consideration in sentence, either in determining objective seriousness, or more generally, for the same reasons identified in McInnes (No 1) at [69]-[88] the "causes that gave rise to the offence" could not have been foreseeable as the Defendant believed he had the only key to the disabled toilet and it was secure. Accordingly, this factor is not considered as part of the determination of objective seriousness.

[16]

Contrition and remorse

The Prosecutor submitted that expressions of regret by the Defendant were not a true indication of remorse. In particular, the Prosecutor submitted that the Defendant had never personally apologised to Mr Terry or his family and had not sought to provide any restitution to them for the harm caused. As a consequence, it was submitted that little weight should be given to expressions of remorse at this late stage of the process.
The Defendant did say, in his affidavit evidence, his oral evidence, and his submissions, that he was sorry for what had happened to Mr Terry. In particular at [3]-[5] of his affidavit he deposed: First and foremost I would like to say to Damien and his family how sorry I am for this terrible incident. I understand that it has impacted severely on everyone's life and it should not have happened. The experience has also left me devastated. While I believe everyone involved made mistakes, mine was not disposing of the Coke bottle with the pesticide in it immediately and I have been kicking myself the last three years. I have learned that I should never take the risk of putting chemicals into unauthorised containers. Since the accident, I have cleared out the chemicals from my own workshop. After the accident involving Damien, I have also resigned from the Committee and from working as the volunteer groundsman for both the Committee and the Club.
In his written submissions at [2]-[3] it was stated: First of all, I would like to make a public apology to Damien and his family, if the Court allows this. In terms of how sorry I am, the EPA have taken my statements out of context in their submissions (par 36) including: It was the Police who said that this was an unfortunate accident, not me; I did not say it was common sense to store pesticide in a coke bottle; I said it was common sense to pour the pesticide from a corroded container to what I had at the time; I did not refuse to admit I had done anything wrong.
The Court gave the Defendant a number of opportunities to express his remorse and contrition for the criminal conduct. The Defendant variously gave evidence in terms, such as (by way of examples): At T13 L49 - T14 L40: Her Honour: I think your daughter's asked you did you want to say you're sorry or not? To remind you. A: Yeah. Yeah. Actually when I first got that phone call my first reaction was how did he get in there and the carer said, "I opened the door. I let him in" and I went ‑ and then they asked about the Triquad ‑ no, sorry, they didn't ask about the Triquad, they said, "What was in the Coke bottle?" and I said ‑ and what I should have said was don't know anything about it, you know, and I wouldn't be here today, you know, well that's saying my opinion. And what it is, I knew that ‑ that the kid was sick like you know, and the doctors need to know what sort of chemical it was and I told him, you know. But he asked me how to spell it and I didn't know how to spell it and all that. So I did arrange to have ‑ I said to ring up Shaun Roggers and Shaun told them what, what it was and they found out what it was and it might have improved his chances of survival which it probably did. And that's about it. Q: Okay. A: Yeah, I don't know if I should be saying this now, I should let the prosecution say and then I go after them, is that right? Q: At the end? Yes. The submissions. But what they're saying to me is that you are not genuine when you say how sorry you are that Mr Terry was hurt. A: Right, no, I mean I'm sorry. Q: And they in part say that because you've not made an apology to his family and you've not ‑ in your affidavit whilst you say it they say that you're just saying it now because you're in trouble. So this is a chance for you on oath, now that you've taken the oath to tell the truth, if you want me to hear anything more about that it's your chance to do that now. If you say it from the bar table it's a submission, so I can still take it into account but it's not as ‑ it's not as heavy in the consideration if it's not under oath. A: I understand. I understand. I'd like to go a different way but I was shocked, I was absolutely shocked when I did get that phone call, you know, because I believe that Bloodtree Oval was safe you know. And there's only been, since 1986 there's only been two people suffered injuries in their facility, you know. Damien was one and you won't believe this, I was the other. I dislocated my shoulder between the change room area and like being treated as a sports committee Gosford Council covered all my medical bills, you know. So if Damien needs any further medical Gosford City Council should come to the party, you know. But as far as remorse goes I mean it's ruined, it's actually ruined my ‑ last three years have just been unbelievable for me. I've suffered a lot. Family problems, everything, you know. I don't know if I should go into this now or I go into it later on, you know. At T18 L49 - T19 L7: Ms Lewer: Is it fair to say, Mr McInnes, that you're fairly focused on the blame that other people have for this incident? A: Not really. It should be shared. Q: So, you accept that you have some responsibility for it? A: Yeah. Q: But you are concerned that other persons also have responsibility for it? A: It should be shared equally because we all made mistakes. At T41 L23 - 48: Her Honour: Now, at the beginning of your evidence, I asked you if you wanted to say anything to Mr and Mrs Terry and Damien, and you said you wanted to wait until after the questioning from the EPA. A: Yes, it sort of bamboozled me a bit. Q: So, is there anything on that issue that you want to say? I'll give Ms Lewer leave to ask you any questions, because this doesn't really arise from her questions, but you did say you wanted to wait. A: Yes. Well, when Damien ‑ Damien got hurt through me not getting rid of that Triquad, and ‑ and I feel sorry about it because it's ‑ it's ‑ it was a stupid thing to do. It was absolutely stupid. And I ‑ and I just simply overlooked it. And ‑ and it's been annoying me ‑ I'm ‑ I'm normally so precise, or ‑ you know, and it's just ‑ I'm basically lost for words. I'm sorry. All I can say to Damien's parents is I'm sorry it happened, you know? It shouldn't have happened. And I know what they're going through because I've been through it before with a baby. I said I don't cry. You know? This case has just absolutely destroyed me. Q: Is that because of the way you feel about what's happened to Damien? A: What's happened to Damien should never have happened. Should never have happened, you know? And I just don't understand why I didn't throw that stuff out. I'm just kicking myself. It's because ‑ there's no excuse. It's not excusable. And I'm sorry. I'm sorry for it. I am terribly sorry. At T74 L7 - 50: Her Honour: Mr McInnes, I am concerned that whilst you accept that it was, as you call it, an accident, that you're not taking full responsibility for the fact that if you haven't had put that material in the toilet, Mr Terry wouldn't have nearly died. A: Exactly. You're right there. I know. I agree with it. But you don't think of those things at the time, because when you work for yourself for 50 odd years ‑ I mean, Jenny Clark called me an opinionated man. What's that mean? Q: Opinionated? It means you have opinions and you share them with people. A: Right, and she described me as that, and me and Jenny used to have many phone calls together. I've got to be fair with the Court ‑ I don't say sorry too much. I'm that sort of person. But I am sorry. I am sorry, because this is ‑ this can ruin me, and it will ruin me. I'm not just thinking of myself; I'm thinking of my whole family. That's what I'm thinking of. And I know what‑‑ Q: But it also nearly ruined Mr Terry's family's lives, as well. A: I was just about to get to that. I also read Damien's mother's statement, and that got me, and my wife's going through the same thing. I know exactly what she's going through because my wife's going through the same thing with her mother, and Sheila is falling apart. She is that close to a mental breakdown, it's not funny. This is my own wife. Because it's not this case. The case is part of it. She's watching her mother fall to pieces in front of her, and Sheila comes home and you know what she does? She takes it all out on me. And I handle it, and I say right, and I do it. We've never had a fight all the 40 odd years. And since we moved to Kariong, we've had three fights, and we've never had a fight before this. And it's pulling my family apart. Not this case; it's not helping. But what's happened to us, and it's all about ‑ one daughter might be splitting up with her husband and the four kids, and the other daughter here ‑ I just found out the other day that her husband's got depression I didn't know anything about. She can handle it. I've got to be here for them. And the other daughter ‑ her husband's got something wrong up here, right, and I had to go on and like lean on him a bit you know, and I'm still there to lean on him and I just can't handle it anymore, honestly. You know. And you know, I'm not going to out and neck myself I tell you but you know, I just don't know what to do. You know. And it's okay to ‑ I wish I'd never volunteered to be quite honest now. I wish I never went up that oval, you know. I mean you know obviously I did, it kept me alive. Anyway that's all I want to say, I've had to do all that.
As illustrated above, responses to these opportunities were largely consistent with his earlier statements that he was, in effect, sorry that Mr Terry had been harmed. Contrition and remorse, however, is more than being sorry for the consequence of the criminal conduct, it is an acceptance of the responsibility for the offence and the consequences of it. As was observed in Merrick v R [2017] NSWCCA 264 at [97]: Remorse for a crime cannot be shown if the facts are not faced and if the criminality is not owned…
The Defendant is genuinely sorry that Mr Terry and his family have suffered as a consequence of the pesticide being consumed. This consequence resonated with the Defendant as, through his own experiences of losing a child and now his wife having to deal with a dying mother, was the feeling of loss and facing the risk of loss brought home to him. However, when faced with having to take "ownership" of the circumstances that gave rise to the harm, he was keen to direct responsibility to others in an attempt to either relieve himself from responsibility or to share some of it with others. No matter what part the activities of others may have played in this matter, the offence with which the Defendant is charged is the storing of the pesticide and the subsequent actual harm to Mr Terry when it was consumed by him. The placement of the pesticide in the Coke bottle, the retention and failure to dispose of the pesticide and the storage in the public disabled toilet was all conduct that fell to him and I am not satisfied, even now, that the Defendant fully owns that responsibility.
I accept that the Defendant has demonstrated real and genuine regret, but he has not shown contrition and remorse of the type to which this consideration is directed. That being said, to the extent that the Prosecutor relied upon the Defendant's lack of remorse to indicate a need for specific deterrence, as I have determined at [69] below, that a component of the penalty is not warranted to specifically deter the Defendant this factor (or lack thereof) would not arise for consideration.

[17]

Prior convictions, character, deterrence retribution and denunciation

The Defendant has a record of criminal convictions that is lengthy in number and the time over which the offences were committed, as summarised in the Prosecutor's submissions at [19] and which indicates that between 1966-2006 the Defendant had been convicted of: 1. Driving offences; 2. Breaching bonds and recognisances and offences of driving whilst disqualified; 3. Assault, misrepresentations, and offering a bribe.
The offences can generally be said to relate to driving offences and offences arising from excessive alcohol consumption. I also accept that some offences, such as driving whilst unlicensed and breaching bonds, do disclose a pattern of disregard of the requirements of the law. The Defendant has, however, apart from this offence, not been convicted of any offence since August 2006, some 14 years.
The Prosecutor submits that the fact of the prior convictions would indicate a need to specifically deter the Defendant from committing further offences and that the fact of these convictions does not allow the Defendant's character to be viewed as a person coming before the Court with an otherwise unblemished record.
The subject matter of the Defendant's previous convictions are of a type so dissimilar to the particular offence for which he is now being sentenced that, having regard to the stated purpose of sentencing in s 3A of the CSP Act as: (b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences. (emphasis added) it could not be said that the Defendant has a history of past offending of the type such as that for which he is presently before the Court for sentence. The Defendant's past criminal history does not by its nature, of itself, indicate that the Defendant requires specific deterrence from committing similar offences to the one now before me for sentence.
In the circumstances of this case, the Defendant's past criminal history is regarded a neutral factor, in that it is not an aggravating feature of this offence. However, the number and nature of past offences must also be taken into account more generally such that I cannot find that the Defendant is of generally good character for the purposes of mitigation as he has such a significant and long period of past offending.
The Defendant has tendered a number of character references attesting to the fact that he is held in high regard by the referees, in particular, for his support and voluntary service to the sporting activities in the local community. I accept that in that respect he is of good character. However, I also accept the Prosecutor's submission that only one of the referees (Mr Gill) referred to the present events with which the Defendant is currently before the Court and none were addressed to the Court specifically, therefore, the references are of limited assistance in determining the sentence in this matter and the statements of the regard to which the Defendant is held in the community must be given less weight where it is not apparent that the referee was aware of the circumstances of the offence.
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in the references, it is apparent that the Defendant is held in high regard by those members of the community with which he has dealt with as part of the local sporting community relating to his volunteer work in that community. I take that matter of the regard with which he is held and the volunteer work he performed into account in the determination of an appropriate sentence.
For the reasons outlined, I do not accept that there is a risk this Defendant is likely to offend in a similar way in the future. There is no evidence to suggest that the Defendant through any work or personal related activities will be coming into contact with any controlled pesticides. Further, his conduct in removing from his home all pesticides held by him indicates that he is aware of the risk of reoffending and has taken steps to avoid such activity. I do not consider it necessary in the determination of the appropriate sentence in this case to take into account a need to specifically deter the Defendant. Additionally, the orders sought by the Prosecutor that the Defendant undertake a number of educative courses relating to working with pesticides should not be imposed as part of the sentence.
The Prosecutor submitted that general deterrence was also indicated as relevant as the type of conduct the subject matter of the charge was one that was specifically identified as conduct to which the legislative regime was directed and, therefore, notwithstanding that there was no prior prosecution or similar events, as it was submitted that detection of such acts was difficult, the Court would accept the need to deter other offenders from such conduct.
As to general deterrence, it is true that the conduct in this case is conduct of a type for which the legislative scheme was developed. I have taken that factor into account in the consideration of the objective seriousness of this particular conduct and to consider the consideration of this general issue again would be tantamount to a double punishment of the Defendant.
The Defendant submitted that the imposition of a financial penalty would not serve any real purpose - as Mr Terry had, fortunately, survived the event and the imposition of a monetary penalty would not change anything except his own financial circumstances. He indicated that he had disposed of all pesticides at his home and that he would not be engaging in any activity in the future that would likely give rise to a similar offence.
With respect to the Defendant's submission that the imposition of a monetary penalty will serve no purpose I do not accept this submission. As outlined at [22] above, the purposes of sentencing include denouncing the conduct of the offender and the recognition of the harm that was occasioned to the victim (in this case, Mr Terry). This principle was concisely formulated by Kirby J in Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267 at [118]: A fundamental purpose of the criminal law, and the sentencing of convicted offenders, is to denounce publicly the unlawful conduct of an offender. This objective requires that a sentence should also communicate society's condemnation of the particular offender's conduct. The sentence represents "a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law". (citations omitted)
The only penalty available for this offence to further those objects is a fine; and the imposition of a monetary penalty in these circumstances will permit the furtherance of those sentencing purposes.

[19]

Section 10 CSP Act

The Defendant submitted that, in all of the circumstances of this case, the Court would exercise its discretion to dismiss the charge against him pursuant to s 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act which, relevant to this submission, provides: 10 Dismissal of charges and conditional discharge of offender (1) Without proceeding to conviction, a court that finds a person guilty of an offence may make any one of the following orders- (a) an order directing that the relevant charge be dismissed, … (3) In deciding whether to make an order referred to in subsection (1), the court is to have regard to the following factors- (a) the person's character, antecedents, age, health and mental condition, (b) the trivial nature of the offence, (c) the extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed, (d) any other matter that the court thinks proper to consider.
The Defendant submitted that it was appropriate to make such order as the imposition of a fine would impose a significant financial burden on him and his family.
The circumstances of this case do not speak in favour of the exercise of such discretion. For the reasons that are outlined in this judgment, the nature of the offence cannot be described as trivial either in the Defendant's conduct or the consequences of the offending. Whilst the Defendant is no longer a young man and he has in the past suffered with his health, neither of these factors would, either of themselves or together with any other factor, indicate that it would be appropriate to dismiss the charge. His health, as the Court was advised by the Defendant, has improved since his cancer treatment. He was also of an advanced age at the date of the offence, this is not a matter where his age played any part in the offending. The Defendant identified no extenuating circumstances (other than financial impacts) that would warrant the dismissal of the charge, and on the evidence before me I am unable to identify any circumstance that would indicate it was appropriate to dismiss the charge.
The evidence of the Defendant's financial circumstances is outlined below. For the same reason that I determine that the Defendant has capacity to pay even a fine at the maximum penalty, the financial inconvenience occasioned by the imposition of a fine in the circumstances of this case do not justify the exercise of the discretion to dismiss the charge.
For those reasons, I reject the Defendant's application that the charge be dealt with by application of the discretion in s 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act.

[22]

Capacity to pay the fine

Section 6 of the Fines Act 1996 mandates that the Defendant's means to pay any fine is taken into account in the fixing of the amount of any fine in the following terms: 6 Consideration of accused's means to pay In the exercise by a court of a discretion to fix the amount of any fine, the court is required to consider- (a) such information regarding the means of the accused as is reasonably and practicably available to the court for consideration, and (b) such other matters as, in the opinion of the court, are relevant to the fixing of that amount.
The Defendant is no longer in paid employment and he has now retired from his former business as a panel beater. Evidence was adduced in these proceedings that the Defendant has the following income and assets as at August 2020: 1. He is in receipt of an aged pension; 2. He holds a private pension the balance of which was $93,477 which distributes $195 per month; 3. The Defendant, in equal shares with his wife, owns an unencumbered house at Kariong, in which they live; and 4. The Defendant has an entitlement to cash in a bank deposit in his wife's name in the order of $65,825.70.
The Defendant acknowledged these assets but asked the Court to find that his capacity to pay was limited as his assets were the result of his entire working life and that he had no further capacity to earn an income. He also indicated variously that: he and his wife had intended to separate at which point he would "give it all to her"; and that he had a daughter with children who was experiencing personal difficulties and he intended to let her live in the house with his grandchildren and his wife and he live elsewhere.
I am required to consider the Defendant's means to pay. It is clear on the evidence that he has the means to pay even a significant fine. Even though the use of funds from his retirement savings to pay a fine is not what he would have anticipated or desired, it is available for the payment of a fine. There is no evidence before me that even the payment of a significant fine would so reduce the Defendant's assets such that he could no longer meet his reasonable living expenses or any current liabilities. Accordingly, I find that the Defendant has sufficient means to pay the fine, even a substantial fine in the context of the maximum penalty permitted to be ordered for this offence.

At a glance

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Judgment (25 paragraphs)

Parties

Cases Cited (14)

Cited By (1)