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Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
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(2016) 256 CLR 656
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(2009) 170 LGERA 253
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(1999) 199 CLR 270
R v Oliver (1980) 7 A Crim R 174
R v Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354
R v Thomson
R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309
(2000) 49 NSWLR 383
R v Visconti [1982] 2 NSWLR 104
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(2007) 52 NSWLR 60
Thuong Nguyen v R [2012] NSWCCA 184
Turkmani v R [2014] NSWCCA 186
(2014) 244 A Crim R 402
Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14
(1988) 164 CLR 465
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Weininger v R [2003] HCA 14
Judgment (65 paragraphs)
[1]
Background to the Overflow Incidents
The premises include the sewage carriers known as the Southern and Western Suburbs Ocean Outfall Sewer ("SWSOOS").
The SWSOOS consists of SWSOOS1, a single concrete sewer carrier, and two additional concrete twin sewer carriers (which merge at Perry Street to form a single barrel) that carry sewage to the MWTP for treatment ("SWSOOS2").
SWSOOS1 is located between General Holmes Drive, Mascot and McFall Street, Botany. It is a large above-ground trunk sewer, 3.4 m wide by 1.8 m deep which is constructed on a nearly flat gradient. As a consequence of the nearly flat gradient and the sewer design and configuration, the flow becomes slower allowing the silt to more readily settle. The localised accumulation of silt can impede the flow of sewage to MWTP and in wet weather may cause overflows of sewage out of SWSOOS1.
SWSOOS2, at the location of the desilting works which gave rise to the commission of the offences ("desilting works", discussed in more detail below), consists of two closed sewer carriers (south and north) which are 2.8 m wide x 2.0 m deep.
SWSOOS1 and SWSOOS2 are connected by cross connection channels at several points to facilitate flow routing or diversions between the sewers.
SWSOOS1 also receives flow from the Southern Diversion Sewer which intersects with SWSOOS1 near cross connection 1 adjacent to Mill Pond. A wet weather siphonic overflow structure ("overflow structure") is located off the Southern Diversion Sewer a few metres from the stop board location known as "SBD113" (discussed further below). The overflow structure is designed to operate in wet weather by acting as a relief outlet when the sewer is reaching capacity.
A gauge is installed near the overflow structure and points down into the flow point to measure inflow to the overflow structure ("gauge"). As at May 2017 the gauge was connected to Sydney Water's remote monitoring network ("IICATS"). Once a day data was transferred to Hydstra (a database used by Sydney Water's Hydrometrics team for viewing data) which received data from about 200 other gauge locations daily. The gauge data was reviewed approximately twice a week. The gauge data was not subject to live or more frequent monitoring by Sydney Water's System Operating Centre because the gauge was installed for the purpose of recording when wet weather overflows occurred to satisfy annual reporting requirements on wet weather overflow performance under the EPL.
[2]
The Overflow Structure
The overflow structure comes off the Southern Diversion Sewer which is connected to SWSOOS1. It is located a few metres upstream of SBD113.
The overflow structure activates when flow levels in the sewer reach such a height that flow will overtop the crest of the pipe leading into the overflow structure (known as the "weir crest"). Based on Work-as-Executed ("WAE") drawings the trigger point at which the overflow structure activates is when flow level depths reach 1.22 m in the Southern Diversion Sewer adjacent to the overflow structure. Based on the WAE drawings this equates to a flow level depth of 1.73 m in the SWSOOS1 near SBD113. As calculated, when flow depth in SWSOOS1 reaches a height of 1.73 m at SBD113 the overflow structure activates.
As flow levels rise the overflow becomes siphonic in nature whereby air is pushed out of the overflow structure. Once the siphonic overflow is primed, the rate at which flow travels through the overflow structure increases (about 80 times greater based on a comparison between flows from a gravity weir and a siphonic overflow). The overflow stops when flow levels drop again to a height that allows air to be drawn in to break the siphonic action, which occurs at the height of the weir crest.
Wastewater that enters the overflow structure flows through an underground pipe which runs from the overflow structure and discharges out of an outlet into the tidal section of Mill Stream, downstream of Mill Pond weir. The outlet is located inside a culvert which runs under SWSOOS1. The culvert connects Mill Pond to Mill Stream. The outlet is not visible from the site of the desilting works. All wastewater that is discharged from the outlet enters Mill Stream.
[3]
Traverse and Prior Desilting Works
Periodically Sydney Water conducts a "traverse" of its sewers, which involves manned entry by specialists into the sewer to assess the condition of the sewer.
A traverse of SWSOOS1 carried out in November 2011 identified silt accumulations of up to 700 mm at certain locations, prompting the initiation of a project by Sydney Water to clean out and de-silt SWSOOS1. The clean out was to occur in stages.
Prior to 2017, SWSOOS1 was last desilted by Sydney Water in 2007. Prior to 2007, SWSOOS1 was last desilted in 2002.
SWSOOS2 was last desilted in 2003/2004 for the south carrier and 2004/2005 for the north carrier.
[4]
The 2017 Desilting Works in SWSOOS1
From approximately October 2016 onwards, Sydney Water undertook a desilting project to restore capacity in SWSOOS1 from the Sydney Airport Grit Pits to Bunnerong Road.
The fourth stage of the desilting project was to be carried out in a 250 m section of SWSOOS1 located to the east of Sydney Airport at the southern side of General Holmes Drive up to the access opening adjacent to the roundabout at Hale and Luland Street adjacent to Mill Stream in Botany ("desilting works").
The desilting works commenced on 22 May 2017. At that time, the estimated time to complete the desilting works was about six to eight weeks.
The section of SWSOOS1 that was the subject of the desilting works is lined internally to prevent leakage of sewage from joints and cracks. The liner was installed when the sewer was last desilted in 2007. Due to the risk of damaging the liner, Sydney Water determined that the most appropriate method for carrying out the desilting works was manual cleaning by work crews who entered the sewer equipped with shovels and vacuum hoses to manually remove the silt and debris.
Veolia Water Technologies Pty Ltd ("Veolia") was engaged by Sydney Water to perform the desilting works under an existing Waste Management Silt and Debris Removal contract dated 18 June 2010.
[5]
Flow Isolation Flow Management Plan
In order to carry out the desilting works Sydney Water implemented flow isolations for manned entry (discussed below). These isolations consisted of physical obstructions in the sewer carrier to isolate sections of the carrier from flow. They included stop boards and a coffer dam.
Prior to installing flow isolations, Sydney Water requires the preparation of an approved Flow Isolation Flow Management Plan ("FIFM Plan") which identifies risks and sets minimum controls for planning and implementing flow isolation safely.
For the desilting works a FIFM Plan was prepared. The scope of the works as described in the FIFM Plan were:
1. insert stop boards in accordance with the FIFM Plan;
2. build coffer dam downstream;
3. pump out excess water; and
4. enter SWSOOS1 and clean silt.
The controls in the FIFM Plan, including the proposed locations of the stop boards, were developed at the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment ("HIDRA") meeting on 26 October 2016. The HIDRA meeting attendees comprised:
1. Ms Michelle Howard (Contract Manager - Sydney Water);
2. Mr James Campbell (Contract Officer - Sydney Water);
3. Mr Terry Robinson (Project Manager - Veolia);
4. Mr Cameron Glegg (Project Supervisor - Veolia); and
5. Mr David Birian (Engineer - Veolia).
The FIFM Plan was subsequently prepared by Mr Campbell (identified as the FIFM Plan Coordinator). The FIFM Plan was reviewed by Mr Enrico Coiro (a Sydney Water engineer from Networks) and ultimately signed off and approved by Mr David Cantlon (the Sydney Water Acting Area Manager, Networks South) on 9 May 2017. Mr Luke Williams (Veolia Job Supervisor) was the person responsible for the implementation of the FIFM Plan.
The FIFM Plan identified the following risks and controls in respect of overflows:
1. "Overflow of SWSOOS1" was a risk due to "High Flows". The control identified to manage this risk was to:
Monitor weather forecast prior to work. Also periodically check the forecast during work to ensure no rainfall is predicted. Work to be stopped in the event of any rain >20mm in a 24 hour period. Monitor level against upstream stopboards and top of cofferdam. If flow level is approaching top of boards (100mm) stop work and evacuate. Divert SWSOOS1 flow at X-Con 2 allowing storage in SWOOS2 [sic] Sth to be used as well. Should also reduce the potential turbulence caused by both SWSOOS1 and MSD flows being diverted at X-Con 1. This will reduce the activation of the Mill Pond overflow.
1. "Overflow of SWSOOS1" was a risk due to "Reduction of capacity due to SWSOOS1 being offline". The control identified to manage this risk was to:
Consider informing EPA of the likelihood of increased overflows, through appropriate Networks contacts. If overflow is likely consider removing top couple of boards to allow flow to travel down SWSOOS1.
[6]
Flow Isolations Installed
To isolate the working area of the sewer and to enable manned entry by Veolia personnel into SWSOOS1 to carry out the desilting works, flow isolations were installed into SWSOOS1 commencing on 22 May 2017.
Flow isolations were achieved by placing two sets of stop boards (about 10 stop boards make up one isolation, with each individual stop board being a wooden board approximately 120 mm in height and weighing between 45 to 120 kg) into SWSOOS1 at stop board locations SBD113 and SBD114 immediately upstream of the site of the desilting works, in order to block flow travelling downstream and divert flow through nearby cross connection 1 into the parallel SWSOOS2 north carrier. Cross connection 1 only connects SWSOOS1 with SWSOOS2 north and does not connect through to SWSOOS2 south.
The stop boards were installed to the height of about 1.8 m, approximately 10 cm below the height of the top of the carrier.
A further single set of stop boards was inserted in SWSOOS1 about 160 m upstream of the site of the desilting works and the overflow structure, at stop board location SBD102. These stop boards were installed to about three quarters of the height of the carrier and operated to divert normal flow away from SWSOOS1 into SWSOOS2 through cross connection 2, which also connected SWSOOS2 North to SWSOOS2 South.
A coffer dam (a temporary dam of stockpiled sandbags) was constructed in SWSOOS1 downstream of the work area to prevent any backflow entering the work area of SWSOOS1.
Mr Campbell was on site on 22 and 23 May 2017, to oversee the installation of the stop boards and the coffer dam.
[7]
Commencement of the Desilting Works
Manned entry into the sewer commenced on 24 May 2017 to begin desilting. Veolia employees were onsite to carry out the desilting works at approximately 6.00-7.00 am each morning until approximately 2.00-3.00 pm each afternoon, between Monday and Friday, during 22 May to 6 June 2017. No work was carried out on weekends.
Each morning before commencing works Veolia employees checked SBD114 for signs of overflow over the top of the stop boards. Veolia Flow Monitoring Log Sheets were recorded in respect of checks made of the flow height against SBD114 and the coffer dam during the desilting works for 25, 26, 29, 30 May and 1, 2, 6 June 2017.
There were no Flow Monitoring Log Sheets for the remaining nine days within the relevant period, five of which were work days. Sydney Water has not been able to locate records for these days.
At the end of work each day the stop boards at SBD113 and SBD114 were not removed. The decision to leave stop boards in place on a continuing basis was made by Sydney Water because:
1. it considered that it would not be appropriate to remove and re-install the stop boards and coffer dam from the carriers and to pump out the isolated work area each morning due to time constraints and the need to undertake the work in a safe manner; and
2. the same method had been successfully employed for desilting works which had occurred further upstream in SWSOOS1 during late 2016 and early 2017.
[8]
The Dry Weather Overflows From 22 May to 6 June 2017 Giving Rise to the First Water Pollution Offence
From the evening of 22 May to 6 June 2017, intermittent overflows of sewage occurred from the overflow structure each night, discharging directly into the northern weir channel of Mill Stream downstream of Mill Pond weir.
During the period 21 May to 6 June 2017, there was no rainfall above 10 mm at any rain gauge owned and operated by Sydney Water within the Southern Suburbs Sewage Treatment System catchment.
The material discharged from the overflow structure was sewage with trace quantities of ferrous chloride (FeCI2), a chemical which is used by Sydney Water to control dissolved sulphides in the sewage.
Neither Sydney Water nor Veolia staff on site during the desilting works observed any signs of the overflows.
Gauge data revealed that the overflow structure was activated and that sewage was discharged into Mill Stream during the time periods in the table below. The gauge data from 10.00 am on 19 May 2017 to 1:38 pm on 30 May 2017 was not recorded because the battery in the gauge was flat.
Accordingly, the italicised entries in the table below are based on extrapolated gauge data. The extrapolated gauge data was calculated by taking flow levels from nearby gauges and adjusting those levels to derive approximate flow levels at which the overflow structure was activated.
Date and time overflow commences (2017) Date and time overflow ceases (2017)
Monday 22 May at 21.36 Tuesday 23 May at 2.00
Tuesday 23 May at 21.27 Wednesday 24 May at 2.10
Wednesday 24 May at 13.52 Wednesday 24 May at 18.50
Wednesday 24 May at 20.50 Thursday 25 May at 2:00
Thursday 25 May at 21:52 Friday 26 May at 0:01
Friday 26 May at 21.52 Saturday 27 May at 1:21
Saturday 27 May at 14.31 Sunday 28 May at 1:55
Sunday 28 May at 17:30 Sunday 28 May at 21:00
Monday 29 May at 21:21 Tuesday 30 May at 2:00
Tuesday 30 May at 21:40 Wednesday 31 May at 1:28
Wednesday 31 May at 21:45 Thursday 1 June at 1:35
Thursday 1 June at 21:58 Friday 2 June at 1:05
Friday 2 June at 21:21 Saturday 3 June at 0:54
Saturday 3 June at 16:05 Sunday 4 June at 0:31
Sunday 4 June at 18:38 Monday 5 June at 1:09
Monday 5 June at 21:11 Tuesday 6 June 1:13
[9]
Volume of the Overflows
Subsequent to the identification of the sewage overflows at Mill Stream, Sydney Water utilised two methods to calculate the estimated volume of sewage discharged into Mill Stream during the period 22 May to 6 June 2017:
1. first, by using a mass balance approach which compared the differences in inflow volumes at MWTP shortly prior to the incident to that during the incident. Sydney Water estimated that approximately 168 million litres ("ML") of sewage was discharged into Mill Stream during the dry weather overflows of 22 May to 6 June 2017. To account for uncertainties and variabilities in the calculation method Sydney Water applied a margin of uncertainty of +/- 14%. When that margin was applied the overflow volume was in the range of 145 ML - 192 ML; and
2. second, by using hydraulic modelling Sydney Water calculated that between 151 ML and 334 ML of sewage was discharged during the incident. The wide range in this estimate accounts for uncertainty as to whether the overflow structure was in siphonic flow or not. If the overflow structure was in full siphonic flow during the overflows then the volume of sewage discharged would likely be at the upper end of the estimated range.
The dry weather discharge of sewage from the overflow structure between 22 May and 6 June 2017, prior to the onset of rainfall late in the evening of 6 June 2017, was not authorised by the EPL.
All of the sewage discharged from the overflow structure entered the tidal section of Mill Stream and flowed downstream into the waters of Botany Bay.
[10]
The Cause of the Dry Weather Overflows
The overflows were caused by the continuing presence of stop boards SBD113 and SBD114 in SWSOOS1 between 22 May and 6 June 2017, together with a number of additional contributing factors. Those factors were:
1. the daily peak dry weather volume of sewage flowing in the SWSOOS during the evenings on both weekdays and weekends;
2. the height of stop boards SBD113 and SBD114 compared to the height of the weir crest on the overflow structure; and
3. the capacity of cross-connection 1 and SWSOOS2 to transfer and receive peak dry weather flows without triggering overflows from the overflow structure.
It was not in dispute that there were no other known reportable incidents in the SWSOOS catchment from the beginning of May to 6 June 2017 that could have contributed to the discharge and pollution which occurred in Mill Stream and the immediate area of Botany Bay into which Mill Stream discharges.
[11]
Sydney Water Becomes Aware of the Overflows
As stated above, at the time of the incident the gauge on the overflow structure was not utilised by Sydney Water for monitoring any overflows during the desilting works. Veolia had been monitoring the height of the flow against the stop boards SBD113 and SBD114 based on an incorrect assumption that the flow would overtop the stop board before it reached the height of the weir crest in the overflow structure.
As also stated above, on 19 May 2017, that is three days before the desilting works commenced, the battery in the gauge on the overflow structure expired.
The flat battery caused the gauge to stop recording data. The fault was not detected as part of Sydney Water routine inspections of gauge data on 22, 24 and 29 May 2017.
On 30 May 2017, the flat battery was identified and replaced on the same day resulting in the recording of flow data from the time of its replacement.
On 5 June 2017, upon a routine inspection of data from the gauge, Mr Paul McVicar of Hydrometrics Services at Sydney Water, noticed that the gauge was indicating that the weir crest level had been overtopped and the overflow structure was active. Mr McVicar emailed Ms Howard (Project Manager at Sydney Water) at 8.37 am on 5 June 2017 with the subject line "SWSOOS1 desilting work - Dry Weather Overflows" to inform her that the data from the gauge was "indicating instances of sewer overflow at night". He attached a screen shot of plot data.
Because there was a gap in data from the gauge (due to the flat battery) until 30 May 2017, a team was sent to check the accuracy and functionality of the gauge the following morning on 6 June 2017.
At about 7.45 am on 6 June 2017, Mr McVicar's team, together with Ms Howard, attended the site of the desilting works to inspect the gauge and confirmed that it was operating correctly. Odour and evidence of sewage overflows were identified by Ms Howard in Mill Stream weir in the vicinity of the overflow structure.
Ms Howard observed that the water downstream of the weir to which the outlet of the overflow structure discharged was a light brown colour and several wet wipes were floating in the water.
Ms Howard and Mr Coiro held a series of phone conversations between approximately 9.00 am to 11.00 am on 6 June 2017, including with Veolia staff and Mr Cantlon, and a decision was made to remove the top three stop boards from SBD113 and SBD114 at the conclusion of that work day. This decision was based on predictions of wet weather in the following days, the weir crest height in the overflow structure, and the need to reduce the height of the stop boards at SBD113 and SBD114 to a level at which peak dry weather flows could pass over the top without activating the overflow structure.
[12]
Wet Weather Overflows From 6 to 10 June 2017 That Are Not the Subject of a Water Pollution Charge
Late in the evening of 6 June 2017, rain began to fall in the SWSOOS catchment. On the morning of 7 June 2017, under Sydney Water's instructions, Veolia commenced clean-up and began to pump out sewage water back to the SWSOOS1 from the site of the overflow at Mill Stream. However, pumping was suspended that morning due to the onset of heavy wet weather. The overflow structure was again activated due to rain.
Wet weather overflows occurred into Mill Stream between the evenings of 6 and 10 June 2017. Wet weather overflows from the overflow structure are not prohibited by the EPL, however, the hydraulic modelling indicates that the wet weather overflows which occurred between the evenings of 6 June to 10 June 2017 were exacerbated by the continuing presence of the stop boards at SBD113 and SBD114.
During the period above there was heavy rain (over 10 mm recorded at individual rain gauges) in the Southern Suburbs Sewage Treatment System catchment. Once wet weather conditions were present in the system Sydney Water was unable to remove the stop boards or coffer dam because the working conditions were unsafe to do so.
Sydney Water hydraulic modelling estimated that approximately 683 ML of sewage and stormwater was discharged from the overflow structure into Mill Stream between the evenings of 6 to 10 June 2017.
Sydney Water modelling also simulated overflows in the same scenario but with no stop boards in place. The model estimated that with no stop boards 535 ML of wastewater would have been discharged. Therefore, Sydney Water's modelling indicated that due to the presence of SBD113 and SBD114, an additional 148 ML of wastewater was discharged into Mill Stream during the wet weather overflows commencing on the evening of 6 June and continuing into the evening of 10 June 2017.
[13]
The Dry Weather Overflows From 11 June to 16 June 2017 Giving Rise to the Second Water Pollution Offence
Rain in the SWSOOS catchment ceased by 11 June 2017. However, the overflow structure continued to activate and sewage continued to intermittently overflow into Mill Stream and into Botany Bay for a further five days until 16 June 2017. Although there was less than 10 mm of rain recorded in the SWSOOS catchment during the period between 11 and 16 June 2017, high level flow conditions from the wet weather were still present in the system until 16 June 2017, and therefore, the stop boards or coffer dam could not be removed until 16 June 2017.
Again, Sydney Water modelling indicated that had there been no stop boards in place an estimated 16 ML of sewage and stormwater would have been discharged from the overflow structure over 11 and 12 June 2017 due to the previous wet weather which had a lag time to pass through the system.
The EPL does not recognise this lag effect in the definition of "wet weather" and "dry weather". Due to the partial isolations in place caused by the 1.5 m stop boards at SBD113 and SBD114, Sydney Water modelling indicated that an estimated 189 ML of sewage was discharged into Mill Stream during this period.
Therefore, between 11 and 16 June 2017 dry weather overflows occurred discharging an estimated 173 ML of sewage from the overflow structure into Mill Stream. These overflows were not authorised by the EPL.
The causes of the 173 ML dry weather overflows into Mill Stream are the same as the causes for the previous dry weather overflows (discussed above). Had the stop boards been totally removed on 6 June 2017, it is estimated that the overflow volume would have only been 16 ML of wastewater.
The stop boards and coffer dam were totally removed from SWSOOS1 on 16 June 2017, when it was deemed safe by Sydney Water for Veolia workers to enter the sewer.
[14]
The Polluted Waters
The dry weather overflows the subject of the charges caused sewage to discharge from the outlet of the overflow structure into Mill Stream. The sewage flowed down Mill Stream and into the waters of Botany Bay.
The length of Mill Stream encompasses several separate parcels of land owned by a mixture of both State and Commonwealth entities as follows:
1. public road reserve owned by Bayside Council (formerly Lot 12 DP 787029);
2. Lot 13 DP 787029 owned by the Commonwealth; and
3. Lot 401 DP787029 owned by the Commonwealth, encompassing the section of Mill Stream downstream of Foreshore Drive and adjacent to Sydney Airport runway, and which is incorporated into the leased area for Sydney Airport and regulated under the Airports Act 1996 (Cth) and the Airports (Environment Protection) Regulations 1997 (Cth) made under that Act.
The waters polluted as a result of the dry weather overflows the subject of the charges include the waters of Mill Stream, to the extent that they are not owned by Commonwealth, and the downstream waters of Botany Bay.
The section of SWSOOS1 that was being desilted is located on land owned by Sydney Water. The overflow structure manhole and weir crest where the overflowing sewage left the Southern Diversion Sewer is located on land owned by Bayside Council. The overflowing sewage travelled through the overflow structure pipework from Bayside Council land onto Commonwealth land. At least some of that pipework is located on Commonwealth land. The outlet of the pipe that discharged into the Mill Stream stormwater channel at a point adjacent to and under the cover of SWSOOS1 is located on Commonwealth land.
[15]
Sydney Water Carried Out the Licenced activity in a Less Than Competent Manner (the EPL Offence)
The removal of silt and associated works are part of operating the sewage treatment system to which the EPL applies.
The parties agreed that the risk of dry weather sewage overflows into Mill Stream as a result of the desilting works was a foreseeable and material risk and was not appropriately considered and mitigated by Sydney Water.
The parties further agreed that a competent operator would have:
1. investigated whether the flow diversion proposed at this location could be carried out without causing dry weather overflows;
2. monitored the overflow structure during desilting works to confirm that overflows were not occurring once the flow isolations were installed; and
3. had a clear written procedure to determine when the coffer dam and stop boards would need to be removed.
[16]
Sydney Water Should Have Investigated the Proposed Diversion
As part of the FIFM Plan Sydney Water ought to have, but did not:
1. confirm the height of the weir crest in the overflow structure which is the height of flow levels in the sewer at which the overflow structure activates. Such information was readily available to Sydney Water;
2. review or monitor sewer flow data from any gauge in SWSOOS1 or SWSOOS2 to determine the pattern or timing of peak sewer flow height in SWSOOS1. Sydney Water assumed that peak dry weather flows occurred mid-morning which was incorrect because sewer gauge data in SWSOOS1 indicated that peak dry weather flows typically arrived each day in the late evening; and
3. consider, for example by carrying out hydraulic modelling, the condition and capacity of cross-connection 1 and SWSOOS2 north to transfer and carry flows from SWSOOS1 and the Southern Diversion Sewer without the flow depth increasing above the weir crest level. Instead, Sydney Water relied on the diversion of flows from SWSOOS1 to SWSOOS2 working successfully for the earlier desilting work carried out upstream in SWSOOS 1.
Each is discussed in greater detail immediately below.
Sydney Water obtained a Traverse Report of SWSOOS2 in April 2015. The traverse was undertaken in November 2014. The report made a number of conclusions in the Executive Summary, including that:
…apart from a major silt bank downstream of Perry St elsewhere silt levels were generally considered moderate. Some lengths had intermittent silt banks which averaged 150-200mm in depth, with up to 600mm found within bends on the alignment of the sewer. For these remaining areas, silt levels currently do not have any adverse effect on the operational capacity of the sewer, however should be monitored in subsequent inspections to determine when action needs to be undertaken to remove silt.
…
Major work is required within this section of sewer inspected over the next 10 years with the extent of work and required timing as set out below.
Sewer Description and Location Length Rehabilitation Timing Estimate Cost
• Protective coating of SWSOOS 2 North and South Cells between Exell Street and Botany Goods Railway (including removal of silt).
• Protective coating of SWSOOS 2 North and South Cells between Cooks River Syphon and Hayden (including removal or silt). 5 km 0-3 years $ 30m
• Projective coating of two flat roof areas in tunnel Perry St and Malabar STP.
• Protective coating of SWSOOS 2 from Perry Street to Dacre Street within Malabar STP (including removal of silt) 2 km 8-10 years $ 25m
[17]
Sydney Water Should Have Monitored the Overflow Structure Once the Flow Isolations Were Installed
During the desilting works Sydney Water did not:
1. direct or require the use of any gauges owned and operated by Sydney Water to monitor flows in the sewer or for dry weather overflows occurring at the overflow structure;
2. check that the gauge was functioning prior to commencing works;
3. direct or require Veolia to carry out specific monitoring (whether visual or otherwise) of the overflow structure; or
4. direct or require any monitoring for overflows to be carried out when no workers were on site after hours or on weekends.
Sydney Water directed and required Veolia to monitor the height of the flow at stop boards SBD113 and SBD114 during working hours based on the incorrect assumption that:
1. the height of the stop boards SBD113 and SBD114 was lower than the weir crest of the overflow structure, and therefore, wastewater would overtop the stop boards before it would overtop the weir crest. Whereas, the height of the weir crest was lower than the height of the stop boards at SBD113 and SBD114;
2. peak dry weather flows occurred about mid-morning (peak dry weather flows in SWSOOS1 in fact typically occurred in the late evening); and
3. workers outside of the SWSOOS carrier would notice dry weather overflows in siphonic mode occurring during the day.
[18]
Sydney Water Should Have Had a Procedure to Remove Flow Isolations in the Event of an Emergency
The decision on 6 June 2017 to remove only the top three stop boards was made based on the knowledge that dry weather overflows had already occurred for the past five nights (at a minimum).
Sydney Water did not have a clear written procedure to determine when the coffer dam and all of the stop boards (not merely the top three) would need to be removed.
[19]
Sampling Undertaken
At approximately 5.00 pm on the evening of 6 June 2017, Sydney Water directed its Field Sampling and Testing team ("FST") to attend the site of the overflow to conduct an assessment. The FST arrived at Mill Stream at approximately 5.45 pm and water samples were undertaken from eight locations including the Mill Pond weir, several points downstream in Mill Stream, and at Foreshore Beach in Botany Bay.
Faecal coliform and enterococci sampling data showed elevated levels of both within Mill Stream. Elevated concentrations of both also existed where Mill Stream confluences with Botany Bay. Bacteriological levels were also elevated at Foreshore Beach.
On the evening of 6 June 2017, the FST provided clean-up recommendations to Sydney Water including pumping polluted waters from Mill Stream back into the sewer before the next tide and installing warning signage at the confluence of Mill Stream and Botany Bay until bacteriological results indicated no sewage.
Signage was installed by Sydney Water near the boat ramp at Foreshore Beach in Botany Bay on 6 June 2017, to alert the public to the presence of sewage in the water.
Mr Coiro visited the area at the confluence of Mill Stream and Botany Bay near Foreshore Beach on either 6 or 7 June 2017, and observed residual sewage material including sanitary items along the edge of the shore. Mr Coiro was, however, unable to determine whether the observed residual sewage material emanated from the wet weather overflow events that occurred prior to the desilting works.
Further sampling was undertaken by Sydney Water on 17 June 2017. Between sampling rounds, Sydney Water considered that the rain and wet weather overflows that occurred from 7 June 2017 would have caused any samples collected during that period to be unrepresentative due to the Antecedent Wetness Index ("AWI") being greater than five. The AWI is a measure of catchment wetness based on the rainfall that has occurred over preceding days. The FST does not ordinarily sample in conditions where the AWI is greater than five.
The sampling results taken on 17 June 2017 by the FST at the same eight locations showed elevated bacteriological levels that were indicative of the presence of sewage within Mill Stream and Botany Bay.
The FST continued water quality sampling in certain locations in Mill Stream and Botany Bay twice a week until 20 July 2017. The results of the water quality sampling were provided to the EPA each week.
[20]
The Clean-Up
The desilting works were suspended on 6 June 2017 and have not been recommenced by Sydney Water.
On 18 June 2017, on instruction from Sydney Water, Veolia commenced the pump out of the polluted water in Mill Stream which continued until 6 July 2017. An estimated 190 ML of sewage contaminated water was pumped from Mill Stream back into the sewage network. Pumping could only occur for about 12 hours each day when the tide was high enough to enable pumping on the downstream side of the weir at Mill Pond.
Sydney Water carried out the flushing of Mill Stream by opening a stand pipe which discharged water into a storm water channel flowing into the northern end of Mill Stream.
In addition to the FST sampling, Sydney Water engaged JSA Environmental Pty Ltd to undertake an environmental assessment and to provide advice on the impact of the overflows and the required clean-up action. The environmental assessment was completed on 21 June 2017.
On 22 June 2017, the EPA issued a clean-up notice to Sydney Water pursuant to s 92 of the POEOA requiring it to clean up sewage contaminated water of all affected areas of Mill Stream and to undertake water quality sampling and analysis twice a week at least three days apart until water quality reached background levels.
Clean-up along Mill Stream at low tide was completed by Veolia on 23 and 24 June 2017, using an excavator and manual brooming to remove solids from the creek bed and to move clean sand to cover sewage contaminated sand exposed at low tide.
[21]
Odour
On 18 June 2017, Sydney Water self-reported odour issues to the EPA which were thought to be the result of residual wastewater from the overflows at the overflow structure.
On 22 June 2017, Sydney Water engaged JBS&G Australia Pty Ltd ("JBS&G") to carry out odour monitoring and surveillance in the Botany area commencing on 22 June 2017 and to assess the mitigation of odour during the clean-up process. The odour monitoring and surveillance continued until JBS&G concluded that no further odour emission measurements or odour surveys were required to be carried out.
[22]
The Purposes of Sentencing
The purposes of sentencing are set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ("CSPA"):
3A Purposes of sentencing
The purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows:
(a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence,
(b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences,
(c) to protect the community from the offender,
(d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender,
(e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions,
(f) to denounce the conduct of the offender,
(g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.
[23]
Statutory Matters Required to be Taken into Account in Sentencing
In addition to the matters set out in Div 1 of the CSPA, the POEOA sets out the factors which are required to be taken into account when sentencing offences committed under that Act. Section 241(1) and (2) of the POEOA relevantly provides that:
241 Matters to be considered in imposing penalty
(1) In imposing a penalty for an offence against this Act or the regulations, the court is to take into consideration the following (so far as they are relevant):
(a) the extent of the harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment by the commission of the offence,
(b) the practical measures that may be taken to prevent, control, abate or mitigate that harm,
(c) the extent to which the person who committed the offence could reasonably have foreseen the harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment by the commission of the offence,
(d) the extent to which the person who committed the offence had control over the causes that gave rise to the offence,
(e) whether, in committing the offence, the person was complying with orders from an employer or supervising employee.
(2) The court may take into consideration other matters that it considers relevant.
Subsections 21A(2) and (3) of the CSPA also set out aggravating and mitigating factors that the Court must consider. Relevant to the facts of this case they are:
21A Aggravating, mitigating and other factors in sentencing
(2) Aggravating factors
The aggravating factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence are as follows:
…
(d) the offender has a record of previous convictions (particularly if the offender is being sentenced for a serious personal violence offence and has a record of previous convictions for serious personal violence offences),
…
(g) the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was substantial,
…
(o) the offence was committed for financial gain…
The court is not to have additional regard to any such aggravating factor in sentencing if it is an element of the offence.
(3) Mitigating factors
The mitigating factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence are as follows:
(a) the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was not substantial,
(b) the offence was not part of a planned or organised criminal activity,
…
(e) the offender does not have any record (or any significant record) of previous convictions,
(f) the offender was a person of good character,
(g) the offender is unlikely to re-offend,
(h) the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation, whether by reason of the offender's age or otherwise,
(i) the remorse shown by the offender for the offence, but only if:
(i) the offender has provided evidence that he or she has accepted responsibility for his or her actions, and
(ii) the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his or her actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both),
…
(k) a plea of guilty by the offender (as provided by section 22 or Division 1A),
…
(m) assistance by the offender to law enforcement authorities (as provided by section 23)…
[24]
Objective Circumstances of the Offences
The objective gravity of the offences fixes both the upper and lower limits of proportionate punishment. It fixes the upper limit insofar as the sentence must not exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crimes considered in light of its objective circumstances (Veen v The Queen (No 2) and Hoare v The Queen [1989] HCA 33; (1989) 167 CLR 348 at 354). It fixes the lower limit because allowance for the subjective factors of the case ought not produce a sentence which fails to reflect the objective gravity or seriousness of the offences (R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354 and R v Nichols (1991) 57 A Crim R 391 at 395).
The objective seriousness is to be determined by reference to the nature of the offences and not by reference to matters that are personal to a particular offender (Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120 at [27]).
In determining the objective seriousness or gravity of the offences the relevant objective circumstances include the factors discussed below.
[25]
Nature of the Offences
The nature and purpose of the statutory provision that has been contravened, and its place in the statutory scheme, are illustrative of the objective seriousness of an environmental offence (Bentley v BGP Properties Pty Ltd [2006] NSWLEC 34; (2006) 145 LGERA 234 at [168]-[169], Plath v Rawson [2009] NSWLEC 178; (2009) 170 LGERA 253 at [49] and Chief Executive, Office of Environment and Heritage v Orica Pty Ltd; Environment Protection Authority v Orica Pty Ltd [2015] NSWLEC 109 at [59]).
The relevant objects of the POEOA contained in s 3 of that Act identify the rationale in Parliament creating the offences.
In respect of the first and second water pollution offences, as Preston J stated in Environment Protection Authority v Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd [2008] NSWLEC 280; (2008) 163 LGERA 71, "pollution of waters is a result offence where the proscribed result directly undermines the object of the [POEOA]" (at [23]).
In relation to the EPL offence, as the EPA submitted, environmental protection licenses are the primary means of regulation under the POEOA and the commission of the offence therefore undermined the statutory scheme set out in that Act. In Orica Australia (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) the Court opined that (at [104]):
104. …Compliance with licence conditions is the price that entities must pay for permission to engage in potentially polluting manufacturing processes. The conditions imposed in any licence are aimed at maximising beneficial environmental outcomes and minimising environmental harm. They represent a balancing exercise between fostering economic growth and development, on the one hand, and protecting and preserving the environment now and for the future, on the other. Strict compliance with the conditions of any environmental licence is therefore necessary to ensure that this balance is achieved and that the objectives of the POEOA are met.
Sydney Water's conduct during the desilting works breached condition O1.1 of the EPL because it failed to undertake the works in a "competent manner". thereby contravening s 64(1) of the POEOA. The transgression was clearly incompatible with the regulatory regime and the objects of the POEOA, especially with respect to the protection of the environment (see, in particular, s 3(d)) (Orica Australia (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) at [105]).
[26]
Maximum Penalty
The maximum penalty provided for an offence indicates the seriousness with which the legislature views the commission of the offence (Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 at 698 and Rawson at [57]). It also provides a sentencing yardstick for the case before the Court (Markarian at [31] and Elias v The Queen; Issa v the Queen [2013] HCA 31; (2013) 248 CLR 483 at [27]).
The maximum penalty for an offence against s 120(1) of the POEOA by a corporation is $1,000,000.
The maximum penalty for an offence against s 64(1) of the POEOA by a corporation is also $1,000,000.
[27]
Sydney Water's State of Mind in the Commission of the Offences
[28]
The Application of the Principle in De Simoni
The offence under s 120(1) of the POEOA is one of strict liability. The principle in R v De Simoni [1981] HCA 31; (1981) 147 CLR 383 (at 389) applies to offences committed under s 120(1) of the POEOA, and therefore, the Court is precluded from considering Sydney Water's state of mind for the s 120(1) offences by reason of the existence of a more serious water pollution offence under s 116 of the POEOA (Environment Protection Authority v Tea Garden Farms Pty Ltd [2012] NSWLEC 89 at [101]-[102]; Environment Protection Authority v Snowy Hydro Ltd [2008] NSWLEC 264; (2008) 162 LGERA 273 at [145]-[151]; Environment Protection Authority v Queanbeyan City Council (No 3) [2012] NSWLEC 220; (2012) 192 LGERA 415 at [178] and Orica Australia Pty Ltd (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) at [127]-[139]). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider whether the first and second water pollution offences were committed intentionally, recklessly, or negligently by Sydney Water.
Sydney Water made the same submission with respect to the commission of the s 64 offence, citing the Court's decision in Orica Australia Pty Ltd (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident). Sydney Water argued that having regard to whether or not it acted negligently in the commission of the EPL offence offended the De Simoni principle because it would amount to sentencing it for a more serious crime than that to which it had pled guilty, namely, an offence against s 116 of the POEOA.
Section 116 of the POEOA relevantly provides that:
116 Leaks, spillages and other escapes
(1) If a person wilfully or negligently causes any substance to leak, spill or otherwise escape (whether or not from a container) in a manner that harms or is likely to harm the environment:
(a) the person, and
(b) if the person is not the owner of the substance, the owner, are each guilty of an offence.
(2) If:
(a) the person in possession of the substance at the time of the leak, spill or other escape, or
(b) the owner of any container from which the substance leaked, spilled or escaped, or
(c) the owner of the land on which the substance or any such container was located at the time of the leak, spill or other escape, or
(d) the occupier of the land on which the substance or an such container was located at the time of the leak, spill or other escape,
wilfully or negligently, in a material respect, caused or contributed to the conditions that gave rise to the commission of the offence under subsection (1), that person, owner or occupier is guilty of an offence.
[29]
Sydney Water's Conduct Was Not Criminally Negligent
In order to determine whether or not Sydney Water's conduct was criminally negligent, it is first necessary to identify the correct test for this mental state.
In Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Fish [2010] NSWLEC 144; (2010) 179 LGERA 386 the Court articulated the test for criminal negligence as follows (at [81]):
81. The Defendants submitted that the relevant principles (accepted by the Prosecutor) as to whether they were negligent in relation to their advice was that, in the criminal context, negligence means more than a breach of a duty of care. To amount to criminal negligence, the degree of carelessness must be such as to show such a disregard for the objects of the statute as to amount to a crime against the state (R v Bateman [1925] All ER Rep 45; (1925) 19 Cr App R 8; see also Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576 per Lord Atkin at 583; applied in Cittadini v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 302 at [38]-[40]). For there to be negligence, there must have been an indifference to an obvious risk (R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226 at 247, applied in Cittadini).
Therefore, to amount to criminal negligence the EPA must prove more than a breach of a duty of care or a failure to take relevant precautions.
The test referred to above in Fish been cited and applied on many occasions in this Court (see, for example, Chief Executive, Office of Environment & Heritage v Orica Pty Ltd at [114] per Preston J).
Curiously, the concept of an 'indifference to an obvious risk', which is often quoted in the context of the commission of environmental crime, does not appear to find recent favour in the context of the test for criminal negligence for involuntary manslaughter.
In King v The Queen [2012] HCA 24; (2012) 245 CLR 588 the plurality of the High Court described the evolution of the test for criminal negligence resulting in death as follows (at [26]-[29] per French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ):
26. In 1925 in Bateman, Hewart LCJ referred to epithets, including "culpable", "criminal" and "gross", used to describe the degree of negligence necessary to establish criminal liability. He said:
"whatever epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment."
In Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions Lord Atkin effectively endorsed that rather instrumental criterion of criminal negligence.
27. Culpable negligence giving rise to criminal liability at common law was not the subject of elaboration beyond the kind of directions approved in Bateman and Andrews. In Akerele v The King the Privy Council referred to the impossibility of defining culpable negligence and the impossibility of making the distinction between actionable negligence and criminal negligence "except by means of illustrations drawn from actual judicial opinions".
28. The common law of criminal negligence as enunciated in Bateman, Andrews and Akerele, was considered in Australia in connection with the construction of ss 289 and 266 of the Criminal Codes of Queensland and Western Australia respectively. Those sections imposed a legal duty on persons in charge of dangerous things "to use reasonable care and take reasonable precautions" to avoid danger to the life, safety or health of any person. Section 266 of the Criminal Code (WA) was considered by this Court in Callaghan v The Queen and s 289 of the Criminal Code (Q) by the Supreme Court of Queensland in R v Scarth. They were construed as importing the common law of criminal negligence. The common law distinction between criminal and civil negligence was to be maintained. The Court in Callaghan referred to Doherty and Andrews, the derivation of the Criminal Code (WA) from the English Criminal Code Bill, and Stephen's discussion, in his History, of killing by omission.
29. The common law standard of criminal negligence expounded in Bateman and Andrews was also accepted in Victoria in its application to involuntary manslaughter. In Nydam v The Queen a unanimous Full Court of the Supreme Court, in a decision dealing primarily with the question of mens rea, described the requisite standard of negligence as involving:
"such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment."
The criterion of "a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow" was adopted by the plurality in Wilson v The Queen.
[30]
The Environmental Harm Occasioned or Likely to be Occasioned by the Commission of the Offences
Section 241(1)(a) of the POEOA requires the Court to take into account the extent of the harm caused, or likely to be caused, to the environment by the commission of the offence. "Harm" is defined in the dictionary to the POEOA as:
harm to the environment includes any direct or indirect alteration of the environment that has the effect of degrading the environment and, without limiting the generality of the above, includes any act or omission that results in pollution.
In Environment Protection Authority v Waste Recycling and Processing Corporation [2006] NSWLEC 419; (2006) 148 LGERA 299 Preston J stated that harm includes both actual harm and potential harm (at [145]-[148]):
145. Harmfulness needs to not only be considered in terms of actual harm, the potential or risk of harm should also be taken into account: Axer Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 113 LGERA 357 at 366 and Bentley v BGP Properties Pty Ltd [2006] NSWLEC 34 (6 February 2006) at [175]. Harm should not be limited to measurable harm such as actual harm to human health. It can also include a broader notion of the quality of life.
146. Harm can include harm to the environment and its ecology. Harm to an animal or plant not only adversely affects that animal or plant, it also affects other biota that have ecological relationships to that animal or plant: Bentley v BGP Properties Pty Ltd [2006] NSWLEC 34 (6 February 2006) at [174].
147. Harm can be direct or indirect, individual or cumulative. Activities that contribute incrementally to the gradual deterioration of the environment, even when they cause no discernible direct harm to human interest, should also be treated seriously.
148. The culpability of the defendant depends in part on the seriousness of the environmental harm. Sentencing courts have exercised their discretion in relation to penalty on the principle that the more serious the lasting environmental harm involved, the more serious the offence and, ordinarily, the higher the penalty: Camilleris Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 at 701. If the harm is substantial, this objective circumstance is an aggravating factor: s 21A(2)(g) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
The meaning of the words "likely to be caused to the environment" was considered by Lloyd J in Newcastle City Council v Pace Farm Egg Products Pty Ltd [2002] NSWLEC 66, where his Honour stated (at [44]), "in considering the harm likely to be caused to the environment, it is to be noted that the word 'likely' in this context has been held to mean "a real or not remote chance or possibility regardless of whether it is less or more than a fifty per cent chance".
[31]
Mill Stream and Botany Bay
Mill Stream is an engineered tidal channel, commencing from the downstream side of Mill Pond weir. It flows into Botany Bay approximately 1 to 1.2 km downstream of the weir.
Mill Stream is highly modified as the result of development, with Sydney Airport's third runway forming its western boundary and Foreshore Road located along its eastern shoreline.
Mill Stream and the north-eastern areas of Botany Bay (including where Foreshore Beach is located) are considered to be degraded estuarine systems.
Mill Stream forms a shallow (less than 2-3 m) estuarine channel, bounded at its most upstream point by Mill Pond weir, which restricts freshwater flow to and from Mill Pond. At its downstream end, near Foreshore Beach, Mill Stream is tidal and has a shoaled and narrow entrance. Circulation within Mill Stream is dominated primarily by tidal flows under dry weather conditions and freshwater inflows from Mill Pond under wet weather conditions.
The Mill Pond catchment extends upstream to Centennial Park. Due to the highly urbanised catchment, the aquatic environment within Mill Stream and the northern parts of Botany Bay, including Foreshore Beach, is under significant pressure and has been impacted by various sources of pollution, such as sewage overflows, stormwater runoff and other discharges from the urban catchment.
[32]
Beachwatch Grading at Foreshore Beach
The NSW Office of Environment and Heritage's ("OEH") Beachwatch program monitors and publishes information about recreational water quality at swimming sites in the Sydney, Central Coast, Hunter and Illawarra regions. The Beachwatch program samples water at Foreshore Beach approximately every five days and publishes a risk rating on its website indicating whether it is safe to swim at the beach or whether there is a risk to the health of swimmers from water pollution.
In accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council's Guidelines for Managing Risks in Recreational Water (2008) ("NHMRC Guidelines"), the Beachwatch program only tests for enterococci as the single preferred faecal indicator in marine waters. These bacteria are excreted in faeces and are rarely present in unpolluted waters.
The OEH publishes an annual State of the Beaches Report which grades swimming sites in New South Wales as "Very Good", "Good", "Fair", "Poor" or "Very Poor" in accordance with NHMRC Guidelines. These annual "Beach Suitability Grades" provide a longer-term assessment of how suitable a beach is for swimming. For locations with a beach suitability grade of "Very Poor" the State of the Beaches Report indicates that "it is generally recommend to avoid swimming at these sites almost all of the time".
For 2016-2017 and 2017-2018, the annual beach suitability grade for Foreshore Beach was "Very Poor" and the beach was stated as being "very susceptible to pollution from sewerage overflows discharging to nearby Mill Stream".
From June to July 2017, the Beachwatch program's enterococci count trigger value for Foreshore Beach was 40 colony forming units ("CFU")/100 mL. This means that where a water sample contains an enterococci count of 40 CFU/100 mL or higher, the OEH publishes a warning on its website that there is an increased risk to human health and that it is unsafe to swim at Foreshore Beach.
During FST's sampling at the eastern end of Foreshore Beach from 20 June to 21 July 2017, levels of enterococci at that site exceeded the Beachwatch trigger value of 40 CFU/100 mL only once on 13 July 2017.
[33]
ANZECC Guidelines
The Australian and New Zealand Guidelines for Fresh and Marine Water Quality (2000) ("ANZECC Guidelines 2000") are used by the New South Wales Government to assess levels of contaminants, including bacterial contamination, within waterways.
When concentrations exceed the guideline trigger values ("GTVs"), there is a risk of impacts, including adverse health or environmental impacts, occurring.
For faecal coliform and enterococci there are GTVs for primary and secondary recreational contact with humans. Primary contact is swimming, and secondary contact encompasses other activities with less direct contact with water, such as sailing, fishing and dog walking.
The GTVs for faecal coliforms are 150 CFU/100 mL (primary contact) and 1000 CFU/100 mL (secondary contact). The GTVs for enterococci are 35 CFU/100 mL (primary contact) and 230 CFU/100 mL (secondary contact).
The GTVs for dissolved oxygen in estuaries are 80% (lower limit) and 110% (upper limit) saturation. The GTV of 80% saturation would be the equivalent of approximately 6.8 mg/L of dissolved oxygen.
The GTVs for pH in estuaries are 7.0 (lower limit) and 8.5 (upper limit).
[34]
The Water Sampling Results
From 6 June to 20 July 2017, water samples were taken from various locations at increasing distances from the overflow structure (excluding sample site 1, which was taken at Mill Pond upstream of the overflow structure and Mill Pond weir). Sample site 9 was in Botany Bay at the eastern end of Foreshore Beach and at the end of the northern pier of Port Botany boat ramp. Images of sites 1 to 8 from which water samples were taken are reproduced below:
Samples of water taken from the sites 2 and 3 (Mill Stream weir channel), 6 (Mill Stream west) and 7 (Mill Stream east) exceeded the GTV for faecal coliform (secondary contact) from 6 to 23 June 2017. A water sample taken from site 8 (towards the western end of Foreshore Beach) exceeded the GTV for faecal coliform (secondary contact) on 17 June 2017). All sampling sites were below the GTV (primary contact) by 3 July 2017.
On 6 June 2017, levels of faecal coliform in Mill Stream ranged from 33,000 to 67,000 CFU/100 mL, which was 220 to 446 times the GTV for primary recreation and 33 to 67 times the GTV for secondary recreation.
At sample site 1 (located in Mill Pond upstream of the overflow structure and Mill Pond weir), water samples also exceeded the GTV for faecal coliform (primary contact) on 6, 17, 23, 26 and 29 June 2017.
The level of enterococci at all sites sampled on 6 June 2017 within Mill Stream and Botany Bay (Foreshore Beach) exceeded both the GTV (primary contact) of 35 CFU/100 mL and the Beachwatch 40 CFU/100 mL trigger value. All sampling sites except sampling site 1 (Mill Pond upstream of the overflow structure), 4 (Mill Stream) and the Beachwatch sample (near site 9, on the eastern end of Foreshore Beach) also exceeded the GTV (secondary contact) of 230 CFU/100 mL on 6 June 2017.
On 6 June 2017, levels of enterococci in Mill Stream at sites 6 (Mill Stream west) and 7 (Mill Stream east) ranged from 980 to 1,100 CFU/100 mL, which was 24 to 27 times the Beachwatch trigger value of 40 CFU/100 mL, and the level of enterococci at sample site 8 (towards the western end of Foreshore Beach) was 14 times the Beachwatch trigger value of 40 CFU/100 mL.
Water samples from sample site 1 (Mill Pond upstream of the overflow structure), also indicated the presence of elevated levels of enterococci exceeding the GTV (primary contact) on 6, 17, 23, 26 and 29 June 2017.
[35]
Actual Environmental Harm Caused by the First Water Pollution Offence
The parties agreed that the dry weather sewerage overflows of 22 May to 6 June 2017 (the first water pollution offence) caused actual harm to the environment by polluting the aquatic environment and degrading the water quality of Mill Stream and Foreshore Beach.
[36]
Likely Environmental Harm Caused by the First Water Pollution Offence
The first water pollution offence also caused likely harm to the environment by creating an aquatic environment less able to support and accommodate aquatic plants and organisms. This conclusion is based on the following agreed facts.
First, on the morning of 26 May 2017, an EPA authorised officer, Mr George Orel, attended Foreshore Beach, Botany Bay by boat as part of an unrelated project to carry out biota sampling. Mr Orel was accompanied by his assistant and a commercial fisherman, who helped with sampling. Mr Orel identified a sewage odour as he landed on Foreshore Beach approximately 200 m north west of the Port Botany Boat Ramp.
Upon inspection of the sand around Mill Stream lookout and the mouth of Mill Stream, Mr Orel observed areas of darker, turbid water within odorous pools on the beach, occurring intermittently over an area of about 100 m (approximately in the same location as sampling site 7). The pools were odorous with black sediment at the bottom. The sewage odour increased towards the mouth of Mill Stream.
As at the morning of 26 May 2017, overflows had been occurring from the overflow structure into Mill Stream during the four prior evenings. It may be inferred that the sewage odour and pools of dark turbid water identified by Mr Orel near Mill Stream lookout contained sewage contaminated water from the previous nights' overflows.
Second, results reported for dissolved oxygen on 6 June 2017, indicated that potential environmental harm as a result of dissolved oxygen levels below the GTV (less than 80%) within Mill Stream, but not at Foreshore Beach (Botany Bay), had occurred at the time of sampling.
Dissolved oxygen is required by aquatic organisms to perform cellular processes such as respiration and needs to be maintained at a certain level for organisms to survive. Dissolved oxygen is often measured in aquatic systems to determine if a waterway can support aquatic life. The GTV of 80% in the ANZECC Guidelines 2000 was developed to provide a range within which the majority of plants and animals can be sustained within a waterway. Low dissolved oxygen may cause environmental harm such as inducing fish kills or be lethal to benthic invertebrates, such as mussels and worms, living within the sands on the seabed. Benthic invertebrates are unable to move away from areas of low sustained dissolved oxygen which results in mortality.
[37]
Actual Environmental Harm Was Caused by the Second Water Pollution Offence
Again, the parties agreed that the dry weather sewerage overflows of 11 to 16 June 2017 (the second water pollution offence) caused actual harm to the environment by polluting the aquatic environment and degrading the water quality of Mill Stream and Foreshore Beach.
[38]
Likely Environmental Harm Caused by the Second Water Pollution Offence
There was equally no serious dispute that likely harm to the ecological environment of Mill Stream and Botany Bay was caused by the commission of the second water pollution offence.
Dissolved oxygen was below the GTV (80% saturation) at Botany Bay sampling sites until at least 23 June 2017 and at Mill Stream sampling sites until at least 26 June 2017.
Daily volumes and nominal concentrations of sewage delivered to Mill Stream during the second overflow period were similar to the first overflow period and I find that as a consequence there were adverse impacts on the ecology of the receiving environment.
The dry weather overflows from 11 to 16 June 2017 occurred directly following a wet weather event which polluted the receiving waters (for example, from stormwater runoff) therefore diluting the effect of the dry weather sewage overflows.
As the influence of the wet weather overflows from 6 to 11 June 2017 on the receiving environment declined with time, the relative influence of the dry weather sewerage overflows continued. At least during the latter part of 11 to 16 June 2017, dry weather sewage overflows were a dominant influence on the water quality within Mill Stream and Foreshore Beach.
There was also the potential for harm to aquatic ecosystems from nutrients and metal concentrations within the sewage discharged during 11 to 16 June 2017.
Further, dry weather overflows during at least part of the period 11 to 16 June 2017 posed an increased risk to human health in Botany Bay. The risk to human health would have been the most significant during 13/14 to 16 June 2017 when public use of the waterway recommenced after the rainfall event.
[39]
Extent of the Environmental Harm
While it may be concluded based on the facts above that actual and likely environmental harm were caused by the commission of the first and second water pollution offences, the extent of that harm was in dispute primarily due to the nature of the receiving waters.
When considering the extent of harm caused by an offence it is relevant for the Court to turn its mind to the condition of the receiving environment. However, the fact that receiving waters have been modified, disturbed or degraded prior to a polluting event cannot be a factor mitigating Sydney Water's conduct (Environment Protection Authority v Ecolab Pty Limited [2002] NSWLEC 206; (2002) 123 LGERA 269 at [14], Environment Protection Authority v Waste Recycling and Processing Corporation [2006] NSWLEC 419; (2006) 148 LGERA 299 at [149] and Director-General, Department of Environment and Climate Change v Walker Corporation Pty Limited (No 4) [2011] NSWLEC 119 at [89]).
As was noted in Ecolab (at [13]-[14]):
13 In assessing the extent of environmental harm it is necessary for the Court to consider the modified state of the environment: see Environment Protection Authority v Rail Infrastructure Corporation [2002] NSWLEC 37 at par 80. Such inquiry requires a comparison of the condition of the creek before and after the contamination event.
14 Findings that the pre-existing condition of the creek was polluted do not serve to mitigate the defendant's conduct: see State Pollution Control Commission v White Wings Limited (unreported, Land & Environment Court, 1 November 1991). As Bignold J observed in that decision: "...a Defendant discharging effluent into a degraded waters is not to be given any advantage by way of mitigation simply because the receiving waters are in a degraded state." Nevertheless, it is important to determine the condition of the receiving waters in order to assess the extent of the environmental harm occasioned by the pollution.
As the agreed facts demonstrate, the receiving environment in the present case was considerably modified and degraded.
In addition to agreeing to the facts referred to above, Sydney Water made the following submissions on the condition of the receiving waters:
1. there could be no suggestion that there was any pollution of Mill Pond. It was for this reason that the sampling location 1 was in Mill Pond immediately upstream of the weir;
2. the sewage discharged into the weir and then through a pipe into Mill Stream into a "highly modified" "engineered tidal channel". Both Mill Stream and the proximate areas of Botany Bay, including Foreshore Beach, were "degraded estuarine systems" and the aquatic environment within Mill Stream and the northern parts of Botany Bay (including Foreshore Beach) were likely to be under significant pressure from various sources of pollution. Foreshore Beach was graded in the State of the Beaches Report between 2016 to 2018 as "Very Poor", which meant that the general recommendation was to avoid primary contact at that beach;
3. neither the weir nor Mill Stream was used by persons for activities involving either primary or secondary contact with the waters therein;
4. the EPL permitted the discharge of sewage effluent during wet weather. While this effluent was diluted in wet weather due to increased stormwater entering the sewage system, Mill Stream also received other pollutants during wet weather which were captured and stored in Mill Pond in dry weather but which could be flushed out in wet weather if Mill Pond overtopped;
5. faecal coliform levels in Mill Stream upstream of the discharge point (tested at sample site 1) on 6 June 2017 were 450 CFU. That is, unsuitable for primary contact but nevertheless suitable for secondary contact. Faecal coliform levels at the end of Foreshore Beach closest to the discharge point of Mill Stream (tested at sample site 8) on 6 June 2017 were 500 CFU. That is, unsuitable for primary contact but, again, suitable for secondary contact. This was the common condition of Foreshore Beach. Moreover, the unaffected upstream waters of Mill Pond had levels of 450 CFU, which would also have necessitated avoiding primary contact;
6. by 17 June 2017, the faecal coliform levels had increased significantly due to rain events between 7 to 10 June 2017, but by 20 June 2017 secondary contact was permissible as was primary contact near the Port Botany boat ramp;
7. similar results existed for enterococci, which were also found in elevated levels in Mill Stream, upstream of the discharge point. On 6 June 2017, secondary contact was available at sampling point 9 near Port Botany boat ramp. The rain events from 7 to 10 June 2017 explained the elevated enterococci levels on 17 June 2017, which returned to below secondary contact levels by 20 June 2017. By 20 June 2019 primary contact was available at sampling site 9 and secondary contact available at sampling point 8;
8. upstream of the weir in Mill Pond there was only one occasion where those waters, which discharged into Mill Stream and then Botany Bay, met the primary contact GTV for enterococci, namely, on 17 June 2017;
9. the dissolved oxygen levels in Mill Stream were "far from conclusive". Upstream in Mill Pond the water did not meet the GTV of 80% on 6 June 2017 at sampling site 6 where the oxygen was significantly depleted. However, at sample sites 7 and 8 the GTV exceeded 80%;
10. after the wet weather event on 7 to 10 June 2017, the 17 June 2019 sampling showed, not unexpectedly given the rain event, reduced dissolved oxygen levels; and
11. while there may have been the presence of benthic invertebrates in the Mill Stream susceptible to adverse impacts consequent upon low dissolved oxygen levels caused by the discharges, they were already part of a highly modified, degraded estuarine system under significant pressure.
[40]
Environmental Harm Caused by the EPL Offence
In respect of the harm, both actual and likely, and its extent, caused by the commission of the EPL offence, the Court relies on the evidence and its findings with respect to the water pollution offences discussed above.
[41]
There is No Double-Counting
Sydney Water submitted that to the extent that the harm caused to the environment by the commission of the first water pollution offence was found to be an aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(g) of the CSPA, this finding could not be taken into account with respect to either the second water pollution offence or the EPL offence because to do so would result in double, or possibly, triple counting (citing R v Johnson [2005] NSWCCA 186 at [22] and Kassoua v R [2017] NSWCCA 307 at [14]).
In cases where an aggravating factor is an element of the offence or is an inherent characteristic of offences of the kind for which a sentence is being imposed, it is necessary to consider the risk of double counting by increasing punishment for a factor that has already been taken into account as an element of the offence (Andrews v R (2006) A Crim R 505 at [18]).
In Kassoua Basten JA cautioned as follows (at [14]):
14. There is a more general risk involved in the counting of aggravating factors by reference to the paragraphs of s 21A(2). The relevance of aggravating factors is in determining the culpability of the offender. Often aggravating factors will not be independent of each other and there is a risk that any attempt to give particular weight to a particular factor will result in double counting, or worse.
With respect to the water pollution offences and the EPL offence, harm to the environment is not an element of the offences and consideration of the extent of the harm caused by the commission of the offences will not infringe the rule against double counting on this basis. Having said this, at least in respect of the water pollution offences, harm to the environment is arguably an inherent characteristic of the offences of the kind for which a sentence is being imposed. But substantial harm to the environment is not, and it is therefore difficult to understand the application of the rule to the present facts. For each offence, consideration of the harm caused to the environment must be separately assessed and determined. To do so is necessary in order to assess the objective seriousness of the offending conduct for each of the charges to which Sydney Water has entered a guilty plea.
Where, as with the present incident, a single series of events has given rise to the commission of several different criminal offences to which separate penalties attach, the Court must, however, take into account the totality of the penalties to be imposed. To do otherwise would be contrary to the totality principle (discussed further below). But of itself, there is nothing erroneous to simply determine a penalty for each of the two s 120 offences or to separately punish for the EPL offence, even if the offences have resulted from overlapping conduct. On the contrary, provided that the totality principle is applied, such an approach is appropriate and the proscription against double counting is not enlivened.
[42]
Sydney Water's Reasons for Committing the Offences
The criminality involved in the commission of the offence by an offender is measured not only by the seriousness of what actually occurred but also by reference to the reasons for its occurrence (Axer at [366] and Bentley at [237]). An offence committed for financial gain is objectively more serious than one which is not.
There is no evidence that the offences were committed for financial gain.
[43]
Reasonable Foreseeability of the Harm Caused or Likely to be Caused to the Environment by the Commission of the Offences
Section 241(c) of the POEOA obliges the Court to have regard to the extent to which the person who committed an offence could reasonably have foreseen the harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment.
It was agreed, and I find on the evidence, that the actual and potential harm caused by the commission of the offences was reasonably foreseeable.
[44]
Control Over Causes
Section 241(1)(d) of the POEOA requires the Court to take into account the extent to which the person who committed the offence had control over the causes that gave rise to it.
It was not in dispute that Sydney Water had control over the causes of the commission of the offences.
[45]
Practical Measures Which Could Have Been Taken to Prevent or Mitigate the Environmental Harm Caused by the Commission of the Offences
The Court must take into account the practical measures available to the defendant to control, abate or mitigate the environmental harm caused by the commission of an offence (s 241(1)(b) of the POEOA).
The parties detailed a number of practical measures which Sydney Water should have, but failed to, implement in order to prevent or mitigate the actual and potential environmental harm caused by the commission of the offences. These measures are the same as those outlined above in the discussion of how Sydney Water carried out the licensed activity in a less than competent manner, giving rise to the EPL offence and the water pollution offences (see above at [99]-[106]). They are relied upon without repetition here.
[46]
Conclusion on Objective Seriousness
In R v DP [2019] NSWCCA 55, Fullerton J opined that (at [42]):
42. While his Honour's assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending might have been expressed differently consistently with the circumstances of aggravation he found established on the evidence, I am not persuaded that his appointment of the offending "in the middle of a very wide range" was not open to him, the more so given that the distinction between offending in the mid-range or above it is imprecise to say the least. I would also add my agreement with the observations of McCallum J (as her Honour then was) in Yeung v R [2018] NSWCCA 52 where, at [19]-[30] (Hoeben CJ at CL and Simpson JA agreeing), her Honour said that the appointment of objective seriousness referable to a notional point on a spectrum of culpability (although convenient as a shorthand descriptor) is not a necessary component of the sentencing task, and to express objective seriousness in that way is rarely definitive of that part of the sentencing exercise that requires the sentencing judge to make an evaluative assessment of the gravity of the particular offending or the culpability of the offender.
Nevertheless, a specific characterisation of the objective seriousness of the offences remains convenient.
I find, for the reasons discussed above, that the first water pollution offence is at the upper end of the moderate range of objective seriousness having regard to (among other circumstances): the 16 day duration of the dry weather sewage overflows; the volume of sewage discharged (hundreds of millions of litres); the degraded state of the receiving environment; the fact that the pollution reached the waters of Botany Bay at Foreshore Beach; the actual and likely harm to the aquatic environment of Mill Stream and Botany Bay and the likely harm to human health; the amenity impacts; the foreseeability of the harm; and the practical measures that a competent operator could have taken to avoid the harm.
I find that the second water pollution offence should, however, be assessed as slightly lower than the objective seriousness of the first pollution offence, but still characterised as moderately objectively serious having regard to (among other circumstances): the five day duration of the dry weather sewage overflows; the volume of sewage discharged (again millions of litres, albeit not anywhere near as much as that discharged during the first water pollution offence); the state of the receiving environment; the fact that the discharges continued to pollute the waters of Botany Bay at Foreshore Beach until at least 23 June 2017; the ongoing amenity impacts; the foreseeability of the harm; and the practical measures that a competent operator could have taken to avoid the harm. The Court has taken into account that but for the rain event of 7 to 10 June 2017, the two water pollution offences would have constituted a single pollution offence.
[47]
Subjective Circumstances of Sydney Water
A proportionate sentence requires the Court to take into account any mitigating factors that are personal to Sydney Water (s 21A(3) of the CSPA). Relevant subjective circumstances include:
1. whether the environmental harm caused by the commission of the offences was not substantial (s 21A(3)(a));
2. whether Sydney Water has demonstrated remorse for its commission of the offences (s 21A(3)(i) of the CSPA);
3. whether, and when, Sydney Water entered a guilty plea (ss 21A(3)(k) and 22 of the CSPA and R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 at [152]-[155]);
4. whether Sydney Water provided assistance to the regulatory authorities in the investigation and prosecution of the offences (ss 21A(3)(m) and 23 of the CSPA);
5. whether Sydney Water is of good character (s 21A(3)(f) of the CSPA); and
6. whether Sydney Water has a prior criminal record (s 21A(3)(e) of the CSPA).
[48]
The Environmental Harm Was Substantial
Given the findings above concerning the extent of the environmental harm caused by the commission of the offences, Sydney Water cannot avail itself of this factor in mitigation.
[49]
Contrition and Remorse
In his affidavit, affirmed 12 June 2019, Mr Gary Hurley, the Manager - Networks at Sydney Water, expressed contrition and remorse for the commission of the offences on behalf of Sydney Water. In addition to Mr Hurley, a number of senior personnel from Sydney Water were present in Court during the sentencing hearing:
1. Mr Bernie Sheridan (Acting General manager - Customer Delivery);
2. Mr Ian Fairbairn (Environmental Performance Improvement Lead); and
3. Mr Peter Chapman (Area Manager - South).
Sydney Water submitted that its actions immediately following the incident were also demonstrative of its contrition and remorse:
1. it promptly reported the incident to the EPA upon becoming aware of the offences;
2. it ceased all high-risk works across its networks until such time that Sydney Water could be sure of no "repeat impacts to the environment";
3. it removed the stop boards as soon as it was safe to do so in order to prevent further discharging; and
4. it immediately voluntarily commenced clean-up works (discussed further below).
In addition, Mr Hurley deposed that since the commission of the offences Sydney Water has made "important changes" to its operating procedures, including:
1. improvements to the FIFM planning process to make it more comprehensive and accountable; and
2. improvements to its monitoring of the SWSOOS.
As a result of the review of the FIFM process Sydney Water has identified a number of weaknesses in the FIFM Plan for the desilting works. In particular, the Plan did not adequately:
1. identify the height of the overflow point on the overflow structure and did not adequately assess the potential for overflows occurring by reason of the flow isolations at this location;
2. require monitoring of the overflow structure or the gauge to confirm that overflows were not occurring;
3. describe a clear written procedure to determine when the coffer dam and stop boards would be removed;
4. require the review of sewer flow data to determine the pattern or timing of peak sewer flow height in SWSOOS1; and
5. require the carrying out of hydraulic monitoring to confirm that there was sufficient hydraulic capacity in SWSOOS2 and cross connection 1 to transfer and carry flows.
Sydney Water has amended its FIFM planning process to make it more comprehensive and accountable. These improvements include that:
1. all FIFM Plans are now incorporated into Sydney Water's electronic workflow system (SW Connect) meaning that all information is captured at a single location and available in real time for team members and project managers. Had this been in place at the time of the desilting works the project managers would have had access to all relevant data and would have been more capable of identifying project risks as they occurred;
2. two new hold points have been incorporated into the planning phase for complex FIFM Plans. The first hold point requires a peer review of the FIFM Plan, in addition to the review processes already encapsulated in the existing FIFM planning process. The second hold point requires mandatory endorsement of the FIFM Plan by a Level 3 Sydney Water Manager where the plan involves a significant asset; and
3. the learnings from the offences have been used to develop new criteria for reviewers tasked with assessing and approving FIFM Plans.
[50]
Assistance to the EPA
Sydney Water cooperated with the EPA during its investigation of the incidents by:
1. providing it with all necessary incident reporting;
2. providing it with action plans for the clean-up of Mill Stream in response to the clean-up notice;
3. promptly implementing and completing the clean-up measures both prior to and following the issuing of the clean-up notice;
4. providing it with the results of water quality sampling and odour surveillance and monitoring as required by the clean-up notice;
5. providing it with updates on clean-up measures; and
6. providing it with detailed modelling and analysis of the incident.
[51]
Early Plea of Guilty
Sydney Water entered a plea of guilty at the earliest available opportunity. It is therefore entitled to the full 25% discount for the utilitarian value of its plea.
[52]
Prior Convictions of Sydney Water
Prior convictions are an aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(d) of the CSPA. On the other hand, a lack of significant prior convictions can act as a mitigating factor under s 21A(3)(e) of the CSPA.
Sydney Water has four prior convictions for similar offences. The EPA has also accepted a number of enforceable undertakings given by Sydney Water, however, because these are not criminal convictions they are irrelevant for the purposes of s 21A(2)(d).
First, on 21 April 2015 Sydney Water was convicted of an offence against s 120 of the POEOA and an offence against s 64(1) of the POEOA in respect of an incident at the MWTP (the Malabar Beach case).
Second, on 21 July 2000 Sydney Water was convicted of an offence of pollution of waters contrary to s 16(1) of the Clean Waters Act 1970 in respect of an overflow of sewage from a manhole in Helensburgh to Camp Creek on 12 October 1998 (Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [2000] NSWLEC 156).
Third, on 3 March 2000 Sydney Water was convicted of an offence of pollution of waters contrary to s 16(1) of the Clean Waters Act (Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [2000] NSWLEC 80). During the operation of its West Camden Sewage Treatment Plant on 22 to 23 October 1998, approximately 7,000-8,000 L of aluminium sulphate was discharged into a tributary of a creek.
Finally, on 12 November 1998 Sydney Water was convicted of an offence against cl 17D(9) of the Pollution Control Act 1970 for contravention of a condition of a pollution control licence requiring it to maintain and operate plant and equipment in a proper and efficient manner and condition (Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [1998] NSWLEC 144). The incident involved a cliff face discharge at North Head Sewage Treatment Plant.
Sydney Water submitted that apart from the 2015 conviction, its prior convictions related to different premises and to conduct which occurred almost twenty years ago.
Sydney Water urged the Court to adopt a similar approach as that taken by Preston J in the Malabar Beach case (at [83]-[84]):
83 Sydney Water has had four prior convictions over the last 20 years. The most recent conviction related to conduct in 1998, about 15 years before the conduct giving rise to the current offences in 2013. The prior offences related to different plants and different infrastructure to the Plant at Malabar. The causes of, and circumstances giving rise to, the prior offences were different to the causes of, and circumstances giving rise to, the current offences. The consequences of the offences, including the nature and extent of environmental harm caused, in each case was different to one another and to the current offence. In these circumstances, I do not consider that Sydney Water's prior convictions manifest a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law or that Sydney Water has not been deterred from reoffending by the sentences imposed for the prior offences, or that it has a propensity to reoffend. I do not view Sydney Water's record of prior convictions as an aggravating factor: s 21A(2)(d) of the CSP Act.
84 On the other hand, it cannot be viewed as a mitigating factor under s 21A(3)(e) of the CSP Act. Sydney Water does have a record of four prior convictions for environmental offences arising from its operation of the sewerage system in Sydney. It cannot be treated as a first time offender or as an offender with little criminal history.
[53]
The Environmental Harm Caused Was Not Substantial
Given my earlier finding that the harm caused by the commission of the offences was substantial, s 21A(3)(a) of the CSPA does not apply to mitigate any sentence likely to be imposed.
[54]
The Likelihood of Sydney Water Reoffending
Given Sydney Water's prior criminal record, I find that there is a likelihood, albeit relatively low, that it will reoffend (s 21A(3)(g) of the CSPA). In arriving at this conclusion, I am mindful of Mr Hurley's evidence that Sydney Water had a number of controls in place to manage the risk of harm to people, the environment, and infrastructure during the flow isolations necessary for the desilting works. These controls were outlined in the FIFM Plan. Furthermore, shortly after becoming aware of the incident Sydney Water commissioned a detailed review of the incident and the FIFM process and improved its monitoring of the SWSOOS.
[55]
The Good Character of Sydney Water
Despite its prior convictions, I find that Sydney Water is of good corporate character. In his affidavit, Mr Hurley detailed the extensive community work undertaken by Sydney Water, including the delivery of the following projects:
1. a partnership with the Parramatta River Catchment Group to make the Parramatta River swimmable by 2025;
2. an infrastructure project to eliminate the need for Sydney Water to discharge raw sewage into the ocean at Vaucluse and Diamond Bay (which it is currently licensed to do);
3. an extensive infrastructure upgrade project to improve beach and harbour quality and the development of water quality models of Sydney Harbour and Botany Bay;
4. partnerships with local councils to better treat stormwater before it enters waterways to improve waterway and wetland health;
5. education programs in local primary schools to inform students about Sydney Water's systems and the challenges associated with water management;
6. participation in educational events such as the Australian Museum Science Festival, Youth Eco Summit, and NSW Geography and Science Teachers Association conferences;
7. conducting public tours of treatment plants and heritage sites owned by Sydney Water;
8. "Brand Without a Bottle", a program aimed to promote tap water in schools;
9. "Beat the Bottle", a campaign to reduce bottled water usage;
10. partnerships with 25 local councils to deliver 170 permanent water stations in public places;
11. a fleet of 50 portable water stations which it provides at events;
12. contributions to the Climate Change Fund for the "WaterSmart Cities" program totalling $6.38 million;
13. a drought response water efficiency campaign called "Love Water Don't Waste It" to promote water saving behaviour; and
14. a community grants program to support projects in areas such as health and wellbeing, education and environment, safety, arts and heritage.
[56]
The Offence Could Have Been Prosecuted in the Local Court
In Harris (at [92]) the Court of Criminal Appeal held that this Court must take into account whether the offence could have been prosecuted in the Local Court. While I have taken this factor into account, I place limited weight on it given the complexity of the present proceedings.
[57]
Deterrence, Retribution and Denunciation
The Court is required to take into account both specific and general deterrence (Walden v Hensler [1987] HCA 54; (1987) 163 CLR 561 (at 569 per Brennan J).
The penalty imposed by the Court must serve as a general deterrent (Environment Protection Authority v Crown in the Right of New South Wales (Office of Environment and Heritage) [2019] NSWLEC 66 at [175]-[177] and see s 3A(b) of the CSPA).
The Court accepts that embedded with the determination of the appropriate sentence to be imposed on Sydney Water must be an element of general deterrence to ensure that operators of large scale sewerage utilities do so in a competent manner that does not harm the environment.
In relation to specific deterrence (s 3A(b) of the CSPA), Sydney Water submitted that there was no need for this element to be considered in the imposition of an appropriate penalty in this case because "compliance with the environmental laws of this State and the protection of the environment form a fundamental element of Sydney Water's day to day operations" and that, therefore, "Sydney Water is acutely aware of its responsibilities."
While this may be so, Sydney Water has a history of prior offending. In addition, it continues to operate the Southern Suburbs Sewage Treatment System and other similar systems. Accordingly, consideration of specific deterrence is necessary (Environment Protection Authority v Ravensworth Operations Pty Limited [2012] NSWLEC 222 at [48] and Environment Protection Authority v Whitehaven Coal Mining Limited [2019] NSWLEC 27 at [251]).
[58]
Consistency in Sentencing
The task of the sentencing court is to seek even-handedness in the imposition of a sentence (R v Oliver (1980) 7 A Crim R 174 at 177 and R v Visconti [1982] 2 NSWLR 104 at 107C). However, care must be taken in achieving consistency. There is always difficulty comparing the penalty in one case with that in another because of the wide divergence of facts and circumstances in each case (Axer Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 113 LGERA 357 at 365). The sentence imposed in a single case does not demonstrate the limits of a sentencing court's discretion (Cabonne Shire Council v Environment Protection Authority [2001] NSWCCA 280; (2001) 115 LGERA 304 at [35] and Environment Protection Authority v Barnes [2006] NSWCCA 246 at [79]).
The EPA relied on three cases where an offender was sentenced for pollution of waters (s 120(1) under the POEOA) and a breach of an EPL (s 64(1) under the POEOA).
The first was the Malabar Beach case. The offences in that case related to the discharge over two days of treated effluent which leaked from a split joint in an effluent pipe into the ocean at a location not authorised by the EPL. A significant volume of treated effluent was discharged (at least 117,000 to 500,000 L), but there was no evidence of actual environmental harm to marine organisms, ecological communities, or human health. The beach was closed to the public for two days. Overall, Preston J found the harm to be substantial but the objective seriousness to be in the "low to moderate range." Sydney Water was ordered to pay $78,750 for each offence after discounting for an early plea of guilty and the application of the totality principle.
Second, Environment Protection Authority v Hawkesbury City Council [2017] NSWLEC 39, which involved a discharge of sewage (approximately 643,840 L) from a council's sewage treatment plant over two charge periods from 16 to 20 July 2015 and from 6 to 9 August 2015, to a nearby nature reserve and into a watercourse. The Court found no evidence of actual harm, but that there was likely temporary harm to the aquatic environment of the watercourse from the July incident and a potential risk to the public from the August incident. The objective seriousness of the July incident was found to be at the low end of the moderate range and the objective seriousness of the August incident was found to be at the high end of the low range. The Council had no prior convictions. The offender was ordered to pay a total of $175,000 to National Parks and Wildlife Service ($119,000 for the July incident and $56,000 for the August incident) after discounting for various mitigating factors and the application of the totality principle.
[59]
Costs
Sydney Water agreed to pay the EPA's investigation costs fixed in the sum of $3,267.60 pursuant to s 248 of the POEOA.
Sydney Water has also agreed to pay the EPA's professional costs, however, these have not been agreed. Because there was no agreement between the parties, under s 257B of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 the professional costs will need to be assessed under s 257G(b) of that Act.
While it is legitimate to take into account any associated costs order in determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed (Harris at [100], Barnes (at [78]) and Environment Protection Authority v Causmag Ore Company Pty Ltd [2015] NSWLEC 58 at [123]), an order for costs does not result in a reduction in any monetary penalty imposed to an amount lower than that suggested by the general pattern of sentencing for the relevant offence (Liverpool City Council v Leppington Pastoral [2010] NSWLEC 170 at [50]).
In the present case, while the EPA's professional costs payable by Sydney Water were not, in the absence of agreement as to quantum, able to be quantified, evidence was nevertheless before the Court to indicate that these costs would be sizable, and were likely to be in excess of $100,000 inclusive of GST.
[60]
Totality Principle
Because there are multiple offences arising out of the same conduct, the totality principle applies. In Orica (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) the Court discussed the totality principle and its application at length (at [224]-[229]. More recently, see Water NSW v Barlow [2019] NSWLEC 30 at [111]-[112]). Those principles are relied upon without repetition in these proceedings.
It is therefore appropriate to reduce the penalties for the second water pollution offence and the EPL offence by applying the totality principle.
It was also submitted by Sydney Water, and I accept and take into account, that but for the period of rainfall in between the first and second water pollution offences resulting in the discharge becoming temporarily lawful under the EPL, the first and second offence would have in fact constituted a single continuing offence.
[61]
Appropriate Sentence
Having regard to the objective seriousness of the offence and the mitigating subjective factors of Sydney Water, together with the penalties imposed in the relevant comparable cases, I consider that the appropriate sentence to be imposed for the first water pollution offence is a monetary penalty of $250,000.
Given that I have found that the objective seriousness of the second water pollution offence to be less than that of the first, the appropriate sentence to be imposed for the second water pollution offence is a monetary penalty of $150,000.
Finally, for the EPL offence the appropriate sentence to be imposed on Sydney Water is a monetary penalty of $200,000.
These figures must be discounted by 30% for the utilitarian value of Sydney Water's early plea of guilty and other factors in mitigation as follows:
1. $175,000 for the first water pollution offence;
2. $105,000 for the second water pollution offence; and
3. $140,000 for the EPL offence.
The second water pollution offence and the EPL offence must be further reduced to $52,500 and $42,000 respectively, after the application of the totality principle.
The total monetary penalty imposed on Sydney Water for the commission of the three offences is therefore $269,500.
[62]
Publication Order
Pursuant to s 250(1)(a) of the POEOA the parties have agreed to a publication order being made. The details of the publication order have been agreed and are set out in the orders and in Annexure "A" to this judgment.
Having regard to the circumstances of this case, I find that the making of a publication order is appropriate, including that the commission of the offences and the penalty imposed be publicised on social media (it is, after all, 2019). Initially Sydney Water opposed the extension of the publication order to various social media platforms on the basis that adverse commentary (trolling) could not be controlled or moderated by it. However, as was accepted during the hearing, adequate steps can be taken to prevent any comments from being posted or disseminated further.
[63]
Monetary Penalty Imposed to be Paid to the Bayside Council's Bushland Restoration and Community Access Improvement Project for Sir Joseph Banks Park and the Environmental Trust
The parties have agreed, and I consider it appropriate that, pursuant to s 250(1)(e) of the POEOA a portion of the monetary penalty imposed by the Court is to be paid to Bayside Council for the purposes of the Sir Joseph Banks Park Bushland Restoration and Community Access Improvement Project as described in Annexure "B" to this judgment ("the project").
The EPA has submitted that an order be made that all future public references made by Sydney Water to its contribution to the project, until 12 months after the date the project is completed, are to be accompanied by the statement that:
Sydney Water Corporation's contribution to the Sir Joseph Banks Park Bushland Restoration and Community Access Improvement Project is part of a penalty imposed by the Land and Environment Court after Sydney Water Corporation was convicted of two offences against s 120(1) (water pollution) and one offence against s 64(1) (breach of licence condition) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW).
There was no opposition to this course by Sydney Water.
Accordingly, $150,000 of the total monetary penalty imposed on Sydney Water is to be paid to Bayside Council for the purpose of the project in the manner described above.
The parties further submitted that any additional monetary penalty not paid to Bayside Council (that is, the remaining $119,500) should be paid to the Environmental Trust established under the Environmental Trust Act 1998 for general environmental purposes pursuant to s 250(1)(e) of the POEOA. Again, I consider that such an order is appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
[64]
Orders
In conformity with the reasons given above, the Court makes the following orders:
In proceedings 174230 of 2018
1. Sydney Water Corporation ("Sydney Water") is convicted of the offence against s 120(1) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 ("POEOA") as charged;
In proceedings 174255 of 2018
1. Sydney Water is convicted of the offence against s 120(1) of the POEOA as charged;
In proceedings 174274 of 2018
1. Sydney Water is convicted of the offence against s 64(1) of the POEOA as charged;
In proceedings 174230 of 2018, 174255 of 2018 and 174274 of 2018
1. pursuant to s 250(1)(e) of the POEOA, Sydney Water is to pay the amount of $150,000 to Bayside Council within 28 days of this order for the purposes of the Sir Joseph Banks Park Bushland Restoration and Community Access Improvement Project as described in Annexure "B" to these orders ("the project");
2. all future public references made by Sydney Water to its contribution to the project, until 12 months after the date the project is completed, are to be accompanied by the following statement:
Sydney Water Corporation's contribution to the Sir Joseph Banks Park Bushland Restoration and Community Access Improvement Project is part of a penalty imposed by the Land and Environment Court after Sydney Water Corporation was convicted of two offences against s 120(1) (water pollution) and one offence against s 64(1) (breach of licence condition) of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW).
1. pursuant to s 250(1)(e) of the POEOA, Sydney Water is to pay the amount of $119,500 to the Environmental Trust established under the Environmental Trust Act 1998 within 28 days of the date of this order for general environmental purposes;
2. pursuant to s 248(1) of the POEOA, Sydney Water is to pay the Environment Protection Authority's ("EPA") reasonable costs and expenses incurred during the investigation of the offences agreed in the sum of $3,267.60;
3. pursuant to s 257B of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, Sydney Water is to pay the EPA's professional costs as may be determined under s 257G of that Act;
4. pursuant to s 250(1)(a) of the POEOA, Sydney Water, at its expense, is to:
1. within 28 days of the date of this order, cause a notice of a minimum size of 10 cm x 18 cm to be published within the first five pages of The Sydney Morning Herald, The Daily Telegraph and the Southern Courier, with the text of such notice to be that as set out in Annexure "A" to these orders; and
2. within 42 days of the date of this order, provide to the EPA a copy of the entire page of each of The Sydney Morning Herald, The Daily Telegraph and Southern Courier on which the notice was published in accordance with the order (9)(a) above;
1. pursuant to s 250(1)(a) of the POEOA, Sydney Water is to:
1. within 14 days of the date of this order, publicise the offences and the orders made against it by posting the text of Annexure "A" to these orders on its Facebook wall, together with a hyperlink directly to the Court's judgment as published on the New South Wales Caselaw website and tagging the EPA in the post;
2. within 14 days of the date of this order, publicise the offences and the orders made against it by tweeting the following text from its Twitter account:
@SydneyWaterNews prosecuted by @NSW_EPA and convicted of 3 offences involving the discharge of up to approximately 507 million litres of untreated sewage into Mill Stream, Botany in May and June 2017. Ordered to pay $269,500 in penalties: [insert hyperlink to judgment as published on NSW Caselaw website]
together with a hyperlink directly to the Court's judgment as published on the New South Wales Caselaw website (as indicated above); and
1. within 21 days of the date of this order, publicise the offences and the orders made against it by posting a photo of Sir Joseph Banks Park on its Instagram account with the following caption:
@sydneywater was prosecuted by @NSW_EPA and convicted of 3 offences involving the discharge of up to approximately 507 million litres of untreated sewage into Mill Stream, Botany in May and June 2017. Sydney Water pleaded guilty to 2 offences of water pollution and 1 offence of breaching its environment protection licence. Sydney Water was ordered to pay a total of $269,500 in penalties, including $150,000 to Bayside Council for the Sir Joseph Banks Park (pictured) Bushland Restoration and Community Access Improvement Project. Sydney Water apologises to the community for these untreated sewage discharges and has implemented actions in an effort to prevent recurrence of the circumstances leading to the offences. Sydney Water takes its responsibility to protect the environment and public health very seriously: [insert url to judgment as published on NSW Caselaw website]
#sydneywater #sydneyparks #sirjosephbankspark #cleanup #community #botany #botanybay #waterways #foreshorebeach #environment
together with a url to the Court's judgment as published on the New South Wales Caselaw website (as indicated above);
1. if the parties identify any practical constraints with the Facebook, Instagram or Twitter platforms in connection with the implementation of order 10 the parties have liberty to restore the proceedings on three days' notice to seek further orders; and
2. the exhibits are to be returned
Annexure A (38.0 KB, pdf)
Annexure B - 2019 EPA Proposal Sir Joseph Banks Bushland Restoration and Community Access Improvement Project Re (6.32 MB, pdf)
[65]
Amendments
31 March 2022 - Removal of duplicate cases listed on the coversheet and in the Judgment.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 31 March 2022
ironment Protection Authority v Forbes Shire Council [2014] NSWLEC 26
Environment Protection Authority v Hawkesbury City Council [2017] NSWLEC 39
Environment Protection Authority v Hunter Water Corporation [2016] NSWLEC 76
Environment Protection Authority v Moolarben Coal Operations Pty Ltd [2012] NSWLEC 65
Environment Protection Authority v Moolarben Coal Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 80
Environment Protection Authority v N (1992) 26 NSWLR 352
Environment Protection Authority v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) [2014] NSWLEC 103; (2014) 206 LGERA 239
Environment Protection Authority v Queanbeyan City Council (No 3) [2012] NSWLEC 220; (2012) 192 LGERA 415
Environment Protection Authority v Ravensworth Operations Pty Limited [2012] NSWLEC 222
Environment Protection Authority v Snowy Hydro Ltd [2008] NSWLEC 264; (2008) 162 LGERA 273
Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [1998] NSWLEC 144
Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [2000] NSWLEC 156
Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [2000] NSWLEC 80
Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [2015] NSWLEC 80
Environment Protection Authority v Tea Garden Farms Pty Ltd [2012] NSWLEC 89
Environment Protection Authority v Waste Recycling and Processing Corporation [2006] NSWLEC 419; (2006) 148 LGERA 299
Environment Protection Authority v Whitehaven Coal Mining Limited [2019] NSWLEC 27
Environment Protection Authority v Wollondilly Abattoirs Pty Ltd [2019] NSWLEC 26
Erector Group Pty Ltd v Burwood Council [2018] NSWCCA 56; (2018) 232 LGERA 304
Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Fish [2010] NSWLEC 144; (2010) 179 LGERA 386
Gore v The Queen; Hunter v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 330; (2010) 208 A Crim R 353
Harris v Harrison [2014] NSWCCA 84; (2014) 86 NSWLR 422
Hoare v The Queen [1989] HCA 33; (1989) 167 CLR 348
Kassoua v R [2017] NSWCCA 307
King v The Queen [2012] HCA 24; (2012) 245 CLR 588
Liverpool City Council v Leppington Pastoral [2010] NSWLEC 170
Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357
McCullough, Wilkins v R [2009] NSWCCA 94; (2009) 194 A Crim R 439
Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120
New South Wales Sugar Milling Co-operative Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1992) 75 LGRA 320
Newcastle City Council v Pace Farm Egg Products Pty Ltd [2002] NSWLEC 66
Nguyen v The Queen [2016] HCA 17; (2016) 256 CLR 656
Nydam v R [1977] VR 430
Plath v Rawson [2009] NSWLEC 178; (2009) 170 LGERA 253
R Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 227
R v Cowan [1955] VLR 18
R v De Simoni [1981] HCA 31; (1981) 147 CLR 383
R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349
R v DP [2019] NSWCCA 55
R v JCW [2000] NSWCCA 209; (2000) 112 A Crim R 466
R v Johnson [2005] NSWCCA 186
R v Nichols (1991) 57 A Crim R 391
R v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; (1999) 199 CLR 270
R v Oliver (1980) 7 A Crim R 174
R v Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354
R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; (2000) 49 NSWLR 383
R v Visconti [1982] 2 NSWLR 104
Regina v Moore [2015] NSWCCA 316; (2015) 91 NSWLR 276
Rex v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8
Roads and Maritime Services v United Petroleum Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 41
Ruge and Cormack v R [2015] NSWCCA 153
Thorneloe v Filipowski [2001] NSWCCA 213; (2007) 52 NSWLR 60
Thuong Nguyen v R [2012] NSWCCA 184
Turkmani v R [2014] NSWCCA 186; (2014) 244 A Crim R 402
Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465
Veen v The Queen [1979] HCA 7; (1979) 143 CLR 458
Walden v Hensler [1987] HCA 54; (1987) 163 CLR 561
Water NSW v Barlow [2019] NSWLEC 30
Weininger v R [2003] HCA 14; (2003) 212 CLR 629
Wilkins v R [2009] NSWCCA 222
Texts Cited: Stephen Odgers, The Law of Sentencing in NSW Courts for State and Federal Offences (4th ed, 2015, Longueville Media)
Category: Sentence
Parties: Environment Protection Authority (Prosecutor)
Sydney Water Corporation (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
Mr Henry El Hage (Prosecutor)
Mr Ian Hemmings SC with Ms Sharon Hall (Defendant)
Sydney Water did not expect that dry weather overflows would occur during the desilting works. There was no reference to dry weather overflows in the FIFM Plan.
Form I of the FIFM Plan contained the FIFM Monitoring Plan which set out the monitoring required to be undertaken by Veolia during the desilting works. The monitoring plan required the following actions:
Monitor level of SWSOOS 1 against upstream stop boards and downstream Coffer Dame [sic]. If level is approaching top of stop boards or Coffer Dam (100mm), evacuate sewer and wait for level to drop.
BOM weather forecast - Periodically check weather forecast. If heavy rain is predicted consider abandoning work for the day. If required seek Sydney Water assistance/instruction if top couple of stopboards need to be remove [sic] to open up SWSOOS 1 for storage.
The FIFM Plan did not identify the height of the weir crest in the overflow structure or the height of flow levels in the sewer at which the overflow structure activates.
Following this decision Sydney Water instructed Veolia to remove three stop boards from SBD113 and SBD114 thereby reducing the height of the stop boards from 1.8 m to 1.5 m, that is, below the height of the weir crest on the overflow structure. It was believed that by reducing the height of the stop boards to below the height of the weir crest on the overflow structure flow would travel downstream through SWSOOS1 instead of diverting out through the overflow structure.
Because the stop boards remained in SWSOOS1 to a height of 1.5 m, Sydney Water did not remove the coffer dam from SWSOOS1 on 6 June 2017. Removal of the coffer dam would take place if all of the stop boards were programmed for removal that day. This was because if the coffer dam was not also removed there was a risk that the unimpeded flow could sweep the coffer dam into the MWTP and damage infrastructure.
Sydney Water declared an incident at 4.49 pm on 6 June 2017 and suspended the desilting works.
The EPA was notified of the incident at 4.58 pm that day.
Bacteriological results continued to be elevated during sampling undertaken during 23 to 26 June 2017, before gradually decreasing to background levels.
The results of the water sampling are discussed in further detail below as part of the consideration of the environmental harm caused by the commission of the offences.
Section 21A(4) of the CSPA states that, "the court is not to have regard to any such aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing if it would be contrary to any Act or rule of law to do so".
The appropriate sentence to be imposed on Sydney Water is to be determined by an instinctive synthesis of all of the relevant objective and subjective circumstances of the commission of the offences (Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357).
Importantly, the sentence to be imposed on Sydney Water for the offences must be proportionate to both the objective seriousness or gravity of the offence and Sydney Water's subjective circumstances (Veen v The Queen [1979] HCA 7; (1979) 143 CLR 458 at 490 and Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 472).
Further, Although Sydney Water's plea of guilty to all three charges entails acceptance of the proof beyond reasonable doubt of the elements of each offence, the Court must not take facts into account in a manner that is adverse to Sydney Water unless those facts have been established beyond reasonable doubt by the EPA. But if there are circumstances that the Court proposes to take into account in Sydney Water's favour, it is enough that these circumstances are proved on the balance of probabilities (Environment Protection Authority v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) [2014] NSWLEC 103; (2014) 206 LGERA 239; R v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; (1999) 199 CLR 270 at [27] and Gore v The Queen; Hunter v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 330; (2010) 208 A Crim R 353 at [105]).
In Orica Australia Pty Ltd (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) the Court summarised the De Simoni principle as follows (at [131]):
131 The rule against punishment for a higher offence than that which the defendant has been charged was set out in R v De Simoni ("the De Simoni principle") per Gibbs CJ (at 389 and 392):
However, the general principle that the sentence imposed on an offender should take account of all the circumstances of the offence is subject to a more fundamental and important principle, that no one should be punished for an offence of which he has not been convicted. Section 582 reflects this principle. The combined effect of the two principles, so far as it is relevant for present purposes, is that a judge, in imposing sentence, is entitled to consider all the conduct of the accused, including that which would aggravate the offence, but cannot take into account circumstances of aggravation which would have warranted a conviction for a more serious offence.
At common law the principle that circumstances of aggravation not alleged in the indictment could not be relied upon for purposes of sentence if those circumstances could have been made the subject of a distinct charge appears to have been recognized as early as the eighteenth century
...
It is not only in cases in which the offence has been accompanied by circumstances of aggravation that a trial judge may be required, in sentencing, to take an artificially restricted view of the facts. This will be so also in cases where the jury's verdict is inconsistent with the view of the facts that the judge himself has formed, for the judge cannot act on a view of the facts which conflicts with the jury's verdict. However, where the Crown has charged the offender with, or has accepted a plea of guilty to, an offence less serious than the facts warrant, it cannot rely or ask the judge to rely, on the facts that would have rendered the offender liable to a more serious penalty.
In that case, the Court's conclusion that having regard to the offender's mental state at the time of the commission of the s 64 offence did not offend the principle was explained in the following way (at [140]-[145]):
140. However, the parties disagreed as to whether Orica's state of mind could be taken into account in relation to the breach of licence offence under s 64(1) of the POEOA. Orica submitted that its breach of licence condition under s 64(1) caused a polluting substance to 'escape' to the environment and because s 116(1) of the POEOA also prohibits the escape of pollutants into the environment and is a more serious offence (maximum penalty $5 million) involving the aggravating circumstance of 'wilfully or negligently' causing that escape 'in a manner that harms or is likely to harm the environment', the De Simoni principle applied.
141. The authorities are equivocal on this question. In Environment Protection Authority v Rethmann Australia Environmental Services Pty Ltd [2003] NSWLEC 351; (2003) 131 LGERA 422, the Court appeared to apply the De Simoni principle to a breach of licence (at [53] per Talbot J).
142. The EPA submitted that Rethmann was wrongly decided on this point and relied upon several decisions of this Court that have considered, contrary to the approach in Rethmann, the state of mind of the offender in relation to a licence condition breach under s 64(1) of the POEOA (Environment Protection Authority v Transpacific Industries Pty Limited; Environment Protection Authority v Transpacific Refiners Pty Limited [2010] NSWLEC 85 at [98] and Environment Protection Authority v Lithgow City Council [2007] NSWLEC 695 at [35]-[39]).
143. In none of the decisions above was the issue squarely raised by the parties and thus properly considered by the Court. I agree with the submission by Orica that there is nothing in the text or context of either the POEOA or the CSPA that discloses a legislative intention to abrogate the De Simoni principle from theoretical application to s 64(1) of the POEOA (indeed s 21A(4) appears to embrace it).
144. However, the principle has no practical application with respect to a breach of s 64(1) of the POEOA because there is no 'more serious offence' of breaching a licence condition than that with which Orica has been charged and has pleaded guilty to. Accordingly, to take into account whether or not Orica breached a condition of its licence negligently is not to infringe the principle. While the De Simoni principle is not narrowly confined to situations where there is another specific offence in aggravated form that is otherwise identical to the offence in question, the offences must nevertheless be of the same general character. Were it otherwise, it would, given the potential breadth of the acts and omissions giving rise to the commission of an offence contrary to ss 115 and 116 of the POEOA, preclude an examination of the state of mind of an offender in most of the strict liability offences created by the POEOA.
145. In my opinion, therefore, the De Simoni principle does not apply to a breach of licence offence under s 64(1) of the POEOA because there is no more serious aggravated form of that general character of offence in the POEOA. Therefore it is open to me to consider whether Orica's state of mind in committing this offence was negligent.
For the reasons that follow, I have determined that the reasoning (but not the conclusion) in Orica Australia Pty Ltd (the Nitric Acid Air Lift Incident) was wrong, if not plainly wrong (although the extent to which the rules of comity apply when a judge departs from one of their earlier decisions is debatable). Obviously this is not a position that I come to lightly (the decision has been criticised elsewhere: see fn 559 in Stephen Odgers, The Law of Sentencing in NSW Courts for State and Federal Offences (4th ed, 2015, Longueville Media), p 184). But as Bramwell B remarked in Andrews v Styrap (1872) 26 LT(NS) 704 (at 706), "the matter does not appear to me now as it appears to have appeared to me then" (quoted by Preston J in Roads and Maritime Services v United Petroleum Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 41, albeit in a civil context).
In Cassidy v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 68; (2012) A Crim R 420, Basten JA alluded to the difficulties that can arise in applying the principle (at [1]-[3]):
1. BASTEN JA: This application provides another example of the difficulties which can arise in applying the principles articulated by the High Court in The Queen v De Simoni [1981] HCA 31; 147 CLR 383. The relevant principle, as explained by Gibbs CJ (with the agreement of Mason and Murphy JJ) is that a sentencing judge cannot take into account a factor which would constitute an element of a more serious offence than the one with which the offender was charged and of which he was convicted, or to which he has pleaded guilty: at 389. That principle, derived from provisions of the Criminal Code (WA), was said to find support in the general law (as discussed at pp 389-391) and has been consistently applied on that basis in this State. That principle continues to be applied, despite the statutory obligation to take into account aggravating factors which do not constitute elements of the offence: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ("the Sentencing Procedure Act"), s 21A(2). The justification for that course is the countervailing obligation not to have regard to any aggravating factor if to do so would be contrary to any rule of law, statutory or otherwise: s 21A(4).
2. The difficulties which can arise in the application of the De Simoni principle have been discussed on a number of occasions in this Court and need not be revisited here: see McCullough v R [2009] NSWCCA 94; 194 A Crim R 439 at [38]-[39] (Howie J, McClellan CJ at CL and Simpson J agreeing); Bourke v R [2010] NSWCCA 22; 199 A Crim R 38 at [46]-[54] (McClellan CJ at CL) and [60]-[72] (RA Hulme J) and Einfeld v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 87; 200 A Crim R 1 at [135]-[138].
3. A particular difficulty arises in the circumstance (not uncommon) in which the conduct which constitutes an element of the offence charged also constitutes an element of a more serious offence. Thus, in De Simoni, the relevant element of the offence was committing a robbery "with actual violence". The violence was constituted by a blow to the back of the head of the victim, which inflicted a wound to the scalp. The Court held that the blow could be taken into account, but not its consequence, to the extent that it involved wounding, because there was a further offence, with a greater punishment, involving the element of wounding, with which the offender was not charged. As explained by Brennan J (in dissent) at 403:
"To omit consideration of the personal violence done to Mrs Scott is to omit consideration of conduct constituting an essential element of the offence to which the respondent had pleaded guilty. The prosecutor's statement of facts did not disclose any use of actual violence or any threat to use actual violence to Mrs Scott other than the blow upon her head .... It was accepted that ... the hitting of Mrs Scott was thus the only actual violence to which that allegation in the indictment related."
Having regard to the conflicting case law, is fair to say that the application of the De Simoni principle in this Court has been no less vexed.
Nevertheless, the fundamental nature of the De Simoni principle has been emphasised repeatedly. In Olbrich the plurality judgment the High Court observed (at [18]):
18. Finally, inquiring about what was done or intended by a person who imported drugs into Australia (apart, that is, from the acts which constitute the importation) will not always be relevant to sentencing that offender for the crime of importation. The offender may have conspired with others to import the drugs; the offender may very well have intended to deal with the drugs in Australia in ways that amount to the commission of other offences in this country. But it would be quite wrong to sentence an offender for crimes with which that offender is not charged. …
In Nguyen v The Queen [2016] HCA 17; (2016) 256 CLR 656, Bell and Keane JJ remarked that "the De Simoni principle is an aspect of the fundamental principle that no one should be punished for an offence of which the person has not been convicted" (at [29] and see Chiro v The Queen [2017] HCA 37; (2017) 260 CLR 425 at [72] to similar effect).
From the authorities, the two propositions that have emerged from De Simoni are that (as summarised by the learned author Stephen Odgers in the text earlier cited, p 184 at [3.123]):
1. first, no one should be punished for an offence for which they have not been charged; and
2. second, a sentencing court cannot take into account circumstances of aggravation which would warrant conviction for a more serious offence than that with which the offender had been convicted.
The second proposition flows from the first. It has been applied to hold that if the circumstances of the offence for which the person is to be sentenced are such that the offender could have been found guilty of a more serious offence, the facts constituting such a finding cannot be relied upon in sentencing the offender (Bourke v R [2010] NSWCCA 22; (2010) 199 A Crim R 38 at [50] and Ruge and Cormack v R [2015] NSWCCA 153 at [38]-[41]).
Similarly, if the circumstances of the offence for which the person has been convicted are such that the offender could have been found guilty of a discrete aggravated form of the offence for which the offender is to be punished, then those facts cannot be relied upon when sentencing the offender (Croaker v R [2008] NSWCCA 232; (2008) 190 A Crim R 15 at [14] and Bourke at [50]).
The latter principle has been extended to the taking into account as an aggravating factor the potential for a more serious offence to be committed (Thorneloe v Filipowski [2001] NSWCCA 213; (2007) 52 NSWLR 60 at [148]).
Where seriousness is assessed by the applicable maximum penalty, the De Simoni principle applies notwithstanding that the offences carry the same maximum sentence (McCullough, Wilkins v R [2009] NSWCCA 94; (2009) 194 A Crim R 439 at [38]-[39]).
The principle in De Simoni will not be breached if the Court takes into account conduct not to punish the offender for that conduct, but for some other reason such as to assess the objective seriousness of the offence for which the offender has been convicted (Weininger v R [2003] HCA 14; (2003) 212 CLR 629 at [31], Bourke at [70] and Einfeld v R [2010] NSWCCA 87; (2010) 200 A Crim R 1 at [146] per Basten JA) provided that the conduct is not entirely separate and distinct from that giving rise to the offence charged but is an incident of the conduct giving rise to the commission of the offence (Wilkins v R [2009] NSWCCA 222 at [34]-[35], Bourke at [55], [62] and [70] and Adams v R [2011] NSWCCA 47 at [29]-[35]).
Similarly, the principle is not breached if the otherwise offending conduct is considered for the purpose of assessing the need for specific deterrence (Thuong Nguyen v R [2012] NSWCCA 184 at [30]-[31]). Nor is it contravened if the offender is punished for facts that merely satisfy the elements of the offence for which they have been convicted even if one of those elements amounts to a circumstance of aggravation sufficient to establish guilt for another more serious offence (Turkmani v R [2014] NSWCCA 186; (2014) 244 A Crim R 402 at [33]-[46]).
Further, the cases draw a distinction between the consideration of conduct to deny leniency to an offender, which is permissible, and taking it into account to aggravate the offender's criminality, which is not (R v JCW [2000] NSWCCA 209; (2000) 112 A Crim R 466 at [67]-[68] and Weininger at [29]). Accordingly, a subsequent admission that an offence was committed with an intention that would have made it much more serious may be used to show an absence of remorse and contrition (Cassidy at [6] and [19]-[21]).
Most recently, the application of the De Simoni principle was examined in Erector Group Pty Ltd v Burwood Council [2018] NSWCCA 56; (2018) 232 LGERA 304. In that case, the respondent council granted development consent to Liverpool Developing Pty Ltd's ("Liverpool") development application in respect of premises on land owned by Liverpool. Erector Group Pty Ltd ("Erector") was appointed the builder and head contractor for the development. Excavation work was carried out that did not comply with s 81A(2) of the Environment Planning Assessment Act 1979 ("the EPAA") or condition 26 of the consent and which may have caused an adjoining building to collapse and damaging several adjoining buildings. Both Liverpool and Erector pleaded guilty to charges alleging a failure to comply with the EPAA and condition 26 of the consent. The sentencing judge found that the damage to the adjoining building had been caused by the offending conduct and that this damage was substantial and that it constituted an aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(g) of the CSPA. The judge rejected an argument that in taking this damage into account he was punishing Liverpool and Erector for an offence for which they were not charged under cl 98E(1) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 for failing to "protect and support" or "underpin" the adjoining buildings.
The Chief Justice determined that the De Simoni principle was not offended because (at [108]-[109]):
108. I do not think that the conclusion of the sentencing judge on whether the damage could be taken into account as an aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(g) was contrary to De Simoni, having regard to his approach to that question. The appellants were punished, not for failing to "protect and support" or "underpin" the adjoining buildings, but for a failure to comply with condition 26 of the development consent and s 81A(2) of the EPA Act. If such a failure to comply led to damage to the adjoining buildings, that would be an aggravating factor. It does not mean that the appellants were being punished for a failure to comply with cl 98E(1) so as to offend the principle in De Simoni.
109. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to decide whether, if the appellants were in fact sentenced on the basis that the commencement of the additional excavation work caused the damage, contrary to what I have outlined at [103] above, then this would have contravened the principle in De Simoni on the basis that the appellants would have been sentenced for a failure to comply with cl 98E(1). Whether this would in fact contravene the principle in De Simoni depends on whether the appellants were being punished for a "more serious offence" than that for which they were charged: De Simoni at 389. It also depends upon whether the "seriousness" of the offence for this purpose is measured by a liability to a higher maximum penalty or a greater standard non-parole period, as stated in Cassidy at [26] by Blanch J with the agreement of Beech-Jones J, in which case, taking the damage in the present case into account as an aggravating factor would not offend the principle, or whether, at least in a case such as the present where the same maximum penalty is prescribed for a wide-range of offences, the application of the principle depends on the objective seriousness of the offence rather than the maximum penalty, as stated in Cassidy at [7] by Basten JA. Because of my conclusion that punishment was not imposed for what would be a failure to comply with the prescribed condition in cl 98E(1), there is no need to determine this issue.
Thus in Harris v Harrison [2014] NSWCCA 84; (2014) 86 NSWLR 422, the sentencing judge had taken into account as an aggravating factor the taking of unmetered water in circumstances where the offence was that of tampering with a meter. On appeal the primary judge was criticised (at [82]) for considering matters which, had they had existed, would have resulted in punishment for an offence different to that which the appellant had been charged (at [82]):
82. Moreover, to treat the consequences of the offence as including the unlawful taking of water comes dangerously close to contravening the rule in The Queen v de Simoni [1981] HCA 31; 147 CLR 383. I accept, as was pointed out by senior counsel for the respondent, that any additional offence that might be applicable such as, for example, offences against s 91A (unauthorised taking of water), s 91B (unauthorised use of a water supply work) and s 91H (failure to install or maintain metering equipment as required) are all "Tier 2" offences, and therefore of lesser gravity than a s 91K offence, and not strictly within the de Simoni principle. However, care must be taken to ensure that an offender is not punished for an offence which is not charged.
The reasoning in Harris was applied more recently in Environment Protection Authority v Wollondilly Abattoirs Pty Ltd [2019] NSWLEC 26 by Pain J (at [14]), albeit in circumstances involving allegations of fraudulent conduct which is far removed from the circumstances of the present case.
It could be argued, applying the logic in Erector, that Sydney Water are merely being punished for contravening s 64 of the POEOA, that is, a breach of the EPL, and not the more serious offence of negligent causing of a substance to otherwise escape (s 116 of that Act), and accordingly De Simoni is not engaged.
However, in asking the Court to determine whether or not Sydney Water breached its licence condition negligently as an aspect of sentencing, the EPA is, assuming that such a finding were made, in effect inviting the Court to punish Sydney Water on a basis dependent upon a circumstance of aggravation that would constitute a different offence with which it has not been charged. This is because, having regard to the way in which the commission of the offence has been particularised, it is the escape of the sewage from the Southern Suburbs Sewage Treatment System that gives rise to failure to carry out the licenced activity of sewage treatment under condition O1.1 of the EPL. There being another more serious offence with which Sydney Water has not been charged under s 116 of the POEOA, the De Simoni principle is infringed if the Court takes into account in determining an appropriate sentence for the breach of s 64 of the POEOA any negligence on the part of Sydney Water.
This would not, however, preclude the Court from taking into account Sydney Water's mental state in determining the objective seriousness of the EPL offence.
But even if the analysis above is wrong, the EPA has, in any event, nevertheless failed to demonstrate to the requisite standard that Sydney Water acted negligently in the commission of the three offences.
The Nydam test (Nydam v R [1977] VR 430 at 445) has subsequently been applied in numerous cases. For example, in Burns v The Queen [2012] HCA 35; (2012) 246 CLR 334 French CJ said (at [19]-[20], footnotes omitted):
19. Involuntary manslaughter by criminal negligence at common law is made out if the prosecution shows that:
"the act which caused the death was done by the accused consciously and voluntarily, without any intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm but in circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment."
20. A person has no civil or criminal liability at common law for negligent conduct unless that conduct involves a breach of a duty of care owed to another. The existence and breach of such a duty is a necessary condition of a finding of criminal negligence. Lord Atkin in Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions equated negligence with "the omission of a duty to take care." In R v Adomakd, Lord Mackay of Clashfern LC observed that "the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to ascertain whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the victim who has died." The question that follows is whether the breach of duty caused the death of the deceased and if so, whether the breach of duty could be characterised as gross negligence and therefore as a crime. …
More recently in Regina v Moore [2015] NSWCCA 316; (2015) 91 NSWLR 276, the test was stated by Simpson JA as (at [140]-[141] and [144], emphasis added):
140. Consideration of the offence of manslaughter by criminal negligence cannot begin without the classic statement of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Nydam v R [1977] VicRp 50; [1977] VR 430.Their Honours (Young CJ, McInerney and Crockett JJ) said:
"In order to establish manslaughter by criminal negligence, it is sufficient if the prosecution shows that the act which caused the death was done by the accused consciously and voluntarily, without any intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm but in circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment."
That statement has been adopted and approved on many occasions: for example The Queen v Lavender [2005] HCA 37; 222 CLR 67; Burns v The Queen [2012] HCA 35; 246 CLR 334 (at [19]-[20]).
141. Useful as the statement is, it does not touch upon that feature of the offence with which this appeal is concerned.
…
144. The important additional element necessary to constitute the criminal offence of manslaughter is:
(v) that the breach of duty is so gross as to warrant the intervention of the criminal law, and criminal punishment. …
These latter cases are seemingly at odds with the language used in the earlier decision in the decision in Cittadini v R [2009] NSWCCA 302 (cited in Fish), where the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal opined as follows (at [38]-[39], emphasis added):
38. Before the jury could find the appellant guilty of manslaughter by criminal negligence they were required to be satisfied to the criminal standard of the high degree of negligence required for that charge. In R v Nicholls (1874) 13 Cox CC 75 that degree of negligence was described as "wicked negligence" being "negligence so great, that you must be of the opinion that the prisoner had a wicked mind, in the sense that she was reckless and careless whether the creature died or not", The degree of negligence must extend beyond a mere matter of compensation between citizens but show such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the state. R v Bateman [1925] All ER Rep 45; (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 see also Andrews v DPP [1937] 2 All ER 552.
39. In R v TakTak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226 this Court referred with approval to what was said in R v Stone & Dobinson; R v Cowan [1955] VLR 18:
"It is clear from that passage that indifference to an obvious risk, and appreciation of such risk, coupled with a determination nevertheless to run it, are both examples of recklessness … What the prosecution have to prove is a breach of duty in such circumstances that the jury feel convinced that the defendant's conduct could properly be described as reckless, that is to say a reckless disregard of danger to the health and welfare of the infirm person. Mere inadvertence is not enough. The defendant must be proved to have been indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health, or actually to have foreseen the risk but to have determined nevertheless to run it."
Having regard to later authorities where the Nydam test has been adopted, Sydney Water argued that mere indifference to an obvious risk was insufficient for the purpose of establishing criminal negligence; something much more was required.
The epithet of 'recklessness' as a convenient summary for the very high degree of negligence required before criminal sanction is imposed derives from early English cases such as Rex v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 per Lord Hewart CJ, Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576 and R v Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354 (at 363). In Andrews, Lord Atkin said the following (at 583, emphasis added):
Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established. Probably of all the epithets that can be applied "reckless" most nearly covers the case. It is difficult to visualize a case of death caused by reckless driving in the connotation of that term in ordinary speech which would not justify a conviction for manslaughter: but it is probably not all-embracing, for "reckless" suggests an indifference to risk whereas the accused may have appreciated the risk and intended to avoid it and yet shown such a high degree of negligence in the means adopted to avoid the risk as would justify a conviction.
One of the earliest reference to the notion of an 'indifference to an obvious risk' in Australia may be found in R v Cowan [1955] VLR 18 per Lowe J who opined that (at 19, emphasis added):
Negligence implies that there is a duty upon the person who is charged with negligence. It implies, too, that he has not performed that duty and where there is a charge of manslaughter it goes a little further; it means that the breach of duty which is charged must be a very gross one, one which a jury thinks ought to be punished as a crime. Sometimes it is put that it must show recklessness, which means that a person, if he adverts to consequences at all of his act or his omission to act, is quite indifferent about the result. That is the kind of negligence which is charged, and then, in addition, it has to be shown that the negligence, if it is established, has been the cause of the death of the deceased, or, at any rate, has accelerated her death.
In R Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 227 (quoted in Cittadini) Yeldham J stated the test for criminal negligence occasioning death as including the descriptor of recklessness, but emphasised the high degree of negligence that was required (at 247C-E, emphasis added):
…I mention but few of the authorities. In R v Nicholls Brett J (at 76) told the jury that a grown up person who chooses to undertake the charge of a human creature who is helpless is bound to execute that charge "without (at all events) wicked negligence… Mere negligence will not do, there must be wicked negligence, that is negligence so great, that you must be of the opinion that the prisoner had a wicked mind, in the sense that she was reckless and careless whether the creature died or not". In R v Bonnyman (1942) 86 Sol Jo 274; 28 Cr App R 131; the Lord Chief Justice, after referring to R v Bateman [1925] All ER Rep 45; (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 and to Andrews reiterated the need for "a very high degree of negligence" to be proved before the felony of manslaughter is established. In R v Stone & Dobinson it was said that "…it is to Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions…that one must turn to discover the definition of the requisite degree of negligence". At 363 reference is made to the words of Lord Hewart CJ in R v Bateman which were quoted with approval by Lord Atkin in Andrews (at 582). In R v Stone & Dobinson it is said that:
"It is clear from that passage that indifference to an obvious risk, and appreciation of such risk, coupled with a determination nevertheless to run it, are both examples of recklessness... What the prosecution have to prove is a breach of that duty in such circumstances that the jury feel convinced that the defendant's conduct could properly be described as reckless, that is to say a reckless disregard of danger to the health and welfare of the infirm person. Mere inadvertence is not enough. The defendant must be proved to have been indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health, or actually to have foreseen the risk but to have determined nevertheless to run it": see also R v Holzer [1968] VR 481.
In New South Wales Sugar Milling Co-operative Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1992) 75 LGRA 320, the Court did not refer to Taktak, but instead referred to negligence of "the criminal type" (per Enderby J at 325), or conduct that "fell so short of the standard of care an objectively reasonable person in the position in which it found itself that it was negligent to the criminal degree" (Allen J at 325). Hunt CJ at CL referred to negligence established to the "criminal standard" citing Andrews (at 321).
The Chief Judge at Common Law in an environmental case heard and handed down on the same day as New South Wales Sugar Milling Co-operative, Environment Protection Authority v N (1992) 26 NSWLR 352 did not explicitly state the test for criminal negligence but cited Nydam, albeit for the proposition that the test was objective (at 359A per Hunt CJ at CL).
What constitutes criminal negligence in the context of environmental crime was subsequently discussed by Mahoney JA in Environment Protection Authority v Ampol Ltd (1993) 81 LGERA 433 (at 437 to 439). Importantly, in Ampol his Honour made it clear that absent statutory refinement there are no different types of criminal negligence (at 437- 438):
The questions assume that, in relation to criminal offences, "negligence" has several distinct meanings each of them separate, and each representing a quantum increase in the extent of the default involved. Counsel have referred the Court to a number of decisions of high authority in which judges have discussed the nature of the mental element (described as mens rea or the like) involved in particular crimes and the significance for this purpose of terms such as "negligence". The cases have examined the question whether a mental element is involved at all and if it is what is the nature of it: see, eg, He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576 (manslaughter); R v Buttsworth [1983] 1 NSWLR 658 (culpable driving); R v D [1984] 3 NSWLR 29 (negligent act causing grievous bodily harm); see also Environment Protection Authority v N (1992) 26 NSWLR 352 at 358-359; 76 LGRA 114 at 120; NSW Sugar Milling Co-operative Ltd v Environmental Protection Authority (1992) 75 LGRA 320. The suggestion has been that, in different contexts, "negligence" may mean different things and that the choice in the present proceeding is between different meanings of this kind. I do not think that these decisions establish, or require the Court to accept, such a view of the term.
Such was not the effect of the traditional criminal law. It has been said that the traditional criminal law did not impose liability for negligence, as such, that is, that negligent conduct - as distinct from purposive conduct - did not constitute a crime: see the survey of the history of the criminal law in this regard by O'Brien CJ of Cr D in R v Buttsworth (at 667-674). I do not mean by this that "negligence" and similar terms were not used in cases concerned with the traditional criminal law. But such terms were used not to indicate that negligent conduct as such was a crime but for other purposes. This use of "negligence" may be illustrated by the much cited case of Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions. The crime there in question was manslaughter. Death had been caused by the acts or omissions of the accused. Conduct which is sufficient to constitute manslaughter may be intentional, that is, directed to causing harm or death, or unintentional. It was in relation to the latter that "negligence" was used. As Lord Atkin pointed out, it has been necessary for the Courts indicate the kind of unintentional conduct which is sufficient to constitute manslaughter. As the history of the criminal law, as discussed in these cases, indicated, the law progressed from the punishment of conduct causing death as such to the punishment only of such conduct where it involved default of some kind.
Mahoney JA went on to refer to Andrews but emphasised that "the default in question must of a high order" (at 438):
But the courts made clear that it was not every default or lack of care which would, if it caused death, constitute manslaughter. It was necessary that the default be of a greater rather than a lesser degree of blameworthiness. To illustrate this, words such as "reckless" and "wanton" were used to describe the default in question. "Reckless" was that chosen by Lord Atkin in Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions. But considered in terms of principle, the use of "negligence" and these other terms indicated merely that the default in questions must be of a high order, that is, that to constitute manslaughter it would necessarily be of a higher rather than a lower order of blameworthiness or unacceptability.
Returning to Sydney Water's submission, I do not accept that the test for criminal negligence in the context of environmental crime stated in cases such as Fish is wrong, let alone plainly wrong, having regard to the test expounded in Nydam which has been picked up and applied in subsequent High Court authority. There is nothing in the statutory scheme contained in the POEOA or the CSPA that alters this view.
Having said this, care must be taken when reciting and relying upon the epithet 'indifference to an obvious risk' in its application to the evidence before the Court for without more it may be apt to mislead and suggest that something less is necessary than the stringent test that criminal negligence demands. As almost all of the cases deploying this language are at pains to emphasise, mere inadvertence to a risk of harm is not enough.
In my view, a preferable recitation of the test for criminal negligence in the context of environmental crime is to ask whether there has been such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that harm would follow that the doing of the act or the omission merits criminal punishment.
But irrespective of the formulation of the test in the circumstances of the present case, the evidence does not establish that Sydney Water had the necessary degree of carelessness, indifference to an obvious risk, or great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised, such that criminal negligence can be established. As Sydney Water correctly submitted, just because the consequences of its actions were foreseeable this does not give rise to criminal negligence.
It is true that the FIFM Plan could have been better and that the flat battery could have been discovered earlier. But equally, it is only with the benefit of hindsight that it is now recognised that the FIFM Plan did not properly consider the depth of the backup flow caused by the stop board relative to the overflow (taking into account the operation of the cross connection), which meant that Sydney Water did not properly have regard to whether the invert at the overflow would be overtopped resulting in a discharge. Importantly for present purposes, a FIFM Plan was prepared and implemented. Similarly, the overflow discharged to a pipe that discharged to Mill Weir that in turn discharged to a pipe leading to the Mill Stream. This had the consequence that any overflow from the SWSOOS was not immediately apparent. Between 22 May and 6 June 2017 there was no indication that the stop boards were being overtopped; there was no odour and no noticeable evidence of discharge. And likewise, the gauge was not designed to alert Sydney Water to a dry weather discharge. Upon the discovery of the flat battery it was replaced in advance of its next scheduled inspection.
In all these circumstances, Sydney Water's conduct can in no way be described as negligent warranting criminal punishment. Rather, the commission of the offences was, as Sydney Water described it (with apologies to Lemony Snicket), "a combination of an unfortunate series of events" (T44.06).
The parties were largely in agreement about the extent of the environmental harm caused by the commission of the offences.
Site 9 (toward the eastern end of Foreshore Beach) achieved 40 CFU/100 mL levels of enterococci by 20 June 2017 and site 8 (towards the western end of Foreshore Beach) achieved this Beachwatch trigger by 26 June 2017.
The levels of enterococci in Mill Stream at sites 6 (Mill Stream west) and 7 (Mill Stream east) were generally high for the entire sampling period declining below the GTV (secondary contact) on some sampling occasions, and never achieving the GTV (primary contact) except at sampling site 7 (Mill Stream east) on 17 July 2017.
Bacteriological values obtained at sampling site 1 (Mill Pond upstream of the overflow structure) were lower than the other sampling sites, indicating that Mill Pond was unlikely to be the main source of bacterial contamination to Mill Stream on 6 June 2017.
Mill Stream is a shallow, restricted, channel-like waterbody, and therefore, the dilution of sewage or other pollutants within receiving waters is limited. Once the sewage plume entered Botany Bay at the eastern end of Mill Stream, the mixing potential of the sewage plume was also limited by reason of the shallow nature of that section of the Bay. Accordingly, faecal coliform and enterococci levels further downstream at sample site 8 towards the western end of Foreshore Beach were lower on 6 June 2017 than other sites sampled, but recorded equal to or greater than 500 CFU/100 mL.
On 6 June 2017, the OEH's Beachwatch program collected a water sample from approximately 500 m south-east of the entrance to Mill Stream and within approximately 100 m of site 9 (which was first sampled by FST on 20 June 2017). The sample reported enterococci levels of 200 CFU/100 mL.
The results of the sampling conducted on 6 June 2017 indicated that dissolved oxygen levels were less than the 80% saturation level (or equivalent 6.8 mg/L) at sample sites 2 and 3 (nearest to the overflow structure), sample site 6 (within Mill Stream) and sample site 1 (Mill Pond).
Dissolved oxygen levels were above the 80% saturation level at the other sites including Foreshore Beach on 6 June 2017.
Dissolved oxygen ranged from 4.4 to 6.7 mg/L and 46.1% to 79.2% saturation (all below the 80% GTV) at sample sites 6 and 7 (Mill Stream) and 8 (towards the western end of Foreshore Beach) on 17 and 20 June 2017. Dissolved oxygen at sample site 9 (at the eastern end of Foreshore Beach) was at 65% saturation and below the GTV on 20 June 2017.
Dissolved oxygen levels achieved greater than 80% saturation at sample site 8 (towards the western end of Foreshore Beach) by 23 June 2017 and at sample site 7 (at the confluence of Mill Stream and Botany Bay) by 29 June 2017. West Mill Stream (sample site 6) rarely met the GTV during the sampling period.
The pH was generally at levels expected for estuarine systems (that is, at greater than 7 pH units) throughout the sampling period except at sampling site 6 on 17 and 20 June 2017.
Sydney Water obtained a sample of raw sewage from the Malabar Sewage Treatment Plant on 5 June 2017. The sample was analysed by FST and provided concentrations of sewage nutrients and toxicants representative of those that may have entered Mill Stream during the dry weather sewage overflows of 22 May to 6 June 2017 and 11 to 16 June 2017.
The nutrients, ammonia and total nitrogen, and the metals, chromium (VI), copper, lead and zinc, all exceeded the GTVs for aquatic ecosystem protection for estuarine waters.
Water samples collected on 6 June 2017 were indicative of such conditions within the receiving waters during the initial period of dry weather sewage overflows from 22 May to 6 June 2017. Therefore, the EPA argued that oxygen dissolved levels were sufficiently low to have caused likely harm to the environment within Mill Stream during that period. I accept this submission.
Nutrient and metal concentrations reported for raw sewage from Malabar Sewage Treatment Plant (on 5 June 2017) were similar to the sewage discharged into Mill Stream during 22 May to 6 June 2017, the latter of which was likely to have caused environmental harm within Mill Stream. For example, high levels of nutrients can induce eutrophication of waterways which can result in algal blooms. High levels of metals can impair metabolic function within aquatic organisms. Dilution within Mill Stream was limited due the characteristics of the discharge and the restricted and enclosed nature of the waterway. Thus for contaminants such as tin and copper, I find that dilutions of greater than 200 times the discharged concentration required to achieve default GTVs were not achieved within Mill Stream itself. Due to the volume of sewerage discharged and the limited dilution within Mill Stream, I find that it is likely that elevated nutrients and metals reached Botany Bay.
The volume of sewage discharged into Mill Stream every day during the dry weather overflows from 22 May to 6 June 2017 was significant. While Mill Stream and Botany Bay were regularly exposed to stormwater following significant rainfall events, the concentration of sewage and frequency of exposure entering Mill Stream and Botany Bay was non-characteristic for the dry weather condition of the receiving environment at the time.
Third, the receiving waters within Mill Stream and along Foreshore Beach contained bacteriological contamination that was uncharacteristic of average dry weather conditions and would have posed an increased health risk to swimmers and other recreational water users. If there were any persons exposed to waters from within Mill Stream or at Foreshore Beach during the period of dry weather sewerage overflows from 22 May to 6 June 2017, they would have been exposed to levels of enterococci that presented an elevated risk of illness, such as gastrointestinal disorders, acute fever and rashes. At the Beachwatch sampling site at the eastern end of Foreshore Beach (sampled by the OEH on 6 June 2017) the levels of enterococci posed a health risk to persons entering or having contact with the water.
In addition, the waters within Mill Stream and along Foreshore Beach posed an increased risk to the health of water users with secondary contact (such as sailing, fishing or dog walking). The risk of primary contact occurring with waters in Mill Stream was, however, extremely low given that it was a fenced artificial tidal channel running adjacent to an airport.
I accept these submissions. This evidence should be taken into account in assessing the extent of the harm caused by the commission of the offences.
Nevertheless there is no doubt whatsoever that the commission of the offences caused the pollution of the waters of Mill Stream and Botany Bay. The untreated sewage was a pollutant that affected the condition of the receiving waters. The pollution lasted for at least a total of 21 days over a period of 26 days. For the first 15 days, the pollution went undetected by Sydney Water. Although the calculation of the volume of pollutant discharged into the waters varied in range, it was on any view sizeable - hundreds of millions of litres of sewage.
In Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation [2015] NSWLEC 80 ("Malabar Beach case") the Court found that the harm was substantial having regard to the nature of the pollutant (partially treated sewage), the number of days over which the pollutant was discharged (many hundreds of thousands of litres over two days), the difference in the marine environment that received the pollutant compared to the marine environment that ought not to have received the pollutant, and the interference with the public amenity and enjoyment of Malabar Beach for two days. By contrast, the sewage here was untreated and hundreds of millions of litres of it was discharged over considerably longer period.
Although the marine environment that received the pollutant was already highly modified and Foreshore Beach was not closed unlike Malabar Beach in the Malabar Beach case, the amenity of Foreshore Beach was affected by odour, there was an increased risk to the health of anyone who may have had contact with the water at Foreshore Beach until 26 June 2017, and signage was required to be installed at Foreshore Beach to alert the public of the presence of sewage in the water. Additionally, the sewage overflows caused dissolved oxygen to fall below the applicable GTV in parts of Mill Stream until 29 June 2017, and at Foreshore Beach until 23 June 2017, creating an environment less able to support aquatic plants and organisms. By comparison, in the Malabar Beach case water samples were taken at Maroubra and Malabar beaches by Sydney Water but did not detect the presence of sewage, the impacts were localised in the vicinity of the discharge point, and Malabar Beach was closed only as a precautionary measure for two days.
Having said this, the actual and likely harm caused by the second water pollution offence was not as serious as that caused by the first water pollution offence because the discharges associated with the second water pollution offence occurred after a period of wet weather which diluted the sewage effluent with stormwater.
The actual and likely environmental harm occasioned by the second water pollution offence lasted for a period of six days, increasing in severity over this period as the influence from the wet weather discharges reduced. By contrast, the actual and likely environmental harm occasioned by the first water pollution offence lasted for a period of 16 days, from the first dry weather overflow on 22 May to 6 June 2017, when rain began to fall.
I therefore find that the environmental harm caused or likely to have been caused to the environment by the commission of both the first and second water pollution offence was substantial and that this constituted an aggravating factor for the purpose of s 21A(2)(g) of the CSPA.
While the evidence indicates that the extent of the actual and likely environmental harm caused by the commission of the second water pollution offence was less substantial than that caused by the first water pollution offence, the harm caused by the commission of the second water pollution offence nonetheless constituted a factor in aggravation.
Finally, the Court finds that the EPL offence is also within the upper range of moderate objective seriousness having regard to: the duration of the offence; the total volume of sewage and wastewater discharged as a result of the offence (which may have been as much as 674 million litres); the state of the receiving environment; the geographical reach of the pollution; the actual and likely harm to the aquatic environment of Mill Stream and Botany Bay and the likely harm to human health; the amenity impacts, the foreseeability of the harm; and the practical measures that a competent operator could have taken to avoid the harm.
Sydney Water has also improved its monitoring of the SWSOOS by:
1. installing an alarm for the overflow structure at Mill Stream which activates when the flow reaches a height of 1.5 m;
2. installing a solar panel to improve redundancy for power at the overflow structure;
3. improving the capability of flow gauging in the SWSOOS whereby signals from gauges on overflow structures are now able to be monitored and actioned by Sydney Water's Operations centre (which operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week). This is a change from the previous situation where, as mentioned earlier, signals from the overflow structures were not monitored on a regular basis as they were only utilised for annual reporting purposes;
4. dedicating an additional $25 million to the programmed desilting of SWSOOS1, which includes funds to improve the access openings to SWSOOS1, thereby enhancing the ability to install and remove isolations; and
5. undertaking strategic planning for the SWSOOS involving flow modelling using data from existing and newly installed gauges at overflow points.
Sydney Water relied on the fact that it "voluntarily" self-reported the incident once it had been discovered. However, as it later conceded, it was required to do under the POEOA.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Sydney Water attended to remediation willingly and in a timely manner. This finding is made even though a statutory clean-up notice was issued by the EPA under s 92 of the POEOA to Sydney Water on 22 June 2017. The fact remains that the remediation works had commenced prior to the service of that notice.
I find that Sydney Water accepts responsibility for its actions and has demonstrated genuine remorse.
Sydney Water also emphasised the "sheer size" of its operation in relation to the handing and treatment of effluent. It submitted that its prior criminal record should have a neutral effect on its sentence and that the prior conviction neither manifested a continuing attitude of disobedience nor a propensity to reoffend, and that therefore, this should not be considered to be an aggravating factor.
I disagree. In circumstances where the offences have been committed in reasonable temporal proximity to the Malabar Beach case, it is appropriate to view the prior convictions as an aggravating factor. In so determining I am mindful of the statement of the plurality in Veen (No 2) (at 477):
…the antecedent criminal history of an offender is a factor which may be taken into account in determining the sentence to be imposed, but it cannot be given such weight as to lead to the imposition of a penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the instant offence. To do so would be to impose a fresh penalty for past offences.
I therefore take into account its prior convictions as an aggravating factor in sentence, which also means that Sydney Water cannot benefit from any mitigation pursuant to s 21A(3)(e) of the CSPA.
Third, Environment Protection Authority v Forbes Shire Council [2014] NSWLEC 26, where the offender discharged approximately 11,261 KL of effluent containing septic waste and manure from its commercial livestock saleyard facility into a stormwater drain and then into an ephemeral creek on a neighbour's land and into two farm dams along that creek. The offender pleaded guilty to a charge of polluting waters in breach of s 120 of POEOA and to a charge of failing to immediately notify the relevant authorities of the pollution incident in contravention of s 148 of the POEOA. There was no evidence of actual harm to the environment, however, there was a risk of harm to public health with the possible presence of human pathogens in a public area, a risk of blue-green algal blooms in the dams, and a risk of cattle on the adjacent land being infected with bovine paratuberculosis. Justice Pain found the offence to be in the medium range of objective seriousness given its duration and the "complete absence of appropriate decision-making capacity and knowledge in the Defendant". The offender had no prior convictions and was given a 25% discount for its early guilty plea. It was fined $130,000.
Sydney Water provided the Court with a table of comparable cases summarising the sentencing considerations and penalties imposed in nine cases:
1. the Malabar Beach case;
2. Environment Protection Authority v Custom Chemicals Pty Ltd [2016] NSWLEC 146;
3. Environment Protection Authority v Hunter Water Corporation [2016] NSWLEC 76;
4. Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority [2017] NSWCCA 302; (2017) 228 LGERA 55;
5. Environment Protection Authority v CSR Building Products Limited [2008] NSWLEC 224;
6. Environment Protection Authority v Moolarben Coal Operations Pty Ltd [2012] NSWLEC 65;
7. Moolarben Coal Operations Pty Ltd (No 2);
8. Environment Protection Authority v Ardent Leisure Ltd (ACN 104 529 106) [2018] NSWLEC 36; and
9. the Crown in the Right of New South Wales case.
Sydney Water drew the Court's attention to three decisions in particular:
1. first, Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific, where the offender, a chemical manufacturer, caused wastewater to discharge onto farm land due to a faulty valve. The offence resulted in the death of five cattle. The offender was fined $300,000 for a breach of s 120(1) of the POEOA and $60,000 for a breach of s 64(1) of the POEOA after discounting for an early plea of guilty and other mitigating factors. Sydney Water sought to distinguish this case on the basis that the harm was substantially greater than the harm caused in the present case;
2. second, Custom Chemicals, where the offender deliberately and repeatedly pumped pollutant into a pond and creek without a license permitting the discharge. The offence was held to be of medium objective seriousness. The offender was ordered to pay $360,000 after discounting for an early plea of guilty; and
3. third, Hunter Water Corporation, where the offender was charged with multiple offences under ss 120(1) and 64(1) of the POEOA for the discharge of an acidic substance into a watercourse over a four month period. The actual environmental harm was considered not substantial but the duration of the offending led the Court to find that the objective seriousness was moderate. The offender had six prior convictions, although these were considered to have a neutral effect on the sentence imposed. The offender was fined $75,000 for the first s 120(1) offence, and $37,500 for each subsequent offence.
I have read each of the cases referred to me by the parties and I have compared them with the facts and circumstances of the present case.