Ruge and Cormack v R

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2015-06-12|Before: Leeming JA, Simpson JA, Hamill J

Solicitors: Legal Aid Commission NSW (Ms Ruge) Aboriginal Legal Service (Mr Cormack) Office of Director for Public Prosecutions (Crown) File Number(s): 2013/122484; 2013/5741 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: District Court of New South Wales Jurisdiction: Criminal Date of Decision: 16 May 2014 Before: King SC DCJ File Number(s): 2013/122484; 2013/5741

Judgment

LEEMING JA: I agree with Hamill J.
SIMPSON JA: I agree with Hamill J.
HAMILL J: The applicants seek leave to appeal against sentences imposed upon them by his Honour Judge King SC DCJ in the District Court sitting in Parkes on Friday, 16 May 2014.

FACTS OF THE OFFENCES

The facts found by King DCJ, based on an agreed statement of facts tendered in each case, were as follows: "1. The premises located at 143 York Street, Forbes, was a single storey detached house owned by Mr Michael James of Tamworth. The house was rented through Ray White Real Estate Agency at Forbes to Rebecca Ruge. At the time of the fire, Ruge lived alone at the house as her partner and son had moved out sometime before. Ruge was also the owner of motor vehicle registered number BL98QF, which was a 2005 blue Holden Commodore sedan. Both the vehicle and the contents of the house were insured at the time by NRMA Insurance. 2. Around the time of the offences, Ruge was spending her time partying with a social group in Forbes who drank and took drugs together. 3. Between Christmas and New Year 2012, Ruge had a conversation with Jack Buckman, a member of her social group, in which they agreed that Buckman would burn out her house and her car, and that she would make insurance claims after that had occurred. 4. Ruge agreed to pay Buckman not less than $6,000 of the insurance money in return for him lighting the fires. 5. Ruge later removed a number of valuables (laptop, camera, video camera) and personal items (papers, photos, resume, achievement certificates etcetera) from her house. 6. On 3 January 2013, Buckman was at a house in Cedar Crescent at Forbes. During the afternoon, Ruge came to the house and gave Buckman the keys to the house and car and said to him "Do it tonight, I'm going to Orange". 7. Later that evening, Buckman, in company with two friends named Alex Cormack and Walter Dalton, walked to Ruge's premises in York Street, Forbes. Using the keys, Buckman got into Ruge's vehicle, which was then parked outside the house. Cormack and Dalton also got into the vehicle. Buckman then drove the vehicle to his mother's house and borrowed $10 from his mother, intending to purchase fuel. He then drove to a BP service station in Darling Street, Forbes. CCTV footage shows Buckman entering the service station at about 10.52pm and purchasing a Repco brand 5-litre tin petrol container. He then went to a petrol bowser and filled the container with $5 (3.44 litres) of unleaded petrol. While he did that, the other two males remained in the vehicle. 8. Buckman then drove back to Ruge's premises where he got out of the vehicle carrying the container of fuel. Cormack and Dalton remained in the vehicle. Using the keys, Buckman entered the house. He then splashed petrol about the house, including in a bedroom, the hallway and the kitchen. He then set the house alight using a lighter. In the process, the petrol container caught fire and Buckman suffered some minor burns. He then ran out of the house and re-entered the vehicle, sat in the driver's seat and then drove off with Cormack and Dalton still in the car. 9. Buckman, still in the company of Cormack and Dalton, then drove to Parkes. He stopped the vehicle at one point and stole a length of garden hose. He then drove the vehicle to a bushland area about twenty metres west of Back Yamma Road. He put one end of the hose into the vehicle's petrol tank and the other end into the backseat area of the vehicle. He then syphoned petrol from the tank to the backseat and set the vehicle alight using a cigarette lighter. The three men then left the area together on foot. 10. Shortly after 11 pm that night, a neighbour contacted Triple-0 to report a fire at 143 York Street, Forbes. New South Wales Fire Brigade units from both Parkes and Forbes attended with police at 11.12pm. The fire was extinguished by 12.04am. The house was vacant and no one was injured by the fire. Police were told that Ruge had left the house about 6.30pm that day to travel to Orange with her former partner and their child. The structure remained standing, although the interior of the house and the roof cavity were extensively damaged along with the furniture inside the house. It is not included in the facts but I have been informed from the bar table without disagreement that the house was subsequently demolished. 11. An inspection was conducted by New South Wales Fire Brigade personnel. It was immediately obvious to them that the fire was suspicious, as there were several ignition points inside the premises, and accelerant pour patterns were obvious in one of the bedrooms. The metal fuel tin was located in the hallway. 12. The vehicle owned by Ruge had been taken from where it would normally be parked on the front lawn of the house. 13. While police were still attending at the house fire, Parkes police responded to a motor vehicle fire in scrub just off Back Yamma Road, Parkes. The fire was reported at 12.01am and extinguished by the Parkes Fire Brigade at about 12.40am. The vehicle was identified as that owned by Ruge and had been totally destroyed by fire. 14. When attending the scene of the house fire, police were given the names of three suspects by onlookers. They received information that three persons Cormack, Buckman and Dalton, were driving around in Ruge's vehicle shortly before the fire started, and that Buckman had apparently borrowed money from his mother to purchase fuel in order to light the fire at the house. 15. The offender Ruge made a statement at 2.15am, denying any involvement in the offences. 16. A crime scene having been established at the York Street premises, Bathurst Crime Scene police attended at about 4.10am on 4 January 2013 to conduct an examination. At least four separate ignition points were identified in the house, a clear and obvious pour pattern was identified in the front child's bedroom, the hallway and dining room were extensively damaged with the fire burning through the timber flooring, suggesting the use of an accelerant poured down the hallway and into the dining room. Numerous samples of carpet and wooden floorboards were collected and sent for analysis. The metal fuel tin was collected as an exhibit and identified as a five-litre Repco brand metal fuel container. There were no signs of forced entry to the premises although at least two windows appeared as if they had been left open. 17. On Friday 4 January 2013, detectives attended the home of Kerry Buckman. She confirmed that she had given her son $10 to buy fuel the night before. Police then attended the BP service station in Darling Street, Forbes, and obtained the CCTV footage of Buckman purchasing the fuel shortly before the fire was lit. 18. On Monday 7 January 2013, police arrested the offenders Buckman and Cormack at a house in Parkes. Buckman was interviewed and denied buying fuel at the BP or lighting the fires. 19. The offender Cormack was also interviewed and made partial admissions. He admitted to being present with Buckman and Dalton when they picked up Ruge's car. He admitted to being present inside the vehicle when Buckman collected the $10 from his mother, bought the fuel from the BP service station, and entered and set fire to the house. He admitted to being present when the vehicle was driven into bushland and set alight by Buckman. He said that he had had a conversation with Ruge a few days before the offences where Ruge had spoken of doing an "insurance job". When asked about his foreknowledge of the offences, Cormack said that he "knew something was going on but didn't want to ask questions". 20. On 7 January 2013, Buckman and Cormack were charged in relation to this matter. 21. On 19 April 2013, detectives attended Wellington Gaol and spoke to the offender Buckman at his request. During the interview he made full admissions of lighting the fire at the premises in York Street on the night of 3 January 2013 and later setting fire to the vehicle. He said that he had committed the offences pursuant to an agreement with Ruge, that she would pay him $14,000 when she received the insurance payout. He also said that on the afternoon of 3 January 2013, the day of the offences, Ruge had given him $1,000 in cash as well as a small amount of cannabis as part payment for the offence he was about to commit. He said that he received this payment at the same time that Ruge gave him the keys to her house and car. 22. About 3.30pm on Friday 19 April 2013, Ruge was placed under arrest and conveyed to Forbes Police Station. She declined to speak to a solicitor and was interviewed, at which time she again denied any involvement. She said that all the people who had made statements were lying, and that the allegations were crazy. She was then charged. 23. The offender Ruge had contents insurance with the NRMA for $50,000 and a full comprehensive motor vehicle policy on her car in the amount of $15,000. On 4 January 2013, she lodged claims with the NRMA for both the home contents and the motor vehicle. 24. The NRMA did not pay the claims (apart from an emergency payment of $1,000), however suffered a total loss of $19,007.49 for expenses incurred in investigating the matter, in respect of which the NRMA seeks compensation. 25. The offender Cormack was not aware of the agreement that had been C reached between Buckman and Ruge as to the payment of money to Buckman in exchange for committing the offences. By his plea of guilty, the offender Cormack accepts that he was part of a joint criminal enterprise with Buckman to commit the offences to which he has pleaded guilty. Cormack provided encouragement to Buckman to commit the offences by being present and ready to assist if required. 26. For the purposes of these agreed facts, Ruge has not conceded the accuracy of Buckman's assertions in his police interview to the effect that Ruge had given him $1,000 and some cannabis on the day the offences were committed. Nor does Ruge concede that the agreement with Buckman was for the payment of $14,000. Ruge concedes that the agreement was for the payment of no less than $6,000. Although the Agreed Facts indicate that Cormack was not aware of the agreement reached between Buckman and Ruge as to the payment of money, as set out at para 19 of the Facts, the circumstances in which he had had a conversation a few days before the offence with Ruge where she had spoken of doing an insurance job and his acknowledgement that he knew that something was going on but did not want to ask questions, as well as his evidence that he at least anticipated benefiting by Buckman providing drugs to him because Buckman would be getting money, indicates as a matter of common sense that without any express communication, he must have anticipated that Buckman was not committing the offences because of some delight in setting fires, but in order to obtain a benefit for himself as well as a benefit for Ms Ruge by way of the insurance claims. Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5 are letters tendered by the Crown. Exhibit 4 is a letter from NRMA Insurance dated 22 April 2014, which inter-alia indicates that they had paid $1,000 directly to Ms Ruge, and had incurred $15,7094.92 in assessment and investigation costs for the claim relating to Ms Ruge's vehicle and contents claims, giving a total, according to the letter, of $16,794.92. I note that at para 24 of the Agreed Facts are, however, that the NRMA suffered a total loss of $19,007.49. Exhibit 5 is a letter from Commlnsure, which indicates that the premises at 143 York Street, Forbes, had been insured by Michael James, and that as a result of the offending conduct on 3 January, the insurer had experienced a loss of $281,683.98. The letter is dated 25 February 2014, and is addressed to Detective Andrew McGrath. Commlnsure indicates that it is seeking restitution in respect of that sum and a further sum to be paid to Mr Michael James of $200, being the insured's excess. The total potential losses to the insurers were: $281,683.98 for the building and contents insured by Michael James, $50,000 for the personal contents of Ms Ruge, and $15,000, being the agreed value of the motor vehicle, being almost $350,000 in total had the claims been successful, that is, had not simply the claim by Mr James been successful, as it was, but also the claims made by Ms Ruge."
His Honour made similar findings of fact when he came to sentence Mr Buckman. In accordance with her duty of fairness and candour, and somewhat against her interests in resisting the grounds based on parity, the learned Crown Advocate directed the Court's attention to the primary Judge's finding that "the role and moral culpability of the offender Mr Buckman must be seen as being equal to that of Ms Ruge."

MITIGATING FEATURES AND PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE APPLICANTS

Both applicants pleaded guilty in the Local Court and King DCJ reduced their sentences by 25% for the utilitarian value of their pleas. His Honour summarised the material tendered on their behalf and the following brief outline is a condensed version of the relevant part of his Honour's judgment on sentence.
Ms Ruge was born in November 1989. She was 23 years old at the time of the offences and 24 when she stood to be sentenced. She had a child (a four year old son) but had broken up with the father of that child and was living with her parents by the time of sentence. She had no criminal convictions but developed a drug and alcohol dependency in her early twenties. His Honour noted that was then a "significant period of engagement with the criminal milieu". She undertook rehabilitation programmes during the period of remand. She had been in a residential programme but had not spent time in custody. The primary Judge treated this as "quasi custody" and gave her credit for two (of four) months spent in residential rehabilitation. Ms Ruge presented with excellent references and had a reasonable record of employment since leaving school. However, her drug problem caused her to leave her job. Her efforts at overcoming her drug problem were impressive. She spent time in Bloomfield Psychiatric Hospital as well as the residential rehabilitation facility. The primary Judge questioned whether "she fully realised the significance of her offending behaviour" but accepted that she had "demonstrated genuine remorse and contrition". According to the sentencing Judge, she "could readily be described as a person of general good character", prior to developing her drug habit and leaving her job.
Mr Cormack was born on 12 June 1992. He was 20 years old at the time of the offences and almost 22 at the time of sentence. He had a criminal history commencing in the Children's Court. This included some serious offences including demanding property with menaces (2012), armed with intent (2013) and a common assault resulting in a full time gaol sentence (2013). King DCJ referred to the criminal record as "appalling". Because of a "family breakdown", the applicant was raised by an older sister. She died in a car accident when the applicant was 12 years of age and he entered a "downhill spiral". He had not had a job since he left school. King DCJ was not satisfied that he was genuinely remorseful but noted that he had made some "partial admissions" on arrest and considered this to be "some evidence of remorse and contrition." His Honour was not satisfied that there were good prospects of rehabilitation and found that Mr Cormack had a "high risk of re-offending". King DCJ said the only thing in his favour was that he was still a relatively young man and would benefit from supervision.

Ruge Ground 1; Cormack Ground 5:The sentencing Judge erred in taking into account irrelevant considerations regarding the potential for a fire to spread and the risk to others.

After setting out the agreed statement of facts, King DCJ made a number of observations concerning the seriousness of the offence. The applicants contend that some of these remarks disclose error. His Honour said: "The potential for a fire to spread to other buildings, whether commercial or domestic, is always a substantial risk with a house fire. Not only does it create a risk to the property of others but also the lives of others who may be potentially resident or present in other premises or building in the vicinity."
Later he said: "There is also always a significant risk to emergency personnel and police who attend that they may suffer individual harm as a result of their attendance to deal with the incident."
The applicants contend that, on the evidence led in this case, these findings were not open or available to inform a proper assessment of the objective criminality of the individual offences. It was submitted that there was no evidence to support the finding that there was a "substantial" or "significant" risk of the additional damage contemplated. The applicant says that the only relevant evidence pointed in the opposite direction. That evidence was the part of the statement of facts where it was said that "the premises located at 143 York Street, Forbes was a single detached house".
The applicants pointed to the observations in Porter v R [2008] NSWCCA 145 where Johnson J referred to the variety of circumstances in which arson could occur and some of the factors that were relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of any individual offence. The factors included: "(i) The potential risk of injury to others. (ii) The possible spread of the fire."
The applicants submitted that the evidence did not permit an adverse finding in relation to those two factors.
The respondent submitted that the comments were unremarkable and that there is, in almost every case of arson, a risk of the fire spreading and a risk of harm to fire fighters. Those factors are the reason that a higher maximum penalty is prescribed where damage is by means of fire or explosion. The respondent pointed to the structure of the provisions creating the offences and made reference to the second reading speech in which the Attorney General explained that where property is damaged by fire or explosion there is an increased maximum penalty because of the kinds of risks to which his Honour referred.
Section 195(1) creates an offence of destroying or damaging property. Such an offence carries a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. If the damage is caused by means of a fire or explosion that maximum penalty is increased to 10 years. Subsection (1A) contains the same distinction for the offence when committed in company. The basic maximum penalty for deliberately damaging property while in company is six years. If the damage is caused by means of a fire or explosion the maximum penalty is increased to 11 years. Section 197 has the additional element of the offence being motivated "dishonestly, with a view to making a gain" and maintains the same structure. An offence of damaging property with the dishonest intention carries a maximum penalty of seven years while the same offence committed by means of a fire or explosion carries a maximum penalty of 14 years.
When the sections were introduced the Attorney General told Parliament that: "a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment is provided as the potential harm is increased by the use of fire or explosion. For this offence it is not necessary that the deed and intent to defraud or injure as it is the present requirement for certain arson offences it is sufficient that the damage was caused by the use of fire or explosives."
In R v Glover [2002] NSWCCA 376 Dunford J (with whom Ipp AJA and Studdert J agreed) referred at [56] to the second reading speech and said that "the use of the words 'potential harm' as opposed to 'damage' strongly suggest that the Attorney was referring to potential risk to other persons".
It can be accepted that the use of fire and explosion carries with it a risk that the fire may spread and may endanger the lives of other people (including fire fighters etc) indirectly. An observation that the offence generically is a serious one for that reason is not objectionable. The question is whether the remarks in the present case were of such a nature or whether they were remarks directed to an assessment of the objective criminality in the present case. That question must be answered by reference to a consideration of the judgment on sentence read as a whole and the impugned comments read in context.
The context in which the comments appear in the remarks on sentence creates an ambiguity. The passage commences with the words "the offences brought against each of the offenders … must be regarded as very serious offences". There is then a reference to the specific property particularised in the charges ("a motor vehicle and the residential premises and its contents as to use Mr Cormack's words 'an insurance job'"). His Honour then described the "sum potentially at risk" and then made the remarks to which exception is taken. That context would suggest that his Honour was assessing the objective criminality of this particular case, rather than referring to the seriousness of offences of arson in a general or generic sense. I accept that if his Honour was making a finding that increased the relative objective criminality of the particular offence within the genus created by the ss 195 and 197, there needed to be something more than the evidence presented in the District Court.
On the other hand, each of the impugned comments commences with the words "is always" and "also always". The use of the word "always" suggests that his Honour was making a more general reference to offences of arson.
Resolution of this ground is difficult. On a reading of the whole of remarks (and putting aside the sentencing outcome), I am not satisfied that King DCJ fell into the error contended for by the applicants. Standing alone, I would not be satisfied that this ground justifies intervention. However, it does not stand alone.

Ruge Ground 2-3:The sentencing Judge erred in failing to make a finding of the existence of special circumstances and adjusting the ratio of the non-parole period to the head sentence to a greater extent than he did.The sentence is manifestly excessive

On its face, the second ground argued on behalf of Ms Ruge is an assertion that the learned sentencing Judge erred in failing to find special circumstances under s 44 of the Sentencing Act. However, the way in which the matter was argued involved the submission that that failure gave rise to a justifiable sense of grievance when comparison is made with the non-parole component of the sentence later imposed on Mr Buckman. It is in this regard that the finding made as to their equal criminality is significant.
Mr Buckman was a person with a number of previous offences on his record albeit that those offences were dealt with in the Children's Court. On the other hand, he was younger than Ms Ruge. However both offenders were quite young and both presented evidence as to efforts that they had made towards rehabilitation. While Ms Ruge presented to the Court with no previous convictions on her record, there was evidence that she had a significant drug problem at the time of the offences, had fallen in with a bad crowd (the "criminal milieu" as the primary Judge put it) and that she had taken steps to overcome those problems.
The same kind of material that led his Honour to find special circumstances in Mr Buckman's case would rationally lead to a similar finding in Ms Ruge's case. On an entirely superficial analysis, it is a surprising result that a person with no prior offences on their record should receive a more severe sentence than an offender who comes to Court with a significant record of previous offending. I accept that in some circumstances the result will be that the person with the record may obtain the benefit of a finding of special circumstances because of their need for a longer period of supervision upon their release from prison. Further, it has been said "disparity is unlikely to be found in relation to a finding of special circumstances in relation to one co-offender and not another": Lau v R [2010] NSWCCA 43 at [15] (McClellan CJ at CL). However, his Honour went on to say: "However, Howie J accepted [in R v Do], as do I that there may be cases where all relevant facts and circumstances being equal, a finding of special circumstances in the case of one offender and not in the other may give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance."
The issue has been contemplated in a variety of factual circumstances: see, for example R v Wahabzadah [2001] NSWCCA 253, Tatana v R [2006] NSWCCA 398, R v Do [2005] NSWCCA 209.
Even if it is accepted (as was put by the respondent) that Mr Buckman was at a "crossroads" in his life, the circumstance of the present case did not suggest that Mr Buckman had a greater need for an extended period of supervision upon his release than did Ms Ruge.
The application of principles of equal justice and parity are not to be applied with technicality but by reference to the substance of the case. In Green and Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; 244 CLR 462 it was said at [30]: "30. The foundation of the parity principle in the norm of equality before the law requires that its application be governed by consideration of substance rather than form."
As Dawson and Gaudron JJ said in Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; 189 CLR 295 at 301-302: "The parity principle upon which the argument in this Court was mainly based is an aspect of equal justice. Equal justice requires that like should be treated alike but that, if there are relevant differences, due allowance should be made for them. In the case of co-offenders, different sentences may reflect different degrees of culpability or their different circumstances. If so, the notion of equal justice is not violated. On some occasions, different sentences may indicate that one or other of them is infected with error. Ordinarily, correction of the error will result in there being a due proportion between the sentences and there will then be equal justice. However, the parity principle, as identified and expounded in Lowe v The Queen, recognises that equal justice requires that, as between co-offenders, there should not be a marked disparity which gives rise to "a justifiable sense of grievance". If there is, the sentence in issue should be reduced, notwithstanding that it is otherwise appropriate and within the permissible range of sentencing options. Discrepancy or disparity is not simply a question of the imposition of different sentences for the same offence. Rather, it is a question of due proportion between those sentences, that being a matter to be determined having regard to the different circumstances of the co-offenders in question and their different degrees of criminality. The different circumstances involved in this case, namely, the fact that Savvas was the principal organiser in both conspiracies and that Postiglione rendered significant assistance to police and prosecuting authorities, clearly require that Postiglione receive a markedly lesser sentence than that imposed on Savvas. If regard is had solely to the head sentences - 25 years in the case of Savvas, 18 years in Postiglione's case - the difference may fairly be regarded as reflecting their different roles in the conspiracies in respect of which they were convicted and Postiglione's subsequent co-operation with police and prosecuting authorities. However, the head sentence is but one component of the sentences. A proper comparison involves a consideration of all components. One component of each of the sentences involved in this case and one which is susceptible of easy comparison is the non-parole period."
I am satisfied that there was an error, in the sense of an unjustified inconsistency, in the approach to special circumstances taken in the two cases. Although the ground was not formulated as a parity ground per se, I am satisfied that Ms Ruge is entitled to a "justifiable sense of grievance" as a consequence of the disparity between the respective non-parole periods imposed on her and Mr Buckman.
In those circumstances, it is perhaps unnecessary to deal with the contention in Ground 3 that the sentence is manifestly excessive. However, in my assessment, the aggregate sentence imposed on Ms Ruge can properly be described as manifestly excessive in the sense that it was "unreasonable" or "plainly unjust". Even though the offence was a very serious one and the loss to the insurance companies of some magnitude, it was an offence with very little planning and was carried out in a most amateur way. The subjective features of Ms Ruge were such that the objective seriousness had to be balanced against the individual circumstances of her case. As Mr Averre pointed out, the starting point was in excess of four and a half years and his Honour also said that he gave her (two months) credit for four months that she spent in a residential rehabilitation programme. That means that the starting point was approaching five years. That is excessive for a first offender of 24 years of age who had taken great strides towards rehabilitation.

Cormack Ground 1: The learned sentencing Judge contravened the principle in R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383 by sentencing the applicant on the basis that he believed his co-offenders would financially benefit from their crimes by way of a fraudulent insurance claim.

Mr Cormack contends under Ground 1 that comments made by the sentencing Judge infringed the principles in R v De Simoni [1981] HCA 21; 147 CLR 383. His Honour referred to the fact that the applicant was aware that it was an "insurance job" and that he knew that Ms Ruge "was to gain substantially". His Honour said that the applicant must have believed that it was not simply a matter of gaining the value of the car and her property present in the premises but also the value of the house. The full text of the impugned remark is as follows: "Mr Cormack was aware of the 'insurance job' at least from some days before, and took part in the joint criminal enterprise to commit the offences and was present, intending by his presence to provide encouragement for the offender Buckman to set fire to the vehicle and the house, and being ready to assist him in doing so if required. He must have appreciated that the intention in performing "an insurance job" was that at least Ms Ruge, with whom he had been in a sexual relationship for approximately two weeks, was to gain substantially, indeed on his evidence, believing that Ms Ruge was in fact the owner of the house, he must have believed that it was not simply a matter of her gaining the value of the car and her property present in the premises, but also the value of the house."
As has been seen, s 197 creates an offence carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years whereas s 195 creates an offence carrying 10 years or (when committed in company) 11 years. The element of "dishonestly, with a view to making a gain for that person or another" is a factual circumstance that aggravates the criminality of a particular case and exposes an offender to a higher penalty. In R v De Simoni, Gibbs CJ (with whom Mason and Murphy JJ agreed) said at 392: "It is not only in cases in which the offence has been accompanied by circumstances of aggravation that a trial judge may be required, in sentencing, to take an artificially restricted view of the facts. This will be so also in cases where the jury's verdict is inconsistent with the view of the facts that the judge himself has formed, for the judge cannot act on a view of the facts which conflicts with the jury's verdict. However, where the Crown has charged the offender with, or has accepted a plea of guilty to, an offence less serious than the facts warrant, it cannot rely, or ask the judge to rely, on the facts that would have rendered the offender liable to a more serious penalty."
As acknowledged by Gibbs CJ, the application of these principles may result in an artificial fact finding exercise. The present case provides an example. The agreed facts referred to the applicant's admission on arrest that he knew that "Ruge had spoken of doing an 'insurance job'". It was this evidence, along with his evidence that Ms Ruge told him that she owned the house, that led the primary Judge to make the findings that he did. It is perhaps unfortunate that the detail of the applicant's admission remained in the agreed facts tendered before King DCJ. It seems to have led his Honour into error. Nevertheless, the principle must be applied. A reading of the judgment on sentence establishes that his Honour took into account a circumstance of aggravation that was not charged against Cormack but which exposed him to a more severe maximum penalty.
I have taken into account the submission of the respondent pointing to various parts of the remarks or judgment on sentence where his Honour referred to other parts of the agreed facts. However, the passages to which the applicant refers leads me to conclude that error is established. I would uphold Ground 1.

Cormack Grounds 2-4:The learned sentencing Judge erred in finding that the applicant's role was substantial. The sentence imposed on the applicant was manifestly excessiveThe applicant has a justifiable sense of grievance arising out of the disparity between the sentence he received and those imposed on his co-offenders.

It is convenient to deal with Grounds 2, 3 and 4 together. They all hinge on an assertion that the primary Judge erred in his assessment of the applicant's criminality and role in the offences. This led his Honour to impose a sentence that was manifestly excessive and one which lacked due proportion with the sentence imposed on Ms Ruge and Mr Buckman thereby engendering a justifiable sense of grievance in Mr Cormack. The critical passage in his Honour's remarks was when he described the applicant's role in the offending as being "substantial". The full context in which that passage appeared was this: "Although offenders who participate in a joint criminal enterprise are equally liable for the actions of the other co-offenders, and accordingly, all other matters being equal, the same sentence, there is at least some distinction as conceded by the Crown as to his participation being less than that of Mr Buckman. Nonetheless, his role was still a substantial one."
As Mr Nash pointed out, the concession made by the Crown at first instance was stronger than that passage suggested. The advocate appearing for the Crown at sentence properly conceded that "the criminality of Mr Cormack is significantly less than that of Ms Ruge and Mr Buckman". He described his role as "his presence emboldening Mr Buckman to carry out the offence of lighting the fires but that concession is made your Honour". On the hearing of the appeal, there was some discussion as to the meaning of the word "substantial" and the flexibility with which that word is used in legal discourse. The word has received judicial consideration particularly in the context of statutory interpretation. Deane J once famously said that it was a word more appropriate "to a maze than to legislative provisions exposing officials of unions and others to action for substantial damages": Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (1979) 42 FLR 331. In DPP v Losurdo (1998) 44 NSWLR 618 the Court (Priestley and Handley JJA and Sheppard AJA) noted that Deane J went on to say that: "[t]he word substantial was not only susceptible of ambiguity; it was a word calculated to conceal a lack of precision. Deane J said that, in the phrase 'substantial loss or damage', 'substantial' could, in an appropriate context, mean real or of substance as distinct from ephemeral or nominal. He added that it could also mean, large, weighty or big. It could be used in a relative sense or could indicate an absolute significance, quantity or size."
The Court concluded in DPP v Losurdo (622) that: "These cases emphasise that there is no point in endeavouring to ascertain the meaning of the word 'substantial' by reference to a number of synonyms. The word is an ordinary English word and must be given its ordinary meaning in the context in which it appears."
Plainly, the meaning of the word "substantial" turns on the context in which it is used. The context here was an assessment of the role of the offender for the purpose of determining his objective criminality both generally and relative to his co-offenders. In that context, I am unable to see how the role that Mr Cormack played can properly be described as a substantial one. Apart from being present throughout the enterprise, there was no evidence that he did anything to actually encourage or embolden Mr Buckman in setting the fires or in making his escape.
I have previously expressed some misgivings concerning the authorities in New South Wales as to the approach of an intermediate appellate Court in dealing with a ground that asserts error in a sentencing Judge's assessment of the relative objective criminality: see Kaminic v R [2014] NSWCCA 116 at [79]-[89]. However, in Sabongi v R [2015] NSWCCA 25 at [70]-[71] I acknowledged that the law appeared to be settled and that the approach urged by Spigelman CJ and Simpson J in Mulato v R [2006] NSWCCA 282 applied. Accordingly, the question is whether it was open to King DCJ to categorize Mr Cormack's role as "a substantial one".
I am satisfied that it was not open to categorise Mr Cormack's role in the offences as "substantial". The primary Judge overstated his role and erred in his assessment of the objective criminality. Ground 2 is made out and this in turns satisfies me that Grounds 3 and 4 must also be upheld.

Re-sentencing

In Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; 88 ALJR 947 at [42]-[43] French CJ, Hayne, Bell and Keane JJ set out the correct approach to s 6(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) in a case where this Court finds error in the sentencing process: "When a judge acts upon wrong principle, allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect the determination, mistakes the facts or does not take into account some material consideration, the Court of Criminal Appeal does not assess whether and to what degree the error influenced the outcome. The discretion in such a case has miscarried and it is the duty of the Court of Criminal Appeal to exercise the discretion afresh taking into account the purposes of sentencing and the factors that the Sentencing Act, and any other Act or rule of law, require or permit. As sentencing is a discretionary judgment that does not yield a single correct result, it follows that a range of sentences in a given case may be said to be "warranted in law". A sentence that happens to be within the range but that has been imposed as the result of a legally flawed determination is not "warranted in law" unless, in the exercise of its independent discretion, the Court of Criminal Appeal determines that it is the appropriate sentence for the offender and the offence. This is not to say that all errors in the sentencing of offenders vitiate the exercise of the sentencer's discretion. By way of example, s 44(1) of the Sentencing Act requires the court when sentencing an offender to imprisonment to first set the non-parole period and then set the balance of the term. Prior to 1 February 2003, a court was required to first set the term of the sentence and then specify the non-parole period. A court which sentences an offender to imprisonment after 1 February 2003 by first setting the term of the sentence commits legal error. Without more, the error does not affect the exercise of the sentencer's discretion. After having identified specific error of the kind described in House, the Court of Criminal Appeal may conclude, taking into account all relevant matters, including evidence of events that have occurred since the sentence hearing, that a lesser sentence is the appropriate sentence for the offender and the offence. This is a conclusion that that lesser sentence is warranted in law. The result of the Court of Criminal Appeal's independent exercise of discretion may be the conclusion that the same sentence or a greater sentence is the appropriate sentence. In neither case is the Court required to re-sentence. Nor is the Court required to re-sentence in a case in which it concludes that a lesser sentence is appropriate for one or more offences, but that a greater sentence is appropriate for another or other offences, with the result that the aggregate sentence that it considers warranted in law exceeds the aggregate sentence that is the subject of appeal."
Like the sentencing Judge, I am of the opinion that it is appropriate to impose aggregate sentence pursuant to s 53A of the Sentencing Act. The commencement dates of the sentences, taking into account the different periods of pre-sentence custody, were agreed in the District Court. The sentence must reflect the purposes of sentencing in s 3A of the Sentencing Act. The offenders must be adequately punished and their conduct must be denounced. The sentences must send a clear message that such conduct will be met with serious punishment. The harm to the victims must be recognised. The community must be protected from the offender and, in this case, that may best be served by another purpose of sentencing, namely promoting the rehabilitation of the offenders.
In Ms Ruge's case, I take into account the period of "quasi custody" when the applicant was in residential rehabilitation. I would allow a discount of 25% for the plea of guilty. I take into account the serious objective criminality involved in each offence, noting that the total loss to the insurance company resulting from the house fire was substantially greater than that involved in destruction to the car. Having considered all possible alternatives, I am satisfied for the purpose of s 5 of the Sentencing Act that no sentence other than imprisonment is appropriate. The offences were part of the one enterprise but involved separate acts and discrete damage. But for the imposition of an aggregate sentence, it would have been appropriate that the sentences be largely concurrent but with a degree of accumulation. For the purpose of s 53A(2)(b), I record that the individual sentences that I would have imposed are 18 months (for the offence involving the motor car) and two years three months (for the offence involving the property within the house). I would find special circumstances pursuant to s 44(2B) of the Sentencing Act. Those circumstances are that Ms Ruge is a person without previous criminal convictions but with a history of drug abuse who will benefit from a longer than usual period of supervised parole.
In the result, I would propose an aggregate sentence of three years with an aggregate non-parole period of two years. Pursuant to s 50 of the Sentencing Act, she is entitled to be released at the expiration of the non-parole period.
In Mr Cormack's case, I take into account his limited role in the two offences. However, at the time of the offences he was on a deferred sentence bond (s 9 Sentencing Act) for damaging property and a suspended sentence bond (s 12 Sentencing Act) for being armed with intent. The breach of conditional liberty is an aggravating feature. No sentence other than imprisonment is appropriate in all of the circumstances. I would provide a 25% discount for his plea of guilty. I take into account his youth but note that his criminal history disentitles him to leniency. I am guarded as to his prospects of rehabilitation. His response to supervision in the past has been poor. I take the same approach to accumulation and concurrency as I have in Ms Ruge's case. I record indicative sentences of 12 months for the offence involving the vehicle and 18 months for the offence involving the property in the house. I cannot identify special circumstances justifying a reduction in the non-parole period that would apply by application of s 44 of the Sentencing Act although I will round down the non-parole period in favour of the offender. I would propose an aggregate (total) sentence of one year and nine months with an aggregate non-parole period of one year and three months.
I propose the following orders in Ms Ruge's case: 1. Leave to appeal granted. 2. Appeal allowed. 3. Quash the sentence imposed in the District Court. 4. In lieu thereof, impose an aggregate sentence comprising a non-parole period of two years commencing on 15 May 2014 and expiring on 14 May 2016 with a balance of term of twelve months commencing 15 May 2016 and expiring 14 May 2017. 5. Pursuant to s 50 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) direct that the offender be released at the expiration of the non-parole period.
I propose the following order in Mr Cormack's case: 1. Leave to appeal granted. 2. Appeal allowed. 3. Quash the sentence imposed in the District Court. 4. In lieu thereof, impose an aggregate sentence comprising a non-parole period of one year and three months commencing on 21 April 2014 and expiring on 20 July 2015 with a balance of term of six months commencing 21 July 2015 and expiring 20 January 2016. 5. Pursuant to s 50 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) direct that the offender be released at the expiration of the non-parole period.

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