EFI20 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1618

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. By application filed on 22 September 2020, and amended on 9 July 2025, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal[1] (the Tribunal) dated 26 August 2020. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the First Respondent (the Minister) in refusing to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa (the protection visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

1. The applicant is a male citizen of Bangladesh and prior to residing in Australia was a resident of Brazil. He first arrived in Australia on a visitor visa on 8 March 2015. He departed and returned multiple times, last arriving in Australia on 25 May 2016.
2. On 23 June 2016, the applicant applied for the protection visa. In a written statement accompanying his protection visa application, the applicant said he feared harm in Bangladesh from supporters of the Awami League (AL) as a result of his affiliation with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). He also claimed: to have left Bangladesh for Brazil in 2014 where he started a business; that the mafia in that country threatened him when he did not pay them the amounts demanded; and that he returned to Bangladesh due to these threats in May 2016. In Bangladesh, AL supporters were coming to his house to harm him, so he had to return to Brazil where he continued to be sought after by the mafia who made threats against his life.
3. On 28 November 2016, the applicant attended an interview with the Department.
4. On 9 January 2017, the delegate refused the applicant the protection visa. In summary, the delegate was not satisfied that he was a target of the AL in Bangladesh and did not accept the applicant's claims about the mafia in Brazil.
5. On 1 February 2017, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision. Along with his application, he provided a further letter explaining the reasons why he was seeking a review. In that letter the applicant claimed, inter alia, that the delegate misjudged his claim, that he obtained refugee status in Brazil and was subject to the mafia in that country, and that the delegate did not understand the situation in Bangladesh.
6. On 30 June 2020, the applicant was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 22 July 2020 via video link (due to COVID-19).
7. On 15 and 21 July 2020, the applicant, by his representative, provided the Tribunal with copies of various country information reports as well as other submissions, statements and documents in support of the application.
8. The applicant appeared at the hearing before the Tribunal on 22 July 2020 with his representative and was assisted by an interpreter in the Bengali and English languages. The applicant was granted until 5 August 2020 to provide further information to the Tribunal.
9. On 30 July 2020, the applicant's representative provided to the Tribunal further documents in support of his claim for protection. On 5 August 2020, the applicant, by his representative, provided further documents to the Tribunal.
10. On 13 August 2020, the applicant was invited to attend a further hearing before the Tribunal on 21 August 2020 by telephone (due to COVID-19).
11. On 18 August 2020, the applicant's representative provided to the Tribunal a further statutory declaration of the applicant and a completed 'Response to hearing invitation' form. On 20 August 2020, the applicant sent further documents to the Tribunal and stated that he had a permanent residency permit in Brazil as a refugee in that country.
12. The applicant appeared at a further hearing on 21 August 2020 with his representative, interpreter in the Bangali and English languages, and with two witnesses. The Tribunal took evidence from the applicant and his two witnesses.
13. On 26 August 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa.

1. The dispositive issue in the review was whether the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under s 36 of the Act.
2. The Tribunal identified the criteria for a protection visa; that the applicant must either satisfy the 'refugee' criterion or meet the 'complementary protection' grounds for protection. The relevant definition of 'refugee' and the provisions relevant to the complementary protection grounds under the Act were also set out.
3. The Tribunal identified that it must have regard to Ministerial Direction No. 56 made under s 499 of the Act, and that it must take into account the policy guidelines titled PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines, and PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines and any relevant country information assessments. The Tribunal stated that they had considered assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in so far as they were relevant.
4. The Tribunal summarised the applicant's background and travel history and then briefly summarised the applicant's claims for protection:

11. The applicant claims that he is at risk of being detained, tortured, killed or facing other forms of serious or significant harm if he returns to Bangladesh because of his past and present membership of the Bangladesh National Party. He claims that he fled Bangladesh in 2013 after being targeted by members of the ruling Awami League and that members of the party still wish to harm him.

12. For the reasons set out below I did not find the applicant to be a truthful or a credible witness. I do not accept that he fled Bangladesh to avoid harm from the ruling Awami League and I find that he became involved with the BNP in Australia not out of political commitment, but in order to enhance his claim for protection.

13. The applicant has residency in Brazil. He claims that he obtained this by successfully claiming protection. He also claims that he was targeted by criminals in Brazil and cannot return there because his life would be at risk. As I do not accept that the applicant meets the criteria for protection in relation to Bangladesh, it is not necessary to consider these claims.

1. The Tribunal summarised the country information that it had regard to and the submissions and evidence provided to the Department and to it, including the documents provided to the Tribunal and the oral evidence given at the two hearings.
2. The Tribunal found that the applicant was not a truthful or credible witness. This led the Tribunal to make the following conclusions:

78. After considering all of the relevant evidence I do not accept that the applicant was a member of the BNP prior to leaving Bangladesh or that he experienced problems of any kind for reasons of political opinion. I do not accept that he was beaten by police or that he was threatened or harmed by members of the Awami League or that a false case was lodged against him at any time. I do not accept that he fled to Brazil in 2013 because he feared harm in Bangladesh for reasons of political opinion or any other reason. I find that these charges were all concocted to support his claim for protection in Australia.

79. In reaching this conclusion I have considered the letters of support from AM Mahbub Uddin Khokon and Abu Sufian Dulal provided by the applicant. However, I note that the authors of both letters are described as senior members of the BNP and both live in Dhaka. I find it highly unlikely that they would have personal knowledge of an office-bearer in one of many small branches of the BNP, the student wing in Noakhali, as the applicant claims to have been. I also note that Mr Dulal was an official in the BNP Youth Wing and stated that the applicant had joined that group, while according to the applicant he belonged to the student wing, which was a different branch of the party. In these circumstances and in light of my findings regarding the applicant's credibility and the DFAT advice regarding the availability of false documents in Bangladesh I have given little weight to these documents.

1. The Tribunal relied on four integers to ground its adverse credibility findings:

(1) First, at [71]-[73], the Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence as to his involvement with the BNP in Bangladesh to be 'vague, at times contradictory and significantly at odds with the country information on the situation in Bangladesh during the time of his involvement.' The Tribunal considered the applicant was unable to provide a 'broadly consistent and reasonably complete account of the problems he faced prior to leaving Bangladesh' and that this was a 'strong indication that he has not provided an accurate account of his experiences.' The applicant gave oral evidence to the Tribunal about police beatings, that he was in hiding between 2008 and 2013, and that he fled Dhaka which were inconsistent with his claims before the delegate.

(2) Second, at [74]-[75], the Tribunal considered that the applicant's descriptions of what occurred due to his involvement with the BNP was at odds with the available country information. The country information suggested that 'generally supporters or members of political parties faced only a low risk of being detained during protests and did not live in fear of violence on a day-to-day basis due to their political affiliations.' It also suggested that low-level members of the BNP were not at such risk of harm that it was necessary for them to go into hiding between 2008 to 2013, as claimed by the applicant, or that an office-bearer of the BNP would be watched or followed by members of the AL. The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence as to the treatment of BNP members to be implausible and lacking credibility. It did not accept the applicant's claims that he was in hiding between 2008 to 2013, that he was forced to flee Dhaka or that he was monitored by the AL.

(3) Third, at [76], the applicant's decision to travel to Bangladesh to visit family in 2016 despite being advised that the situation there had not improved, that he had allegedly fled in fear in 2013, and that he had visas to travel to Peru or Australia at the time strong indicated that he was not fearful of harm in Bangladesh at that time and did not flee in 2013.

(4) Fourth, at [77], the Tribunal found the applicant's account of the troubles he faced in Bangladesh when he returned in 2016 to be unpersuasive. The applicant gave inconsistent accounts of what happened when a group came to his house to find him, and his claimed risk of harm from the police was inconsistent with him saying the police responded to his call for assistance. The Tribunal stated that while these were 'minor issues' they offered a further indication that the applicant was not providing an honest or accurate account of his reasons for leaving Bangladesh and seeking protection in Australia.

1. The Tribunal also considered the applicant's claims regarding continued involvement with the BNP in Australia. Equally, the Tribunal found the applicant's evidence was confused and unpersuasive. First, no claim of such involvement was raised before the delegate despite his claim that he had attended BNP meetings before his interview with the delegate. Second, he provided differing accounts of the composition and activities of the BNP NSW. Third, the applicant's witnesses who claim to be involved with the BNP in Australia gave evidence inconsistent and at odds with the applicant's evidence. In this regard, the Tribunal found as follows:

90. I accept that the applicant has had some association with a BNP group in Australia. However, in light of his willingness to concoct claims in support of his application and the problems with his evidence regarding his involvement with the group, I do not accept that he has been an active member of any BNP group in Australia since 2016 or that he participated in public activities or that he currently holds the position of Organising Secretary of the BNP NSW. I believe that he participated in some BNP activities mainly to bolster his claim for protection in Australia. I do not accept that he is a committed follower of the BNP and I am not satisfied that he would participate in political activities of any kind if he returned to Bangladesh.

1. Not being satisfied that the applicant was an active BNP member in Bangladesh, or that he faced problems with the authorities or members of the AL prior to his departure in 2013 or during his visit in 2016, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance he would suffer serious or significant harm if he returned to Bangladesh. The Tribunal was also not satisfied, primarily based on country information, that the applicant's involvement with the BNP in Australia would lead to any real or continuing interest by authorities or the AL if he returned to Bangladesh.
2. Finally, the Tribunal, in finding that the applicant would not continue to participate in any political activities in Bangladesh, was not satisfied that there was 'a real chance' that he would experience serious harm amounting to persecution or that he would suffer significant harm as defined in Australian law for reasons of political opinion if he returned to Bangladesh now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
3. The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant met the refugee or complementary protection criteria and affirmed the decision under review.

1. The originating application was accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant's solicitor which annexed the Tribunal's decision. It was not necessary to take this affidavit into account as the Tribunal's decision was already included in the Court Book.
2. The Court Book was tendered into evidence at the hearing and marked Exhibit CB.
3. On 19 January 2021, the applicant filed the affidavit of Jodie Ellen Coomber, affirmed on 12 January 2021, which annexed the Transcript of the Tribunal hearing on 22 July 2020 (T). The Coomber Affidavit was read and is in evidence.
4. The amended application, filed on 9 July 2025, advanced five grounds of judicial review. The applicant's written submissions were filed on the same day. On 21 July 2025, the Minister filed their written submissions.
5. The parties appeared at a hearing on 4 August 2025 at the Parramatta Registry of the Court.
6. The applicant was represented by Mr J R Young of Counsel. The Minister was represented by Mr T Reilly of Counsel.
7. The oral submissions of the parties developed their written submissions.

1. The amended application advanced the following grounds of judicial review (without alteration):

1. The Second Respondent made jurisdictional error by failing to acknowledge the deficiencies of the hearing process and thereby made a decision which was:

(a) unreasonable and/or

(b) failed to take into account a relevant consideration.

2. The Second Respondent made jurisdictional error by having regard to alleged evidence before the delegate of which there was no evidence.

3. The Second respondent made jurisdictional error by failing to make any determination of which was the country of nationality of the Applicant for the purposes of section 5H of the Migration Act 1958

4. The Second Respondent made jurisdictional error by failing to have regard the trauma suffered by Applicant in Brazil.

5. The Second Respondent engaged in a reasoning process which was unreasonable by reason of the maters set out in Grounds 1, 2 and 4 above.

1. Where relevant, I have considered ground five, which alleges unreasonableness on the part of the Tribunal, as part of the consideration of grounds one, two and four.

1. Ground one takes issue with the mode of the hearing, which was conducted by telephone, in circumstances where the Tribunal's findings were based on its assessment of the applicant's credibility. The applicant also takes issue with the lack of reference by the Tribunal (in its decision) as to how the hearing was conducted. In oral submissions, it was contended that proceeding with the hearing by telephone affected the quality of the hearing and the Tribunal was required to consider the impact of this when assessing the applicant's credibility and its failure to do so was unreasonable (ground five).
2. Reference was made to an exchange at the hearing (as extracted below), which the applicant contended demonstrates the confusion and lack of communication between the applicant, the member and the interpreter.
3. At T19, lines 10-20:

10. MEMBER: Okay. Did you have any other problems before you went to Dhaka?

APPLICANT: No. When such as, like, protests were happening I went to Dhaka

15. MEMBER: So, no - at - so, just- just so I'm clear- sorry, go on, what was that? Interpreter, did you hear that?

INTERPRETER: No.

20. MEMBER: No, I'm not surprised. Can I ask him to repeat it?

APPLICANT: When they came to look for me in my home, you know- and [1:07:40] told me they would- they would kill me if they found me. That's when I went to Dhaka.

25. MEMBER: So, you just told me you didn't have any more problems, and now you're saying you did. Is that- am I- is that correct?

APPLICANT: I - well, first of all, I was - yeah, there was no- not any more problems. I went to Dhaka, and even in Dhaka I kept changing my address, and kind of I was in hideout.

1. It was submitted that the question asked by the Member at T19 [L15] was incomprehensible and not understood by the interpreter and the applicant was instead asked to repeat it. It was submitted that the applicant's response of 'No' may have needed an explanation, but what followed was confusion, and the Tribunal did not recognise in its decision that what took place was a far from ideal manner of conducting the hearing.
2. The Minister contended that the Tribunal's credibility findings were not legally unreasonable and that the Tribunal had provided lengthy reasons for its conclusions.
3. I accept the Tribunal's reasons do not indicate that the hearing before it was conducted by telephone and with the assistance of an interpreter in the Bengali and English languages. Omission of this information, however, does not of itself establish an error on the part of the Tribunal.
4. The evidence before the Court (CB 155) indicates that due to COVID-19 restrictions, and the Tribunal not being able to hold in person hearings, the applicant was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 22 July 2020 by MS Teams videoconference. The hearing proceeded by telephone because of technical issues with the representative's equipment. As disclosed in the transcript, the Tribunal acknowledged that a telephone hearing was not ideal and informed the applicant and his representative to raise any issues as they arise: T4 [L25]-[L41]. The transcript does not disclose that the applicant or his representative raised concerns about the hearing being conducted by telephone, nor does it disclose that the Tribunal's questions were incomprehensible or that there was confusion between the applicant, interpreter and the Tribunal. The example relied upon by the applicant at T19 (extracted above) appears to suggest the Tribunal had some difficulty hearing what the applicant said (or difficulty understanding his response) and had to confirm with the interpreter if they got what the applicant had said, to which the interpreter replied 'no', after which the Tribunal requested the applicant to repeat his response. I am not satisfied that this example demonstrates that the Tribunal's questions were incomprehensible or that the hearing was confused.
5. To the extent that the applicant's complaint contends he was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review; as required by s 425 of the Act, this is not made out. The hearing proceeded by telephone due to technical issues with the representative's video equipment (T4, [L35]-[L48]). In the absence of any issues raised by the applicant or his representative about the mode of the hearing, I am not satisfied that any error arose on the part of the Tribunal in allowing the applicant to appear before it by telephone: see s 429A(a) of the Act.
6. The reasons at [34]-[50] record that the Tribunal asked the applicant questions about his background, claims for protection and past claims of harm. The applicant's responses, as recorded, appeared relevant to the questions being asked by the Tribunal. Further, as disclosed in the reasons, the Tribunal discussed with the applicant the concerns it had with his evidence, and he was given an opportunity to respond to those concerns. I am unable to identify any failure on the part of the Tribunal to afford the applicant a real and meaningful hearing: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 at [33].
7. In making its findings, as detailed at [71]-[90], the Tribunal had regard to the evidence provided by the applicant to the Department and the Tribunal, and concluded that the applicant was not a credible witness. The Tribunal's consideration of the claims and evidence before it was detailed and cogent. In view of its reasons, it was open for the Tribunal to find that the applicant's evidence regarding his claimed involvement with the BNP in Bangladesh was vague, in some respects contradictory and at odds with the relevant country information: at [71]. In that regard, it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to make the adverse credibility findings it made.
8. The applicant has not satisfactorily demonstrated how the mode of the hearing impacted his evidence and in what way the Tribunal's credibility findings were legally unreasonable.
9. Grounds one and five do not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.

1. By these grounds, the applicant contends there was no record of the evidence given by the applicant at the interview before the delegate and, in the circumstances, it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to rely on matters not said to the delegate to make the findings it made.
2. At the hearing before me, the applicant submitted that there was no transcript of the interview with the delegate and the Tribunal did not expressly state in its reasons that it had regard to anything other than the decision of the delegate. The applicant took issue with the Tribunal relying upon matters which were not raised by the applicant at the interview with the delegate to reject his claims and make adverse credibility findings. It was submitted that the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to evidence provided by the applicant during the visa application process, including evidence of what was said to the delegate. It was contended, however, that in circumstances where the Tribunal relied upon what was not said at the interview to make its findings, the Tribunal was required to base these findings on evidence, and not just on what was recorded by the delegate in its decision. To further explain the point, the applicant said it cannot be assumed by the Tribunal that what was not recorded by the delegate in its decision was not mentioned by the applicant.
3. I asked counsel for the applicant whether there was evidence that the Tribunal was incorrect in finding that the applicant had not mentioned a matter to the delegate which he had so mentioned at the interview. In response, counsel submitted that the process of the court was not to 'rehash' the decision of the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal had failed to comply with its obligation under s 430 of the Act as it had not indicated that it listened to the recording of interview before the delegate or had regard to a transcript of the same.
4. In providing specific examples from the Tribunal's decision as to how this contended failure could be established, the applicant referred to paragraphs [73], [81] and [84] of the decision. These paragraphs are the subject of consideration further below.
5. The Minister accepted that the Tribunal had not expressly mentioned whether or not it had listened to a recording of the interview with the delegate, but contended that the Tribunal was entitled to inform itself from the delegate's account of the interview, as it appears to have done at [27] of its reasons, by reference to the delegate's record of the evidence given by the applicant: CB 132-133. It was contended that if the Tribunal had not listened to the interview, which is not known, this was not of itself a jurisdictional error and no authority was relied upon by the applicant to suggest otherwise.
6. There is no evidence before the Court which suggests the Tribunal had a transcript of the interview before the delegate. It is also not known, as submitted by the Minister, whether the Tribunal had listened to the recording of the delegate's interview. Details of the interview and the evidence given by the applicant were, however, set out in the delegate's decision record. At CB 125, the delegate set out a summary of the applicant's written claims for protection and stated at CB 126 that at the interview the applicant did not provide any additional claims to his written statement. At CB 132-134, the delegate set out the applicant's claims, including the questions they asked the applicant in respect of his claims and the applicant's responses to those questions. Relevantly, the delegate set out the evidence given by the applicant at CB 132-133 in response to questions about his claimed political profile in Bangladesh and past incidents of serious harm. I accept the Minister's submission that the delegate's account of what was said by the applicant at the interview was detailed. It is also of some significance that the applicant at no point contended that the delegate's account of what he said at the interview (as detailed at CB 132-133) was inaccurate or that any relevant evidence given by him had been omitted by the delegate.
7. The obligation in s 430(1)(d) of the Act to refer to evidence or any material on which its findings of fact were based, did not necessarily require the Tribunal to listen to the recording (or have regard to a transcript) of the interview before the delegate. Whether it was reasonable for a Tribunal to rely on the delegate's account of what was (or was not said) at an interview before them will invariably depend on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, the delegate's account detailed the questions asked by the delegate and the applicant's responses to those questions. In the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to rely on the delegate's account of the evidence given (or not given) by the applicant at the interview when assessing the credibility of his claims and evidence.
8. The applicant takes issue with the Tribunal's consideration of his evidence, at [73] of its reasons, about claims of past harm in Bangladesh. Relevantly, in the preceding paragraph at [72] the Tribunal expressed concern that the applicant claimed, for the first time at the hearing before it, that he had been beaten by the police on several occasions between 2009 and 2013 and had been in hiding until 2013 when he left for Dhaka. The Tribunal considered the applicant's failure to mention this claim in his written and oral submissions to the Department, in addition to other concerns with his evidence, was a strong indication that the applicant had not provided an accurate account of his experiences in Bangladesh. The Tribunal acknowledged at [73] that considerable time had passed since the claimed events occurred and when the applicant spoke to the delegate, but it was not satisfied that he would have failed to mention being beaten by the police and having to go into hiding to the Department if these claims were true.
9. In my view, it was open for the Tribunal to reason as it did. It was not irrational or unreasonable for the Tribunal to compare the evidence given to the Department (both oral and written) to that which had been provided to the Tribunal. It should also be noted that in this example, the Tribunal also relied on the applicant's written submissions to the Department, which had also omitted the claim about him being beaten by the police. At CB 126, the delegate noted in their decision that, at the interview, the applicant had not made any additional claims to those in his written statement. In the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to also rely on the delegate's account of the interview to find that the applicant had not mentioned the claim about being beaten by the police.
10. The applicant also took issue with the Tribunal's reasons at [81], where the Tribunal stated that the applicant had made no mention of any involvement with the BNP NSW when he was interviewed by the delegate in November 2016. The applicant contended that the Tribunal was required to base its decision on what was said to the delegate and not what was not said to the delegate. It was also contended that the issue of the applicant's involvement with the BNP in NSW must have been discussed at the interview because the applicant sent photographs to the Department two and a half weeks later. First, there was nothing illogical or unreasonable with the Tribunal comparing what the applicant had said (or failed to say) before the Department with the evidence that was given before it for the purposes of assessing the credibility of his claims. Second, the reasons at [81] disclose that the Tribunal put to the applicant its concern that he claimed to have attended BNP meetings in NSW prior to the interview with the delegate, but he had not mentioned his involvement with the BNP in NSW to the delegate. In his response, the applicant said he did not mention his involvement because he was new to the group. The Tribunal, for reasons it gave, found his explanation unconvincing. I find no error in the Tribunal's reasoning.
11. To the extent that the applicant relies on the Tribunal's reasons at [81] to suggest the Tribunal unreasonably relied on matters not advanced at the interview before the delegate, this is not made out. In addition to the delegate's account, which does not record any evidence given by the applicant at the interview about his involvement with the BNP in NSW, the applicant's response to the Tribunal's concern on this matter was of itself an admission that he had not so mentioned it to the delegate. It was therefore not unreasonable for the Tribunal to find that if the applicant had any association with the group prior to the interview he would have mentioned it to the delegate: at [81].
12. The applicant also takes issue with the Tribunal's reasons at [84], however, it is not clear how this assists the applicant as that paragraph relates to the inconsistencies in the evidence given to the Tribunal at the hearings before it on 22 July 2020 and 21 August 2020 about the structure, activities and his position with the BNP in NSW, which undermined the applicant's claims about his involvement with that group. There appears to be no reference to or reliance by the Tribunal on evidence that was (or was not) before the delegate in respect of those claims.
13. I am not satisfied that the Tribunal's reasons at [73], [81] and [84] disclose any error on its part.
14. It is for the applicant to establish that the Tribunal had, in the circumstances of his case, erred in relying on the delegate's account of the evidence given by him at the interview. A general complaint about the Tribunal relying on the delegate's account, even in circumstances where the reliance was on the omission of evidence, is not of itself sufficient to establish jurisdictional error.
15. The submission advanced by the applicant that it was an error for the Tribunal to rely on the delegate's account because he may or may not have mentioned particular matters is, with respect, misconceived. It is for the applicant to provide adequate particulars, with supporting evidence where available, to support their contentions. The applicant's contention that the Tribunal erred by relying on matters not raised before the delegate, in my view, could have been established by the applicant filing evidence of the transcript of the interview before the delegate and the identifying of any evidence raised at the interview which the Tribunal erroneously found had not been previously mentioned by him. It was for the applicant to identify, with some specificity, the error made by the Tribunal in its reasons and how that error was material to its decision. I am not satisfied that he has done so.
16. In the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to rely on the delegate's account of the interview, (which I found were detailed and consistent with the applicant's written claims for protection), when assessing the credibility of the applicant's claims. The Tribunal's reasons for rejecting the applicant's claims, including those relating to being beaten by police in Bangladesh and his level of involvement with the BNP in NSW, were cogent and detailed. It cannot be said that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings lacked an evident and intelligible justification: Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541 at [10] per Kiefel CJ, [82] per Nettle and Gordon JJ, citing Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [76] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ. Nor can it be said that the Tribunal's findings or decision were not open to it on the evidence before it: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130]-[132] and [135] per Crennan and Bell JJ and at [78] per Heydon J.
17. For these reasons ground two and five do not establish jurisdictional error.

1. These grounds take issue with the Tribunal's approach of considering the applicant's protection claims only in respect of Bangladesh and not considering his claims against Brazil. This was a different approach to that taken by the delegate, who considered the applicant's claims in respect of Bangladesh and Brazil.
2. It was contended that the Tribunal erred by failing to consider the question of whether the applicant was also a national of Brazil and whether he was owed protection on account of events that occurred in Brazil. In oral submissions, it was also contended that the Tribunal had failed to identify Brazil as a receiving country. In written submissions, the applicant also contended that the applicant's experiences in Brazil were relevant to his credibility and subjective fear of harm and that the Tribunal erred by its failure to consider the impact of incidents in Brazil and that no reasonable Tribunal would have ignored the trauma that may have been caused by these incidents when assessing the credibility of the applicant.
3. The Minister submitted that while nationality and citizenship are not always commensurate, the applicant had only ever claimed to be a citizen of Bangladesh (CB 24) and had indicated he had a right to enter and reside in Brazil (CB 25). It was submitted that the Tribunal would have only been required to consider the applicant's protection claims in relation to Brazil if it had found that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh. It was submitted, by reference to s 36(3) of the Act, that the Tribunal, having found that the applicant was not owed protection obligations in relation to Bangladesh, did not need to consider whether he was owed protection obligations in relation to Brazil.
4. In the present case, the Tribunal's task was to assess whether the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations either because he was a refugee, as provided for in s 36(2)(a) of the Act, or he satisfied the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa).
5. Relevantly, the definition of 'refugee' in s 5H(1)(a), where a person has a nationality and is outside the country of his or her nationality, and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of nationality.
6. In the present case the applicant indicated he was a citizen of Bangladesh. In response to questions in the application form about whether he was currently or had previously been a citizen or national of any other country, the applicant answered 'No'. In response to the question of whether the applicant had the right to enter or reside in any country(s) other than his country(s) of nationality, the applicant answered 'Yes' and wrote 'Brazil'. Given the applicant's own responses to the questions on the protection visa application form that he was a citizen of Bangladesh and not a citizen or national of any other country, there was no reason or any discernible basis for the Tribunal to consider whether the applicant was or was not also a national of Brazil.
7. While not necessary to discuss in detail, it should be noted that if the Tribunal had found the applicant was also a national of Brazil, then it would have been prevented from assessing the merits of the applicant's claims for protection on the basis that the application for a protection visa was not validly made. This is because of the restrictions that were imposed by ss 91N(1) and 91P(1) of the Act[2] (which were in effect at the time the applicant applied for the protection visa) on dual nationals. The effect of the operation of these provisions was that a non-citizen, who was a national of two or more countries, was unable to lodge a valid application for a protection visa unless the Minister had personally determined that s 91P did not apply to that applicant under s 91Q: see AHZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 164 at [25] per Perry J citing Buchanan J in SZOAU v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 33; (2012) 199 FCR 448 at [4]-[5]. In the absence of a determination by the Minister, the dual national's visa application would have been invalid and could not have been considered: ss 47(3) and (4) of the Act.
8. However, as noted above, the applicant in this case indicated he was a national of Bangladesh and not a national of any other country. In the circumstances, there was no error in the Tribunal proceeding to assess the applicant's claims for protection by reference to Bangladesh as his country of nationality. At [13] of its reasons, the Tribunal explained that the reason it did not assess his claims in respect of Brazil was because it did not accept that the applicant satisfied the criteria for protection in relation to Bangladesh. There was no error in the Tribunal's approach in that regard.
9. As to the contention that the Tribunal failed to identify Brazil as a 'receiving' country for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa), this is not made out. The definition of 'receiving country' in relation to a non-citizen, was relevantly stated in s 5(1) of the Act and means: 'a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country'. The applicant indicated he was a national of Bangladesh and there was no error in the Tribunal finding that Bangladesh was 'a receiving country' for the purposes of assessing whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
10. I accept the Minister's submission that the assessment of the applicant's protection claims in relation to Brazil would have only been relevant if the Tribunal had found the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations in relation to Bangladesh.
11. To explain further, if the Tribunal had found that the applicant was owed protection in relation to Bangladesh, then the Tribunal would have been required to assess whether, by operation of s 36(3), the applicant was excluded from being owed protection by Australia because he had the right to enter and reside in Brazil. Before excluding the applicant from Australia's protection under s 36(3), the Tribunal would have had to consider whether any of the exceptions provided for in s 36(4)-(5A) applied to the applicant. Relevantly, this would have included considering the applicant's protection claims in relation to Brazil.
12. However, in the present case, the Tribunal, having found the applicant did not satisfy the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) or the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa), did not need to consider the application of s 36(3) or the exceptions to that provision at s 36(4)-(5A). The Tribunal was not bound by the approach taken by the delegate. The Tribunal explained at [13] of its decision why it took the approach it did. It conducted an independent merits review of the applicant's claims and made its own findings in accordance with the relevant statutory requirements. No error is disclosed in that regard.
13. The only other issue remaining for consideration is whether the Tribunal erred in not taking into account events that occurred in Brazil in its assessment of the applicant's credibility. In this case, the Tribunal assessed the applicant's claim for protection in relation to Bangladesh. As reasoned above, it did not (and was not required to) assess the applicant's claims in relation to Brazil.
14. I am not satisfied that any error is disclosed in the Tribunal not considering the applicant's claims in relation to Brazil for the purposes of assessing the credibility of his claims in relation to Bangladesh or his credibility generally. The applicant's claims in relation to Brazil were on an entirely different basis to his claims in relation to Bangladesh. The Tribunal's reasons for why it did not consider the applicant to be a credible witness were cogent and detailed, and the applicant has not established that consideration by the Tribunal of the applicant's claims in relation to Brazil would have made a difference to the Tribunal's assessment of the applicant's credibility generally or the credibility of his claims in relation Bangladesh.
15. Having regard to the approach taken by the Tribunal, as explained at [13] of its reasons, it was not irrational or unreasonable for the Tribunal to assess the applicant's credibility, and form the view that it did, within the confines of his claims in relation to Bangladesh.
16. Grounds three, four and five do not establish jurisdictional error.

1. As none of the grounds advanced establish jurisdictional error, the application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighty (80) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Skaros.

[1] The Court notes that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has been superseded by the Administrative Review Tribunal. Item 10, Part 2 of Schedule 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 provides that for any proceedings that were pending in any court or tribunal immediately before the transition time and to which the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was a party, the Administrative Review Tribunal is, after the transition time, substituted for the Tribunal as a party to the proceedings.

[2] Subdivision AK (ss 91M to 91Q) of Division 3 of Part 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was in effect until 23 June 2023 when it was repealed by the Migration Amendment (Giving Documents and Other Measures) Act 2023 (No. 26).