EFE20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 447

1. The below summary of the Tribunal's decision record is derived primarily from the Court Book and the Minister's submissions and, unless otherwise stated, is not in issue.
2. At [3]-[9], the Tribunal noted the applicant appeared at the hearing conducted via Microsoft Teams from her representative's office, and that the connection issues resulted in part of the hearing being conducted by telephone rather than video.
3. At [7]-[8], the Tribunal acknowledged the applicant's submission that the disruptions in the hearing had affected her capacity to give evidence. However, it was satisfied that the credibility issues raised had been fairly and appropriately considered despite the disruptions, and declined to adjourn the hearing for a further in-person hearing.
4. At [18]-[24], the Tribunal set out the applicant's claims, the documents provided to the delegate and to the Tribunal, and the country information that was before it including: the 2019 US International Religious Freedom Report on China provided by the applicant; the 2019 DFAT Country Information Report on China; and a 2016 Freedom House report.
5. At [27], the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant was a citizen of China, that China was the receiving country against and therefore, assessed her claims on that basis.
6. At [29], the Tribunal noted there were 'significant inconsistencies' in the applicant's evidence. The Tribunal discussed the inconsistencies of the applicant's evidence: at [31]-[65]. These inconsistencies concerned, among other things; her testimony regarding the arrest of a fellow church member; when she left Fuqing for Guangzhou; where she was living; where the Local Church gatherings occurred; and her confusion as to where she was when she received a phone call to leave Fuqing; all of which called into question whether the applicant had any involvement with the Local Church in China. Moreover, inconsistencies as to the nature of the Local Church meetings, which she initially claimed were administrative meetings but then claimed them to be 'regular church meetings,' their locations, and their frequency, eroded her credibility further.
7. At [66]-[69], the Tribunal found that because of the blatant inconsistencies and deficiencies in her evidence, it was not satisfied the applicant was a religious adherent in China, that she regularly attended Local Church gatherings in China, that any members were arrested and she fled China to avoid arrest, or that her parents' home had been sealed by the authorities for being an illegal meeting place of the Local Church. The Tribunal was not satisfied the authorities in China had any adverse interest in the applicant as a result of any Local Church activities, and as such, it was not satisfied she faced a real chance of serious or significant harm as a result of Local Church attendance or activity in China.
8. At [72]-[77], the Tribunal further noted several other credibility concerns that could demonstrate opportunism on the part of the applicant. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been involved with a church in Sydney, Australia. It put to her that she could attend a registered or unregistered church in Fujian province, and noted her response that she believed the Local Church to be different from mainstream Christianity. The Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence and the cumulative credibility issues identified that the applicant joined a church in Australia for genuine religious motives, and it was not satisfied she would be involved in the Local Church or any other religion that was banned on return to China, and that if she had developed genuine religious beliefs, she could choose to be involved with a registered church in China.
9. At [78], the Tribunal noted it was not satisfied the applicant had any fundamental objection to belonging to a registered church in China on the basis of its credibility concerns that the applicant would seek to practice Christianity in China in the first place.
10. At [83], the Tribunal considered the applicant was given a fair opportunity to give evidence and answer questions, and was not satisfied that the credibility issues identified were nuanced or marginal such that they required a face-to face hearing, and found the credibility concerns were 'strong, bordering on overwhelming'.
11. At [86]-[89], the Tribunal accordingly was not satisfied there was a real chance of serious or significant harm in China for any of the reasons claimed and therefore, affirmed the decision under review.

1. The originating application filed with the Court on 22 September 2020 contained three grounds of review. The applicant also filed an affidavit which annexed the Tribunal's decision and various documents. As the Tribunal's decision and the documents annexed to the applicant's affidavit were already in the Court Book, it was not necessary to take that affidavit into account.
2. On 24 March 2025, orders were made by a Registrar of this Court providing for the applicant to a file any amended application, written submissions and any affidavit evidence at least 28 days before the hearing. On 9 February 2026, the applicant filed her written submissions (the written submissions), and at the hearing leave was granted for the applicant to rely on her written submissions.
3. On 16 February 2026, the Minister filed their written submissions (the Minister's submissions).
4. On 24 February 2026, the applicant additionally filed submissions in reply (the reply submissions). As there were no orders permitting the applicant to file a reply, leave was required for the applicant to rely on those submissions. There being no objection by the Minister at the hearing, leave was granted for the applicant to rely on her reply submissions.
5. On 2 March 2026, the parties appeared at the final hearing at the Parramatta Registry of the Court. The applicant appeared in person and was assisted by an interpreter in the English and Mandarin languages. The Minister was represented by Mr M Wong of Minter Ellison.
6. At the hearing, the Court Book, filed by the Minister on 30 November 2020, was tendered into evidence and marked Exhibit CB.
7. As the applicant was self-represented, I explained to her how the hearing would proceed, and the role and powers of the Court in judicial review proceedings.
8. The applicant largely relied on her written submissions, including those filed in reply to the Minister's submissions, and did not advance much in the way of oral submissions.

1. The originating application advanced the following handwritten grounds (without alteration):
   1. I firmly believe that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to give me a genuine opportunity to give evidence and present arguments at the hearing before it. It is my believe that the Tribunal has already made his decision on my case before the hearing. It is my believe that the Tribunal has actually just gone through the motions of arranging hearing for me but never intended to consider my application properly and impartially.
   2. My hearing was scheduled by video conference through MS Teams video on 27 August 2020 at 9:30 AM. Unexpectedly the hearing was delayed by around 2 hours due to serious traffic accident at Harbour Bridge on that day. Shortly after the hearing started it was interrupted as the MS Teams video became offline. We had to reconnect with the Tribunal through MS Teams video. But, the hearing was quickly interrupted once again, because the Tribunal had to find another interpreter as the previous interpreter got another appointment. We then had to wait and got the connection with the Tribunal through MS Teams video. Following that, we repeatedly lost our connection with MS Teams video for many times, because the line was always dropped repeatedly. We had to repeatedly reconnect with the Tribunal through MS Teams video again and again. Finally the Tribunal had to give up MS Teams video and connected me by telephone as the hearing was repeatedly interrupted for many times, it was definitely impossible for me to give my evidence support of my application or to present my arguments... to issues arising from my case. I was inevitably subject to difficulties, mentally and psychologically. So, at the end of the hearing I clearly spoke to the Tribunal that I was not satisfied with the hearing, and sincerely required the Tribunal could arrange a genuine hearing for me in person so that I could give my evidence and present my argument in person to the Tribunal. Unfortunately, my request was rudely and unfairly rejected by the Tribunal, which made me feel very much disappointed, therefore, firmly believe that the Tribunal has actually just gone through the motions of arranging a hearing for me and that the Tribunal has already made his decision on my case in advanced.
   3. If I returned to China, I will be arrested and imprisoned by the Chinese authorities, because I have been blacklisted due to my particularly important role played in the Local Church, which was called "Shouters" by others. Even today, the Local Church Is regarded as "Evil Cult" In China by the Chinese governments, and thus I must become a victim of persecution on my return. However, the Tribunal failed to assess my review application for protection correctly according to the laws, as a result, I lost my valuable chance of gaining protection by the Australian government. I sincerely request your Honour at the Court to set aside the Tribunal's decision, send my case back to the Tribunal and order the Tribunal to fairly and carefully consider my application by laws.

1. By grounds one and two, the applicant contends that she was not given a fair and meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing. She contended an inability to properly give evidence and present arguments due to connection issues and because the interpreter had to be changed mid-hearing.
2. The applicant further contended that the Tribunal's refusal to provide her with a face-to-face hearing, as she had requested, was because it had already made up its mind on the review.
3. In her reply submissions, the applicant submitted the following:

...that a fair-minded observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal had prematurely formed an adverse credibility view before rejecting the request for a face-to-face hearing.

The refusal occurred despite [the] acknowledged technical instability; interpreter disruption; and the Tribunal's heavy reliance on demeanour-based impressions.

The Respondent asserts that credibility findings were not based on demeanour. However, the Tribunal expressly referred to: 'vagueness and hesitancy', long pauses, impression of concoction.

Those are inherently demeanour-based assessments.

In circumstances where demeanour played a material role, refusal of an in-person hearing was legally unreasonable.

1. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal acknowledged the connection issues that were experienced during the hearing and noted that, at times, the applicant was connected by way of telephone only: at [7]. It also acknowledged the applicant's request for a face-to-face hearing, however, gave reasons why it did not consider it necessary, having regard to the significant credibility concerns which it considered had been fairly and appropriately determined despite the mode of the hearing and the disconnections: at [8] and [82]-[83].
2. In relation to the change of interpreter, the Minister submitted that the hearing was supposed to start at 9:00am, however, a different interpreter had to be arranged and consequently the hearing did not commence until 12:28pm. As such, the change in interpreter occurred prior to the hearing properly commencing and only one interpreter was used for the duration of the hearing. The Minister submitted that even if there was a change in interpreter, there was no evidence that this amounted to procedural unfairness.
3. In respect of the allegations of bias, the Minister submitted that the reasons do not disclose anything that would cause a fair minded lay-observer to infer the Tribunal was pre-disposed against the applicant, let alone was cogent evidence provided to demonstrate the Tribunal did not approach its task with an open mind: SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69].
4. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's decision not to allow for a further face-to-face hearing occurred after it had already received the applicant's evidence. It was contended that the Tribunal's reasons reveal that the applicant was given the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments, including responding to the Tribunal's concerns relating to the inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence. It was submitted that the Tribunal, for the reasons it gave, was not satisfied with the explanations given by the applicant to explain her inconsistent evidence.
5. The Minister further submitted that the Tribunal at [38]-[39], acknowledged the long pauses by the applicant when invited to comment on the inconsistencies between her written and oral claims given at the Departmental interview. It observed that her explanations were given with a 'vagueness and hesitancy' that did not persuade the Tribunal that she was recounting events from actual experience, and such gave the impression that she was hesitantly concocting evidence: at [42].
6. The Minister also referred to the Tribunal's reasons at [52], where the Tribunal noted several 'significant' and 'further' pauses prior to a brief disconnection by the applicant from the hearing. The Tribunal recorded that the interpreter had remain connected. At [56], the Tribunal noted its concern that the inordinate delay in the applicant's failure to answer the question was because of her realisation that she had given inconsistent evidence that she returned to her home village on the weekends, yet, she had previously claimed to attend church gatherings in Fuqing city on Saturday nights. It was submitted that the delay, as acknowledged by the Tribunal, was due to the applicant processing how to explain her inconsistent evidence, noting her eventual response that she also attended other Local Church gatherings in four different locations outside of Fuqing city: at [51]-[54]. The Tribunal noted the claim to attend Local Church gatherings in four different locations outside of Fuqing city was different to what she had previously claimed before the Tribunal: at [55].
7. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's concerns regarding the applicant's credibility were 'strong, bordering on overwhelming' and were not so nuanced or marginal as to necessitate a face-to-face hearing: at [83]. It was contended that the Tribunal's credibility findings were based predominantly on the significant inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence and were not simply based on the applicant's demeanour including the delay in her responses: MZYUM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 51 at [73].
8. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's decision to decline the request for a further face-to-face hearing was not one that lacked an evident and intelligible justification: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [76].

1. It is not in dispute that the Tribunal was required to invite the applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review: s 425 of the Act. The invitation to appear before the Tribunal must be 'real and meaningful' and must not be a hollow shell or empty gesture: Mazhar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1759; (2000) 183 ALR 188 at [31]; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 at [33].
2. The applicant in this case was invited to appear before the Tribunal via Microsoft Teams: at CB 173. The Tribunal acknowledged the difficulties with the video connection and noted in its reasons that part of the hearing had to be conducted by telephone. Section 429A(a) of the Act provides for the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments by telephone. So, the mere fact that the hearing was conducted, in part, by telephone does not of itself establish error on the part of the Tribunal.
3. As to the disconnections during the hearing, the applicant has not explained how this impaired her ability to give evidence and present arguments. Nor has she been able to demonstrate that a change in interpreter, which occurred prior to the delayed start of the hearing, resulted in her being denied a real and meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing.
4. As submitted by the Minister, the Tribunal acknowledged the connection issues, but formed the view, for the reasons it gave, that this did not prevent the applicant from being afforded a fair hearing.
5. I accept that this was not a case where the Tribunal relied upon the applicant's demeanour or appearance, in any significant way, in arriving at its adverse credibility findings. The Tribunal's reasons plainly disclose that it was concerned with the substantive inconsistences between the applicant's written claims; her oral evidence at the Departmental interview; and her oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing. The inconsistencies included:
   • the applicant's location when she was informed that Church members had been arrested: at [31]-[35];
   • when she left Fuqing city and how long she had spent in Guangzhou prior to travelling to Australia: at [36]-[39]; and
   • her attendance at the Local Church gatherings, including the location and frequency of those gatherings: at [48]-[65].
6. The Tribunal considered the applicant's explanations in response to its concerns about the inconsistencies including: her claim that it was due to her feeling unwell during the interview with the Department; or that it was because of stress and her misunderstanding the mode of the Tribunal hearing; however, the Tribunal was not satisfied, for the reasons it set out at [35] and [45]-[46], with those explanations given the significance of the inconsistencies in respect of her core claims.
7. As to the applicant's request for a face-to-face hearing, the Tribunal plainly considered that request and I accept that the Tribunal's reasons at [83], for concluding that a further (face-to-face) hearing was not required, and such did not lack an evident and intelligible justification given the 'strong, bordering on overwhelming' concerns the Tribunal had with the applicant's credibility. I accept the Tribunal's credibility concerns would not have been alleviated by adjourning the review and conducting a further in-person hearing. The applicant has not demonstrated legal unreasonableness on the part of the Tribunal.
8. Nor has the applicant demonstrated bias, actual or apprehended, on the part of the Tribunal. As submitted by the Minister, the applicant has not put on any evidence which demonstrates that the Tribunal was so committed to not providing her with a face-to-face hearing, that it was incapable of being persuaded differently, regardless of what the applicant had said. Nor has the applicant put on any evidence which discloses that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably infer that the Tribunal did not approach its task with an open mind. I accept that it was only after the applicant had given her oral evidence and responded to the Tribunal's concerns, that the Tribunal considered (and declined) to adjourn the review to allow a face-to-face hearing: at [81]-[83]. The Tribunal's reasons for not providing the applicant with a further (face-to-face) hearing do not disclose bias, actual or apprehended, by the Tribunal.
9. For these reasons, grounds one and two do not establish jurisdictional error.

1. Ground three does little more than reiterate the applicant's protection claims and invites the Court to engage in impermissible merits review: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 286.
2. Ground three does not establish jurisdictional error.

1. The applicant raised further grounds in her written submissions. I had concerns that the further grounds may have been generated with the assistance of artificial intelligence, such as by ChatGPT: Valu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 95; (2025) 386 FLR 365 at [22]. When this concern was raised with the applicant at the hearing, she denied this and said that the submissions were drafted with the assistance of a friend. She also maintained that her reply submissions, which I observed also appeared to be generated by artificial intelligence given their structure and lack of coherent argument, had been drafted with the assistance of the same friend.
2. Notwithstanding my misgivings about how the grounds in her written (and reply) submissions were drafted, I have given the applicant the benefit of the doubt.
3. For ease of reference, I will set out each ground (without alternation) and consider them in turn.

GROUND 1 - Misapplication of Credibility Assessment Principles

The Tribunal committed an error of law by treating minor and non-material inconsistencies as determinative of my overall credibility, thereby failing to properly distinguish between peripheral detail and core claims.

Particulars:

• The Tribunal relied on discrepancies concerning my precise location when receiving a telephone call, and minor variations in dates relating to my departure from Fuzhou.
• These matters did not go to the essential elements of my protection claim, namely my participation in an underground Christian house church and subsequent police interest.
• By elevating peripheral inconsistencies to dispositive status, the Tribunal applied an incorrect legal standard to the assessment of credibility.
• The Tribunal's reasoning was legally unreasonable and constituted jurisdictional error.

1. By ground one of the written submissions, the applicant takes issue with the Tribunal's consideration of her evidence, in particular, its treatment of inconsistencies in the evidence, which she submitted were peripheral, and resulted in the Tribunal applying the 'incorrect legal standard to the assessment of credibility'.
2. The inconsistencies in the evidence, as found by the Tribunal, which the applicant takes issue with, concerned her location (at work or at home) when she was informed that member of her church had been arrested. It also concerned inconsistencies in her evidence about when she left Fuqing for Guangzhou, and how long she had spent in Guangzhou before coming to Australia. The applicant contended that these were peripheral or minor inconsistencies, which did not undermine her core claims for protection, and were unreasonably elevated by the Tribunal without recognising the stress or trauma that may have affected the applicant's ability to recall detail.
3. As noted by the Minister, it is well established that credibility findings must be rationally made, and that minor inconsistencies and trivial errors do not constitute a valid ground for an adverse credibility finding to be made: EVI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 518 at [36].
4. The Tribunal in this case, however, did not consider the inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence to be peripheral or minor. Relevantly, the Tribunal reasoned at [28]:

The events that are claimed by the applicant to have taken place in China in May and June 2015 are crucial to her claims. What happened during this period constitute the reasons why the applicant claims that she fled China. Given the significance of the events for the applicant and its consequences, in terms of the applicant fearing that she would be arrested for involvement in the Local Church, the Tribunal would expect the applicant to have a reasonable recollection of the events in question and to provide details with reasonable consistency. The events would have been impactful.

[Emphasis added]

1. In her reply submissions, the applicant contended that the significance of the inconsistencies was overstated and only concerned the peripheral chronology, not whether the persecution actually occurred or whether she genuinely feared harm. It was also contended that the Tribunal failed to consider the stress or trauma which could have affected her ability to recall details.
2. The assessment of evidence, subject to the bounds of rationality and reasonableness, is a matter for the Tribunal: Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582 at [25]-[27].
3. In the present case, it was not illogical or irrational for the Tribunal to find that the events the applicant claimed to have occurred in May and June 2015 were 'crucial' to her claims for protection. Nor was it unreasonable for the Tribunal to expect that the applicant would have a reasonable recollection of those events.
4. The Tribunal did not fail to consider the applicant's explanations for the inconsistencies in her evidence, including her claims of stress and health issues. As noted above, the Tribunal considered those explanations but was not satisfied by them.
5. It cannot be said that the decision made by the Tribunal, or the process of reasoning in which it engaged, was not open on the evidence before it: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) at [133]-[135].
6. No legal unreasonableness has been demonstrated in the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence before it or in its conclusion that the applicant's claims were not credible.
7. Ground one of the written submissions does not establish jurisdictional error.

GROUND 2 - Failure to Genuinely Engage with Explanatory Evidence

The Tribunal failed to genuinely consider my explanations that inconsistencies arose from stress, health issues, and the circumstances of a remote interpreted hearing.

Particulars:

• While the Tribunal acknowledged these explanations, it dismissed them without evidentiary basis or expert assessment.

• The Tribunal substituted its own speculative assessment of my medical and psychological capacity.

• Such treatment amounted to mere formal acknowledgment rather than genuine evaluative consideration.

This constituted constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction and legal unreasonableness.

1. By ground two of the submissions, the applicant contends the Tribunal failed to properly consider her explanation that the inconsistencies in her evidence arose from stress, health issues, and the circumstances of a remote interpreted hearing.
2. In considering whether the Tribunal engaged, at the requisite level, with the applicant's explanations, the Tribunal's reasons must be considered as a 'whole' and those reasons 'must be construed in a practical and common-sense manner and not with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error': Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160 at [76].
3. In the present case, there was no failure by the Tribunal to properly engage with the applicant's explanations. At [35] and [45] of its reasons, the Tribunal noted the applicant's claim to have recalled incorrect information at the interview with the Department because she was unwell and stressed. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant's illness or stress could explain the inconsistencies in her evidence.
4. The Minister submitted that it was open for the Tribunal not to accept that unwellness at the interview with the Department to be a sufficient explanation for the significant inconsistencies including: her physical location when she received the phone call informing her of the arrest of her fellow church members (at [35] and [36]); and when she left Fuqing, including the time she spent in Guangzhou: at [45]-[46]. I accept that no legal unreasonableness has been demonstrated in the Tribunal's rejection of the applicant's explanations for the inconsistencies in her evidence.
5. The Minister referred to the Tribunal's reliance upon further inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence, including the conflicting accounts as to the location of the Local Church gatherings (at [49]-[55]); and inconsistent evidence about who attended the gatherings held at her parents' house: at [57]-[60]. It was noted that the applicant only changed her evidence after the Tribunal sought her comment in response to the inconsistencies.
6. The Minister further submitted that there were clear inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence, including the following examples:
   • whether she always (only) attended Local Church gatherings in Fuqing city or attended Local Church gatherings outside Fuqing City; and
   • whether the gatherings held in her parents' house were regular church gatherings or were limited to church leaders for administrative purposes.
7. I accept, as submitted by the Minister, that it is unclear how these inconsistencies were the result of interpreter error or the hearing being held remotely.
8. It was for the applicant to demonstrate, by putting on evidence, that the standard of interpretation was such that she was denied a fair opportunity to give evidence and present arguments in support of her case: SZOYU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 936 at [31]. The applicant has not demonstrated any such denial.
9. In her reply submissions, the applicant claimed that the Tribunal's mere acknowledgement was not a genuine consideration, and that the Tribunal failed to engage with the psychological impact of fear-based memories; the disconnections during the hearing; and the impact of the change of interpreter.
10. The Tribunal did not just note the applicant's explanations, but it engaged with them and explained why, having regard to the substantive inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence, it rejected them. For reasons already discussed, the applicant has not demonstrated in what way the disconnections or a change of interpreter resulted in her being denied a fair hearing. Nor has the applicant put on any evidence which suggests that her psychological state was so impaired that she was unable to effectively participate in the hearing before the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 78 ALJR 992 at [19].
11. None of the matters raised by ground two of the submissions or the reply submissions establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

GROUND 3 - Jurisdictional Error: Illogical and Irrational Reasoning

The Tribunal's reasoning involved illogical inferences not open on the evidence. Particulars:

• The Tribunal inferred that genuine fear would necessarily entail precise recall of dates and locations.

• The Tribunal assumed a single rational behavioural model and used it to reject my account.

• These assumptions were not grounded in evidence and ignored cultural, linguistic, and psychological variables.

The decision was infected by illogicality of the kind described in SZMDS and WZARH.

1. By ground three of the written submissions, the applicant contends that the Tribunal's reasoning, which unfairly required her to recall precise dates and locations, was illogical. The applicant also alleges an assumption by the Tribunal of a 'single rational behavioural model', which lacked evidence and ignored variables.
2. The Minister relied upon their submissions in response to ground one of the written submissions, contending that it was plainly open for the Tribunal to find that the applicant's inconsistencies were significant, given the claimed events directly related to her decision to flee to Guangzhou and her eventual departure to Australia to seek protection.
3. In responding to the allegation that the Tribunal adopted a 'single rational behavioural model', the Minister noted that this appears to be a reference to an assumption in economic and social theory that individuals will act rationally, and that it was unclear what the applicant is alleging by this reference.
4. In her reply submissions, the applicant contended that the Tribunal made an assumption that a genuine refugee will recall precise details years after the events, and that the Tribunal's finding that the inconsistencies in her evidence were 'strong, bordering on overwhelming' was disproportionate to the nature of the discrepancies identified.
5. When considering grounds of illogicality or irrationality, the role of the Court is strictly supervisory. As observed by Crennan and Bell JJ in SZMDS at [133]:

...the correct approach is to ask whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did make on the material before it.

Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.

1. To the extent that this ground also alleges error of the type that can be characterised as the making of an 'unwarranted assumption' by the Tribunal, the case law suggests that the making of 'unwarranted assumptions as part of a credit finding' may be reviewed by a Court on rationality grounds: DAO16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175; cited in BOH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship & Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 573 wherein his Honour Perram J relevantly explained at [8]:

...a party relying upon an unwarranted assumption to establish jurisdictional error will need to establish that the assumption is not one which a reasonable decision maker could make. Another way of asking this question is to ask whether the decision has an evident and intelligible basis: Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 at [10] per Kiefel CJ, [82] per Nettle and Gordon JJ, citing Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 at [76] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ In this case, therefore, this means that the question for decision is whether the Tribunal's impugned credit findings were ones which could reasonably be arrived at or whether they lacked an evident and intelligible justification.

1. As discussed above, the applicant has not put forward any evidence which suggests that her psychological state was such that it adversely affected her ability to recall events, including dates and locations. Nor has the applicant explained what cultural or linguistic variables were ignored by the Tribunal which led to it making an assumption that no reasonable person could have made.
2. I am satisfied that it was open for the Tribunal to consider the inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence to be significant, given they related to her core claims for why she departed China and sought protection in Australia. The Tribunal's reasons disclose that the applicant was given an opportunity to respond to its concerns in relation to the inconsistencies in her evidence, that the Tribunal had regard to those explanations and that it ultimately rejected them. The Tribunal's decision sets out the reasons for why it rejected the applicant's claims, and it cannot be said that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings lacked an evident and intelligible justification.
3. Ground three of the written submissions does not establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

GROUND 4-Denial of Procedural Fairness in Assessment of Hearing Conduct

The Tribunal denied my procedural fairness by treating pauses, hesitations, and technical interruptions during a remote interpreted hearing as indicators of fabrication.

Particulars:

• The hearing was conducted remotely with interpretation and subject to technical interruptions.

• The Tribunal failed to adequately account for these factors in assessing responsiveness.

• The inference drawn created an apprehension of bias and procedural unfairness.

I was denied a fair hearing according to law.

1. By ground four of the submissions, the applicant alleges denial of procedural fairness. The applicant takes issue with the Tribunal's reliance on the pauses and hesitation in her responses to conclude that she had fabricated evidence, in circumstances where the hearing was conducted remotely, via an interpreter and affected by technical interruptions. The applicant contended that this further demonstrated the Tribunal's bias and procedural unfairness.
2. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were based predominantly on the significant inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence, and not simply the applicant's demeanour: MZYUM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 51 at [73]. As to the applicant's further allegations of bias and denial of procedural fairness, the Minister relied on their earlier submission that these grounds lacked merit.
3. For the reasons already given in relation to grounds one and two of the originating application, I am not satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated any procedural unfairness or bias on the part of the Tribunal. The Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were based primarily on significant inconsistencies in evidence relating to core aspects of the applicant's claims for protection, rather than on the manner in which she gave her evidence. The Tribunal was plainly aware of the deficiencies in the hearing, including the technical interruptions which resulted in part of the hearing having to be conducted by telephone only. Nevertheless, it concluded that a further face‑to‑face hearing would not have altered those findings. It was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to reason as it did. Nor do its reasons disclose any bias on its part.
4. There is also no basis to support a finding of actual or apprehended bias, as the Tribunal considered the applicant's requests and explanations with an open mind and gave intelligible reasons for its conclusions.
5. Ground four of the written submissions does not establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

GROUND 5- Circular Reasoning and Unsupported 'Opportunism' Finding

The Tribunal's finding that I acted opportunistically was the product of circular reasoning.

Particulars:

• The Tribunal first rejected my account of religious activity in China.

• It then inferred that religious practice in Australia was opportunistic.

• That inference was subsequently used to deny future risk upon return.

• No independent evidentiary foundation supported this chain of reasoning.

Circular reasoning constitutes jurisdictional error.

1. By ground five of the written submissions, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal engaged in circular reasoning when it: rejected her claims of religious activity in China; inferred that her religious practice in Australia was opportunistic; and relied on that inference to reject any future risk of harm upon return to China.
2. The Minister contended that the Tribunal's findings were not circular and that it was open for the Tribunal to:

(a) reject the applicant's claims relating to her religious activities in China, due to the numerous inconsistencies in her evidence; and

(b) find given the numerous concerns it had with the applicant's credibility, that she may have engaged in the Local Church in Australia for opportunistic reasons only, and would not be involved in the Local Church on return to China: at [72].

1. As submitted by the Minister, the Tribunal accepted at [74], the applicant had been involved with a Local Church in Australia. It took into account her reasons for her involvement, including that she 'attends gatherings because the Lord saved her', that 'God's salvation has prevented her from suicide', and that the Local Church differed from mainstream Christianity: at [73] and [75].
2. The Tribunal at [76], however, was not satisfied that the applicant's involvement with the Local Church in Australia was for genuine religious motives. It further reasoned that, even if she had developed genuine religious beliefs and wished to practice Christianity in China, she would not do so in a manner that would be disapproved of by the Chinese authorities, as she had no objection to attending a registered church in China: at [77]-[78].
3. I accept the Minister's submission that it was open for the Tribunal, given its concerns as to the applicant's credibility, not to accept that the applicant's involvement with the Local Church in Australia was genuine. It was also open for the Tribunal to go on and consider, in the alternative, that even if the applicant had developed a genuine religious belief, that she would not do so in a way that was 'significantly disapproved by the Chinese authorities', and as such, would not face a real chance of serious or significant harm in China by reason of any Christian activities she may participate in: at [79].
4. I accept that it was open for the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did. The Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant would not face a real chance of serious or significant harm in China, which was based in part upon its earlier adverse findings in respect of past events the applicant claimed to have occurred in China, and her conduct in Australia, which it considered opportunistic, did not involve circular reasoning. In other words, the Tribunal's conclusion was clearly supported by its earlier (independent) finding in respect of the applicant's claims of past events in China and, in turn, its view of her conduct in Australia. This reasoning does not disclose any error of the type alleged by the applicant.
5. Ground five of the written submissions does not establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

GROUND 6 - Misapplication of Internal Relocation / Alternative Practice Principle

The Tribunal erred in law by concluding that attendance at a registered church in China constituted a viable alternative without proper analysis.

Particulars:

• The Tribunal failed to assess whether attendance at a registered church would require me to suppress or abandon core religious beliefs.

• The Tribunal did not engage with my evidence regarding doctrinal and practical incompatibility.

• The conclusion was therefore legally flawed.

The Tribunal misapplied protection principles and committed jurisdictional error.

1. By ground six of the written submissions, the applicant alleges error by the Tribunal in concluding that the applicant would be able to practice her religion by attending a registered church in China, as doing so would require her to suppress or abandon her core religious beliefs.
2. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had been involved with the Local Church in China or that her involvement with the Local Church in Australia was for genuine religious motives. On that basis, as submitted by the Minister, the Tribunal found that the applicant would not seek to be involved with the Local Church in China upon her return. Alternatively, as found by the Tribunal, even if the applicant had developed genuine Christian beliefs, she could practice her religion in a way that did not attract the adverse attention of authorities. It was submitted that the Tribunal's findings did not amount to the Tribunal impermissibly requiring the applicant to modify her behaviour, given it had found the applicant's involvement with the Local Church in Australia was not for genuine religious motives.
3. In her reply submissions, the applicant contended that the Tribunal assumed that she did not have a genuine belief in the Local Church and that it failed to analyse the doctrinal differences between the Local Church and the registered (state controlled) churches in China. It was contended that the Tribunal, notwithstanding its doubts as to her past activities, was still required to assess whether she presently held the genuine belief and whether manifestation of that belief would expose her to harm.
4. The Tribunal did not make a finding that the applicant could alter or suppress her religious beliefs to avoid persecution in China. This misunderstands the Tribunal's reasons.
5. The Tribunal was not satisfied, for the reasons it gave, that the applicant demonstrated that she had joined the Local Church in Australia for genuine religious motives and, on this basis, did not accept that the applicant would, upon return to China, join the Local Church or any other religion or sect that was 'disapproved of or banned by Chinese authorities': at [77]. These findings, and the reasons upon which they were based, provided a sufficient basis to support the Tribunal's conclusion that it could not be satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of serious or significant harm upon return to China.
6. The Tribunal's alternative finding did not, as suggested by the applicant, require her to suppress her religious belief. In considering the applicant's evidence at the hearing, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a fundamental objection to belonging to a registered church in China: at [78]. It was in the context of this finding that the Tribunal considered that, even if the applicant had developed genuine Christian beliefs, that she could practice her faith by attending a registered church in China. On this basis, it was open for the Tribunal to conclude that it could not be satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of serious or significant harm upon return to China.

1. As none of the grounds raised establish jurisdictional error, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.

1. At the hearing, the Minister sought an order that the applicant pay their costs fixed in the amount of $5,900.00. When invited to make submissions with respect to costs, the applicant did not challenge the Minister's application or the amount sought, only stating that she was unable to pay. Financial hardship is generally not a reason for not making an order as to costs.
2. I am satisfied that costs should follow the event. Further, having regard to the work undertaken and the scale costs for a standard migration matter, I will order that the applicant pay the amount sought by the Minister.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and nine (109) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Skaros.