DXO22 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 385

1. To obtain assistance in this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is therefore helpful to outline the Tribunal's decision in some detail.
2. The Tribunal began by identifying the visa decision under review (at [1]). The Tribunal then correctly set out the criteria for a protection visa (at [3], and later at [14]-[19]).
3. The Tribunal outlined the applicant's protection claims as set out in her visa application as follows (at [5]):
   • The applicant claims she left Malaysia because of political and economic issues.
   • The applicant claims the authorities will not help "because of the economic and political issues over there".
   • The applicant claims if she returns to Malaysia she will be facing unemployment and financial hardship.
   • The applicant claims she cannot relocate "because of the political and economic issues and [her] financial problem".
4. The Tribunal observed that the applicant's claims appeared to be economic and relating to a claim that she would be unemployed and thus face economic hardship if she returned to Malaysia. In this respect, the Tribunal had regard to country information which considered the Malaysian economic situation. The Tribunal also observed that the economic climate in Malaysia was a matter that affected the population generally and that the applicant had not advanced any submission or evidence which would distinguish her from the general population in that respect (at [20]-[22]).
5. The Tribunal noted that the applicant's vague reference to "political issues" did not appear to be a claim that she would be in any unusual disadvantaged economic situation on the grounds of her political opinion. Even if such a claim were advanced, the country information indicated that any economic harm in Malaysia would not rise to the level of serious harm (at [24]).
6. The Tribunal concluded that there was not a real chance the applicant would experience harm for any of the reasons claimed, or that there was a real risk she would face significant harm if she were returned to Malaysia (at [28]-[29]).
7. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa (at [30]).

1. The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 6 December 2022 is in the following terms:
   1. I was discriminated in my country due to serious economic and political reasons, which I was treated unfairly, causing me unable to apply for jobs. This violated my human rights and forced me to flee to my country to seek protection because the authorities could not protect me.
   2. The AAT's lack of fairness and professionalism had resulted in jurisdictional errors, and the materials and evidence were poorly determined. I believe I deserve a chance to describe my circumstances and fight for my rights.
2. The applicant appeared before the Court on 4 March 2026 without legal representation but with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. The Court confirmed with the applicant that she had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
3. The materials before the Court include the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit filed by the applicant on 6 December 2022 (the affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 4 March 2026), a Court Book numbering 107 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 9 February 2026.
4. The applicant was not represented at the hearing and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [9] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [25] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court: see, by way of recent example, ERM18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 228 at [18]. Accordingly, at the hearing of this matter, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what she believed to be wrong with the Tribunal\'s decision and/or procedure.
5. The Court also took some time to explain that it could not undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 (Wu Shan Liang) at 272) and could only consider whether or not the Tribunal decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that in migration decisions such as the decision being challenged, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error include:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355);

(e) where the decision-maker fails to consider the entirety of an applicant's claims (or integers of the claims) made (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [111]);

(f) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and

(g) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648 (SZMDS); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445).

1. However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and she should attempt to tell the Court why she said the Tribunal had fallen into error.
2. When invited to address the Court as to what the Tribunal did wrong, the applicant stated that she had nothing to say. Following the submissions of the Minister, the applicant was again invited to make any submissions in response but indicated that she did not wish to do so.

1. As outlined above, the application for judicial review contains two grounds. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret the applicant's grounds as broadly as possible (per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392).

1. In respect of the first ground, the Court agrees with the Minister's submission that this does no more than repeat the applicant's claims to fear harm as set out in her application for a protection visa.
2. Taking as broad a view as permissible in judicial review, the Court considers that the applicant may be contending through this ground that the Tribunal did not have regard to this claim or that it failed to engage with it on an intellectual level. However, such a contention could not succeed for the following reasons:
   • Firstly, the Tribunal accurately summarised the claims made by the applicant at [5] of its reasons. It cannot be said that it was unaware of her claims or that any of her claims, or integers of those claims, were overlooked.
   • Secondly, in considering the applicant's claims with respect to unemployment and financial hardship, the Tribunal considered relevant and current country information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It is clear that the Tribunal properly engaged with that country information, including whether the economic climate might affect the applicant in a manner which would differentiate her from the general Malaysian population.
   • Thirdly, the Tribunal engaged with the applicant's vague reference to "political issues", noting the absence of any particularity to that claim and that the country information did not support any chance of serious harm.
3. In summary, the Tribunal did engage properly with the bare claims asserted by the applicant. It did so by reference to those claims and to relevant country information.
4. Ground one is not made out.

1. Once again, taking as broad an interpretation as permissible, ground two asserts procedural unfairness on the part of the Tribunal. In that respect, the applicant appears to complain that she was not afforded a proper hearing opportunity.
2. However, as submitted by the Minister, the applicant expressly provided consent to the Tribunal to make a decision without holding a hearing. In that consent form, the applicant further indicated that she did not wish to provide any additional evidence or change or update her claims in any way. Furthermore, the applicant did not respond to a subsequent invitation to provide the Tribunal with any additional material.
3. As a consequence, the Tribunal only had bare assertions of claims which, prima facie, did not indicate any basis for a finding that the applicant would be at risk of harm. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considered relevant country information which formed the platform for its rejection of the applicant's claims.
4. Ground two is also dismissed.
5. Ms Woollett, whose client is subject to a direction to behave as a model litigant, also advised that she had otherwise reviewed the decision and was unable to identify jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. There was nothing further she wished to draw to the Court's attention.
6. Similarly, the Court has considered the Tribunal decision as a whole and can find no easily discernible jurisdictional error. The Tribunal's decision reveals it understood the relevant task before it. It considered the limited claims made by the applicant along with the relevant country information. All of the matters considered by the Tribunal were clearly relevant and there is no evidence that it failed to consider relevant material. The Tribunal's findings in this matter were based on rational reasons that were arrived at on consideration of matters that were logically probative (CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; (2016) 253 FCR 496; Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1126; (1998) 86 FCR 547; and DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175). It cannot be said that no other rational or logical decision maker could have drawn the same conclusion or arrived at the same decision (SZMDS).
7. Ultimately, this was simply a matter where the Tribunal considered the limited claims advanced by the applicant and, for cogent and rational reasons, did not believe she met the criteria for a protection visa. The applicant's disagreement with the Tribunal's reasons is consequently no more than an invitation to this Court to engage in impermissible merits review contrary to the longstanding admonition against such an exercise in cases such as Wu Shan Liang.
8. The Court is satisfied that, even adopting the broad approach referred to in [26] of these reasons, no jurisdictional error is established.

1. The application for judicial review made by the applicant has failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty (40) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.