DWN20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 2044

1. The name of the first respondent be amended to "Minister for Immigration and Citizenship".
2. The application is dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the first respondent's costs fixed in the amount of $4,553.02.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04(h) of the Rules.

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) which refused to grant him a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa (Protection visa). However, the applicant filed his application for judicial review in this Court 124 days outside the 35-day prescribed time limit under s 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
2. The applicant applies for an order extending time under s 477(2). The application for judicial review filed in this Court is incompetent unless I find it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time under s 477(2) of the Act.
3. For the reasons that follow I dismiss the application for an order extending time under s 477(2) and dismiss the application generally.

1. On 3 May 2015, the applicant, a citizen of Malaysia, first arrived in Australia on an Electronic Travel Authority visa.
2. On 5 December 2016, the applicant lodged an application for a Protection visa. The applicant claimed to fear harm in Malaysia as a bisexual man and from his parents forcing him into an unwanted marriage.
3. On 4 April 2017, the delegate refused to grant the applicant a Protection visa and on 20 April 2017, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision.
4. On 5 March 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision under review not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

1. The Tribunal summarised the applicant's claims as stated in his protections visa application.
2. The Tribunal summarised the applicant's reasons for leaving Malaysia. The applicant stated that in 2014, he was caught with another male in a car by the Islamic Religious Department. Due to an affiliation with his father, the Islamic Religious Department let the applicant off with a warning that he will be put in prison if they were to ever catch him in a similar situation again (the 2014 incident). The Tribunal noted that the applicant did not recall the exact date of the 2014 incident nor the man he was with, but that it occurred at Port Dickinson Beach and that he had met the man on "Grindr".
3. The Tribunal noted that the applicant arrived in Australia on 3 May 2015, and between the 2014 incident and his arrival in Australia in May 2015, the applicant claimed he did not have any sexual relations with other men.
4. The Tribunal summarised the applicant's sexual relationships in Australia, including his presence on "Grindr" and "blue tick" but found the applicant did not have any further evidence that he had intimate relationships with men in Australia.
5. The found that it had concerns as to whether the applicant gave credible evidence. The Tribunal found that the applicant was inconsistent with his evidence regarding his same sex relationships in both Malaysia and Australia.
6. Tribunal did not accept the applicant's claims that he was bisexual, gay, in a same-sex relationship or attracted to people of the same sex. The Tribunal also did not accept the 2014 incident, his claims of sexual behaviour as a child and that he was put under any pressure of getting married.
7. The Tribunal assessed whether the applicant met the refugee criterion assessment and found that it was not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
8. The Tribunal affirmed the decision to not grant the applicant a protection visa.

1. The applicant seeks an order for an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Act so that he can bring his application for judicial review in this Court. Under the heading 'Other Interlocutory, interim or procedural orders sought by applicant' in the application, the applicant provided the following grounds in respect of the extension of time, as follows:
   1. I was not aware of the limit for the judicial review in Court and I required extension of time to seek justice where I believe there was a lack of procedural fairness.
   2. The Applicant met the key elements of the Subclass 866 visa, but the Tribunal member did not consider and therefore committed factual and legal error.
2. I have read these paragraphs as being the grounds relied upon by the applicant to seek an order for an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Act. The applicant has not filed an affidavit setting out any evidence in support his grounds for seeking an extension of time. The only affidavit he did file was in support of his application for judicial review, which makes no mention of any reasons why he delayed filing the application or why an extension of time should be granted (see exhibit A1).
3. In the application for judicial review the applicant sets out five proposed grounds, under the heading 'Grounds of application'. The grounds are (as written):
   1. The Tribunal misconstrued the risk and fear of significant harm as set out in section 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958.
   2. The Tribunal construed erroneously (and narrowly) the existence of risk to life and fear of significant harm to the applicant upon his returns to Malaysia for his bisexual identity.
   3. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the said decision because its "reasonable satisfaction" was not arrived [at] in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act
   4. The Tribunal has failed to investigate applicant's claim, especially the grounds of LGBT in Malaysia.
   5. The second respondent failed to comply with the mandatory requirement under section 424A(read with section 424AA) of the Migration Act to give the applicant clear particulars of information it considered would be part of the reason for affirming the decision under review, to ensure the applicant understood why that information was relevant to the review and the consequence of its being relied upon, and to invite the applicant to comment upon or respond to that information.

The Tribunal did not issue any written invitation under section 424A of the Act and made no attempt to, and did not, comply with the requirements set out in section 424AA of the Act.

1. At the hearing of this matter before me on 18 November 2025, the applicant was not represented, however, he did have the assistance of a Thai interpreter. Ms F. McNeil of counsel instructed by Mills Oakley appeared for the first respondent.
2. At the hearing I explained that the application before me was for an extension of time, and if I granted the application, I would then set the matter down for a final hearing. I also explained that if I refused the application, then I would dismiss the matter generally.
3. I explained to the applicant that the factors I have to consider in order to make my decision whether to grant an extension of time, or not, included the following factors: (i) the length and reasons for the delay, (ii) any prejudice caused by the delay, and (iii) whether the proposed grounds of review had sufficient merit: see Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579 (Katoa) which is the leading High Court authority on what factors are to be considered in extension of time applications under the Act.
4. After explaining this to the applicant, Ms McNeil drew the Court's attention to a separate proceeding in this Court (MLG1934/2021) where the applicant is seeking judicial review of the same Tribunal decision. I note both matters use the same pseudonym for the applicant, DWN20. The applicant could not tell me why he had filed two applications. The application in proceedings MLG1934/2021 was filed on 3 August 2021. It contains 7 grounds of review, none of which relate to the decision of the Tribunal. They appear to have been copied from another, unrelated, matter because the grounds refer to a "dismissal decision" made by the Tribunal. There was no "dismissal decision" made by the Tribunal in relation to this applicant on 5 (or 6) March 2020.
5. Ms McNeil made an application for proceedings MLG1934/2021 to be consolidated and heard together with these proceedings, proceedings MLG3105/2020. I considered this was appropriate, given the applicant is unrepresented, to consolidate both proceedings and to have them both heard together. Multiple proceedings for the same claim are generally considered an abuse of process. After explaining this to the applicant, I granted the application and made orders under r 22.03 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules) consolidating both proceedings MLG1934/2021 and proceedings MLG3105/2020, and ordering that both matters be heard before me on 18 November 2025.

1. After dealing with the matter of consolidating both proceedings, I asked the applicant to outline his submissions to the Court on the factors relating to whether an extension of time should be granted. I specifically asked him to explain to the Court his grounds or reasons why he thought an extension of time should be granted. He said that the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 lockdowns in 2020 meant he had difficulty filing his application for review in this Court on time because, he said, the "Court was closed". He said that that when he contacted the Court about filing his application for review of the Tribunal decision the Court staff told him over the phone to "go online".
2. He also said at the time of receiving the Tribunal decision in 2020, he was suffering from depression, and dyslexia and was stressed and did not have anyone to advise him when and how he should file his application in this Court. He also said he lacked money to obtain advice on what he should do.
3. I then took the applicant to the four grounds of his substantive application and asked him if he had read them. He said he had. I asked him if he wanted to make submissions about the 4 grounds and explain why he considered the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error (which I defined) or explain why the Tribunal got it wrong. He said the main error, as far as he was concerned, was the Tribunal asking him about the death his sister. He submitted that the questions about his sister was inappropriate, and it made him lose focus on what evidence he had to give to the Tribunal in support of his claims. He said because of this he had evidence (from Facebook pages he had with him) that he wanted to give to the Tribunal but could not as a result of the Tribunal making him lose his focus.

1. Ms McNeil firstly addressed the matters raised orally by the applicant. She submitted on the issue of delay that the reasons given by the applicant about lack of access to the Court during the COVID-19 lockdowns in Melbourne did not explain the entirety of the 124 day delay from 6 March 2020 to 10 August 2020, when the applicant's lawyer filed the application for review. Ms McNeil drew my attention to a decision of Judge Johns in Millawithanachchi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1310 at [62] where his Honour discussed the COVID-19 lockdowns in Melbourne and the likely difficulties experienced in the lodgement process of the application.
2. Next, Ms McNeil submitted there was no medical evidence before the Court supporting the applicant's claim he suffered from depression and from dyslexia in 2020 at the time he received the Tribunal's decision. Ms McNeil also submitted there was no mention of any medical condition suffered by the applicant at the time of the Tribunal hearing in the Tribunal decision, and there was no mention of any medical condition suffered by the applicant referred to in any of the grounds in support of his extension of time application in this Court.
3. Ms McNeil submitted that impecuniosity (or financial constraints) "alone" is not an acceptable explanation for delay in filing his application for review. Ms McNeil referred me to the Federal Court decision of SZMNO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 797 (SZMNO) in support of this submission (being a case regarding the same issue in the context of a late filing of a Notice of Appeal in the Federal Court of Australia): see also BRGAO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 126, per Spender J.
4. Ms McNeil submitted the explanation given for the delay was inadequate.
5. As to the issue of prejudice, Ms McNeil referred and relied upon her written submissions.
6. As to the proposed substantive grounds contained in the application for judicial review, Ms McNeil referred and relied on her written submissions, made very brief oral submissions about grounds 1, 2, 3 and 5, and made brief oral submissions about ground 4.
7. As to ground 4, Ms McNeil said that the first respondent had accepted that a document (a letter dated 19 April 2017) was attached to the applicant's application for review filed in the Tribunal, which was not referred to by the Tribunal in its decision. This letter was brought to the Court's attention on the basis that it possibly raised an arguable ground of review, namely, that the Tribunal, by not specifically referring to the letter or its contents, failed to consider a claim. The error being identified as a possible error by the first respondent was an error of the type referred by the Federal Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 (NABE (No 2)). In the letter the applicant said, "I am truly have a bad financial as well". A reference to the applicant's poor financial situation was not previously raised by the applicant until the 19 April 2017 letter was sent to the Tribunal.
8. Ms McNeil submitted that the 19 April 2017 letter did not raise a new Convention based claim, rather it was more in the nature of background information, unrelated to the protection claims that had been made by the applicant. She also submitted that, in any event, such a matter was not material to the decision of the Tribunal in the sense explained by the High Court in LPDT v Minster for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 (it could not have made a difference to the outcome if it was considered). Ms McNeil submitted that the proposed ground 4 did not have sufficient merit, in light of the delay, to warrant an extension of time being granted.

1. The Court has a discretion to make an interlocutory order under s 477(2) extending the 35-day period prescribed by s 477(1) to commence an application in relation to the decision of the Tribunal.
2. Section 477(2) provides:

(2) The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) may, by order, extend that 35-day period as the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) considers appropriate if:

(a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and

(b) the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.

1. The decision to grant an extension of time is a discretionary one: see DZAAD v Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 204 at [28]. The discretion to extend time is given for the purpose of enabling the Court to do justice between the parties: Hughes v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1978] VicRp 27; [1978] VR 257 at 262; Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 at 480.
2. The relevant principles regarding applications for an extension of time under s 477(2) have been considered by the Full Federal Court in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49, and by the High Court in Katoa.
3. In Katoa, the plurality stated, in respect of a cognate provision to s 477(2), (s 477A(2)), that "the paragraph allows the Court to look at a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties, and the merits of the underlying application" and "the level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low: the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice".
4. I will apply the considerations and legal test outlined in Katoa, and give brief reasons why I am not satisfied that it is necessary interests of the administration the justice to make an order extending time under s 477(2) of the Act.

1. The first consideration is the length of the delay and any explanation given by the applicant for the delay. The first respondent describes the delay of 124 days as "very significant". I agree.
2. In relation to the reasons for the delay, the applicant has not filed any affidavit evidence to explain the delay and why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time. I address the five reasons given by the applicant for the delay, and why I reject them.
3. First reason: lack of legal advice. Even though there was no evidence given about this, I do not accept this as an adequate explanation for the delay. A lack of knowledge about the judicial review process, as claimed by the applicant, does not constitute an acceptable explanation for the applicant's significant delay (CZQL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1610 at [137]).
4. Second reason: lack of knowledge about the 35-day time limit. I do not accept this as an adequate explanation for the delay, as the first respondent submitted, the applicant was informed of his ability to seek judicial review of the Tribunal's decision within 35 days, as noted in the attachment 'MR25 Information about decisions - MR Division', which accompanied the Tribunal's Notification of Decision on 6 March 2020.
5. Third reason: delay in filing because of COVID-19 lockdowns in Melbourne in 2020. Even though there was no evidence given about this, I do not accept this as an adequate explanation for the delay. The first lockdown in Melbourne in 2020 was between 31 March 2020 and 12 May 2020. The second lockdown was between 9 July 2020 and 27 October 2020. Even assuming there was some difficulties during these periods, the lockdowns do not explain why the applicant could not file his application electronically during the 35-day period after 5 March 2020. While there may have been some difficulty accessing the physical Registry of this Court in Melbourne during the lockdown periods, it was still possible to file documents electronically with the Court throughout both lockdown periods. I note in this regard that the applicant filed his application electronically on 10 August 2020 (which was during the second lockdown period).
6. Fourth reason: the applicant was suffering from depression and dyslexia and this hindered his ability to file an application for review in this Court. There was no medical evidence provided to this Court by the applicant to support this ground. Nor was there any mention of any medical condition that may have hindered the applicant in in any of the grounds in support of his extension of time application in this Court. There is no basis for accepting this reason for the delay. I do not accept this as an adequate explanation for the delay.
7. Fifth reason: the applicant's impecuniosity. I do not accept this as an adequate, partial or a complete explanation for the delay. Impecuniosity is generally not an acceptable explanation for failing to lodge a judicial review application within the requisite time period: see DDI22 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1732 at [35] relying on Barker J in SZMNO at [25]-[26]. Further, and in any event, there was no evidence given by the applicant as to what his financial constraints were during the relevant period from March to August 2020.
8. In my view, this consideration weighs against the granting of an extension of time.

1. The next consideration is whether the first respondent suffers any prejudice. The first respondent submits that he would suffer some prejudice if an extension of time is granted, given the public interest in the adherence to time limits and the final disposition of matters in an orderly and expeditious fashion. In my view, this consideration is neutral.

1. The final consideration is the merits of the substantive application itself.
2. The plurality in Katoa stated at [17]-[19] that "in determining what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the purposes of s 477(2), it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a "reasonably impressionistic level", but "there will be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits". The plurality in Katoa ultimately held that the provision "entrusts to the [Court] the function of identifying and formulating the interests of the administration of justice and how they should be weighed and assessed, including by reference to the merits of the proposed application".
3. Further, in considering the merits of the proposed grounds of the application for an extension of time, the Court must consider, at an impressionistic level, whether the proposed ground are "arguable", "reasonably arguable", or "sufficiently arguable", to warrant the grant of an extension of time: see Mortimer J (as her Honour then was) in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 at [62]- [63].
4. Assessing the merits of the application in the present case at an impressionistic level, I consider that the five grounds of review relied upon in this matter is neither arguable nor reasonably arguable nor sufficiently arguable. My reasons are as follows.

1. Ground one alleges the Tribunal misconstrued the risk and fear of significant harm as set out in s 36(2A) of the Act. This proposed ground of review is totally unmeritorious. It is plain from paragraph [101] of the Tribunal decision the Tribunal correctly understood the test in s 36(2A) of the Act, when it considered the complementary protection claim of the applicant.
2. Ground 1 is without any merit.

1. Ground two asserts the Tribunal "construed erroneously (and narrowly) the existence of risk to life and fear of significant harm to the applicant" in Malaysia. This ground is similarly unmeritorious. This argument merely seeks to challenge the factual conclusions that the Tribunal came to in [99]-[101] about whether the applicant's satisfied the complementary protection criterion under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Merits review of the Tribunal's factual findings is not available in application for judicial review under s 476 of the Act: see Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic).
2. Ground 2 is without any merit.

1. In ground three the applicant asserts that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make its decision because its "reasonable satisfaction" was not arrived at in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This ground is unparticularised.
2. It is clear from the decision that the Tribunal applied the correct test for considering and determining whether it was satisfied the applicant met the criterion of both s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal correctly set out the legal criterion for each relevant provision in paragraphs [3]-[8], and then, after extensively considering the evidence and making its factual findings, set out its conclusions on the legal criterion under the Act in paragraphs [94]-[101]. This proposed ground of review is not reasonably arguable.

1. Ground four, as it is expressed, does not raise an arguable claim of jurisdictional error. As the first respondent correctly submitted, the assertion the Tribunal "has failed to investigate the applicant's claims, especially the ground of persecution in Malaysia" misunderstands the proper role of the Tribunal. As the High Court has made clear, the Tribunal is not obliged to conduct its own investigations which might improve an applicant's case, except in very limited circumstances: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCATrans 165; (2009) 259 ALR 429 at [1]; Minister for Immigration v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594 at [1], [20], [86]. In my view, no such very limited circumstances arise in the present case.
2. In submissions, the first respondent raised, by reference to this ground, a possible jurisdictional error by reason of the Tribunal failing to consider a claim contained in a letter dated 19 April 2017, or an integer of a claim, which was not referred to by the Tribunal in its decision. For the following reasons I do not consider this possible ground is reasonably arguable.
3. The Tribunal is not required to deal with a case not stated by an applicant or not arising squarely from the material put before it: see NABE (No 2) at [49]-[49], VQAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 104 at [25] and [31], WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [44], Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244 at [42], Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1196; (2001) 113 FCR 396 at [79]).
4. In DWN027 v Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 20; (2018) 355 ALR 238 (DWN027) (at [17], [21], per Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Nettle JJ), the High Court emphasised that a decision-maker's obligation to go beyond the case articulated by an applicant is confined to unarticulated claims which are apparent on the face of the material before the decision-maker.
5. In Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389 Kirby J held at [78]:

The Tribunal acts in a generally inquisitorial way. This does not mean that a party before it can simply present the facts and leave it to the Tribunal to search out, and find, any available basis which theoretically the Act provides for relief. This Court has rejected that approach to the Tribunal's duties. The function of the Tribunal, as of the delegate, is to respond to the case that the applicant advances. A fortiori this is the function of the Federal Court in determining any application to it for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal.

1. The letter dated 19 April 2017, contained statements regarding the applicant's poor financial circumstances in Malaysia. In my view, it contained facts that had no relevance to the protection claim the applicant had advanced in the Tribunal, namely the claim he would be persecuted in Malaysia because he is LGBT, and specifically that he is bisexual. The contents of the letter dated 19 April 2017 did not amount to an "un-articulated" Convention based claim, or an integer of the claim he was advancing, which arose squarely, or emerged clearly, on the face of the material that was before the Tribunal. In my view, the contention the Tribunal has committed the type of jurisdictional error identified by the Full Court in NABE (No 2) is not reasonably arguable.
2. Ground 4 is not reasonably arguable.

1. Ground 5 makes a bare assertion that the Tribunal breached ss 424A and/or 424AA of the Act. This ground is also unparticularised. There is no basis for asserting a breach of s 424A or s 424AA. In my view, the Tribunal's obligation in s 424A(1) was not engaged in this matter.
2. The only evidence (or information) that was relied upon by the Tribunal was information provided by the applicant himself, and/or country information. The exceptions in s 424A(3)(a) and (b) expressly excluded this type of information from the operation of s 424A.
3. Ground 5 is without any merit.

Conclusion on merits of the substantive application

1. I have concluded that each of the five grounds of the substantive application for judicial review are either not reasonably arguable or they are without any merit. I find that they do not disclose any arguable jurisdictional error.
2. As the applicant is not represented, I have also separately considered whether any arguable substantive jurisdictional error in the decision sought to be reviewed arises from the decision and material before me: see MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [112] and [113]. I am satisfied that no arguable substantive jurisdictional error arises from my review of the Tribunal decision in this matter.
3. I assess that the consideration of the merits of the substantive application weighs heavily against the making of an extension of time order.

1. In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending time under s 477(2) of the Act.
2. Accordingly, I dismiss the application for an extension of time and dismiss the application generally, with costs.

1. As I outlined above, in proceedings MLG1934/2021, which I consolidated and heard together with proceedings MLG3105/2020, the same applicant sought judicial review of the same Tribunal decision.
2. In proceedings MLG1934/2021, the applicant filed an application for judicial review well outside the 35-day period in s 477(1). In fact, it was filed on 3 August 2021, almost 1 year after proceedings MLG3105/2020 were commenced. As the applicant is unrepresented, and for completeness, I have considered the seven grounds set out in the application filed in MLG1934/2021, and read them as possible further grounds of review of the Tribunal decision. As I outlined above, on a fair reading of the seven grounds, none of them relate to the Tribunal decision. They appear to relate to another unrelated matter where there was a "dismissal decision". No such decision was made in relation to the applicant's review application in the Tribunal.
3. As I have determined in proceedings MLG3105/2020 the Tribunal decision contains no arguable jurisdictional error, and no extension of time order should be made under s 477(2) of the Act, I also consider it is appropriate, in the circumstances, to make orders dismissing proceedings MLG1934/2021, with costs.

1. The first respondent seeks costs in proceedings MLG3105/2020 fixed in the sum of $4,553.02. I consider the amount sought by the is reasonable for this type of matter. I will make an order for the amount sought by the first respondent against the applicant.

1. The first respondent seeks costs in proceedings MLG1934/2021 fixed in the sum of $4,553.02. I consider the amount sought by the is reasonable for this type of matter. I will make an order for the amount sought by the first respondent against the applicant.

I certify that the preceding seventy-nine (79) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Cleary.