police powersarrestself-defenceassist police officerbreach of the peacewrongful imprisonment"suspicion""belief"reasonable forceuse of CCTV evidence[1990] HCA 26
State of New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 85 NSWLR 226[2014] NSWCA 47
Hyder v The Commonwealth (2012) 217 A Crim R 571[2002] NSWSC 194
State of New South Wales v Reilly (2003) 57 NSWLR 496[2003] NSWCA 208
R v Hoare and Heavey [1965] NSWR 1167[2013] NSWCA 361
Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182[2012] HCA 5
New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638[2006] NSWCA 145
Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221[1987] HCA 5
Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 232 CLR 635[2008] HCA 27
Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarek (2009) 239 CLR 420
Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 [2014] HCA 36
Vo v Tran [2016] NSWSC 1043
New South Wales v Smith [2017] NSWCA 194
Re Tetbury Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 37
Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145
Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221; [1987] HCA 5
Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 232 CLR 635; [2008] HCA 27
Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarek (2009) 239 CLR 420
Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 [2014] HCA 36; (2014) 254 CLR 185
Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; [1977] HCA 45
Amaca Pty Ltd v Booth (2011) 246 CLR 36; [2011] HCA 53
Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375
Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; [1992] HCA 54
State of New South Wales v Koumdjiev (2005) 63 NSWLR 353; [2005] NSWCA 247
MBP (SA) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 657; [1991] HCA 3
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Drew Cuthbertson (Plaintiff)
Daniel Fletcher (Plaintiff)
The State of New South Wales (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
Mr D. Toomey SC with Mr D. Morgan (Plaintiffs)
Ms K. Williams SC with Mr A. Williams (Defendant)
[2]
Solicitors:
Mr Matthew Garling (Plaintiffs)
Ms Nouhad Khoury (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2015/00108800 and 2015/00135825
Publication restriction: None
[3]
Preliminaries
After midnight on 8 September 2013, two young adult males Drew Cuthbertson and Daniel Fletcher were travelling in a train with friends between Central Railway Station and their homes on the Central Coast following a birthday celebration at Kings Cross. Senior Constables Walker and McArthur, in the course of Transport Police duties, observed Mr Fletcher consuming alcohol and swearing in the lower compartment of a carriage, in consequence of which actions they directed him to leave the train and accompanied him to the vestibule to wait for the train to arrive at Eastwood Station. Mr Cuthbertson accompanied Mr Fletcher to the vestibule. Senior Constable McArthur says that he was assaulted by Mr Cuthbertson whilst in the vestibule. In the vestibule of the train and subsequently on Eastwood Station platform SC McArthur voiced arrest of Mr Cuthbertson. Mr Cuthbertson was charged with the offences of assault and of resist an officer while in the execution of his duty pursuant to section 58 Crimes Act 1900, NSW. Mr Cuthbertson was ultimately found not guilty.
In the vestibule of the train and on the Eastwood railway station platform Messrs Cuthbertson and Fletcher and Senior Constables McArthur and Walker engaged in a transaction of confrontation both oral and physical. In these proceedings Messrs Cuthbertson and Fletcher proceed civilly against the State of New South Wales claiming damages for trespass to a person, assault and battery, wrongful imprisonment, and, in the case of Mr Fletcher only, personal injury damages. Mr Cuthbertson claims damages compensating him for the legal costs of his successful defence of the "resist" charge.
The State of New South Wales concedes that it is vicariously liable for any tortious action by the Senior Constables but defends the actions saying that the Senior Constables were acting within their powers and functions as police officers.
The hearing occupied 12 days including oral submissions. The parties submitted in excess of 220 pages of written submissions.
[4]
The Contest
The hearing proceeded on the basis of Mr Cuthbertson's and Mr Fletcher's proceedings being heard together, the evidence in each being evidence in the other.
By his Statement of Claim filed 7 May 2015, Mr Fletcher sues for assault and trespass to person ("assault" allegations) occurring when he was removed from the train. He alleges being grabbed by SC Walker on the arm and in the region of his left chest and shoved off the train and onto the platform (at [6]).
Mr Fletcher (at [7]) describes continuing assault allegations occurring on Eastwood platform by SC Walker in the form of grabbing, pulling, holding, pulling Mr Fletcher's hand up behind his back, throwing and flinging Mr Fletcher to the ground, and by SC Walker forcibly placing his body weight on Mr Fletcher whilst Mr Fletcher was on the ground.
Mr Fletcher claims personal injury damages compensating him for a fracture to his right distal ulna (right forearm fracture) suffered during his struggle with SC Walker on the platform.
Mr Fletcher pleads that if SC Walker's touching of him was lawful; then, because the force was excessive and unnecessary, it was nevertheless assault.
Mr Fletcher claims that he was wrongfully imprisoned whilst upon the platform of Eastwood Station (mis-described in [11] as "Eastwood Police Station") being detained against his will and deprived of his liberty. Whereas in his Statement of Claim the period of imprisonment is stated at 15 minutes, in plaintiff closing submissions it was refined to 8 minutes.
Particulars to [13] of his Statement of Claim describe the imprisonment as when he was grabbed, held and assaulted by SC Walker "and/or" for the period during which he remained seated on the platform as he was directed to do by SC Walker.
In addition to pleading denial of trespass, assault and wrongful imprisonment, the defendant, in answer to the whole of Mr Fletcher's Statement of Claim, pleads that SC Walker performed according to his statutory powers and duties as follows:
1. by using reasonable force pursuant to s 230 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (LEPRA) employed to prevent a breach of the peace (at [13]);
2. in direction of Mr Fletcher to leave the train pursuant to cl 55 (1) of the Passenger Transport Regulation 2007 (at [13A]);
3. in removal of Mr Fletcher from the train pursuant to cl 55 (5) of the Passenger Transport Regulation 2007; and
4. in accordance with acting in good faith pursuant to s 6 of the Police Act 1990.
[5]
Approach - Law
That the plaintiff plead that SC McArthur and SC Walker used excessive and unnecessary force and that the defendant pleads that SC McArthur and SC Walker exercised reasonable force, whilst acting in good faith pursuant to police statutory powers and functions; requires that the evidence of the transaction of events between the plaintiffs and the police including the physical engagement in that course be analysed with inclusion of consideration of the perspective states of mind possessed and reasonably available to SC McArthur and SC Walker in the taking of such action as it is ultimately found they did do: State of New South Wales v Randall [2017] NSWCA 88; State of New South Wales v Bouffler [2017] NSWCA 185.
There is not, nor could there properly be, dispute between the parties that physical touching and restraint from liberty by SC Walker and SC McArthur would be tortious unless permitted within their common law and statutory powers or in self-defence. The burden of establishing the elements of the defence falls upon the State: State of New South Wales v Randall [2017] NSWCA 88, per Basten JA at [15].
The defendant was not permitted to go beyond the particulars of its defence given in its letter of further and better particulars 28 March 2011 (Exhibit B), and therefore was not permitted in relation to Mr Fletcher's case against SC Walker to assert that his action was to quell a criminal assault upon Ms Erin Spence by Mr Fletcher. This does not exclude the defence of taking action to avoid a breach of the peace: s230 LEPRA.
The defendant letter of further and better particulars dated 28 March 2011 (Exhibit B) made plain that the defence to Mr Fletcher's case was that police responded reasonably in the scenario of belligerent conduct shown in the CCTV footage. At an early point in the hearing I indicated that I understood the use of "belligerent" in the defendant's letter of particulars to mean behaviour in the style of aggression, violence and conflict-like.
[6]
CCTV Footage
When opening its case, the plaintiff played the whole of the 8 passages of CCTV footage within Exhibit A. The case was conducted by both parties on the basis that the CCTV footage was the most complete and most accurate evidence of events. The CCTV footage included the whole transaction between the Senior Constables and the plaintiffs recorded by cameras showing activity on the lower deck of the carriage, in the vestibule to the carriage and on the Eastwood Station platform. Not surprisingly, after the passage of 3.5 years since the subject events occurred, all witnesses had refreshed their memory from pre-hearing viewing of the CCTV footage. During the hearing, all witnesses were referred to the CCTV footage when giving oral evidence. My observation was that all witnesses, when giving oral evidence, relied on the CCTV footage as the most accurate record of what occurred. The CCTV footage is silent and therefore evidence of what was said, was contained only in the oral evidence.
It is open to the Court to arrive at observations of movement and action of each of the Senior Constables and of Messrs Fletcher and Cuthbertson from the CCTV footage (Exhibit A). That CCTV evidence shows events without the subjective assessment and exercise of judgement and thought of the participants of the events, at the time depicted: Blacktown City Council v Hocking [2008] NSWCA 144 per Spiegelman CJ at [4]. This is particularly so in this case because of the following factors:
1. the perceptions of each of Messrs Cuthbertson and Fletcher must have been somewhat affected by their being under the influence of alcohol;
2. the weakening of individual recollections of witnesses over the 3.5 years between the incident and the trial (acknowledging that there was an intervening criminal proceedings in 2014);
3. each witness gave evidence strongly influenced by refreshment of memory by reviewing the CCTV footage in preparation for and during the trial; and
4. the hearing proceeded on the agreed basis that the whole of the CCTV footage be shown to the Court, and admitted into evidence without objection, and was referred to by the defendant in its letter of 28 March 2017 by way of provision of further and better particulars.
In Blacktown City Council v Hocking at [7], Spiegelman CJ said "It is not entirely clear in what circumstances photographs can be used as direct evidence, as distinct from explicating evidence otherwise given"; and at [13], the Chief Justice preferred the statement of Young J in Beaton v McDivitt (1985) 13 NSWLR 134 at 142-143, that it is available to the Court to treat "photographs as evidence and not merely as material to understand the evidence".
[7]
Lawful Action by Police
The plaintiffs' allegations must be considered in context. Review in the Courtroom is conducted in a leisurely atmosphere with time for contemplation of action which was not available to the Senior Constables on 8 September 2013. Any fair review must be free of unreal, retrospective criticisms of what an arresting constable might or might not have done or believed in the circumstances: Macintosh v Webster (1980) 43 FLR 112 at 123; Woodley v Boyd [2001] NSWCA 35 at [37] per Heydon JA, Davies and Foster AJJA agreeing.
In Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1 the Victorian Court of Appeal observed at [142] (citations omitted):
"Police officers are bound to prevent breaches of the peace that they reasonably apprehend. In order to prevent a breach of the peace, police officers are entitled to exercise reasonable force. In evaluating the reasonableness of police conduct, 'the matter must be judged by reference to the pressure of events and the agony of the moment, not by reference to hindsight'. Further, a police officer may use such force, not disproportionate to the object, as he believes on reasonable grounds to be necessary to effect, or assist in effecting, the lawful arrest of a person committing, or suspected of committing, an offence."
Police may not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or manifestly unreasonably in the agony of the moment. The point is, however, that it is the policemen's perception in the environment in which action is taken which is the subject of inquiry. It is not for the Court, with a sophisticated opportunity assisted by representations of counsel and complaints given in oral evidence by witnesses, all having over extensive time formed opinions of events; to apply an unreal measure of what was reasonable on the basis of the suspicions and belief of the policemen in the moments of the events: NSW v Randall [2017] NSWCA 68 at [22], [28], [39] to [40], [64] and [101].
Only events up to the time of each subject police officer's action are relevant to the inquiry concerning that action.
In order for arrest of a person without a warrant to be lawful pursuant to s 99 (2) LEPRA, the arresting police officer must hold a suspicion based on reasonable grounds that the person has committed an offence.
Pursuant to s 99 (3) LEPRA, a police officer must not arrest without a warrant unless the police officer holds a suspicion, based on reasonable grounds, that it is necessary to arrest the person (in this case) to ensure the appearance of the person before a Court in respect to the offence (s 99 (3) (a) LEPRA), or to prevent a repetition or continuation of the offence or the commission of another offence (s 99 (3) (b)): State of New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 85 NSWLR 226; [2014] NSWCA 47 at [26]; Hyder v The Commonwealth (2012) 217 A Crim R 571; [2012] NSWCA 336 at [15] to [18] and [90]; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Mathews-Hunter [2014] NSWCA 843 at [54].
[8]
The Defendant's Onus
The parties agreed that the defendant bore the onus of proof that the arrest, touching, and detention of each of Messrs Fletcher and Cuthbertson was lawful: Zavarinos v State of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 320 at [12].
The relevant statutory provisions upon which the defendant relies, as at the date of the events, provided as follows:
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (LEPRA)
99 Power of police officers to arrest without warrant
(1) A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person if:
(a) the person is in the act of committing an offence under any Act or statutory instrument, or
(b) the person has just committed any such offence, or
(c) the person has committed a serious indictable offence for which the person has not been tried.
(2) A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person if the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person has committed an offence under any Act or statutory instrument.
(3) A police officer must not arrest a person for the purpose of taking proceedings for an offence against the person unless the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that it is necessary to arrest the person to achieve one or more of the following purposes:
(a) to ensure the appearance of the person before a court in respect of the offence,
(b) to prevent a repetition or continuation of the offence or the commission of another offence,
(c) …,
(d) …,
(e) …,
(f) …
(4) A police officer who arrests a person under this section must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, take the person, and any property found on the person, before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law
230 Use of force generally by police officers
It is lawful for a police officer exercising a function under this Act or any other Act or law in relation to an individual or a thing, and anyone helping the police officer, to use such force as is reasonably necessary to exercise the function
231 Use of force in making an arrest
A police officer or other person who exercises a power to arrest another person may use such force as is reasonably necessary to make the arrest or to prevent the escape of the person after arrest.
Police Act 1990
6 Mission and functions of NSW Police Force
(1) The mission of the NSW Police Force is to work with the community to reduce violence, crime and fear.
(2) The NSW Police Force has the following functions:
(a) to provide police services for New South Wales,
(b) to exercise any other function conferred on it by or under this or any other Act,
(c) to do anything necessary for, or incidental to, the exercise of its functions.
(3) In this section "police services" includes:
(a) services by way of prevention and detection of crime, and
(b) the protection of persons from injury or death, and property from damage, whether arising from criminal acts or in any other way, and
(c) the provision of essential services in emergencies, and
(d) any other service prescribed by the regulations.
(4) A reference in this section to the functions of the NSW Police Force includes a reference to the functions of members of the NSW Police Force.
(5) …
(6) Nothing in this section confers on the NSW Police Force a power to provide a police service in a way that is inconsistent with any provisions applicable to police officers under the LEPRA.
Passenger Transport Regulation 2007
(provided in Preliminaries)
Civil Liability Act 2002 - Self-Defence at Common Law
52 (1) A person does not incur a liability to which this Part applies arising from any conduct of the person carried out in self-defence, but only if the conduct to which the person was responding:
(a) was unlawful, or
(b) …
(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person believes the conduct is necessary:
(a) to defend himself or herself or another person, or
(b) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the liberty of another person, or
(c) …, or
(d) …,
and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as or she perceives them.
(3) …
[9]
Reliability of Witnesses
The testimony of the witnesses in Court provided competing interpretations of the played CCTV evidence, Exhibit A. The case was conducted on this basis in that both parties required the whole of the CCTV footage to be shown at the start of the hearing. Each of the witnesses had refreshed their memory from viewing the CCTV footage before giving their oral evidence in circumstances where the events preceded the hearing by 3.5 years, albeit there had been criminal proceedings in 2014. Not infrequently when required to comment on events shown in the CCTV footage, witnesses had to be asked whether they were merely interpreting the film or giving evidence of an actual recollection following refreshment of memory from the film. At no time did a witness give evidence that the CCTV footage was not accurate or did not accurately show an event about which they gave evidence. Of course, the CCTV footage was silent and therefore provided no record of evidence of speech.
[10]
Mr Fletcher as a Witness
Mr Fletcher's poor memory was a striking feature of his presentation as a witness. The extent of his inability to recall events was not restricted to the events of the subject incident, 3.5 years in the past. He was unable to recall with reliable accuracy much more recent events. He knew that he had consulted orthopaedic specialist, Dr Ellis, on referral by his solicitor, on one occasion. He was unsure as to whether that occasion was in 2015 or in 2017: Transcript Day 2, page 107, lines 26 to 42. In fact, he consulted Dr Ellis in 2015. He could not recall what was said during the consultation. Dr Ellis was the only medico-legal doctor he attended for the purposes of the case, and plainly the consultation post-dated the subject events by 2 years. Mr Fletcher's inability to recall whether he had consulted Dr Ellis only a few months or 1.5 years before the hearing was striking, but not out of keeping with his general inability of recall.
Mr Fletcher could not recall being treated at the Emergency Department of Gosford Hospital for a fracture of his 5th metacarpal resulting from him having punched a wall in March 2009. When referred to the clinical notes of that treatment, he accepted that he had punched the wall, but still had no recall of those events. Despite the obvious importance to him of the CCTV footage for his refreshment of memory, he was unable to recall whether or not he had viewed the CCTV footage prior to the listing for hearing of the matter in October 2016 (which hearing was vacated because the video could not be shown in the courtroom), only six months before this subject hearing: Transcript Day 3, page 140, line 1 to page 141, line 17.
Whilst Mr Fletcher's claim for damages is in great part for his claimed on-going impairment of use of his right wrist consequent of it being fractured in his struglle with SC Walker, he described the mechanism of injury in October 2015 to Dr Ellis as:
"… was in the process of being arrested, both hands and wrists were behind his back and behind his neck, and he experienced pain in both, particularly the right side." (bold added);
whereas the CCTV footage plainly shows that Mr Fletcher's wrists were never held behind his neck. His recollection of perhaps the most central facts of his case was inaccurate when speaking to Dr Ellis only 2 years after the events.
In his case on damages relating to impairment for work, whereas in evidence in chief he said that he did not recall returning to work before removal of the plaster from his right wrist on 14 October 2013 (Transcript Day 1, page 42, lines 15 to 42); on being shown records of his employer during cross-examination, he agreed that he returned to work on 16 September 2013, only one week after the injury. When giving evidence in chief concerning a back injury suffered on 21 February 2017, only 2 months before the hearing, Mr Fletcher was unable to give a precise answer as to how long he had off work. The best that he could do was "about 3 or 4 weeks after" the injury he returned to "just a lot of light duties": Transcript Day 1, page 53, line 30 to page 54, line 7.
[11]
Mr Cuthbertson as a Witness
Mr Cuthbertson candidly conceded that he had difficulty recalling the events both because of the passage of time and because he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the subject events: Transcript Day 6, page 310, lines 5 to 37.
Mr Cuthbertson gave evidence of his recollection of conversation in the following terms: [Transcript Day 5, page 280, lines 11 to 26]
Q. Is it fair to say that you don't have a very good recollection now of words spoken in the carriage of the train on the evening of 8 September 2013?
A. I do recall some significant words that were said. But not all.
Q. You don't have a recollection, do you, of the precise words used by Senior Constable Walker when Mr Fletcher was given the fine for drinking on the train?
A. No, I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall that Mr Fletcher provided some identification to Senior Constable Walker, while he was still seated in the carriage on the train?
A. I don't recall him doing so. But I imagine he would have.
Q. And Senior Constable Walker told Mr Fletcher, didn't he, that he'd be getting an infringement notice in the mail, or words to that effect?
A. Yes, I can imagine that, yep.
Mr Cuthbertson's use of "significant" in regard to his belief in his recall is to be weighed in the affectation of accuracy of human recollection over the passage of time before giving evidence (allowing for the intervening criminal proceedings in 2014), the effect of the influence of alcohol under which he was functioning at the time of the events, and his tendency in evidence, as I closely observed him, to be reconstructing from a diminished memory. I was concerned that he gave evidence with a commitment to a narrative, as he over 3.5 years has consciously or subconsciously constructed it. Mr Cuthbertson was shown to exaggerate in his description of force used by SC McArthur against him. I will accord caution to acceptance of his evidence where it is inconsistent with other evidence.
The following passage shows weakness of recollection, answering that he did not recall matters which would be against the interests of his and Mr Fletcher's cases and, again, a concession of agreement with use of "imagine" when the question fitted his narrative. I set out the transcript at Day 5, page 281, lines 1 to 49:
Q. How can you say, sitting here today, that Mr Fletcher didn't say the word "fuck" when speaking to Senior Constable Walker, just after Senior Constable Walker had told him he'd be getting an infringement notice?
A. Because I recall that me and Daniel were in the conversation, not Daniel and Mr McArthur.
Q. I put to you that in addition to Mr Fletcher swearing in his conversation with you, he was also swearing and saying the word "fuck" in his conversation with Senior Constable Walker?
A. No, I don't recall that at all.
Q. I suggest to you that when Mr Fletcher was saying the word "fuck", he was doing so in a loud voice?
A. No. Having a conversation, like I said, me and him were in general conversation, and they were there giving him the ticket.
Q. What's a general conversation, Mr Cuthbertson?
A. Something that you have with your friend. Talking about something, an event. General conversation.
Q. What was your general conversation with Mr Fletcher about, just after Senior Constable Walker had told him that he'd be getting a fine for drinking?
A. I don't remember the conversation, what it was about.
Q. You don't really remember, do you, that you were having a general conversation, as you call it, at all?
A. I do remember having a conversation with him, yes.
Q. You said in your evidence‑in‑chief that Mr Fletcher was asked by the officers to stop swearing, several times, do you recall giving evidence to that effect?
A. Yes.
Q. It was Senior Constable Walker who asked him several times to stop swearing, wasn't it?
A. I don't recall who it was.
Q. In addition to that, Senior Constable McArthur said to Mr Fletcher, words to the effect of, "Mate, keep the language down", didn't he?
A. I'm not too sure.
Q. Senior Constable Walker told Mr Fletcher that he could also get a fine for swearing, didn't he?
A. I don't remember that.
Q. I suggest to you that after Senior Constable Walker told Mr Fletcher that, Mr Fletcher continued to swear, and use the word "fuck"?
A. I imagine he did, because he did get escorted off the train for swearing.
[12]
Senior Constable McArthur as a Witness
SC McArthur gave evidence with control and care displaying his experience with giving evidence in Court. I observed him carefully in order to differentiate between technique learned through experience on the one hand and veracity on the other. I also observed him carefully during cross-examination for display of demeanour such as anger or loss of control. During an appropriately robust cross-examination, I observed SC McArthur to maintain his composure.
SC McArthur properly conceded that he was an experienced Court witness. He openly gave evidence of having viewed the CCTV footage repeatedly, as opportunity to do so was available to him during his police work, in preparation for the hearing.
SC McArthur was willing to make the appropriate concession that although he voiced arrest for assault upon him to Mr Cuthbertson in the vestibule of the train; subsequently when Messrs Fletcher and Cuthbertson were on the platform, he pointed and told Mr Cuthbertson to leave. Later, when on the platform with SC Walker, SC McArthur voiced arrest to Mr Cuthbertson a second time, for the assault in the vestibule. The common ground was; therefore, that between the first and second arrest, SC McArthur told Mr Cuthbertson that he was free to leave.
The CCTV being silent, it would have been available to him not to give that evidence of oral direction interrupting the two occasions of arrest. As an experienced police officer, it is likely that he was aware of the prohibition against arrest without a warrant unless necessary under s 99(3) LEPRA.
SC McArthur's evidence was that he did not obtain Mr Cuthbertson's identification details until a later time upon the platform than that invitation to leave occurring between the two events of arrest. Accordingly, SC McArthur's evidence conceded that his direction that Mr McArthur was free to leave, was given at a time when he did not have details upon which to issue a Court Attendance Notice. Had Mr Cuthbertson departed at that time, he would have been free of prosecution.
It was therefore a substantial concession, in my opinion. The relevant evidence during cross-examination appears in a passage as follows: (Transcript Day 9, page 507 to 508 line 28)
Q. When you got off the train for the second time, you have said that you told Mr Cuthbertson he was under arrest for assault, didn't you?
A. Assault police, yes.
Q. It was your intention, at that time, to get this man's details, so you could forward him a Court attendance notice, that's right, isn't it?
A. Yes, I don't know which way it was going to go at that stage, but that was going to be the most likely course.
Q. What do you mean you didn't know which way?
A. Well, I didn't know if I was going to.
Q. Please, just let me finish the question. What do you mean by you didn't know which way it was going to go at that stage?
A. Well, I didn't know if I would need to take him back to the police station. Or I didn't know what, if I was going to deal with him by way of future Court attendance notice.
Q. If the man had provided his name and address to you, you were then in a position to check that, weren't you?
A. Yes.
Q. That in fact happened, on this night?
A. Yes.
Q. If you'd done that, there couldn't have been any possible reason to take him back to the police station?
A. No.
Q. Could there?
A. Only if his violent behaviour continued.
Q. Your principal objective, when you got back off the train, was to get his name and address from him, so that you could send him a Court attendance notice, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. How as Mr Fletcher obstructing you from doing that, or impeding you in achieving that purpose?
A. Just, well, as I said, I don't know if you like this word, but general hindrance, impeding, obstructing. Making things difficult.
Q. From what, speaking to him?
A. Yes.
Q. If Mr Fletcher was doing anything, it only had the effect of moving Mr Cuthbertson away from the train, didn't it?
A. No, he was making it, the process, very difficult.
Q. If Mr Fletcher was impeding you, as you suggest he was, it was only because what you did, as soon as you got off the train, was to attempt to physically seize Mr Cuthbertson?
A. No, I approached him. To arrest him.
Q. Do you say that when you approached him, to arrest him?
A. Yes.
Q. You did not initially have any intention of placing your hands on the man?
A. Not at that stage, no.
Q. When you got off the train, your evidence to this Court, is that you did not have an intention to place your hands on the man?
A. No. Not until, no.
Q. That is an absolute lie, isn't it?
A. No.
Q. I want to suggest to you that in the face of what is depicted on that video, you are denying the undeniable?
A. No.
Q. The reason you're denying it, is because you realise that to get off the train, and immediately to physically seize this man, without making any attempt to get from him his name and address, what unjustifiable?
A. I don't know, but that wasn't my intentions. My intention was to rearrest Mr Cuthbertson, and as you've said, get his name and address. However, I was obstructed, or hindered, by Mr Fletcher.
[13]
Senior Constable Walker as a Witness
I observed SC Walker carefully as he gave his evidence, taking a cautious view of his presentation because of his obvious experience in giving evidence. I formed the view that his evidence was generally reliable. In particular, he was unrattled by a robust cross examination and most importantly; his evidence was consistent with the vision of the transaction available in Exhibit A CCTV. In relation to this latter observation, SC Walker impressed as a witness who was giving evidence according to belief of his actual recollection, refreshed as it would have been by viewing the CCTV footage.
[14]
Ticket Checking
Following a substantial period of video showing the approximately nine ex-party attendees on their homeward journey to the Central Coast following their attendance at their friend Gabbi's birthday party at Kings Cross, they are seated with a few other passengers in the lower level of a double decker carriage. The group of which the plaintiffs were members are seen behaving with young adult exuberance, but not with visible recklessness or offensively. Indeed, at least a couple of other passengers joined the carriage from an earlier station without apparently taking offence to any behaviour.
SC Walker is first seen walking through the carriage. He asked for tickets to be produced. During this engagement, there is no apparent discord visible on the silent videos between him and the plaintiffs. Mr Fletcher's evidence in chief was that he was politely asked for his ticket. He was wrong in his recollection that both Senior Constables were present. Thinking that his friend from junior high school, Mr Cuthbertson, had his ticket, he asked Mr Cuthbertson for it. Upon Mr Cuthbertson informing him that he did not have it, Mr Fletcher found his ticket and presented it. SC Walker then moved up the stairs and disappeared from view leaving the carriage.
Mr Cuthbertson appears to be animated, pointing, gesticulating and talking. This was his performance in the carriage when the police were absent and when the police were present.
[15]
Second Police Attendance - Mr Fletcher Drinking Alcohol
Mr Fletcher's evidence in chief is that when he saw the police re-entering the carriage, he put down the can of alcohol he was holding. In fact, only SC Walker re-visited the carriage. SC McArthur stood on the stairs between the lower compartment of the carriage and the vestibule. He was behind SC Walker. He could hear what was said. Both plaintiffs had been drinking alcohol on the train. Police only saw Mr Fletcher drinking alcohol.
SC Walker informed Mr Fletcher that he would be breached for drinking alcohol on the train. It is apparent from Mr Fletcher's evidence that he produced some form of identification from which SC Walker took down his details.
During SC Walker taking down his details, Mr Fletcher says that he and Mr Cuthbertson were engaged in general conversation, and as was his habit in general conversation, he was swearing. He was politely asked by SC Walker to stop swearing which he said he did and apologised. Mr Fletcher was repeatedly asked to stop saying "fuck". As SC Walker continued to take down his particulars of identification, Mr Fletcher says that he accidentally again swore. In evidence in chief, he said that at that point SC Walker said to him "That's it mate, you're off the fucking train". As discussed in more detail below, in cross-examination Mr Fletcher conceded that he could not recall what words SC Walker used, and that whilst he retained an impression of "fuck", his evidence in chief was not truthfully accurate. The common ground is that Mr Fletcher was lawfully directed to leave the train.
He then got up, walked up the stairs and entered the vestibule with SC Walker and SC McArthur. Mr Cuthbertson joined him in the vestibule.
Police evidence was that each of Messrs Fletcher and Cuthbertson smelled of alcohol and that their speech was slightly slurred. The plaintiffs gave evidence of consuming about 4 drinks during the evening at Gabbi's birthday party at Kings Cross, before commencing the journey home by train from Kings Cross to Central Railway Station and then joining the subject train. The can of Woodstock Bourbon & Cola which Mr Fletcher had been holding had been drunk from by each of the plaintiffs on the train.
[16]
Exhibit A4 - Vestibule - Facing South - Clear Camera - 055B5981-07
The escalation of confrontation and physical engagement commenced in the vestibule of the train carriage as it arrived at Eastwood Station platform.
CCTV shows events in the vestibule. The Senior Constables stand in what SC McArthur described as the "blade" position. This means that in accordance with their officer safety protocol, they stand able to see the person under control and each other, angling their bodies and position to do so. Mr Fletcher was the person under control. He was complying with SC Walker's direction, under cl 55 (5), to exit the train when it arrived at Eastwood Station. The Senior Constables were observing Mr Fletcher's compliance. Mr Fletcher had been issued with an Infringement Notice for his consuming alcohol and swearing on the train. Each matter was a minor offence, carrying punishment of a fine.
In more detail, the CCTV shows:
SC McArthur comes up the stairs from the lower carriage into the vestibule first and alone. He positions himself near the base of the stairs from the upper carriage and facing north (toward the camera).
Mr Fletcher comes up the stairs from the lower carriage, and walks across to near the doors. He stands side-on to the doors facing south (back to the camera).
Mr Cuthbertson follows behind Mr Fletcher from the lower carriage and stands face-to-face with Mr Fletcher, shoulder to the door. He faces north.
At 0:24, SC Walker enters the vestibule, being the last to come up the stairs. As did SC McArthur before him, SC Walker holds a rail for stability.
At 0:29, SC McArthur and SC Walker have adopted the "blade" position, whilst Mr Fletcher and Mr Cuthbertson are still face-to-face and close, apparently talking. Neither SC McArthur nor SC Walker would be within a metre of either of the plaintiffs.
At 0:36, Mr Fletcher has remained in his position, and Mr Cuthbertson moved back against the south wall whilst facing north to Mr Fletcher. SC McArthur, who had been standing approximately where Mr Cuthbertson moved to, moved to the side to the base of the stairs.
At 0:41, Mr Fletcher, stands with left hand out toward SC Walker as if Mr Fletcher and SC Walker are talking. SC McArthur is beside and just behind the elbow of Mr Cuthbertson, but looking at Mr Fletcher.
[17]
Unlawful Arrest of Mr Cuthbertson
That Mr Cuthbertson did not physically slap SC McArthur, and that SC McArthur could not have felt a sting near his sternum, as the Senior Constable claimed; leads inevitably to the conclusion that at the time of the first and second arrests, SC McArthur did not suspect, nor did he have reasonable grounds to suspect, the offence "of assault" under s 58 Crimes Act 1900, or the offence of "resist" had occurred. It follows that s 99 (2) LEPRA did not provide SC McArthur lawful power to arrest Mr Cuthbertson as he did.
In consequence of these findings, the restraint of Mr Cuthbertson and struggle with Mr Cuthbertson within the vestibule and pushing him out the door by SC McArthur, was not lawful use of force to prevent escape or for the performance of arrest under s 231 LEPRA.
In closing submissions, the defendant attempted to defend SC McArthur's man handling of Mr Cuthbertson by putting that Mr Cuthbertson's "thrashing and pulling away in the vestibule" constituted a breach of the peace because it was likely to cause harm to be done to a person or a person to fear being harmed through the disturbance of Mr Cuthbertson's engagement with SC McArthur. The defendant relied on the judgment of the House of Lords in R v Howell [1982] QB 416 at 427:
"It is for this breach of the peace when done in his presence or the reasonable apprehension of it taking place that a constable, or anyone else, may arrest an offender without warrant."
In State of NSW v Bouffler [2017] NSWCA 185 at [164] a "breach of the peace" was defined to include "a wide range of actions and threatened actions that interfere with the ordinary operation of civil society".
The defendant referred to SC McArthur's evidence that he removed Mr Cuthbertson from the train onto the platform "for fear of the other commuters, the safety of them, the breach of the peace": Transcript Day 6, page 360, lines 34 to 44. During oral closing submissions, Senior Counsel for the defendant directed attention to a seated male person, who I would understand to be a member of the group with which the plaintiffs were travelling - but it is not important one way or the other - raising his hands and sitting back as SC McArthur and Mr Cuthbertson came near to him in their passage through the vestibule. The suggestion was that this was evidence consistent with SC McArthur's concern for other commuters.
[18]
Events on the platform up to restraint of Mr Fletcher
The defence relies strongly on what it describes as a quality of physically assertive behaviour of the plaintiffs. The defendant relied on SC McArthur's description of them as very erratic in their behaviour.
After the plaintiffs were pushed from the train by the Senior Constables, SC McArthur and the plaintiffs were on the platform but SC Walker remained on the train. The CCTV footage does not show that either of the plaintiffs was trying to leave or that they were trying to physically attack SC McArthur. The body deportment particularly of Mr Cuthbertson is consistent with him shouting. SC McArthur's evidence was that Mr Cuthbertson was calling him "fucking tough" and "fucking idiot". In fairness, if that language was used, it was not a threat or a statement of intention by Mr Cuthbertson to participate in violence with SC McArthur or anybody else. Again, in fairness, Mr Cuthbertson had just been man-handled by SC McArthur in the vestibule of the train carriage and arrested for an assault on police which he did not commit.
The passage of time following Mr Cuthbertson and Mr Fletcher being ejected from the train is in my view of importance.
On Exhibit A5 at 0:32, the plaintiffs and SC McArthur are on the platform, and SC Walker is just inside the door. Immediately previously Mr Fletcher had taken hold of Mr Cuthbertson's white pullover. That action indicated that not only were neither of the plaintiffs behaving in an attacking way to the Senior Constables but that the plaintiffs, particularly Mr Fletcher were exercising physical restraint, opposite to attack. It can be seen that SC McArthur has hold of Mr Cuthbertson's upper arm. Mr Cuthbertson's arms are down. Mr Fletcher's hand is on Mr Cuthbertson's left shoulder. The actions of the plaintiffs are not of aggression directed towards SC McArthur.
At 0:38, SC McArthur raises his arm and I accept his evidence that he was directing Mr Cuthbertson that he could leave. This was a release from the first arrest which had been voiced in the vestibule and which I have determined to be an unlawful arrest.
At 0:40, SC McArthur re-enters the vestibule of the train and joins SC Walker. In the few seconds beforehand Mr Fletcher's girlfriend Erin had exited the train. She was on the platform. It can be seen that she was refusing Mr Fletcher's encouragement that she re-join the train. She walked away from him at 0:44, and Mr Fletcher can be seen to pick her up from behind and put her back on the train with the Senior Constables. In the process of lifting her body weight from the platform to the train vestibule he has one foot on the platform and one foot placed on the verge of the train. The CCTV shows that his weight never moves into the train. Mr Cuthbertson's right arm is up in obvious direction of Erin to remain on the train. Mr Fletcher immediately steps back on the platform when he releases Erin.
[19]
Consideration of Events After Erin Re-joined the Train
At this point, at Exhibit A5 2:50, the next period of events of significance in the plaintiff cases commences.
In the portion of these reasons where I dealt with reliability of witnesses, I went in detail to the evidence of the incident of SC McArthur lifting Mr Cuthbertson from his embrace of Mr Fletcher. In rejecting the reliability of Mr Cuthbertson's description of the lift - his description of a lift with pinching of skin under both armpits being shown by the CCTV footage to be false - his evidence of this instant which is displayed on the CCTV footage from Exhibit A5 2:50 was grossly exaggerated. SC McArthur's description of the lift by one of his hands under one of Mr Fletcher's armpits was consistent with the CCTV footage and is to be preferred.
Following SC McArthur's lift of Mr Cuthbertson the following occurs:
Mr Cuthbertson throws his arms around and his jumper becomes removed in the physical engagement he has with SC McArthur. SC McArthur's evidence was that he grabbed and lifted then directed Mr Cuthbertson because Mr Cuthbertson had disobeyed the "simple request" that he move away from Mr Fletcher. Mr Fletcher agreed that Mr Cuthbertson started thrashing his arms around and that he removed his shirt, as indeed, I find to be a fair interpretation of the CCTV: Transcript day 3 page 177 lines 31 to 50.
SC McArthur by placing his hand at the chest to neck junction of the then bare chested Mr Cuthbertson pushes Mr Cuthbertson to the stanchion seat and restrains him in that position.
In the course of the restraint, Mr Cuthbertson claims SC McArthur forced his head against the stanchion causing the skin to split. Having watched the CCTV footage carefully, in my opinion the physical action satisfies me that there is no action by SC McArthur intended to injure or cause harm to Mr Cuthbertson in that way. SC McArthur conceded that he pushed Mr Cuthbertson's head, causing it to hit the stanchion. No doubt the hit caused discomfort but vision of the CCTV footage does not show any powerful or sudden force. Mr Cuthbertson does not, for instance, reach for his head. CCTV footage does not show that Mr Cuthbertson became angrily aroused such as by flexing his muscles, albeit SC McArthur said he did: Transcript day 7 page 382 line 28. Mr Cuthbertson did not seek medical assistance.
[20]
Application of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)("CLA")
Mr Fletcher's claim for damages compensating him for his fractured wrist is a claim for personal injury and for personal injury damages as defined in section 11 CLA. That definition draws no distinction between damages awarded in claims for negligence and damages awarded in claims for an intentional tort: New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 248 CLR 417; [2012] HCA 57 at [18] per French CJ and Hayne J. I reject the plaintiff written submission 31 May 2017 at [6] where it is put that because negligence is not pleaded, the CLA does not apply.
It follows that Part 2 CLA applies to Mr Fletcher's claim for damages in respect of his fractured right wrist, unless application of the Act is excluded by section 3B CLA: section 11A(1) CLA. This applies regardless of whether the claim for damages is brought in tort, under statute or otherwise: section 11A(2) CLA.
The plaintiff submits: "the conduct of Sen Cons Walker in pulling the plaintiff by the hand/arm caused him to fall backwards to the ground (the point at which the inference is the plaintiff broke his right wrist) was such as to engage" the exclusion pursuant to section 3B CLA of the application of the CLA to damages in regard to Mr Fletcher's fracture.
Section 3B CLA relevantly provides:
1. The provisions of this Act do not apply to or in respect of civil liability (and awards of damages in those proceedings) as follows:
1. Civil liability of a person in respect of an intentional act that is done by the person with intent to cause injury or death…committed by the person - the whole Act except: …
The question of whether or not section 3B CLA applies is not satisfied merely by finding the relevant act to have been an "intentional tort"; but rather, the focus is upon the act itself and whether it was both:
1. An intentional act; and
2. Intended to cause injury: Croucher v Cachia [2016] NSWCA 132 at [20] and [31]-[34]; Hamilton v State of NSW [2016] NSWSC 1311.
The plaintiff bore the onus of proving that SC Walker intended both the act causing the injury and the injurious consequence. The defendant accepts that "the acts of SC Walker in holding Mr Fletcher by the right arm, continuing to hold him and pulling him away from Erin and the train in response to Mr Fletcher pulling SC Walker towards Erin and the train and in manoeuvring him to the ground in response to Mr Fletcher lunging and leaping towards Erin were intentional acts" within the meaning of section 3B(1)(a): defendant closing submission 5 June 2017 at [199].
[21]
Mr Fletcher's Wrist Fracture
I have concluded that the right wrist injury which was suffered by Mr Fletcher in his struggle with SC Walker, occurred in the course of lawful action by SC Walker and that the force employed by SC Walker was not excessive because it was lawful, reasonable reaction to the forceful and wrongful action of Mr Fletcher, directed toward Erin pursuant to s230 LEPRA..
I am required, in any event, to give reasons briefly assessing damages which would be awarded, had SC Walker's action been tortious.
Doctor Ellis assessed Mr Fletcher's right wrist injury as "a minimally displaced fracture of the distal radius of his right arm" Exhibit D. His assessment as at the 8th of July 2016 of resultant disability was expressed as follows: "he has been able to return to full-time work as a carpenter but requires break periods and repetitive movement and forceful use of his right hand are limited by the post-traumatic arthritis affecting the wrist joint. There is signification (sic) weakness in the right hand grip and he is right-handed. It is likely he will maintain his employment as a carpenter in reduced capacity and his impairment was assessed according to AMA Guidelines 5th Edition in my previous report.
Further treatment is not likely to improve the function of his right hand.
He has persisting disability using a hammer, writing, and driving and can no longer ride a motorbike." The impairment assessment in Doctor Ellis' earlier report of the 21st of October 2015 identified dominant right handgrip strength as impaired at 20% of which 5% was considered pre-exiting, leaving a residual impairment related to the subject injury of 15% right upper extremity impairment. Dr Ellis equated this to an overall whole person impairment of 9%.
In closing written submissions at [181] the defendant refers to reports of x-rays pre-existing Doctor Ellis' assessment but apparently not considered by him. Those x-ray reports record that during early treatment the fracture had been immobilized in "good" position. The defendant did not require Doctor Ellis for cross examination. The defendant did not rely on medico-legal opinion. The court does not possess specialist radiological nor orthopaedic expertise such as to reach a preference between descriptions of the fracture contained in medical literature. The unchallenged expert opinion of Doctor Ellis must be accepted subject to proof of the factual history reported to him by Mr Fletcher.
[22]
Mr Fletcher - CLA Damages
Non-economic loss - section 16 CLA: the above recount of restriction of use of his right hand in the course of work duties provides a description of pain and restriction implicitly pervading Mr Fletcher's activities in private life. He said that the right wrist injury had significantly curtailed his ability to enjoy his passion of motorcycle riding.
A high degree of generalization is required in assessing non-economic loss as a percentage of a most extreme case under section 16: Doubleday v Kelly [2005] NSWCA 151; Motorcycling Event Group Australia Pty Ltd v Kelly (2013) 86 NSWLR 55; [2013] NSWCA 361 at [204]. No doubt Mr Fletcher's suffering is not relieved by his continuing want to pursue manual employment requiring the use of his right hand. There is not to be a double compensation with the economic loss which would follow from his impairment. I assess non-economic loss at 25% of a most extreme case in the sum of $40,000.
Past Economic Loss: other than the one week of work immediately following the injury and the reference in his evidence to days off when the symptoms were worse, Mr Fletcher did not give evidence upon which a calculation his past economic loss can be approached arithmetically. On day 2 of the hearing, his senior counsel made a submission that a sum of somewhere between $5,000 and $7,500 would be appropriate. He expressly resiled from the sum of $867 described in the plaintiff's Schedule of Damages handed up at the commencement of the hearing.
During cross examination, Mr Fletcher agreed that employment records showed he was paid $708 for his work with Campbell's in the week preceding his injury. He was being paid $18.65 per hour from 8 July 2012: Transcript Day 2 page 112; Exhibit 7. Mr Fletcher accepted that in the financial years 2013 to 2016, his gross earnings were $37,500, $42,500, $40,918 and $42,820 respectively. Given his increase in skills over that period; those broad figures do not describe an economic loss consequent of his claimed impairment. Time off due to his back condition is a discounting factor. At [2016] of its written submission made 5 June 2017 the defendant calculation of earnings loss in the week following the injury is in the sum of $957. Imprecision of evidence does not relieve the court of the obligation to assess economic loss. I allow $5,000.
Future Economic Loss: Mr Fletcher seeks a buffer in respect of future economic loss, said to restrict his diminished earning capacity consequent of his injury pursuant to section 13 CLA.
[23]
Fletcher - Assessment at Common Law
General damages: At common law general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity are not restricted by the provisions of section 16 CLA. I would assess general damages at common law in the sum of $65,000.
Past economic loss: In this case, the provisions of the CLA do not affect the calculation of damages for past economic loss such that the assessment differs from that which I would estimate at common law. I assess past economic loss in the sum of $5,000.
Future economic loss: Whilst the above quoted passage from the judgment of Giles JA in Parks' case and in that case per McClellan AJA at [58] refer to the requirement posed by section 13(1) that damages accord with Mr Fletcher's "most likely" future circumstances; at common law, the task of assessment engages with a lower threshold of assessment based on an estimation of possibilities: see the discussion by Hall J in Vo v Tran [2016] NSWSC 1043 at [212]-[225].
The imprecision of the evidence in this case is such that whereas in the assessment of this head of damages pursuant to section 13 CLA (above) I referred to a conservative approach to accepting a future of employment for Mr Fletcher achieved in manual work and to his impairment diminishing his capacities for work in the broader employment market of work types; so that imprecision here does not avail, because of the difference between approach on the basis of "possibilities" and "most likely" future circumstances, a different estimate of buffer in the result. I estimate $75,000.
Medical expenses: Mr Fletcher does not claim past or future medical expenses.
In the event that I had found Mr Fletcher entitled to damages at common law for the injury to his wrist, I would have estimated damages in the total sum of: $145,000.
[24]
Fletcher - Damages for the "Assault Allegations" and False Imprisonment
I have found that Mr Fletcher was assaulted by SC Walker when SC Walker pushed him from the train vestibule. It was a push of limited force. It was not violent. Mr Fletcher was able to step onto the platform without loss of balance.
I have found that Mr Fletcher was assaulted by SC Walker when SC Walker pulled Mr Fletcher's arms behind him and dragged him away from Mr Cuthbertson soon after the Senior Constables stepped from the vestibule of the train onto the platform for the purpose of SC McArthur voicing the second arrest. This assault involved substantial force by SC Walker.
I have found that Mr Fletcher was wrongfully imprisoned whilst SC Walker detained him on the platform until the event of the struggle between SC Walker and Mr Fletcher involving Erin.
In none of the assaults which I have found, did Mr Fletcher suffer physical injury. Each of the assaults was for duration of only a few seconds. The assaults did not involve frank violence such as punching. The total period of wrongful imprisonment which I have found lasted approximately 2 minutes.
By his Statement of Claim, Mr Fletcher identified the first assault as him being pushed from the train: at [6] and the "ASSAULT/S" on the platform by particulars which may encompass the second assault described above however that assault did not find attention in plaintiff closing submissions; written submissions 30 May 2017 at [17] and [18].
The physical quality of the first assault was minimal. The physical quality of the second assault was more substantial but in reality, the plaintiff case as I understand it to be prosecuted and in any event, in my view, as it should be in reality and practicality approached; is a case incorporating the second assault as a component of wrongful imprisonment.
I approach the question of assessment of damages compensating Mr Fletcher for the tortious "assault allegations" and wrongful imprisonment in the aggregate, as components of a single course of wrongful conduct. In my view, it is not required in the assessment of damages to differentiate between battery and assault in this case.
In regard to the two assaults and the wrongful imprisonment, the events occurred in the course of what was fairly observed to be disrespectful behaviour to a quality which would provoke the reasonable police officer albeit, the worst of that behaviour is properly attributable to Mr Cuthbertson. At the time of his ejection from the carriage vestibule Mr Fletcher was complying with the direction that he leave the train. At the time of the second assault he was attempting to distance Mr Cuthbertson from SC McArthur who was approaching Mr Cuthbertson with unreasonable, direct purpose to arrest, having immediately beforehand in the train vestibule man-handled Mr Cuthbertson without lawful cause. Mr Fletcher was entitled to proceed as he did at the point of the second arrest. He was not directing unreasonable force toward either Senior Constable.
[25]
Fletcher - Assessment of Damages for the Struggle with SC Walker Related to Erin and the Second Wrongful Imprisonment
As I am obliged to do, I assess aggravated and exemplary damages for:
the struggle with SC Walker in relation to Erin; and
the second claimed wrongful imprisonment of Mr Fletcher
as if I had found in favour of those components of his claim.
Applying the above stated principles: if the force employed by SC Walker had been wrongful, then aggravated damages and exemplary damages would be required to compensate Mr Fletcher for the intangible harm he suffered in consequence of that degree of force wrongfully inflicted upon him by a police officer, as well as exemplary damages as a punishment and deterrent from wrongful use of that degree of force by a police officer. I assess aggravated and exemplary damages, in addition to personal injury damages. I assess aggravated and exemplary damages in the single sum of $15,000.
The second period of wrongful imprisonment would be the period of six minutes or so that Mr Fletcher sat on the Western side of the platform. He was not approached, stood over or forcefully directed during that period. On the plaintiff case Mr Fletcher remained on the Western side of the platform in compliance with an oral direction by SC Walker that he go and sit there. I would assess ordinary, aggravated and exemplary damages in the single sum of $2,000.
[26]
Mr Cuthbertson - Assessment of Damages
Mr Cuthbertson was man-handled in the vestibule of the train by SC McArthur. There was no violence in the form of heavy pushing, punching or infliction of pain. Indeed, the violence was, in reality, the strong restraint against Mr Cuthbertson's own force of pulling away. Then SC McArthur pushed him from the carriage holding his arm. That Mr Cuthbertson's behaviour was disrespectful rising to a degree of provocation and satisfying the term used by Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs "smart arse" does not lessen his entitlement to compensation for ordinary damages of the assault; but is a discounting factor for consideration of aggravated and exemplary damages of the assault in the vestibule.
Mr Cuthbertson was assaulted again by SC McArthur when proceeding unlawfully with the second arrest, he grabbed Mr Cuthbertson by the arms and using force placed him upon the stanchion seat. There had been the period which I identified when the Senior Constables were within the vestibule of the train and the plaintiffs were upon the platform for SC McArthur to have considered his action. The effect of the "smart arse" conduct of Mr Cuthbertson in the vestibule had expired by the commencement of that second assault in the process of the wrongful second arrest. Mr Cuthbertson's protests of innocence were well-founded from the voicing of the second arrest through the balance of the transaction between himself and the Senior Constables. His shouting that SC McArthur was acting as a "tough guy" was not unreasonable resistance to unlawful police action including the man-handling of him in the train vestibule and on the platform.
The pointing of the O.C. canister at Mr Cuthbertson was employment of unnecessary force. Mr Cuthbertson conceded that he did not have an immediate fear that SC McArthur would deploy the spray because SC McArthur did not voice an immediate threat but rather a warning that he could deploy the spray if Mr Cuthbertson was physically oppositional. In that way, on the facts of this case, the O.C. spray was not, in my view, of equal threat to imminent use of a weapon. Nevertheless, as recognised by Nielson DCJ in Randall v State of New South Wales [2013] NSWDC 277 at [88], the O.C. canister was a weapon with potential for use in assault. Pointing of it at Mr Cuthbertson's face from one metre away, particularly in the circumstances that he was seated with his back against the metal pylon of the stanchion in a physically calm deportment with his feet out in from of him and not in any way in a body position "loaded" for physical opposition; was clearly an interference with his personal dignity and caused him a sense of unsafety. This was in a public place albeit there were no persons other than his friend Mr Fletcher to witness it.
[27]
Cuthbertson's Claim for Recovery of Legal Costs
Mr Cuthbertson defended the charges of assault an officer and resist an officer while in the execution of his duty contrary to section 58 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). At first instance, in the Local Court, he was convicted but he was successful in his appeal against conviction in the District Court. Mr Cuthbertson concedes that he would not be entitled to recover his costs in defending the criminal proceedings, had he been charged with assault, alone, and not also with the offence of resisting a police officer in the execution of his duty.
The amount of the legal costs claimed by Mr Cuthbertson is $91,367.75 being the total of costs and disbursements set out in two invoices issued to him by his solicitors in the criminal proceedings, Messrs Foott Law and Co (the "law practice") on 16 December 2014 in relation to the Local Court and District Court criminal proceedings: Exhibits L and R. Those invoices do not distinguish between the costs relating to the assault and the resist charges. There is no evidence whether or not the bill was fair and reasonable, other than the unchallenged inference arising from a normal experience that licensed practicing solicitors, Senior Counsel and junior counsel would bill appropriately.
The parties agree the following points:
1. The provisions of the Legal Professions Act 2004 NSW (LPA) apply;
2. Mr Cuthbertson and the law practice did not enter into a Costs Agreement which complied with the mandatory provisions of the LPA for a Costs Agreement to be enforceable by the law practice; and
3. The law practice did not provide Mr Cuthbertson with costs disclosure as required by Part 3.2, Division 3 of the LPA.
The defendant submitted that Mr Cuthbertson's claim for costs as special damages should be dismissed for three reasons:
1. First, Mr Cuthbertson did not prove on the balance of probabilities that he suffered loss in respect of the legal costs of the criminal proceedings because:
1. The legal costs have not been paid by Mr Cuthbertson;
2. Further, Mr Cuthbertson did not prove that he incurred liability in respect of those costs because:
a. The evidence did not establish that Mr Cuthbertson entered into costs agreements with the law practice on the terms set out in the unsigned documents of the law practice dated 3 December 2013 and 26 May 2014 (Exhibits H and P) - the purported Costs Agreements, or on any other terms;
b. Alternatively, any costs agreement entered into between the law practice and Mr Cuthbertson included a term that he was not required to pay legal costs of the Local Court and District Court criminal proceedings unless and until those legal costs were recovered as damages in a civil claim against the State of New South Wales arising out of the arrest on 8 September 2013. On this basis, it follows that:
i. Those agreements are void by reason of sections 323 and 327 of the LPA;
ii. Alternatively, if the agreements were valid (which the defendant denied), Mr Cuthbertson's liability to pay legal costs under those agreements was conditional or contingent on this Court awarding damages in respect of those costs in these proceedings, and that conditional contingency has not been fulfilled;
1. Further and alternatively, Mr Cuthbertson did not prove that he was liable to make restitution for legal services provided by the law practice on a quantum meruit basis because his receipt of those services without payment did not constitute unjust enrichment in circumstances where he was told that the law practice would not require payment until the costs were recovered as damages in civil proceedings, and that has not occurred;
2. Further and alternatively, even if Mr Cuthbertson has incurred liability in respect of the legal costs, he is not required to pay those legal costs because:
a. The law practice failed to make the disclosures required by sections 309 to 311 and 316 LPA, with the result that Mr Cuthbertson is not required to pay the legal costs, and the law practice cannot maintain proceedings against him to recover those costs, unless they have been assessed: section 317 LPA,
1. The legal costs have not been assessed.
1. Secondly, even if it is found that Mr Cuthbertson has suffered a loss in respect of the legal costs in the criminal proceedings (which the defendant disputed), any such loss was not recoverable as damages in this civil proceeding in any event because it was not the natural and probable consequence of the alleged assault and false imprisonment.
2. Thirdly, even if the Court found that Mr Cuthbertson has suffered a loss in respect of the legal costs of the criminal proceedings (which the defendant disputed) and that such loss was recoverable in this civil proceeding (which the defendant also disputed), Mr Cuthbertson adduced no evidence of the quantum of that loss
See defendant written submissions 5 June 2017 at [7].
[28]
Consideration of Claim for Costs of the Criminal Proceedings
Mr Fahey was a principal solicitor at the law practice and was responsible for the conduct of the criminal proceedings in the Local Court and, on appeal, in the District Court. He gave evidence of receiving instructions, forwarding of "Costs Agreements" of the law practice, receipt of counsels' fee disclosures, billings and evidence of his conversations with Mr Cuthbertson regarding payment of legal costs in the criminal proceedings.
By written submissions dated 8 June 2017 Mr Cuthbertson conceded that the law practice costs disclosure was deficient in relation to disclosing matters required by section 310 LPA and that the "Costs Agreements" were deficient and thus void by virtue of the "Costs Agreements" lacking a signature of a responsible solicitor of the law practice pursuant to section 327(1) LPA.
The plaintiff submitted that neither the failure to disclose as required by the LPA, nor that the "Costs Agreement" was "void" pursuant to the provision of the LPA extinguished a liability for those costs. The plaintiff submits that in respect of the "void" "Costs Agreements", the costs were recoverable pursuant to section 319(1)(c) LPA. The plaintiff submitted that "nowhere in the scheme of the LPA does the liability for costs cease to exist by virtue of deficiencies in the costs disclosure or costs agreement requirements".
At a date not identified in the evidence but prior to the 20th of November 2013 Mr Cuthbertson provided initial instructions to Mr Fahey at the law practice in regard to the Court Attendance Notices which he received in relation to the offences. Mr Fahey said he discussed the charges with Mr Cuthbertson, Mr Cuthbertson paid $1000 at some early stage on account of costs. On 20 November 2013 Mr Cuthbertson entered his plea of not guilty at Ryde Local Court. At some time around 3 December 2013 the law practice forwarded its "Costs Agreement" dated 3 December 2013 (Exhibit H) to Mr Cuthbertson. At about that time but in any event in the early part of the engagement of the law practice, Mr Cuthbertson informed Mr Fahey that he did not have money to pay the costs. Mr Cuthbertson continued to provide and the law practice continued to accept instructions and provide services. The "Costs Agreement" required the client (Mr Cuthbertson) to sign and return it. A signed Costs Agreement was never received from Mr Cuthbertson by the law practice.
[29]
COSTS
In Mr Fletcher's claim, the defendant has had substantial success on the issues of the struggle related to Erin and the second period of wrongful imprisonment. The defendant should pay 70% of the costs of Mr Fletcher's proceedings accordingly. Mr Cuthbertson has been largely successful in his claim and costs should follow the event.
[30]
Interest on Damages
The plaintiffs claim interest on their respective awards of damages. The damages crystallized on 8 September 2013. This requires that interest be awarded at the full rate of 4% over 4.2 years on common law damages: MBP (SA) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 657; [1991] HCA 3. Had damages awarded been assessed pursuant to the provisions of the CLA, section 18 CLA limits on interest would apply.
Damages in Mr Fletcher's case:
$11,000 x 4% per annum x 4.2 years = $1,848.
Mr Cuthbertson's case:
$34,000 x 4% per annum x 4.2 years = $5,212.
[31]
ORDERS
In Fletcher v State of New South Wales 15/00135825:
1. Judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of $12,848.
2. Defendant to pay 70% of the plaintiff's cost of the proceedings
In Cuthbertson v State of New South Wales 15/0010880:
1. Judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of $84,712.
2. Defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings.
[32]
Amendments
21 December 2017 - Paragraph 310: changed "For the first and second assaults $4,000" to "Ordinary damages for the first and second assaults and wrongful imprisonment $4,000".
[33]
Paragraph [383]: Pursuant to UCPR 36.17 "slip rule", amended interest on damages in Mr Cuthbertson's case to $3,4000 x 4% per annum x 4.2 years = $5,212. Accordingly, arithmetically the total judgment for Mr Cuthbertson in 385 calculates to $85,212.
22 December 2017 - Paragraph [385]: changed "$85,212" to "84,712".
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Decision last updated: 22 December 2017
Passenger Transport Regulation 2007, clause 55 (5) relevantly provided at the time of the incident as follows:
"(1) A driver of a public passenger vehicle or train or an authorised officer may direct a person to leave, or not to enter, a public passenger vehicle or train if the driver or authorised officer is of the opinion that:
(a) …
(b) the person is otherwise causing, or is likely to cause, inconvenience to other passengers or to the driver of the public passenger vehicle or train (whether because the person is under the influence of alcohol or another drug, or for any other reason), or
(c) the person is committing an offence under this Regulation in or on the public passenger vehicle or train, or
(d) …
(2) …
(3) …
(4) …
(5) A person who refuses or fails to comply with a direction given under this clause may be removed from the relevant public passenger vehicle, train, premises or monorail works by an authorised officer."
The parties agreed that Senior Constables Walker and McArthur were at all relevant times "authorised officers" for the purposes of cl 55 (5).
Late in the case the plaintiff abandoned opposition to the lawfulness of SC Walker's direction for Mr Fletcher to leave the train. Senior Counsel (at Transcript Day 1, page 23) for the defendant at the end of the plaintiff opening which included the viewing of CCTV within Exhibit A, identified the events to which Passenger Transport Regulation 2007 55 (5) (cl 55 (5)) applied to Mr Fletcher as:
1. Mr Fletcher not himself alighting when the doors opened, he having been directed by police to do so: Video 055B5981-7 at 1:47 to 1:52; and
2. Mr Fletcher putting himself partly back inside the train when he lifted Erin into the train: Video C052 at 0:40 to 0:48.
To the latter incident, Senior Counsel for the plaintiff responded that when Mr Fletcher put his girlfriend Erin back on the train, he moved to the platform and it was several steps in events after his lifting Erin onto the train that SC Walker yanked Mr Fletcher away.
Mr Fletcher seeks ordinary damages to compensate him for the alleged assault and trespass upon his person and consequent fear and distress, as well as for humiliation and damage to his reputation, and damages for wrongful imprisonment.
In addition, he seeks aggravated damages and exemplary damages.
By Amended Statement of Claim filed 24 October 2016, Mr Cuthbertson pleads two allegations of unlawful arrest by SC McArthur. The arrests are identified at [6] and [10] by place and time of occurrence. The first arrest is alleged to have occurred when Mr Cuthbertson was physically restrained depriving him of his liberty and detained against his will when standing in the vestibule area of the carriage as the train neared Eastwood Station. The second arrest is alleged to have occurred when Mr Cuthbertson was on the platform at Eastwood Station. Mr Cuthbertson alleges that each arrest contravened or was performed in absence of the lawful power of arrest conferred upon SC McArthur as a police officer.
In opening, Senior Counsel for Mr Cuthbertson put the unlawful arrest allegation in the description of separate incidents but also in the description, of a continuum. At Day 1, Transcript page 6, line 30 to line 38, Senior Counsel for Mr Cuthbertson said:
"It is the plaintiff's case that that arrest was unlawful for the reasons I have already adumbrated. Whether or not that arrest was a continuing transaction or whether there was a distinct further arrest is really of no moment if your Honour finds that the justification for Constable McArthur's actions were poisoned at the root. But even if your Honour were to find that the first arrest had been lawful, we will ultimately submit there would have been no basis for the second arrest in the circumstances as we apprehend would be described by Constable McArthur and indeed by the plaintiffs themselves."
Mr Cuthbertson puts his case for wrongful imprisonment in the alternative, that if his arrest was lawful; then he was falsely imprisoned when SC McArthur and/or SC Walker detained him for an unnecessary and unlawful period of time (at [8 (b)] and [12 (b)]).
Whereas Mr Cuthbertson's Statement of Claim pleads that he was wrongfully imprisoned for around 30 minutes (at [13]) whilst he was detained against his will and deprived of his liberty, in final written submissions the period was reduced to 12 minutes.
By Defence to Amended Statement of Claim filed on 24 October 2016, the defendant admits the first arrest (at [4 (a)]) and says that the arrest was lawful, being for assault on SC McArthur by Mr Cuthbertson. The defendant admits that when arrested Mr Cuthbertson was detained against his will, but otherwise denies the allegations (at [5]). The defendant admits the second arrest by SC McArthur on the platform shortly after Mr Cuthbertson was removed from the train, but denies at [11] and [12] that the arrest was unlawful.
The defendant at [7] pleads that the arrests were pursuant to s 99 (2) LEPRA identifying the bases as SC McArthur having reasonable grounds to suspect that Mr Cuthbertson had committed the offences of:
1. assault officer in execution of duty pursuant to s 58 Crimes Act 1900; and
2. resist officer in execution of duty pursuant to s 58 Crimes Act 1900.
Further, the defendant pleaded that pursuant to s 99 (3) LEPRA, SC McArthur was not restrained from making the arrests because he had reasonable grounds to suspect that it was necessary to arrest Mr Cuthbertson in order to:
1. ensure his attendance at Court; and to
2. prevent a repetition or continuation of the offence or the commission of another offence.
At Defence [13] and [14], Mr Cuthbertson's allegation of wrongful imprisonment is denied by the defendant, and Mr Cuthbertson's allegations of its duration, before "release" from detention against liberty (Amended Statement of Claim at [13] and [14]) are put in issue.
Mr Cuthbertson's first allegation of assault and trespass to his person ("assault" allegations) (Amended Statement of Claim at [15] and [16]) is pleaded as having occurred in the vestibule of the carriage. It is particularised as follows:
"(a) McArthur grabbed the plaintiff by the shirt/body and pushed/flung him about the vestibule area;
(b) Walker grabbed the plaintiff by the arm and pulled the plaintiff towards the rear of the carriage; and
(c) McArthur, while still holding the plaintiff, forcefully pushed the plaintiff off the train onto the platform without consent;"
The Defendant wholly denies those vestibule allegations. In addition, the defence (at [15 (b)]) response is that SC McArthur and SC Walker in the vestibule and on removing Mr Cuthbertson to the platform employed reasonable force pursuant to ss 230 and 231 LEPRA.
Mr Cuthbertson, at Amended Statement of Claim at [17] and [18], pleads a second assault and allegation by SC McArthur and SC Walker. In relation to this assault, Mr Cuthbertson pleads the following particulars:
"(a) The plaintiff was:
(i) pushed;
(ii) forced backwards;
(iii) grabbed;
(iv) pulled;
(v) shoved;
(vi) manhandled;
by either or both Police Officers; and
(vii) threatened with OC Capsicum Spray; and
(viii) patted down by McArthur without his consent."
In relation to both assault allegations, the plaintiff pleads at Amended Statement of Claim [19]:
"If for whatever reason it is found that McArthur lawfully touched the plaintiff, it is pleaded that he assaulted the plaintiff by using excessive and/or unnecessary force on the plaintiff."
The Defence to Amended Statement of Claim at [19A] denies the use of excessive or unnecessary force, and pleads that such force as was used was reasonable pursuant to the provisions of ss 230 and 231 LEPRA.
In further expression of response to the allegation of wrongful imprisonment, at [20B] the Defence to Amended Statement of Claim pleads that the restraint and detention by police was exercised upon reasonable grounds, believing that Mr Cuthbertson was or was about to breach the peace.
The Defence to Amended Statement of Claim at [20A] expands the defence response of reasonable force as follows:
"(a) McArthur was acting in self-defence in response of the plaintiff striking McArthur.
(b) McArthur feared for his own safety and feared a further assault from the plaintiff.
(c) McArthur's response to being struck by the plaintiff was reasonable in the circumstances as perceived by him."
Mr Cuthbertson seeks ordinary damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages. The Defence to Amended Statement of Claim denies those claims.
This approach, which I adopt, is not like that criticised by Tobias JA in Blacktown City Council v Hocking where his Honour considered the trial Judge to have made findings based upon her interpretation of photographs of a Telstra pit in the absence of expert evidence as to what the photographs depicted and what conclusions could be drawn from them (at [86]-[88], [145]-[172] and particularly at [170]).
During the hearing it was acknowledge by Senior Counsel for the parties and myself that each of us would consider the CCTV footage in Exhibit A when away from the Courtroom. In that process there was nothing to be viewed which was not evidence in the open forum and the forensic contest. In my view, for all these reasons, the CCTV footage contains evidence which the Court is free to consider in determination of the factual contest: see Kassem v Crossley & Anor; Kassem v Kraym & Anor [2000] NSWCA 276.
Whilst bearing in mind that the CCTV record omits what was said by Mr Cuthbertson, Mr Fletcher, SC Walker, and SC McArthur, the CCTV footage is valuable and objective evidence depicting the context in which those actions of the police officers complained of occurred and in which the police officers formed their states of mind at the times of taking action in claimed exercise of their authority.
In my opinion, it would be unreal to assess the exercise of discretion to use force by the Senior Constables and to detain each of the plaintiffs by focusing only on the filmed evidence of the transaction. To do so would rob from consideration the required appreciation of the police officers' perceptions of suspicion and belief drawn from the course of the transaction up to the time upon which the officers determined to take each action complained of.
In oral evidence, the officers described the conduct of Messrs Fletcher and Cuthbertson with terms such as "erratic" and "aggressive".
The CCTV footage is of particular value in three ways:
1. firstly, the film permits close examination of important moments of physical confrontation, much like replay, including at slow motion, of a sporting event;
2. secondly, the film provides a visual record of behaviour of the participants and therefore visual evidence of events known to SC McArthur and SC Walker at the times of their respective exercises of power including of arrest, detention and use of force; and
3. the visual record displays the physical environment to be taken into account when determining between conflicting accounts of what was said.
The CCTV footage is silent and therefore what was said between participants must be determined on the oral evidence. In this regard, the credibility and reliability of witnesses is important in the Court's preference for evidence of one witness over another where the evidence of what was said was not consistent. This determination is assisted by observation of physical movement available on CCTV footage. For example, the hunching of shoulders and projection of chest and forceful pointing of arm, as well as the expression of face and movement of face, neck and mouth can be observed to indicate physical effort employed when things were said, and the body language of aggression or pacificity and other physically observable mannerisms in between.
I agree with the submission at [14] of the defendant's Written Submissions dated 18 May 2017 which reads:
"However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the whole of the relevant events occurred during a period of approximately 2 minutes in the vestibule of the train, and approximately 13 minutes and 30 seconds on the platform of Eastwood Railway Station, and the physical interaction between the officers and the plaintiffs was limited to approximately 17 seconds in the vestibule of the train, and periods of 43 seconds, 38 seconds and 49 seconds on the platform of Eastwood Railway Station."
At the outset, my general observation is that the CCTV footage causes me to observe that the physical confrontation between the police officers and the plaintiffs occurred first at the time when the train was coming to a complete stop at Eastwood Railway Station and the doors were opening. At that point SC McArthur grabbed Mr Cuthbertson by the arm when Mr Cuthbertson raised his right arm and attempted to move toward the open door and the outside.
From that moment, the body language of the transaction is generally heated between both plaintiffs and both police officers. Mr Fletcher's then girlfriend, Ms Spence, who I will refer to by her first name "Erin", as did the witnesses (the young woman wearing a white skirt) inserted herself into the transaction between the four principal players, and in particular engaged physically with Mr Fletcher.
I accept, as was the evidence, that the Senior Constables perceived a risk of injury to police and to others in the environment of two adult males, both under the influence of alcohol, when there were only two police officers present. The CCTV footage visualises that physical equation.
Civil liberty being preciously protected in our society, the necessity required by s 99 (3) LEPRA is met if the arresting police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that arrest needed to be actioned or could not be dispensed with in order to ensure achievement of one or more of the purposes listed in that sub-section.
The arresting officer's exercise of his discretion to arrest must be within these parameters, otherwise the arrest will be unlawful: Zavarinos v State of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 320 at [24].
Section 53 CLA provides that where the defendant is successful in the subjective "belief" limb but not in regard to the objective test, "reasonable response" limb of s 52, limited damages may be available where the Court is satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional, and in those circumstances, a failure to award damages would be harsh and unjust.
In Prior v Mole [2017] HCA 10, the High Court considered the conferral of power under s128 (1) Police Administration Act (NT) on a member of the Police Force of the Northern Territory to apprehend without warrant a person who the police officer has reasonable grounds for believing is intoxicated. The power was further conditioned on the police officer having reasonable grounds for believing that because of the person's intoxication, the person was unable to care for themself.
In that case, in the mid-afternoon of New Year's Eve 2013, Mr Prior was apprehended under s128 (1) by a police officer because the officer believed that Mr Prior was intoxicated in a public place, and because of his intoxication, that Mr Prior might intimidate, alarm or cause substantial annoyance to people and that it was likely he would commit the offence of drinking in a regulated place or disorderly behaviour.
In the present case the defence must satisfy the Court that SC McArthur when effecting arrest, held the suspicion that Mr Cuthbertson had committed an offence (s 99(2) LEPRA). SC McArthur could not proceed to arrest without warrant unless at that time he also held the suspicion that it was necessary to do so for the stated purposes in s 99 (3) (a) or (b). The facts and circumstances known to the police officer must, in order for the defence to succeed, have constituted objectively reasonable grounds for those suspicions.
In Prior v Mole (supra), the High Court applied the description of the state of mind of "belief" elucidated in George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26. It is not irrational or unreasonable for a police officer in arriving at his belief when predicting what a person may do or continue to do, to take into account his experience of observing patterns of human behaviour: Prior v Mole (supra) per Keifel and Bell JJ at [18] and [20]. The same rationale must apply to the police officer arriving at his "suspicion".
"Belief" is more than "suspicion". They are different states of mind: George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26 at [13].
"Suspicion" is a state of mind of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking. Facts which would reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient to reasonably ground a belief. Yet a suspicion that something exists or that something occurred is more than a mere idle wondering whether or not it exists or occurred, it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or fear that something exists or occurred: George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26 at [14];
In Prior v Mole, Gageler J at [24] explained that the objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists. He said that the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. "Belief" is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture. His Honour included in the relevant circumstances, information provided to the police officer by someone else.
In the first instance, the Court looks to the mind of the member of the police force who purported to exercise the power and answers the questions:
1. what was his suspicion or belief?; and
2. what were the objective circumstances by reference to which he formed that suspicion or belief?; and
3. did those objective circumstances provide a sufficient foundation for a reasonable person to form the requisite state of mind, being suspicion or belief, respectively?
applying to this case the approach of Gageler J in Prior v Mole (supra) at [25] to [27].
In order for the defendant to succeed in the defences of self-defence, pursuant to s 52 CLA and at common law, conduct of the plaintiffs to which the Senior Constables responded must have been unlawful, and if it was; then, the test is whether police believed, on reasonable grounds, that it was necessary in self-defence to do what they did. The above definition of "belief" found in George v Rockett (supra) is the standard of the subjective state of mind required for by the defence. The proportionality of the police officer's response to the harm threatened is a factor to be taken into account in the application of that test, but it is not inherently determinative.
The question, whether or not the force used was both necessary and proportionate to the threat faced, must be determined in context of the environment in which the exercise of power occurred. State of New South Wales v McMaster (supra) involved consideration of the police officer's perception when reacting in a critical incident scenario. Applying George v Rockett (supra) the Court of Appeal observed that in order to make out the defence, "it is not necessary that the objective circumstances establish that the subject matter, … the threat or likelihood of harm to [the police officer or other person being protected by the police officer], in fact existed. The relevant belief may be based on surmise or conjecture": State of New South Wales v McMaster (supra) at [183].
In Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic.) (1987) 162 CLR 645; [1987] HCA 26, the High Court when commenting upon the Judge's direction to a jury in a criminal proceeding; observed the danger of excessively intense focus in an abstract manner of what might be considered an overly microscopic identification of evidence of actions in the subject matter of the struggle out of which the self-defence plea arises.
Throughout this hearing, I regularly referred the parties to my concern that the "flood" of information available by the CCTV footage could, when applied with too precise an analysis, distract from a real interpretation of the events shown.
Without meaning to trivialize the importance of these issues, illustration of the point is found in post incident replay of review of referee decisions during sports broadcasting. It is plain from the above authorities that the Senior Constables' states of mind are to be reviewed on the basis of their perceptions in the agony of the moment. Like the on-field sports referee, they did not have the benefit of slow motion replay on CCTV footage.
At [18], the High Court in Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic.) (supra) said:
"When upon the evidence the question of self-defence arises, the trial Judge should in his charge to the jury place the question in its factual setting, identifying those considerations which may assist the jury to reach its conclusion. In attempting to identify those considerations in any abstract manner here, there is a danger of appearing to elevate matters of evidence to rules of law. For example, it will in many cases be appropriate for a jury to be told that, in determining whether the accused believed that his actions were necessary in order to defend himself and whether he held that belief on reasonable grounds, it should consider whether the force used by the accused was proportionate to the threat offered.
However, the whole of the circumstances should be considered, of which the degree of force used may be only part. There is no rule which dictates the use which the jury must make of the evidence and the ultimate question is for it alone. The trial Judge should also offer such assistance by way of comment as is called for in the particular case. No doubt, it will often also be desirable to remind the jury that in the context of self-defence, it should approach its task in a practical manner and without undue nicety, giving proper weight to the predicament of the accused which may have afforded little, if any, opportunity for calm deliberation or detached reflection."
In the Court of Appeal in State of New South Wales v McMaster (supra), Beazley P at [166] held that the formulation by the High Court in Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic.) (supra) was equally applicable in civil cases, and was in apparent favour of the desirability of approaching a decision about self-defence in that practical manner. The President adopted the State's submission (at [156]) of a two-stage test in determination of a self-defence argument, the first stage involving subjective requirements and the second stage involving objective requirements, as follows:
"(1) Did the person believe subjectively that it was necessary to do what he did in self-defence?
(2) If the person did so believe, did he do so on reasonable grounds?"
As to the second limb, with reference to Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic.) (supra), the President said that the test required that the defendant's belief be reasonably held according to the definition of belief set out above from George v Rockett; and Prior v Mole (supra).
Following the President's adoption of the principles for determination of the question of self-defence to be applied in civil cases; relevant for the present case is the further passage of the High Court judgment extracted from [19]:
"Where an accused person raising a plea of self-defence was the original aggressor and induced or provoked the assault against which he claims the right to defend himself, it will be for the jury to consider whether the original aggression had ceased so as to have enabled the accused to form a belief, upon reasonable grounds, that his actions were necessary in self-defence. For this purpose, it will be relevant to consider the extent to which the accused declined further conflict and quit the use of force or retreated from it, these being matters which may bear upon the nature of the occasion and the use which the accused made of it. Indeed, even in circumstances in which the accused was not the original aggressor, retreat in the face of a threat of violence before resort to force may be relevant to the belief of the accused or the reasonableness of the grounds upon which the accused based his belief. There is, however, no longer any rule that the accused must have retreated as far as possible before attempting to defend himself. It is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in determining whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that what he did was necessary in self-defence [authority omitted]."
As briefly referred to above, in chief Mr Fletcher gave evidence that SC McArthur had said to him "That's it mate, you're off the fucking train". In cross-examination, Mr Fletcher first conceded that he could not recall the words spoken by SC McArthur, and subsequently conceded that by giving evidence that SC McArthur used that expletive, without any recollection of him having done so, he had lied: Transcript Day 1, page 34, lines 20 to 3; Transcript Day 3, page 127, line 5 to page 129, line 41.
Mr Fletcher in fact conceded that he was unable to recall most of what was said in the conversations that night at Transcript Day 2, pages 126 to 127, line 11. At Transcript Day 2, page 126, line 16, he said "I don't recall many words said that night, honestly".
On the whole, I cannot accept his evidence as reliable as to the spoken part of the transaction between the plaintiffs and the police.
I formed the view that Mr Fletcher possessed little actual recollection of events, independent of providing an interpretation of that which he saw on the CCTV footage. In particular, his recollection of what was said was so unreliable that it cannot be accepted whenever there is contrary evidence. I did not consider him to be deliberately untruthful. In my view, his answers showed him to be in a confusion of mind resulting from lack of ability to recall. Indeed, I formed the view that he was not within himself confident as to what facts he did recall, and what facts he was reconstructing following reference to the CCTV footage.
Mr Cuthbertson gave unreliable evidence describing events in the vestibule including his struggle with SC McArthur in the vestibule. This was a significant event. It was the time of action related to the first arrest for which he sues. It was the first physical engagement between the Senior Constables and the plaintiffs. He sued for assault in the struggle.
The CCTV footage, plainly shows that the energy involved in Mr Cuthbertson being swung when restrained by SC McArthur in the vestibule, following the first arrest, came from his pulling away. Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs, in final submissions, agreed that when SC McArthur grabbed hold of Mr Cuthbertson's hand, Mr Cuthbertson was side on to the officer and the door, stepping off his right leg, and with his hip and weight toward the opening door, with his left leg raised in the stride to get out. Senior Counsel for the plaintiff agreed that the informal but proper term was that Mr Cuthbertson was attempting to "scarper" out the door.
Anchored by SC McArthur's grip, Mr Cuthbertson's momentum swung him back into the vestibule. It is apparent when the CCTV footage is paused at about the moment of his rearward collision with SC Walker. It can be seen that his body weight is leaning back against the restraint of SC McArthur. After that, SC McArthur follows him and together they walk further into the vestibule before he is, with restraint and pushing, removed from the train by SC McArthur.
During cross-examination on Day 5, between Transcript pages 286 and 289, Mr Cuthbertson gave answers immediately after his having been shown that CCTV footage. His answers are inconsistent with that footage, as follows:
At Transcript page 286, line 8, he says that he was not upset with Mr Fletcher being removed from the train yet, in the vestibule and within a few seconds of the first arrest, it can be seen that he raised his right arm to push away SC McArthur's hand which happened to be in front of him only because SC McArthur was gesturing during conversation with Mr Fletcher (that it was only a gesture, Mr Cuthbertson conceded at Transcript page 285, line 45). Only a few questions before, Mr Cuthbertson had denied brushing away SC McArthur's hand saying "That did not happen, no": Transcript page 285, lines 21 to 27. The brushing away of SC McArthur's hand appears offensive in the CCTV footage, at least in the sense of discourteous or rude, and perhaps belligerent. Immediately afterward, Mr Cuthbertson placed his right hand on his hip so that his elbow is pointed at SC McArthur. The vision is inconsistent with his claim that he was not upset. Indeed, in my opinion, his body language displays an oppositional attitude which was visible to the Senior Constables.
At Transcript page 286, lines 9 to 14, Mr Cuthbertson denied that he was even thinking about the inconvenience of getting off the train at Eastwood Railway Station to accompany Mr Fletcher. Plainly at that early hour of the morning, it would be normal for someone to regret and to be thinking about the inconvenience of having to get off at the station and wait for the next train to the Central Coast.
Having immediately before being shown the CCTV footage of the first arrest and ensuing struggle in the vestibule, and being directed to answer questions about what he actually remembered, not about what he had just seen (Transcript page 288, line 45), Mr Cuthbertson repeatedly denied that he pulled away from SC McArthur. Giving that narrative, against what plainly the CCTV footage shows to have occurred; he maintained in his answers expressions which indicated to me that he was answering in his narrative as opposed to either his recollection or that which he from the CCTV footage knew to be correct. He answered:
at Transcript page 288, line 49:
"I wouldn't have pulled away, no. I didn't pull away."
at Transcript page 289, line 4:
"Yeah. I was under arrest, I wasn't pulling away."
and he gave the following answer at Day 5, Transcript page 289, lines 6 to 9:
Q. I suggest to you that you did pull away, and you pulled in the direction of the opening carriage doors?
A. That didn't happen.
In this way, Mr Cuthbertson attempted to exaggerate the force applied by SC McArthur by refusing to acknowledge his own pulling.
A most central component of Mr Cuthbertson's complaints against the police concerned his being lifted from a sitting position on the platform. This event in the course of the transaction occurred after he had joined Mr Fletcher who was sitting on the platform. Previously the Senior Constables had separated Mr Fletcher and Mr Cuthbertson. SC Walker was dealing with Mr Fletcher and SC McArthur was dealing with Mr Cuthbertson.
On being asked by SC Walker to stand up and move away from Mr Fletcher, Mr Cuthbertson put his arm around Mr Fletcher.
The CCTV footage plainly shows that SC McArthur reached down with his right arm and held Mr Cuthbertson by his left upper arm (see Exhibits A5 and A6). Mr Cuthbertson struggled against SC McArthur's effort to remove him from his seated position to place him, away from Fletcher, on a seat at the base of the stanchion, from which he had moved when under SC McArthur's control beforehand.
Mr Cuthbertson gave evidence that SC McArthur had lifted him under each armpit and had pinched his flesh such as to leave the marks shown in the photographs contained in Exhibit T. Mr Cuthbertson's evidence in chief was as follows (Transcript Day 5, page 270, line 9 to line 30):
Q. Before that happened, did Senior Constable McArthur say anything to you?
A. Not that I can recall, no.
Q. You said, by grabbing you by the arm, am I correct about that?
A. Yep.
Q. In what fashion?
A. Well, he grabbed me, under both of my arms, by my skin, through my shirt.
Q. "By your skin"?
A. Yeah.
Q. You're indicating with your hands, is that how it happened?
A. Yeah, he had me like that, but it was on my skin, not around my arm, if that makes sense.
Q. As you've given that evidence, you've indicated closing your fists?
A. Yes. That's how he would have had me, like that and lifting me straight up, by my skin.
Q. How did that feel?
A. No, that hurt a lot. I was bruised and scarred from that
.
and during cross-examination at Transcript Day 5, page 302, line 10 to page 303, line 7:
Q. You gave some evidence earlier today about Senior Constable McArthur lifting you up whilst you were sitting on the ground next to Mr Fletcher, do you recall giving evidence about that?
A. Yes.
Q. I suggest to you that Senior Constable McArthur put one of his hands under your left arm in order to lift you up?
A. Yes, and he put his other hand under my right arm as well.
Q. I suggest to you that Senior Constable McArthur used only one hand under your left arm to lift you up?
A. That is not what happened, no.
Q. I put to you that Senior Constable McArthur did not lift you or grab you by the skin?
A. He lifted me up by the skin.
Q. I am putting to you that he simply slid his hand under your left armpit and lifted you without grabbing your skin?
A. That is not what happened.
Q. Once you were standing up, you started thrashing your arms around, didn't you?
A. No.
HIS HONOUR
Q. What was that, a yes or no?
A. No.
WILLIAMS
Q. You started moving your arms around, didn't you, Mr Cuthbertson?
A. Yes, they were moving.
Q. Moving them in a vigorous manner?
A. I was getting thrown around again, yes, so they were being moved around quite vigorously.
Q. Mr Cuthbertson, I suggest you were not getting thrown around at this point in time, you had simply been lifted from a seated position to a standing position?
A. I was lifted by my skin, under my arm.
Q. As I put to you earlier, you were not lifted by your skin, you were lifted by the use of one hand by Senior Constable McArthur pressing under your left armpit?
A. That is incorrect.
Exhibit T photographs show bruising only of the right upper arm and armpit. The CCTV footage shows SC McArthur only taking hold of the left arm. There is no contact between SC McArthur and Mr Cuthbertson's right arm. The CCTV footage in Exhibits A5 and A6 does not show a gripped holding-on of Mr Cuthbertson's left upper arm by SC McArthur.
On the whole, having carefully observed Mr Cuthbertson give his evidence, I found his testimony to be so unreliable as to be not accepted unless corroborated by other evidence. Mr Cuthbertson gave exaggerated evidence of forceful action by SC McArthur upon him.
In closing submissions, I took counsel for the parties to the CCTV footage of SC McArthur stepping off the train with SC Walker and engaging with Mr Cuthbertson and Mr Fletcher on the platform, that being the events in relation to which the above evidence was given. In particular, I drew counsel's attention to Mr Fletcher stepping between SC McArthur and Mr Cuthbertson as SC McArthur stepped off the train in the direction of Mr Cuthbertson, and that at that time SC McArthur's arm is not reached out to Mr Cuthbertson, but is bent at the elbow such as to be simply across his own chest. I received no opposition from counsel to that description of the CCTV footage. The CCTV footage is therefore consistent with SC McArthur stepping off the train to approach Mr Cuthbertson to ask for his identification, and inconsistent with an immediate intention to place hands upon Mr Cuthbertson to physically seize him. The footage is Exhibit A5 at 0:50.
However, as will be seen later in these reasons, I reject SC McArthur's evidence of that he was assaulted by Mr Cuthbertson in the vestibule. I do not accept SC McArthur's evidence that Mr Cuthbertson backhanded him to the chest causing a slight sting. The CCTV evidence is to the contrary. This conclusion means that the first and second arrests were unlawful.
As will be seen later in these reasons, I also do not accept SC McArthur's evidence that Mr Cuthbertson threw a closed fist punch at him. SC McArthur deployed his O.C. spray canister and pointed it at Mr Cuthbertson. His claimed justification for pointing the O.C. spray was his claim of the punch. The CCTV of precisely what Mr Cuthbertson's waiving arms were doing is not clear. Mr Cuthbertson denied punching and I find the evidence does not support more probably than not, that Mr Cuthbertson closed his fist and punched.
I am concerned that SC McArthur was willing to exaggerate description of events, in order to justify his two very serious actions of what was "man-handling" Mr Cuthbertson in the vestibule and of deploying his O.C. spray canister.
From about 0.40, young women (who in the evidence are identified by first names "Gabbi" and "Erin") are in the vestibule on the western side (opposite the side where the Senior Constables and plaintiffs are). Gabbi was the person whose birthday the plaintiffs had attended in Kings Cross. Erin was Mr Fletcher's girlfriend.
Between about 0:45 and1:00, there appears to be rocking of the carriage and SC Walker takes a step to his right to place his feet wider apart than they were previously. The plaintiff describes this as moving closer to Mr Fletcher. SC Walker appears to be looking downward, with his hands in front. His back is to the camera. It is not apparent from the video that he deliberately moves to be closer to Mr Fletcher. He may have moved just to establish balance.
Mr Fletcher's face is turned as if talking to SC McArthur, which would be consistent with SC McArthur's evidence.
Between 0:43 and 0:50, Mr Cuthbertson moves his hands, and in particular his right hand, and is seen to be speaking to the Senior Constables to his right. SC Walker's back is to the camera, and SC McArthur cannot be seen much at all beyond SC Walker. It is not discernible who was speaking to whom.
At about 1:00, other passengers in the carriage move out of the vestibule.
At about 1:15, Mr Fletcher is moving about with more apparent energy.
At 1:21, Mr Fletcher's left hand is pointed directly out and SC Walker has stepped back, perhaps another metre, to beyond the mid-way across the vestibule.
At 1:20 to 1:24, the plaintiff identifies as when "McArthur puts left hand up to the chest area of Cuthbertson". In opening, Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs described this movement as provocative. It was put in opening and in cross-examination to SC McArthur that he was standing over Mr Cuthbertson and put his hand across Mr Cuthbertson's chest. Mr Cuthbertson's evidence was that SC McArthur made him feel uncomfortable by standing so close as to be in his personal space. Mr Cuthbertson said that SC McArthur's hand did not touch his chest. In closing the plaintiff conceded that SC McArthur did not restrain Mr Cuthbertson at this point.
At 1:21, the CCTV footage plainly shows that SC McArthur is not even looking in Mr Cuthbertson's direction when his left hand momentarily is in front of and close to Mr Cuthbertson's right shoulder and distal pectoral region. The hand is not accurately described as the plaintiff puts it: across Mr Cuthbertson's chest. Mr Cuthbertson is looking out the window of the train door. It would appear that neither SC McArthur nor Mr Cuthbertson is even focused on the other, let alone on SC McArthur's hand. SC McArthur is half an arm's length away from Mr Cuthbertson. He is not standing over him. He is not standing against him. SC McArthur is facing Mr Fletcher. This is entirely consistent with SC McArthur's description of what was occurring.
Continuing analysis of events in the vestibule as depicted in the CCTV footage:
At 1:24, significantly, Mr Cuthbertson has turned his face from the window to see SC McArthur's hand, and raised his arm and elbow. In response, SC McArthur has turned from Mr Fletcher to Mr Cuthbertson and moved his hand up toward his own chest. The freeze frame at 1:24 shows that the energy of action is Mr Cuthbertson to SC McArthur, not SC McArthur to Mr Cuthbertson.
At 1:25, SC McArthur has put his left hand on the bottom of the balustrade to the stair, it having been waved away by Mr Cuthbertson. Still, SC McArthur is not standing over Mr Cuthbertson. SC McArthur's posture is relaxed. His left hand is on the bottom of the rail and his right hand is resting at his waist or belt.
At 1:26, Mr Fletcher extends his left hand pointing again in the direction of Erin and Gabbi, whilst SC Walker looks on from metres away.
At 1:28, whilst SC Walker remains on the eastern side of the mid-line of the vestibule some metres from Mr Fletcher, Mr Fletcher continues to be facing in his direction and apparently doing the talking. SC McArthur appears to be looking at Mr Fletcher, still in a relaxed posture with hand on rail, whilst Mr Cuthbertson with hand on hip and right elbow out toward the side of SC McArthur, appears to be looking out the window. SC McArthur and Mr Cuthbertson have the body deportment of relaxed persons.
All participants knew that the train was close to achieving stop. In final submissions, counsel for each of the parties conceded this and reference was made to the passing of lights outside the windows slowing to a stop.
At this point, the transaction between the plaintiffs and the Senior Constables suddenly and dramatically changed.
On the defendant case, it was put that at about 1:38 to 1:41, Mr Cuthbertson suddenly turned to SC McArthur and said words to the effect and style of "Fuckin' see you later bro", backhand slapped SC McArthur on the chest, and attempted to bolt out of the just opened door. SC McArthur gave evidence that he felt a "slight sting" from the backhand slap to his chest. SC Walker said that he saw the strike. Mr Cuthbertson denied striking SC McArthur. Mr Fletcher said that he did not see any strike of SC McArthur by Mr Cuthbertson.
The defendant case is that Mr Cuthbertson assaulted SC McArthur in breach of s 58 Crimes Act 1900, SC McArthur being a police officer in the performance of his duties. The defendant put its case that SC McArthur immediately arrested Mr Cuthbertson pursuant to his power under s 99 (2) LEPRA, and physically restrained Mr Cuthbertson in order to avoid his escape and so as to obtain the particulars of his identity, as well as to prevent the continuation of his assault or prevent further offending pursuant to s 99 (3) (a) and (b) LEPRA.
Evidence was given as to what was said. [Transcript Day 1, page 36, lines 9 to 34] Mr Fletcher in chief gave the following evidence:
Q. Will you tell his Honour what you recall occurring in the vestibule of the carriage before you arrived, and as you arrived at Eastwood Station?
A. There was a general conversation between everyone in the ‑ in the carriage. As the doors was opening, that is all I seen was Mr ‑ Constable McArthur grab Drew by the, kind of the shoulder, and kind of drag him through the carriage. And then I was like, what is going on, what has happened, and I heard him saying, "You are resisting arrest, it is assault of a police officer". And I said, "What happened, I didn't see nothing". And then McArthur ‑ sorry, Mr Walker, pushed me off the train.
Q. Did you hear anything to be said by Mr Cuthbertson?
A. Not ‑ just yeah, like, "We are getting off the train", that is all I recall hearing. Like he has ‑ he has said, "I am not going to leave my mate, I am going to get off at the station with him because I am not going to leave him". I remember him ‑ I remember hearing that, and that was ‑ yeah, that was all I really recall.
Q. When you say you saw Mr Cuthbertson being dragged by the arm by Constable McArthur, what did you think of that?
A. Aggressive, very, like what has happened, what did he do.
Q. Did you do anything in response to that?
A. I was shocked more than do anything, no.
Q. In any event, you said that at some point you were pushed off the train?
A. Yes.
In cross-examination, Mr Cuthbertson denied that he was arguing with the Senior Constables. He denied having said to the Senior Constables words to the effect "I am getting off the train too, bro, he is my bro. I am not going to leave him here at the fucking train station because youse fucking kicked him off": Transcript Day 5, page 286, lines 20 to 24.
When faced with the CCTV footage of what the defendant said was a slap upon SC McArthur, Mr Cuthbertson gave the following evidence: [Transcript Day 5, page 287, line 45 to page 288, line 34]:
EXHIBIT A4 PLAYED TO COURT
Q. As the train pulled in, slowing down towards Eastwood station, you moved your right forearm and hand up towards Senior Constable McArthur's chest, didn't you?
A. It was a gesture, yes.
Q. I put to you that the gesture was a slap to the chest?
A. That didn't happen, no.
Q. I suggest to you that as you made what you refer to as that gesture, you said to Senior Constable McArthur words to this effect, "Fucking see you later, bro"?
A. No, that wasn't what was said.
Q. Something was said, is that correct?
A. Yes, there was something said.
Q. What do you say was said?
A. I said, "Don't worry about me, I'm getting off the train with my friend".
Q. I put to you that what in fact happened was, that you gave Senior Constable McArthur a backhanded slap to the chest, and said the words, "Fucking see you later, bro" in an angry tone?
A. That's not what was said, no. Or done, no.
Q. I put to you that by that gesture and by those words, by that you were expressing your anger towards Senior Constable McArthur about having to get off the train, because you wanted to stay with Mr Fletcher?
A. Like I said earlier, I wasn't disturbed at all. I, there was no worries. Was getting off with my mate, that was it.
Q. Senior Constable McArthur took you by the right arm as the train doors opened, didn't he, and said words to this effect, "You're under arrest for assault police"?
A. Yes.
Q. You then said to him, didn't you, "No, I'm fucking not", or words to that effect?
A. I don't recall that.
Mr Fletcher gave evidence consistent with the first passage of the conversation above put to Mr Cuthbertson. His focus was upon Erin during the moment the slap was alleged to have occurred. His evidence in cross-examination of the conversation leading up the moment of the alleged slap was as follows: [Transcript Day 3, page 142, line 36 to page 143, line 14]
Q. Mr Cuthbertson during this time was protesting, wasn't he, with the officers about you having to get off the train?
A. Not protesting, no.
Q. He was expressing some displeasure, wasn't he, that he would be getting off the train to stay with you?
A. Not that I know, no.
Q. Mr Cuthbertson said something along these lines, didn't he, "I'm getting off the train too, he's my bro, I'm not going to leave him here at the train station because youse kicked him off", something to that effect?
A. Something around that, yes.
Q. That was said, wasn't it, by Mr Cuthbertson in an angry tone of voice?
A. Not that I could tell, no.
Q. Whilst this was going on your focus, your attention became focussed on Erin, didn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Your attention really remained focussed on her from this point until the train pulled into Eastwood Station, didn't it?
A. Around that, yes.
Q. As the train pulled into Eastwood Station but before the door was opened Mr Cuthbertson moved his arm to slap Senior Constable McArthur with the back of his hand on Senior Constable McArthur's chest, didn't he?
A. Not that I know, I didn't see that.
SC McArthur's evidence in chief of these events was as follows: [Transcript Day 6, page 356, line 45 to page 358, line 39]
Q. What was the reason for you standing in the vestibule near Mr Cuthbertson and Mr Fletcher in the manner you have described?
A. Well, there was no reason standing Mr Cuthbertson, there was ‑ we were just escorting Mr Fletcher from the train.
Q. What, if anything, was said between the four of you, from the time that you were standing in the vestibule until shortly before the train began to slow down, arriving into Eastwood Station?
A. Well, I remember having a debate with Mr Fletcher and explaining to him why he was getting removed from the train. And that he appeared to calm down a lot, he didn't ‑ I can't remember him swearing too much once we were on the vestibule. But I remember Mr Cuthbertson, who was next to me on the left, appeared to become more agitated.
Q. I will just pause there, will you please describe what, if anything, Mr Cuthbertson did or said that caused you to have the perception that he was becoming more agitated?
A. Because he was joining in in the argument‑‑
TOOMEY: I object. That is a conclusion and an opinion, your Honour. At this point, the words that are said to have been used ought to be used in the evidence.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, well that is true about words, but in my opinion, it fits within section 78 and in any event, it is his observation. Yes, go on.
TOOMEY: Is your Honour allowing it?
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I am allowing it, yes.
WILLIAMS
Q. Would you like to continue the answer you were giving?
A. Yes. At one stage when we were standing there on the vestibule, Senior Constable ‑ sorry, Mr Cuthbertson said words along the lines of, "I have got to get off the fucking train too, bro, he is me bro, I can't just leave him here at the train station cause youse are kicking him off", or words to that effect, I remember him saying. And I remember saying to him the words to the effect of, "Mate, if you don't keep the language down you are going to get removed from the train as well".
Q. When Mr Cuthbertson said the words that you have just referred to, can you describe the tone of voice that he used?
A. Yeah, it was becoming more menacing, I would describe, more confrontational.
Q. What, if anything, happened as the train stopped at Eastwood Station, just immediately before the doors opened?
A. Mr Cuthbertson said, "Fucking see you later, bro", and then with the back of his right open hand, has slapped me to my chest area, my sternum.
Q. Can you describe the tone of voice Mr Cuthbertson used when he said those words, "Fucking see you later, bro"?
A. Menacing.
Q. To whom were those words directed?
A. Me.
Q. What, if anything, was your initial reaction to this?
A. I have grabbed of his arm and I said, "You are under arrest for assault police".
Q. Just going back a step, what, if anything, did you feel when, as you have described it, Mr Cuthbertson slapped your chest with the back of his hand?
A. A slight sting to my chest and a little bit of shock.
Q. What, if any, perception did you have at that time of the spirit in which Mr Cuthbertson had said those words to you and slapped you with the back of his hand in your chest?
TOOMEY: I object. It is an opinion, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: I must say, I don't have a precise recollection of the question, what was it? I heard it but I don't remember it precisely enough to‑‑
WILLIAMS: The question was, what, if any, perception the witness had as to‑‑
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I will allow it, go on.
WILLIAMS
Q. Do you recall the question or shall I put it again?
A. Would you say the question again please?
Q. What, if any, perception did you have at that time about the spirit in which Mr Cuthbertson had said to you the words, "Fucking see you later, bro", and slapped your chest with the back of his hand?
A. I felt, that it was like ‑ that he assaulted me purposely, and that it was like a parting gesture before he got off the train.
Q. What, if anything, did you then do, immediately after the slap to the chest that you have described?
A. I took hold of Mr Cuthbertson's right arm to prevent further assault, and said, "You are under arrest for assault police".
SC McArthur described what he considered to be Mr Cuthbertson's display of belligerence preceding attendance in the vestibule as snatching back his ticket when it was checked (the CCTV footage was equivocal as to whether or not this occurred), rolling his eyes at the Senior Constables, and butting into the conversation between the Senior Constables and Mr Fletcher. SC McArthur gave evidence of the following style: [Transcript Day 7, page 406, line 1 to 21]
Q. It is your evidence to this Court, is it, that Mr Cuthbertson's belligerence, as you have called it, was greater on the occasion that you and Senior Constable Walker returned to that carriage?
A. Yes.
Q. So far, have you seen any evidence of that on this video, up until 12.52?
A. Well, it's very difficult, because his facial expressions and his eyes aren't really clearly picked up.
Q. What was belligerent about his eyes? You gave evidence that he rolled his eyes, is there something else?
A. Yes. I remember he, during the conversation with Mr Fletcher, that Mr Cuthbertson, I can't recall the exact words, he get butting in the conversation, and then rolling his eyes in our direction, and I took that as a belligerent, provocative, confronting sort of act.
Q. It is belligerent to roll one's eyes, is it?
A. Well it's not the common thing to do when you're speaking to people.
Q. You characterised it as belligerent, is that right?
A. That's correct, yes.
In my opinion, the CCTV footage of body actions, is consistent with SC McArthur's description of Mr Cuthbertson butting in and at one point shaking his head. I accept, having listened to each of the witnesses carefully, that the plaintiffs, and Mr Cuthbertson in particular, were not conducting themselves in a respectful way toward the Senior Constables but, as was put in cross-examination by Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs and agreed to by SC McArthur (at Transcript Day 7, page 408) as being "smart arse". SC McArthur in that passage of cross-examination gave the following evidence: [Transcript Day 7, page 408, lines 35 to 50]
Q. I know you use the term "belligerent". What I'm suggesting to you is that while you mightn't have liked Mr Cuthbertson's attitude, there was nothing aggressive about it. You thought he was a smart arse, that's what you've told us?
A. Yes, I do, I agree, 100%, yep. It was, I believe, it wasn't aggressive, but it was certainly confrontational and provocative. Provoking.
Q. Because he was being a smart arse?
A. Yes.
Q. You thought he was being disrespectful to you as a police officer, that's the bottom line, isn't it?
A. I don't know about disrespectful, but being a smart arse, yes.
Q. What do you mean by "being a smart arse"?
A. As in, provocative. Trying to provoke a response, being confrontational.
SC McArthur could not recall the words used by Mr Fletcher during the ticket checking period that he considered to paint his behaviour as belligerent and "smart arse".
On these facts, the information known to SC McArthur at the point at which he alleges he was slapped; may be summarised, taking his evidence at its highest, as: repeated use of the word "fuck" by Mr Fletcher both in the carriage whilst tickets were being checked and in the vestibule; provocative and affronting behaviour by Mr Cuthbertson but not aggressive behaviour; and generally that he and SC Walker were dealing with two young adult males who showed signs of being affected by alcohol and who were argumentative. To the extent that evidence of SC McArthur and SC Walker describe anything more than the above, such as behaviour deploying an air of hostility, I do not find that fact because it is not consistent with behaviour visible on the CCTV footage of the lower compartment of the carriage and in the vestibule.
The CCTV footage (Exhibit A4) shows the sudden change from conversation to violence which occurred in the vestibule, as the train pulled to a stop and the doors opened. The evidence was as follows:
From 1:39 to 1:41, there is a quick movement of Mr Cuthbertson's right hand which the defence identifies as the backhand slap to the chest of SC McArthur. The defence says that slap was an assault of SC McArthur as an officer in the execution of duty contract to s 58 Crimes Act 1900. SC McArthur, it will be recalled, gave evidence of physically feeling the hit and describing the sensation felt as a "slight sting" to the chest. Whilst SC Walker's evidence was that he saw the slap, his view was from some metres away in the vestibule, with the centre support poles between himself and the event. His purpose at the time was to focus upon Mr Fletcher exiting the train. Mr Cuthbertson denied slapping SC McArthur, and Mr Fletcher's evidence amounts for him not having seen anything happen because his attention was directed to his girlfriend Erin at about that time.
Throughout the hearing this passage of CCTV footage was shown at full speed as well as at half speed. Only during closing submissions some weeks after the close of evidence, was the passage of CCTV footage played frame by frame. There were several frames within the period of less than 2 seconds to be examined. On that occasion, the vision was also displayed with better clarity in a more recently renovated and equipped Courtroom. To maximise the opportunity of the vision, it was viewed with the Courtroom lights turned off. With the opportunity of that better view, on my inquiry, Senior Counsel for the defendant properly conceded a retreat from the defendant's earlier position that the CCTV footage showed the slap. Of the frame of the CCTV footage at which Mr Cuthbertson's hand is in closest proximity to SC McArthur, Senior Counsel for the defendant conceded that the footage showed Mr Cuthbertson's hand raised directly in front of his own upper arm; but submitted that in the blurred vision of his hand and in the reality that "not every single moment is picked up on this frame by frame analysis" (Transcript Day 12, page 733, line 15). She submitted that the footage was inconclusive of a slap.
Having reviewed the CCTV footage carefully frame by frame and in slow motion, Mr Cuthbertson's right hand is seen to lift only in front of his own upper arm. It does not make contact with SC McArthur. The CCTV footage shows that even his elbow is closer to SC McArthur than is his hand. No part of Mr Cuthbertson touched SC McArthur. What is more, SC McArthur does not make any visible movement, indicating a shock or reflex reaction, as if it did.
Mr Cuthbertson had returned his hand to his waist, and approximately 2 seconds passed before SC McArthur with his right hand took hold of the back upper arm (triceps region) of Mr Cuthbertson before grabbing Mr Cuthbertson's arm with his right hand. At the same moment, SC McArthur's and Mr Cuthbertson's faces are directed to each other, and SC McArthur is facing the open train door. Mr Cuthbertson with his left side on to the open train door is lifting his left leg and, by his hip position, displaying a movement to exit out the door. During final submissions, that Mr Cuthbertson was trying to exit at that moment was common ground.
Because of what can be seen on the CCTV footage I am unable to accept SC McArthur's evidence that he felt the slap and experienced a slight sting.
SC Walker's evidence must be understood in the circumstances of him not having a purposeful focus upon either SC McArthur or Mr Cuthbertson. He had no expectation of Mr Cuthbertson striking SC McArthur. His impression of the quick hand movement would be influenced by seeing SC McArthur grabbing Mr Cuthbertson as he did and hearing him voice the arrest for assault police officer in the course of his duty.
I accept Mr Cuthbertson's evidence that he did not slap or otherwise touch or assault SC McArthur.
I do accept that in the situation of the two police officers supervising the two adult male plaintiffs for compliance of Mr Fletcher to the lawful direction that he exit the train; they had received the above-referred to swearing and affronting behaviour. The flick of the hand departing gesture by Mr Cuthbertson accompanied by "Fucking see you later bro" in a provocative tone of voice would plainly have been offensive to SC McArthur. I accept Mr Cuthbertson spoke words like those. The preceding environment between the plaintiffs and the Senior Constables had not been normal. The unattractive descriptive "smart arse" employed by Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs during cross-examination of SC McArthur was not out of proportion to what I accept from the evidence of the plaintiffs' conduct and conversation from the time of SC Walker engaging with Mr Fletcher over his drinking from the can of Woodstock Bourbon & Cola up to this trigger moment at approximately 1:41 on Exhibit A4.
The CCTV footage, as well as the disrespectful language which I have found, cause me to think it less likely that Mr Cuthbertson at that moment said, as he claims, "Don't worry about me, I'm getting off the train with my friend". There was no prior conversation about a caring concern expressed by SC McArthur, nor to the effect that Mr Cuthbertson was concerned that SC McArthur would be worried about him were he to exit the train with Mr Fletcher.
On the other hand, the shorter statement and its offensive terms are in keeping with Mr Cuthbertson's immediate body movement to the exit, and the common evidence that what was said was his "departing gesture" combined with the movement of his hand.
Events within the vestibule continued as follows:
At 1:44, body positions shown are of SC McArthur being stationary at the stairs and of Mr Cuthbertson's hip pulling toward the door, left foot extending, head turned toward the door, and moving forward and toward the door away from SC McArthur who has hold of his right arm. SC Walker has commenced to react by left hand on the centre pole of the vestibule and left foot placed forward to walk in the direction of SC McArthur and Mr Fletcher.
At 1:45, Mr Cuthbertson is moving away from SC McArthur who has hold of his arm. This is seen to cause Mr Cuthbertson to swing around against SC McArthur's restraint. The back of his right side and arm goes into the chest of Mr Fletcher who is near to the door. SC Walker has strided out with his right leg toward Mr Fletcher meaning that Mr Cuthbertson has come backward into Mr Fletcher and SC Walker. It is plainly shown that Mr Cuthbertson's feet are forward of his body so that he is clearly leaning body weight away from SC McArthur who has been pulled forward and is on the other side of Mr Cuthbertson.
I disagree with Plaintiff submissions that at 1:44 and 1:45, SC McArthur pushes Mr Cuthbertson into Mr Fletcher. In particular, SC McArthur is not throwing Mr Cuthbertson about the vestibule like "a rag doll" as described in the evidence of the plaintiffs. Mr Cuthbertson might be actively pulling away, or his momentum from his step to the door, when anchored by SC McArthur's grip, might have caused him to swing into the vestibule.
Mr Fletcher turns and moves slightly into the vestibule to observe Mr Cuthbertson's physical engagement with SC McArthur. The movement is consistent with him being distracted by being bumped into and seeing the physical engagement between his friend and SC McArthur, momentarily from continuing his exit in compliance with that direction. There is no evidence to suggest that preceding that moment, Mr Fletcher displayed any behaviour inconsistent with compliance with that lawful direction to exit.
SC Walker pushes Mr Fletcher out of the doors and onto the platform. The push is not violent. It is a firm and steady physical direction by force such that Mr Fletcher is able to step backwards, including from the train to the platform, without any sign of him being imbalanced.
SC McArthur pushes Mr Cuthbertson to the doors and out onto the platform. The push is a controlled direction not causing Mr Cuthbertson to have to hurry or any apparent imbalance as he is directed across the vestibule to the door and backwards onto the platform.
In my opinion, those submissions must be rejected because Mr Cuthbertson was lawfully reacting to the unlawful physical restraint applied by SC McArthur. SC McArthur instigated and pursued the struggle. Mr Cuthbertson was in retreat.
As I have found that SC McArthur did not have power to arrest Mr Cuthbertson, it is not necessary for me to consider the section 99 (3) LEPRA defence.
For completeness I add that because Mr Cuthbertson did not assault SC McArthur I do not accept that the defendant has established on its onus of proof that SC McArthur was possessed of the state of mind that he suspected that it was necessary to arrest Mr Cuthbertson to prevent a repetition or continuation of an offence of assault upon SC McArthur or the commission of another offence. SC McArthur in above quoted evidence conceded "100%" that Mr Cuthbertson had not displayed aggression. Further, if I am wrong as to his state of mind, I find that, on the evidence, there were not reasonable grounds for him to possess that suspicion.
That Mr Cuthbertson was moving toward the opening door, as if to bolt away from SC McArthur must be considered in the context of their close physical proximity and the limited opportunity that would have been available (although it was not examined on the evidence) for Mr Cuthbertson to escape without providing his details. In any event, Mr Fletcher, Mr Cuthbertson's friend, was making no effort to bolt. He had given SC Walker his personal contact details earlier, when on the lower deck of the carriage and SC McArthur was aware of that. The appropriate course, had SC McArthur legitimately suspected he had been assaulted, in the circumstances, would have been to have demanded Cuthbertson and Fletcher remain and provide Mr Cuthbertson's identification and contact details.
Even if Mr Cuthbertson's hand had touched SC McArthur's chest causing a slight sting, in my opinion, SC McArthur failed to exercise the restraint against arrest required by section 99 (3) LEPRA. Had there been an assault by the back of Mr Cuthbertson's hand contacting SC McArthur's chest as a departing gesture and causing a slight sting; then, it was not the exercise of reasonable force and it was not necessary for SC McArthur to grab hold of Mr Cuthbertson's arm and forcefully restrain him as he did do.
In summary, in my opinion, even had the defence succeeded in proving the assault alleged, SC McArthur acted in breach of section 99 (3), neither of the exceptions relied upon section 99 (3)(a) and (b), justifying his action of arrest against the required restraint: section 99 (3) LEPRA. In addition he used unreasonable force when he grabbed and swung Mr Cuthbertson in the vestibule and when he pushed him from the train. Mr Cuthbertson was not given a direction to leave the train.
Because I have found that SC McArthur was not acting in the exercise of his police functions when he initiated the struggle in the vestibule by grabbing Mr Cuthbertson's arm, it was SC McArthur and not Mr Cuthbertson who caused the disturbance. It was SC McArthur who applied physical force which swung Mr Cuthbertson into the vestibule. Mr Cuthbertson had been trying to depart the train.
I reject the defence that SC McArthur took action to avoid a breach of the peace.
I reject SC McArthur's evidence:
"My first reaction was to grab hold of his arm for self-defence"
and
"He's assaulted me out of the blue. Who's to say there is not going to be a follow up?"
I reject the defence of self-defence: Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutors (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645; [1987] HCA 26 at [19].
I have found that Mr Fletcher did not move into the vestibule as if to disobey the lawful direction given by SC Walker under cl 55 (5) that he exit the train. The CCTV footage shows that he not unreasonably turns and moves slightly in the course of observing the unlawful manhandling of his friend Mr Cuthbertson by SC McArthur. Mr Fletcher's distraction, arising out of a legitimate concern for his friend, is understandable and acceptable. The doors to the train remained open and so it could not be said that he had refused to exit in accordance with the direction. This was observable by SC Walker.
In those circumstances, the pushing of Mr Fletcher off the train by SC Walker was unlawful. I reject the defendant submission that the force then used by SC Walker was reasonably necessary to exercise the function of directing Mr Fletcher to leave the train. Specifically, I find that Mr Fletcher did not refuse or fail to comply with the lawful direction he had been given.
It follows that Mr Fletcher is entitled to be compensated for the physical touching, grabbing and pushing he suffered from SC Walker in the vestibule.
I reject the defence case that Mr Fletcher's actions reasonably permitted the Senior Constables to suspect that he was attempting to or that he intended to reboard the train when putting Erin back on. He obviously did not attempt to reboard.
At 0:50, SC Walker and SC McArthur step off the train and onto the platform.
SC McArthur walks directly at Mr Cuthbertson. At 0:51, Mr Cuthbertson has his hands in the air indicating surrender, not physical challenge. Mr Fletcher is trying to stand between them and, in protection of his friend, block SC McArthur's approach to Mr Cuthbertson.
In my opinion, the important thing to observe is that in the passage of events shown on Exhibit A5 between 0:40 and 0:50, the opportunity for the parties to desist from further confrontation presented itself. The Senior Constables are within the vestibule of the train and the plaintiffs are on the platform. Whilst ten seconds is not a long time by reckoning, observation of the CCTV footage shows that during that period there was no physical aggression between the plaintiffs and the Senior Constables. Mr Fletcher can be seen encouraging, Mr Cuthbertson, to stay away. SC McArthur had indicated a release from his earlier voiced arrest. The plaintiffs are not trying to re-enter the vestibule of the train. This was an opportunity for the Senior Constables to have left matters as they were, and to have avoided the risk of unnecessary physical engagement with the plaintiffs and depravation of liberty of the plaintiffs.
SC McArthur prior to his stepping back onto the platform to approach Mr Cuthbertson, had the important opportunity I have referred to, to consider the action he might take. Stepping back onto the platform as he did was plainly confrontational. It can be seen on the CCTV footage at 0:51 in his approach to Mr Cuthbertson.
Whilst I accept that SC McArthur and SC Walker were of the view that each of the plaintiff's had conducted themselves offensively, on occasion provoking police with their language; as SC McArthur conceded in the above quoted passage of his evidence concerning the conduct of Mr Cuthbertson prior to his allegation of assault, that conduct was not aggressive.
When the Senior Constables stepped onto the platform to confront the plaintiffs, the state of mind of SC Walker was that he was assisting SC McArthur in the recommencement or revoicing of the arrest or the making of a second arrest in relation to the original assault. He had, whilst focused upon Mr Fletcher in the vestibule, seen a flick of Mr Cuthbertson's forearm, the grabbing of Mr Cuthbertson by SC McArthur and he heard SC McArthur's claim of having been assaulted and his arrest of Mr Cuthbertson. It is to be accepted that SC Walker suspected that there had been an assault. He had the reasonable grounds of that information for his suspicion. He believed that he was assisting SC McArthur in the performance of arresting Mr Cuthbertson pursuant to section 230 LEPRA.
For the reasons given in my analysis of the first arrest, I do not accept that SC McArthur suspected that he had been assaulted and the offences under section 58 Crimes Act of assault and resist committed. Again, I do not accept that he had reasonable grounds to hold such suspicion.
As Exhibit A5 at 0:51 shows, there were no other persons on the platform but the plaintiffs and the Senior Constables. The plaintiffs attempt to walk away from the Senior Constables. SC Walker walks around behind Mr Fletcher grabbing him around the shoulder and by one arm and pulling him away. The plaintiffs attempt to embrace, and SC McArthur pulls Mr Cuthbertson away.
SC McArthur denied that he proceeded immediately to grab hold of Mr Cuthbertson. My earlier described analysis of the CCTV explained that his arm was initially bent, not reaching for Mr Cuthbertson. Importantly for the purposes of section 99(3) LEPRA his evidence during cross examination of what his purpose was, was inconsistent.
This was the point in time when he voiced the second arrest to Mr Cuthbertson for the alleged assault by Mr Cuthbertson upon him in the vestibule of the train. Between Transcript Day 9 pages 505 line 45 and 507 line 39 SC McArthur said that his purpose was to arrest Mr Cuthbertson (Transcript 506 line 12 to line 31) but he also gave evidence that it was his intention to get Mr Cuthbertson's details so that he could proceed by Court Attendance Notice, answering: "yes, I don't know which way it was going to go at that stage, but that was going to be the most likely course" (Transcript 507 lines 6 to 10). Next, SC McArthur agreed that if Mr Cuthbertson had provided his name and address, which in fact subsequently occurred, there could not have been any possible reason for arrest (Transcript 507 lines 21 to 39). I repeat SC McArthur knew that SC Walker had the contact details for Mr Cuthbertson's friend, Mr Fletcher. There seems to have been little risk of not being able to issue a Court Attendance Notice to Mr Cuthbertson. A reasonable police officer in the position of SC McArthur would have realised that.
That Mr Fletcher stepped between Mr Cuthbertson and SC McArthur on SC McArthur's approach, and I accept the evidence of SC Walker that Mr Cuthbertson responded to the voicing of the second arrest "no. I am not"; does not assist the defendant because the arrests were unlawful and the words "no. I am not" were a correct protest of innocence dissociated from any attempt to escape or from any aggression towards the police.
What followed was SC Walker dragged Mr Fletcher away by arms pinned behind his back and likewise SC McArthur dragged Cuthbertson away. For the reasons given, I accept that SC Walker initially proceeded in the belief that he was assisting SC McArthur in effecting a lawful arrest by separating the two adult male plaintiffs so as to maintain police safety and control of the situation. On the other hand, for the reasons given, I do not accept that SC McArthur proceeded with lawful authority to arrest Mr Cuthbertson. SC McArthur retained no lawful authority to detain Mr Cuthbertson or even to demand that he provide his details of identification. I repeat that I have found that SC McArthur did not suspect and did not have reasonable grounds for suspecting that Mr Cuthbertson had committed the offences of assault and resist under section 58 Crimes Act.
SC McArthur physically guided Mr Cuthbertson to a seated position at the base of a stanchion on the platform where, Mr Cuthbertson provided a card containing his identification which later in these events police checked and found to be correct. There is no evidence that at any time Mr Cuthbertson refused to provide his details.
I have found on the evidence that there were no circumstances of aggression or violence of Mr Cuthbertson pursuant to which SC McArthur could have, had there indeed been an assault, had reasonable grounds to suspect that it was necessary to arrest Mr Cuthbertson in order to avoid continuation of an offence or further offending: section 99 (3) (b) LEPRA. Accordingly, not only did the power to (second) arrest not arise under section 99 (2); but SC McArthur also breached the restraint against arrest demanded by section 99 (3).
Albeit I have accepted that when he stepped out of the train and onto the platform SC Walker believed that he was assisting SC McArthur in the process of bringing Mr Cuthbertson before a court on the charge of assault, I do not accept that during the following seconds, having witnessed SC McArthur's direct approach upon Mr Cuthbertson on the platform and voicing the second arrest without first giving him the opportunity of producing his details of identification; that from that point SC Walker continued to proceed lawfully pursuant to section 230 LEPRA. The provisions of LEPRA which underpin the nature of the functions that police officers perform and the necessity for that work to be carried out as part of a disciplined and hierarchical structure, recognizes that force may be needed to be used in doing so: those provisions do not permit an activity to be carried out which is not lawful: State of NSW v Bouffler [2017] NSWCA 185.
In the defence of SC McArthur's case, it was put that he used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend himself against the threat of further assault from Mr Cuthbertson. As I have found there was no first assault. SC McArthur conceded in evidence that Mr Cuthbertson was not aggressive toward police when in the vestibule of the train carriage. On my observation of the CCTV footage, given above; in my opinion, the force employed by SC McArthur and SC Walker, particularly from about Exhibit A5 one minute by pinning the plaintiffs' arms behind them to separate them, was an excessive and unjustified response to Mr Cuthbertson's flick of his forearm in the train vestibule being a gesture of departure and some disrespectful language. The defence of self-defence is not available. In any event, police instigated the physical confrontation.
It follows that each of the plaintiffs was assaulted by the respective Senior Constables and that they were wrongfully deprived of their liberty. This lasted little more than one and a half minutes (Exhibit A5 at 2:06) and included unlawful physical contact and direction by police upon each of the plaintiffs.
A significant event then occurred, Mr Fletcher's girlfriend Erin became the focus of a violent engagement between him and SC Walker. Erin was on the platform. Mr Fletcher had just thrown her his jumper and was shouting at her to get back on the train. A moment after the jumper is thrown, SC Walker raises his arm and has Erin's attention. I accept that SC Walker was requesting Erin to re-join the train. When Erin did not re-join the train, Mr Fletcher attempted to walk past SC Walker toward Erin. SC Walker took hold of Mr Fletcher's right arm.
At Exhibit A5 2:06 Mr Fletcher by body position can be seen to be imploring SC Walker who is standing in a relaxed pose but has hold of Mr Fletcher's right arm region. The scene is consistent with the oral evidence that Mr Fletcher was asking SC Walker something about getting Erin back onto the train. SC Walker steps toward Erin, and Erin, facing SC Walker and Mr Fletcher, has her hand up. It is plain that the communication between the three of them is of requests for her to re-join the train.
That SC Walker took a step toward Erin and had only one hand holding Mr Fletcher's shirt at the right shoulder is indicative that his intention and purpose was not to do other than to control the position of Mr Fletcher and to, as he put it in his evidence, get Erin to re-join the train because it was the best way of stopping the situation from escalating.
The CCTV footage plainly shows that Mr Fletcher pulled past SC Walker and at Exhibit A5 2:10 Mr Fletcher is leaning with effort and pressing from his right leg against the restraint of SC Walker who has hold by his right hand of Mr Fletcher's right wrist region and his left hand still at the shirt of Mr Fletcher's right shoulder. At this moment, Mr Fletcher reaches out and his hand has hold of Erin on the outside of her arm at about the elbow, and he is by that contact pushing her toward the train door.
At Exhibit 45 2:12, Mr Fletcher's push of Erin is seen to have been with such effort that Erin is going toward the train and Mr Fletcher has bent legs and has gone down on his left knee. SC Walker is straining with both hands holding the right wrist region of Mr Fletcher in order to restrain him from achieving direction of more force onto Erin. It can be seen that SC Walker has been pulled around ninety degrees so that his body position is with feet planted firmly to hold against the pull of Mr Fletcher. The sequence of events seen is entirely consistent with SC Walker's evidence. The train doors were closed except for the vestibule in front of them which were open because they were being blocked by persons in the way of the sensors. SC Walker said that he restrained Mr Fletcher because: Transcript Day 9 page 545 lines 7 to 21:
…he then started going back towards the train himself, and at that time I'm holding him by his right arm, and he's trying to get towards the train doors and towards where the woman is standing. I think he's tried to get back towards her on the train about three times. The first time, I thought I'd better keep hold of him by his arm, with one arm, I had one arm down on his lower arm and the other hand up near his shoulder.
He's then gone towards her again, l and I've held him, and then I believe it to be on the third time, he has lashed out towards her pushing and trying to grab towards the female, and I've pulled him back from her and then I believe it to be the third or fourth time, he's leapt towards her, and at that time I've put my arms around his torso and used somewhat of a police manoeuvre of getting a person off balance using their body weight to get him away from something or someone, and I've taken him back away from where the train was, and then onto the ground.
There is no exaggeration in SC Walker's evidence that Mr Fletcher "leapt toward her". It is plain that Mr Fletcher used his full strength against the restraint of SC Walker.
Significantly, the CCTV footage is inconsistent with Mr Fletcher's claims that SC Walker "yanked" his arm. I reject that proposition. SC Walker was attempting to restrain Mr Fletcher from his approach to Erin.
Mr Fletcher's approach to Erin is properly characterized as apparently dangerous. SC Walker knew that Mr Fletcher wanted Erin to be on the train strongly enough that a short time before he had walked up behind her and bodily carried her into the train. That episode shortly preceded the shouting and direction to her of the subject incident.
SC Walker said he still believed that Mr Fletcher was going to get back onto the train and he was not sure what Mr Fletcher's intentions toward Erin in that physical action were. He described the risk to Erin and to Mr Fletcher which he perceived as: Transcript Day 9 page 546 lines 42 to 47:
Q: What, if anything, did you apprehend at that time might happen if you had not pulled Mr Fletcher back?
A: I believe that Mr Fletcher and or the young lady, could have fallen into the train doors, or between the train platform and the train itself. I couldn't be sure that their safety was, you know, being expected an injury if it wasn't for, if I hadn't held him back.
The CCTV shows the behaviour of Mr Fletcher remaining on the platform, to be quite inconsistent with the reasonable factual basis for SC Walker to have suspected that he was attempting to re-board the train. In any event, the defendant did not plead clause 55 (4) of the Passenger Transport Regulation 2007, which is the subclause making it an offence to re-enter a train once directed to leave.
The evidence is overwhelmingly supportive of reasonable grounds for SC Walker to have believed that he was restraining Mr Fletcher in order to protect Erin and indeed Mr Fletcher from injury in the way he described.
I accept that he held that subjective belief and I find that it was reasonably held for those reasons. Specifically, in relation to his belief of his duty to restrain Mr Fletcher from committing a breach of the peace (s 230 LEPRA). SC Walker's evidence in this regard was:
Transcript Day 10 page 601 lines 36 to 44:
Q: What do you understand to be the meaning of breach of the peace?
A: Well in this circumstance, the need to stop him from acting out what I believed to be in a violent manner towards Erin, to keep him away from her, for her safety. If he was to grab or push at her, that she could fall over onto the platform, or down between the train and the tracks, between the doors as they were closing. There could have been numerous ways that she could have been injured if he'd grabbed at her the way he was doing, if he continued to grab and push at her, sorry.
What can be seen on the CCTV footage at Exhibit A5 2:14 to 2:15 is that the forward push of Mr Fletcher's body lunge ends at a point his right foot is planted on the platform and his left foot is raised with his body leaning toward her and SC Walker has his right arm around Mr Fletcher's hip area and his hand inside the inner upper right leg of Mr Fletcher. Mr Fletcher continues to lunge so that SC Walker gets both hands around Mr Fletcher's hip area and Mr Fletcher is still leaning forward and reaching out to Erin who remains on the platform. Finally at 2:15, SC Walker from that position is able to cause Mr Fletcher to go to ground. Mr Fletcher landed on his hands. SC Walker had his hands on Mr Fletcher's hips and SC Walker was off balance coming down on Mr Fletcher. I reject the plaintiff's submission that the force employed by SC Walker was excessive. The force which he applied can be seen on the CCTV footage to be no more than was physically required in a man on man engagement to restrain Mr Fletcher's advance toward Erin and putting him to ground was a part of that restraint. SC Walker's evidence quoted above accurately described that.
I accept Mr Walker's evidence in the following cross examination. His following evidence is consistent with the CCTV footage. At Transcript Day 10 page 594, lines 11 to 24:
Q. What were you going to say after "and"?
A. And, you know, that's when I've put my arms around his waist, when he's lunged back towards the train, and used his body weight to get him off balance, and he's gone to the ground. I wouldn't call it, like a, you know, like a rugby league tackle, where they've come from, you know, 10 metres away.
TOOMEY
Q. You wrestled him to the ground, off his feet, on a concrete platform?
A. He was put to the ground, yes.
Q. You have a problem with the description of that as a "tackle"?
A. Well, I wouldn't call it a tackle, no.
On the whole of this evidence, and particularly having examined the CCTV footage closely I reject the plaintiff's proposition that SC Walker's actions including the action of taking Mr Fletcher off balance by hands around the hip, were intended by SC Walker to cause Mr Fletcher injury, harm or pain of any description.
Quite frankly, my opinion is, that the putting to ground was purely a component of the restraint without any intention other than restraint. It was not a technique to force submission. In my opinion the force employed by Mr Fletcher in his aggressive approach to Erin provided reasonable grounds for SC Walker, in the predicament of the moment, to gauge it as highly dangerous for Mr Fletcher and for Erin. SC Walker committed himself to the restraint of that action to the point where he himself went to ground and risked injury.
Separately I find that the visible composure of Mr Fletcher and of SC Walker immediately preceding Mr Fletcher's violent attempt to get to Erin, and that Mr Fletcher's want to get to Erin was a separate matter from his concern for Mr Cuthbertson; satisfy me on the balance of probabilities, in finding that SC Walker's participation in the unlawful arrest of Mr Cuthbertson was not a relevant cause of Mr Fletcher's surge toward Erin. These were separate incidents.
In conclusion I find that the force employed by SC Walker was reasonably necessary for him to exercise in the course of his function pursuant to section 230 LEPRA and in accordance with his duty to avoid breach of the peace. It was action consistent with his duty pursuant to section 6(3)(b) of the Police Act 1990. During closing submissions the plaintiff clarified that in his case Mr Fletcher does not submit that the struggle between himself and SC Walker was causally related to the wrongful arrest of Mr Cuthbertson by SC McArthur: Transcript day 12 page 710 line 44 to 711 line 9.
About three seconds following Mr Fletcher's struggle with SC Walker (at Exhibit A5 2:18), Mr Cuthbertson moves from the stanchion seat to join Mr Fletcher on the ground, against the direction of SC McArthur that he not do so and subsequently that he move back to the stanchion seat. The common evidence of Mr Cuthbertson and SC McArthur is that SC McArthur put his hand out directing Mr Cuthbertson to stay away from the engagement between SC Walker and Mr Fletcher, and Mr Cuthbertson walked into SC McArthur's hand.
With his one right hand not forcefully on Mr Cuthbertson's left shoulder, SC McArthur directed Mr Cuthbertson to sit on the stanchion seat closest to SC Walker and Mr Fletcher but a little distance away.
At Exhibit A5 2:28, Erin approaches Mr Fletcher sitting on the ground and she finally agrees to and does re-join the train. The doors of the vestibule close. It can be seen by Exhibit A5 2:40 that SC McArthur is standing up debating with the seated Mr Cuthbertson without physical contact between them. SC Walker has one hand on Mr Fletcher's shoulder. At Exhibit A5 2:50 the train can be seen to be moving away.
Exhibit A5 at about 3:10 shows the Constables to have for about 15 seconds stood away from the plaintiffs whilst they were seated on the station platform and whilst Mr Cuthbertson refused to move away from Mr Fletcher preceding SC McArthur's lift of him. That Mr Cuthbertson's refused to move away was common ground. On SC McArthur's evidence, Mr Cuthbertson responded to the spoken direction: "nup, I'm sitting here with my mate": Transcript page 380 line 15; statement of SC McArthur made 8 October 2013 at [25] (Exhibit 2). Mr Fletcher recalled Mr Cuthbertson saying: "I'm sitting with my friend": Transcript day 3 page 176 line 34. Mr Fletcher agreed that SC McArthur only put a hand under Mr Cuthbertson's left armpit to lift him: Transcript day 3 page 177 line 5. Obviously this was contrary to Mr Cuthbertson's grossly exaggerated evidence. At the time, SC Walker was standing by and not touching Fletcher.
In my opinion, the action of SC McArthur with one hand and without obvious force, directing the approaching Mr Cuthbertson to sit on the stanchion seat and so prevent him from engaging in the aftermath and closing moments of the above described struggle between SC Walker and Mr Fletcher, was appropriate use of force to assist SC Walker to avoid the continuing breach of the peace (s 230 LEPRA). As before, I accept that appropriate police procedure would be to separate two young adult males in a confrontational environment in order to maintain control of the situation and avoid the opportunity of them combinnig as a physical force. Further, there would have been significant risk of injury to Mr Fletcher, Erin, SC Walker or Mr Cuthbertson had he engaged in that struggle. SC McArthur's actions were performed to avoid a breach of the peace and were lawful pursuant to the provisions of section 230 LEPRA and section 6(3)(b) of the Police Act 1990.
SC McArthur steps back and directs his O.C. spray canister at the face of Mr Cuthbertson.
To the extent that it is necessary to do so, I will deal with these incidents in more detail.
In my opinion, what is significant about Mr Cuthbertson's actions during him being lifted from the seated position on the platform and caused to sit at the stanchion seat as well as during CCTV vision up to a point where it can be seen that SC McArthur deployed his O.C. spray canister, is that Mr Cuthbertson's physical actions whilst obviously oppositional are not directed to attack of SC McArthur. Undoubtedly SC McArthur was properly defensive of Mr Cuthbertson's waving arms and the strong and fast action of that movement but a focus to attack on SC McArthur is not seen.
SC McArthur's placement of his hand at the junction of the neck and chest of Mr Cuthbertson directing him to assume the seated position at the stanchion, in my opinion was for the period until Mr Cuthbertson is seen to calm down. For the reasons given above, that was appropriate lawful action directed to avoiding a breach of the peace in continuation of separation of the plaintiffs following Mr Fletcher's violent outburst directed toward Erin. Whilst Erin had departed, the Senior Constables were entitled, for their own safety, to enforce a reasonable level of controlled calm.
Considering Mr Cuthbertson's grossly exaggerated description of SC McArthur's lift of him, shortly before that; having considered the CCTV footage I do not accept that he suffered more than minor pain or discomfort from his head hitting the stanchion. His description of the incident is part of his exaggerated narrative of force used by SC McArthur. In my opinion, in that action, SC McArthur did not use excessive force.
At this point I interject two observations of Mr Fletcher:
At Exhibit A5 3:24, when the shirtless Mr Cuthbertson had been placed upon the stanchion seat with his head against the pillar; Mr Fletcher rises to his feet in protest at SC McArthur's action and SC Walker steps in with a hand in front of Mr Fletcher to keep the plaintiffs separate. In my opinion, SC Walker's action at this point, for the same reasons as discussed above in relation to SC McArthur, are a continuation of his lawful function to avoid a breach of the peace. In my opinion, the force employed by him is seen on the CCTV footage to have been reasonable.
Whilst Mr Fletcher's wrist became fractured at some point during his struggle with SC Walker, that was not a fact which could have been known to either of the Senior Constables. Throughout the CCTV footage until Mr Fletcher departs the platform in the lift; he points, gesticulates and waves his right arm around. His actions are very physical. It is only when the lift descends from the platform that he supports his right wrist with his left hand. Indeed, I viewed that very short passage of CCTV, filmed through the glass of the lift-well carefully because, prior to seeing him support his right wrist in that way, his use of his right arm did not display, to lay viewing, a disability.
Returning to Mr Cuthbertson, his conduct, including physical movements such as waving his hands, on at least one occasion attempting to stand from the stanchion seat after being directed to sit, and his arguing with SC McArthur; were in my opinion, within his entitlement to conduct himself in protest of and resist restraint in regard to the unlawful arrest: State of New South Wales v Reilly (2003) 57 NSWLR 496; [2003] NSWCA 208 at [11], [91] and [147]. It is not centrally important, whether or not Mr Cuthbertson knew that the arrest was unlawful. What is important is the fact that it was unlawful: R v Hoare and Heavey [1965] NSWR 1167; (1965) 84 WN (Pt1) (NSW) 248. At 1173 [30]-[37] Walsh J accepted the following statement of principle (authority omitted): "although a person is entitled to resist an arrest which a Constable is not authorised to make, he is guilty of an assault if he uses more violence than is reasonably necessary for the purpose." Mr Cuthbertson is not seen to direct violence or direct aggression suggestive of imminent attack toward SC McArthur.
That unlawful use of arrest by police is prone to understandably provoke emotional responses from the subject member or members of the public has been recognised and Mr Cuthbertson's conduct deserves assessment in that perspective. In DPP v Carr (2002) 127 A Crim R 151; [2002] NSWSC 194, Smart AJ, when dealing with unlawful exercise of arrest at [35] made the following observation: "this Court in its appellate and trial divisions has been emphasizing for many years that it is inappropriate for powers of arrest to be used for minor offences where the defendants name and addresses are known, there is no risk of him departing and there is no reason to believe that a summons will not be effective. Arrest is an additional punishment involving depravation of freedom and frequently ignominy and fear. The consequences of the employment of the power of arrest unnecessarily and inappropriately and instead of issuing a summons are often anger on the part of the person arrested and an escalation of the situation leading to the person resisting arrest and assaulting police. The pattern in this case is all too familiar. It is time that statements of this Court were heeded."
Her Honour Fullerton J agreed with His Honour's exposition in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Matthews-Hunter [2014] NSWSC 843 at [57].
It will be remembered that SC McArthur had voiced the arrest a few minutes beforehand, when the Senior Constables stepped from the train to the platform. Mr Cuthbertson had given to SC McArthur a card with his identification details before the struggle between SC Walker and Mr Fletcher. It was common ground that SC McArthur had forgotten that Mr Cuthbertson's card was in his notebook. Again, in the passage of the CCTV footage, there is no evidence of attempt to escape or of inability to obtain Mr Cuthbertson's particulars. From the point where Mr Cuthbertson has stopped thrashing around with his arms and is on the stanchion seat, SC McArthur's continuing to process the arrest is a continuation of his failure to comply with the restraint against so proceeding required by section 99 (3) LEPRA, even if the (minor) assault had occurred.
Exhibit A5 at 3:31 shows SC McArthur deploying his O.C. ('oleoresin') spray canister at Mr Cuthbertson.
The evidence from 3:15 plainly shows that in those prior 16 seconds Mr Cuthbertson was not directing forceful actions toward SC McArthur but at first was removing his pullover from his right arm, then put both hands up toward SC McArthur whilst remaining seated on the stanchion seat and immediately placed his hands down beside his bottom on each side, with his head bowed when SC McArthur put his right hand on Mr Cuthbertson's left shoulder. In my opinion, whilst Mr Cuthbertson was protesting, he was not displaying disobedience of police direction. Mr Cuthbertson's position at 3:17 is body language of submission whilst seated. SC Walker is nearby to SC McArthur and SC McArthur is not at risk and there is no physical approach directed toward him by Mr Cuthbertson. Mr Fletcher remains seated on the bitumen of the platform some distance, probably a body length away. SC McArthur steps back and points the O.C. spray canister at Mr Cuthbertson who remains in a body position and language not directing any force toward SC McArthur. Indeed, SC Walker at 3:31 has moved away, not as one might expect him to have done if he felt SC McArthur was under threat. Mr Cuthbertson's feet are not even directly under him as if he could launch toward SC McArthur. Mr Cuthbertson's feet are out in front of him as he is reclined back on the stanchion seat against the pillar.
The time at which Mr Cuthbertson was calm and the lawfulness of employment of force and direction to maintain control to avoid a breach of the peace by SC McArthur concluded, is not later than Exhibit A5 3:15. I repeat, that is 15 seconds before SC McArthur pointed the O.C. spray canister at Mr Cuthbertson's face from a distance of about 1 metre.
I found little persuasion in SC McArthur's descriptions of Mr Cuthbertson snarling and pumping out his chest. It is not seen on the CCTV of those 15 seconds.
SC McArthur gave the following evidence of why he deployed his O.C. spray canister in that way: Transcript day 7, page 382 line 16 to page 383 line 11.
Q. What, if anything, can you recall Mr Cuthbertson saying to you in the tone of voice you have described?
A. He was saying words to the effect of, "Come on, come on".
Q. What, if anything, did you do in response to these actions that you have described of Mr Cuthbertson?
A. I remember, at one time on the stanchion, I think I had my hand, for my own safety, I had my hand just on his chest area, and I remember him trying to brush my hand away. At one point, he has thrown a closed right fist at my body, I don't believe it hit me. For my own protection, I have then, with my open right hand, trying to stop him getting up, and preventing, like self‑defence and further assault, I pushed the top of his head, and unfortunately his head hit the steel girder behind, not hard, but hit the steel girder behind.
Q. What then happened after Mr Cuthbertson hit his head in the way you have described?
A. Well he began to flex his muscles, he began to snarl, continued to snarl, show his teeth, nostrils flared, glaring at me, and he continued to say, "Come on", or words to that effect.
Q. What, if anything, did you then do?
A. I have then pulled out my oleoresin spray, and pointed it at his face, and I've said, "If you don't calm down, you're going to get sprayed".
Q. Can you describe the distance between your spray and Mr Cuthbertson's face when you pointed it at his face?
A. Around a metre.
Q. Why did you point your spray at Mr Cuthbertson's face in the way you have described, and say to him, "If you don't calm down, you'll be sprayed"?
A. Because his behaviour, violent behaviour, was just increasing, and I felt it was getting out of hand, and I felt like I needed to, like, prevent any further violent confrontation.
Q. What, if anything, happened after you pointed the spray at Mr Cuthbertson's face in the manner you have described?
A. He said words to the effect, "I'm calm".
Q. To your observation, at that point in time, was Mr Cuthbertson calm?
A. He did calm down.
Q. What, if anything, did you do immediately after he calmed down?
A. I said, once again, to explain it to him, I said, "If you don't calm down this violent behaviour, you going to get sprayed, do you understand?" And he said, "Yes". And shortly after that, I put my spray away.
Early in these reasons, when assessing the reliability of evidence given by SC McArthur, I referred to his description of a closed fist punch and that I do not accept that evidence. SC McArthur was asked to identify the point in the CCTV footage where it occurred. The part of the CCTV footage identified by him did not reveal, to my viewing, such a a movement. SC McArthur's perception of an attempted punch, is unlikely to have been significant at the time because he neither charged Mr Cuthbertson with that assault nor made any record of such a punch in the COPS Event Report (Exhibit 11) albeit he did describe it at [27] of his Statement made 8 October 2013 (Exhibit 12) Further, preferring the CCTV footage as I do, I do not accept Mr Cuthbertson's evidence that SC McArthur grabbed him around the throat. The CCTV vision is of SC McArthur's hand meeting the upper chest at the base of the neck of Mr Cuthbertson. In closing submissions that position of fact seemed to be common between counsel for the parties.
At Transcript day 3 page 181 senior counsel for the defendant identified the passage of CCTV footage upon which the defendant relied as showing that Mr Cuthbertson threw a closed first at SC McArthur. On that occasion the reference was made to Exhibit A6 at about 3:18 to 3:19: Transcript day 3 page 181 line 48. A view of CCTV A6 3:12 to 3:22 does not show any such action, to my observation. Both Messrs Cuthbertson and Fletcher denied that a closed fist punch was thrown by Mr Cuthbertson at SC McArthur. Another reason why I consider SC McArthur's oral evidence to exaggerate events in the 15 or so seconds preceding his deployment of his O.C. spray canister is that he maintained that it was only following deployment of the canister and his direction to calm down that Mr Cuthbertson did calm. As described above, my observation of the CCTV footage is that Mr Cuthbertson calmed down beforehand. It was Mr Cuthbertson's evidence that he did.
I repeat, that I reject SC McArthur's evidence that Mr Cuthbertson threw a closed fist punch at him. I consider that he exaggerated the circumstances in his attempting to justify his deployment of his O.C. spray canister. In my opinion there was no physical threat to SC McArthur, nor continuing physical movement of any kind by Mr Cuthbertson warranting SC McArthur's pointing of his O.C. spray canister at the face of Mr Cuthbertson from a distance of only about 1 metre. SC McArthur acted with excessive use of force in those circumstances. Calm having previously been achieved, his action was not in lawful performance of the functions:
1. Avoiding breach of the peace;
2. Self-defence;
3. Process of a lawful arrest.
From Exhibit A5 3:15, SC McArthur's continuing depravation of liberty of Mr Cuthbertson was a wrongful imprisonment.
The plaintiff gave the following evidence of the experience of the O.C. canister being pointed at him:
Q. How did you feel about that?
A. I was ‑ I was definitely worried about what that would do to me and yeah, I sat still and yeah, I felt pretty uncomfortable.
Q. Did you know why, at that point, he had done that?
A. He pulled it out because I was intimidating him.
Q. When you say, "because you were intimidating him", what led you to that conclusion?
A. He told me to, "Stop flexing, you are intimidating me", and as he said that, he pulled his mace out.
Q. What did you understand him to mean by, "Stop flexing"?
A. I didn't understand at all, because I was just sitting there, he had me placed down, sitting.
Q. Were you flexing your muscles at that time?
A. No I was not.
Q. Were you doing anything else to intimidate Senior Constable McArthur at that time?
A. No, I don't recall doing anything to intimidate anybody.
In fact, the plaintiff said that he did not expect SC McArthur to activate the spray because he understood from the words spoken by SC McArthur that he would not do so, so long as the plaintiff was not physically aggressive toward him. In my opinion therefore the pointing of the O.C. spray was not an assault upon the plaintiff. There was not an immediate fear. It was however an exercise of unreasonable force not pursuant to a lawful police function, for the reasons I have given.
Whilst from this point, Mr Cuthbertson remained seated on the stanchion seat where he eventually replaced his pullover, the following occurred over a period of about 9 minutes:
SC McArthur reminded Mr Cuthbertson that he was under arrest, sought Mr Cuthbertson's acknowledgement that he understood that he was under arrest. SC McArthur warned Mr Cuthbertson that he would record anything Mr Cuthbertson said to be used in Court: SC McArthur Transcript Day 7 page 383 lines 15 to 20.
On SC McArthur demanding identification, Mr Cuthbertson reminded him that he had provided a card with his details earlier which SC McArthur had placed in his notebook: SC McArthur Transcript Day 7 page 383 line 23.
SC McArthur commenced recording Mr Cuthbertson's particulars in his notebook: SC McArthur Transcript Day 7 page 383 line 27. SC Walker performed a police radio check to verify Mr Cuthbertson's particulars and to ascertain whether there were any outstanding matters, warrants or the like: SC McArthur Transcript Day 7 page 383 line 45.
In a "civil" manner Mr Cuthbertson said to SC McArthur: "I never assaulted you" and SC McArthur responded "yes, you did, you back handed to me to the chest on the train. You resisted on the train. Come out here. That's why you're placed under arrest, do you understand" and that civilly expressed denial by Mr Cuthbertson was repeatedly made over at least 5 minutes: SC McArthur Transcript Day 7 page 383 lines 29 to 34.
At some point Mr Cuthbertson asked SC McArthur what was going to happen and SC McArthur responded that he would be issued Court Attendance Notices for assault police and resist arrest: SC McArthur Transcript Day 7 page 383 line 37.
After about 4 minutes Mr Cuthbertson stood as he was directed to do by police with raised arms and SC McArthur performed a pat down search of him. Mr Cuthbertson then complied with SC McArthur's direction that he again sit on the stanchion seat.
After approximately 9 minutes Mr Cuthbertson was permitted to stand and depart.
For the reasons already stated, Mr Cuthbertson was wrongfully imprisoned by SC McArthur and by SC Walker during the whole of the 9 minutes following Mr Cuthbertson displaying calmness, 15 seconds before SC McArthur deployed the O.C. spray.
Combined with the period of wrongful imprisonment starting with the Senior Constables stepping from the vestibule to the platform and up to the struggle between SC Walker and Mr Fletcher, this brings the total period during which Mr Cuthbertson was wrongfully imprisoned to about 10 to 12 minutes.
I now return to Mr Fletcher. Following the struggle between SC Walker and Mr Fletcher, Mr Fletcher was dealt with separately to Mr Cuthbertson. When SC McArthur placed Mr Cuthbertson on the stanchion seat, Mr Fletcher stood from his position of seated on the platform. At about Exhibit A5 3:20 SC Walker can be seen directing Mr Fletcher away from Mr Cuthbertson. The direction is by speech and by the Senior Constable pointing with his hand. At one point it includes a gentle push and then a subsequent pointing with his left hand. In compliance with SC Walker's direction, Mr Fletcher retreated to the other (Western) side of the platform. SC Walker's evidence was that he said to Mr Fletcher that if he wanted to wait for Mr Cuthbertson he would have to sit and wait - indicating the other side of the platform. The direction being given to Mr Fletcher can be seen on Exhibit A7 at 3:40 and Mr Fletcher commenced sitting at just before 4:00.
Mr Fletcher's evidence of the direction given to him was as follows:
Evidence in Chief Transcript Day 1 page 55 line 21 to page 56 line 24
Q. I just want to take you back once more to the events of the early morning, 8 September 2013 and when you had been directed over to the western side of the platform by Constable Walker, what did you regard, if anything, to be your obligation?
A. To listen.
Q. What, if anything, did you think about your freedom to leave at that point?
A. Sorry, could you repeat that?
Q. What, if anything, did you think about your freedom to leave the station, at that point?
A. None. I was more worried about Drew. Wasn't thinking about my safety.
Q. Had you thought at all about your freedom to leave the station, before you were directed to go over to the western side?
A. Yes.
Q. What had you thought?
A. Just to leave, that's what I got told to do.
Q. When were you told to leave?
A. On the train. Get off the, like to get off the train, so.
Q. After that, you've told us that you were grabbed, and dragged to the ground?
A. Yes.
Q. After that, at some point, you were directed to sit over on the western side of the station platform.
A. Yes.
Q. How did you regard that direction, coming from a police officer?
WILLIAMS: I object to that. The witness has already answered this question.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I reject it.
TOOMEY: With respect, I'm not sure that he has answered it in those terms.
WILLIAMS: It's not a question of the precise framing of the question. He's going over the same territory.
HIS HONOUR: The question, to the best of my note was, in your question before, when you'd been directed to the west side of the platform by Walker, what did you regard your obligation. Is that not the same question, Mr Toomey.
TOOMEY: I suppose it essentially is, yes, your Honour. I accept that.
Q. Do you remember what the terms of the direction were? That is, what Constable Walker said to you, when he directed you to the other side of the station?
A. "Go over there and sit down."
When examination in chief recommenced two days later Mr Fletcher's evidence was: Transcript Day 2 page 60 line 5 to page 61 line 24:
Q. Mr Fletcher, on Monday you gave some evidence about being directed by Constable Walker across to the western side of the platform at Eastwood Station?
A. Yes.
Q. When he did that did you have an opinion, please answer this question simply yes or no?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you have an opinion as to whether you were then at liberty to leave the station or not?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. The answer to the question, did you have an opinion‑‑
HIS HONOUR: He said, "Yes, I was", didn't he, was that his answer?
WITNESS: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: No, no, was his answer "Yes, I was"?
TOOMEY: That's what I heard, your Honour.
Q. I'm asking you just for the moment, Mr Fletcher, whether you had an opinion?
WILLIAMS: I object, the witness has in substance answered that question.
TOOMEY: No, he hasn't, your Honour, with great respect. It plainly was not responsive to the question whether he held an opinion.
HIS HONOUR: I understand the difficulty you're in, Mr Toomey but the objection made is properly made. You even directed the witness or invited the witness to answer yes and instead of answering yes or no ‑ to invite yes or no. Instead of answering yes or no he answered, "Yes, I was".
TOOMEY: Which was not responsive to the question I asked and which is the question I now seek to put again, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: It was responsive in the sense that it was an answer and a voluntary evidence of the content of the opinion.
TOOMEY: That's the difficulty, your Honour, with respect. We don't know whether it was. I wish to do it in two steps and that's what I'm trying to do.
HIS HONOUR: You have a go and Ms Williams is free to object and I'll contemplate the objections as they come.
TOOMEY: May it please, your Honour.
Q. Did you have an opinion one way or the other concerning whether you were free to go when the direction was given to you by Constable Walker to go across to the western side of the platform?
WILLIAMS: I object.
HIS HONOUR: I will allow that, yes, go on, the answer is yes.
TOOMEY
Q. What was your opinion as to whether you were free to go or not?
WILLIAMS: I object.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, that's the trouble.
TOOMEY: I press it, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: I reject it.
And, two days later at Transcript Day 2 page 67 line 5 to line 11:
Q. What was your opinion when you were told to go and sit down on the western side of the station?
A. To sit down and listen to what I was told to do.
Q. What was your opinion as to whether you were free to go or not at that point?
A. I wasn't.
I allowed the two questions quoted above from page 67, over objection by Senior Counsel for the defendant because of the lack of clarity in Mr Fletcher's prior answers.
In cross examination Mr Fletcher gave the following evidence concerning SC Walker's direction: Transcript Day 3 page 179 lines 3 to 29
Q. You were talking to Constable Walker did you say?
A. Like, he was telling me to move away, so I was walking back. Told me to sit down.
Q. We'll come to what that verbal exchange involved shortly, but Senior Constable Walker was speaking with you, but not making physical contact with you, that's correct, isn't it?
A. I think he did, I can't remember.
Q. What do you say he did then, as part of that physical contact?
A. Kind of just, pushed me away to say, go over.
Q. You've indicated a gesture with your hand, with an open palm?
A. Kind of, like, pushing me, or telling me to go that way, I can't really recall.
Q. You say you can't recall whether it was a push or just a gesture to indicate?
A. Like, the way, yeah, just a gesture type thing. I can't recall him touching me, or forcefully telling me.
Q. A gesture indicating a direction, is that fair?
A. Yes.
HIS HONOUR: The transcript should show the witness was moving his arm out in the direction away.
TOOMEY: Yes, your Honour.
Plainly Mr Fletcher was not a sophisticated witness and his answers are less than clear for determination of the question whether or not, in fact, SC Walker by directing him to the other side of the platform, deprived him of his liberty. Early in these reasons I assessed his evidence of what was spoken to be unreliable. Indeed, he admitted that it was. Like most communications about which the evidence is imperfect, the question is best answered by considering the communication in the context of the surrounding circumstances. Those considerations are as follows:
SC Walker was directing Mr Fletcher to the other side of the platform away from Mr Cuthbertson in the period immediately following highly physical struggle between SC Walker and Mr Fletcher, when appropriately, the Senior Constables were separating Mr Cuthbertson and Mr Fletcher in order to avoid a breach of the peace or a continuation of that offending behaviour. The Senior Constables, as found above in the discussion relating to Mr Cuthbertson, were lawfully exercising their powers at common law and pursuant to section 230 LEPRA as well as pursuant to section 6 of the Police Act, in that regard. Mr Fletcher's impressionistic answer quoted above, that SC Walker was directing him to move away from Mr Cuthbertson fits with that context.
Mr Fletcher agreed that SC Walker was making a gesture when indicating the direction, there was no forceful touching or direction.
SC Walker conceded that he could not recall exactly what occurred but when directing Mr Fletcher away from SC McArthur and Mr Cuthbertson he said "something like": "if you want to wait, just wait over here, he won't be long" Transcript Day 9 page 549 line 35 to page 550 line 34. In cross examination SC Walker was challenged that he did not use the leading words "if you want to wait". The question was "double barrelled" including that he just gave a direction to Mr Fletcher to sit on the Western platform. SC Walker responded that he did not believe so and he volunteered: "I would have preferred if he'd left completely". Transcript Day 10 page 605 lines 24-29.
Whilst Mr Fletcher sat on the Western side of the platform, he was not attended by either Senior Constable. SC Walker was assisting SC McArthur attend to Mr Cuthbertson. There was therefore no continuing direction or control that he remain there. If there was police compulsion that he do so, it was wholly contained in what was said to him and how he was directed by SC Walker as described in the above evidence.
Following the direction given by SC Walker, Mr Fletcher walked backwards and sat on the Western side of the platform: Exhibit A7 at 3:30-3:55; A6 3:54.
CCTV Exhibits A7 and A6 show that whilst seated on the West side of the platform Mr Fletcher was gesturing with both hands and pointing vigorously toward the Eastern side of the platform. I interpreted that evidence as him having something to say about what was occurring between Mr Cuthbertson and the Senior Constables. There is no evidence as to what he said. The visible evidence is consistent with his maintaining an active involvement and interest in the welfare of Mr Cuthbertson, as he volunteered he possessed in the above quoted answer from his examination in chief at: Transcript Day 1 page 55 line 34 "I was more worried about Drew".
The common evidence of SC Walker and of Mr Fletcher was that SC Walker came to Mr Fletcher on about the Western side of the platform and something was said after which Mr Fletcher moved freely including to the Eastern side of the platform before departing the platform by the lift. Mr Fletcher's evidence was that SC Walker "told me to leave the station" Transcript Day 2 page 66 line 14. SC Walker could not recall what he said but did not adopt those words, identifying them as not words he was likely to use. The question put to him at Transcript Day 10 page 607 lines 13 to 17 was that he used words to the effect of "you can get off the station now, we don't need you".
Mr Fletcher is shown to get up and leave at about Exhibit A6 9:46 meaning that he was on the Western side of the platform according to the timing of CCTV footage for a period of approximately 6 minutes.
Having considered the whole of the above evidence carefully, in my opinion the evidence does not prove more probably than not, that what was said by SC Walker and gesticulated by him amounted to a direction with which Mr Fletcher complied to the depravation of his liberty for those 6 minutes.
In my opinion, the communication by SC Walker, which I have found was appropriate at the time given, in order to avoid a continuation of a breach of the peace, was a direction for Mr Fletcher to move away from Mr Cuthbertson and SC Walker. There was no follow up supervision of that direction. Mr Fletcher had not been charged with anything therefore SC Walker did not have in mind any continuous dealing with Mr Fletcher. SC Walker's evidence that he would have preferred for Mr Fletcher to leave was in keeping with this and in the circumstances is acceptable.
Mr Fletcher apparently continued to interject with his interest in the welfare of Mr Cuthbertson albeit he did not do so from close quarters. The evidence does not support a finding, on the balance of probabilities that Mr Fletcher's remaining on the Western side of the platform was not his personal choice in order to care for Mr Cuthbertson, rather than to leave.
To the extent that SC Walker was assisting SC McArthur in the process of the unlawful arrest, his participation was unlawful after calm was restored at Exhibit A5 3:15 because, as earlier found, I do not accept that SC Walker was not aware that SC McArthur was proceeding in breach of the restraint against arrest demanded by section 99 (3) LEPRA. Had SC Walker given a continuing direction to Mr Fletcher as a component of his provision of that assistance; then, the direction would be unlawful; but for the reasons just stated.
Whilst SC Walker approaching Mr Fletcher and speaking to Mr Fletcher just before he left is consistent with them having discussed Mr Fletcher's departure; the evidence of what was said lacks precision. Mr Fletcher did give evidence of words actually spoken. His recollection of what was said over the course of the whole transaction was poor across the whole of his evidence. That the conversation between Mr Fletcher and SC Walker occurred in close temporal proximity to Mr Fletcher leaving, without more, in my opinion, does not positively infer that SC Walker spoke words releasing Mr Fletcher from an earlier given police direction.
Indeed, Mr Fletcher's poor recollection and unsophisticated giving of evidence is shown in the above quoted passages. He changed his answer about his "opinion" of what SC Walker had communicated to him after his senior counsel had indicated that his first answer "yes I was" (free to leave) was not responsive. Mr Fletcher's evidence was equivocal between whether he was restrained to the Western side of the platform by SC Walker's communication or by his choice to support Mr Cuthbertson. The following passage of his evidence reveals this: Transcript Day 3 page 190 line 6 to line 13:
Q. Who told you?
A. Constable Walker. Told me to leave, so I got up and walked up towards the station, I said, "I don't want to leave my friend".
Q. But you didn't in fact leave the station after moving across, moving from the western side across to the eastern side of the platform, did you?
A. No. Cause I was saying I didn't want to leave my friend.
For these reasons, in my opinion, the evidence does not support, on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Fletcher was wrongfully imprisoned for that period of approximately 6 minutes on the Western side of the platform.
Accordingly, the question for determination is whether the plaintiff has satisfied its onus of proof as to the second limb of section 3B(1)(a) only; that is whether SC Walker intended the injurious consequence of his act. As it puts its case (above) the plaintiff does not differentiate between SC Walker's acts of pulling Mr Fletcher's right arm and his act of putting Mr Fletcher to the ground. In the course of the hearing I directed the parties' attention to consideration of that differentiation in regard to the question of causation, in the circumstances of Dr Ellis' expert medical opinion (by report only) not being based on an accurate description of the act.
There is no expert medical opinion identifying when in the course of the struggle between SC Walker and Mr Fletcher, the fracture to Mr Fletcher's right wrist occurred. The history given to Dr Ellis by Mr Fletcher described his hand being held up behind his neck. The plaintiff did not press that factual scenario because it is inconsistent with the CCTV footage.
The temporal connection between the occurrence of the fracture and the struggle with SC Walker is proved by CCTV footage of Mr Fletcher descending the lift from the platform using his left hand to support his right hand and wrist and by the clinical notes of Gosford Hospital of his attendance later that day.
Mr Fletcher said that he felt pain in his wrist during the pulling, and that the pain was in both wrists but excruciating when he landed on the concrete. In closing oral argument, the plaintiff submitted that the report of excruciating pain was proof that the fracture occurred when Mr Fletcher landed on the platform.
In the absence of specialist medical opinion, it is lay person speculation as to whether the increased pain felt when Mr Fletcher's hands hit the platform indicated a fracture but the pain in the right wrist during the pulling did not.
Conversely, it is speculation for a lay person to observe the forces involved in the pulling and in the impact with the platform as the mechanism causing the fracture.
For completeness, as I informed the parties during oral submissions, in my opinion no assistance in answering the question, whether or not SC Walker intended to cause injury, is to be found by inference from vision of him in the latter part of CCTV footage as he and SC McArthur walk away along the platform demonstrating an arm and shoulder roll movement. There is no evidence of what SC Walker was discussing with SC McArthur at that time and in any event at its highest, this vision might invite speculation that SC Walker was demonstrating what he imagined he had done or perhaps what he might with greater concern for personal safety have done.
I have found that the evidence is equivocal as to whether the fracture occurred during the full strength pulling between the two young male adults or at the moment of impact to the ground. The plaintiff does not identify anything about the act of pulling which is identifiable with an intention to injure Mr Fletcher. In my opinion, there is nothing about that act which could be identified with an intention other than to restrain Mr Fletcher from proceeding toward Erin and the train. There is, for instance, no suggestion of special techniques intended to inflict pain or submission as were considered by Campbell J in Hamilton's case. On that basis alone, in my opinion, the plaintiff has failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the act of putting Mr Fletcher to ground, upon which he bases his case, caused the fracture.
During cross examination SC Walker denied that his manoeuvre which caused Mr Fletcher and himself to go to ground was properly described as a "tackle". During examination in chief he explained that he was not thinking that he might cause injury to Mr Fletcher during the whole of the act of the pulling and of the manoeuvre which caused Mr Fletcher to go to ground: Transcript Day 9 page 547 lines 21 to 45. SC Walker was not cross-examined on that evidence. On the whole, his evidence was a denial of intention to cause Mr Fletcher injury. SC Walker's evidence in this regard is congruent with the analysis of the CCTV footage earlier in these reasons.
I find that the plaintiff has failed on its onus to prove on the balance of probabilities that SC Walker, in the act of putting Mr Fletcher to ground, intended to cause injury to Mr Fletcher within the meaning of section 3B(1)(a) CLA. It follows that the Act does apply to Mr Fletcher's claim for personal injury compensation consequent of his fractured wrist.
Mr Fletcher completed Year 12 at Brisbane Waters High School in 2008. From Year 12 he worked part-time at Campbell's Hardware, Woy Woy 10-12 hours per weekend. After completing High School he increased those hours to 2 to 3 days per week. In 2010 he suffered a left hand crush injury in that work and was off work for 2 to 3 weeks. This occurred when he was stacking timber. He said that his left hand returned to normal function.
In 2010 he suffered back injury when he fell backwards on timber whilst working at Campbell's Building Materials. He received medical treatment and compensation. He was seen by Doctor Russo during the course of his rehabilitation until April 2012. In April 2012 his treating physiotherapist Mr Rees designed a rehabilitation program. Mr Fletcher agreed, in cross examination that he was assessed to have a permanent lifting restriction of 20 kilograms: Transcript Day 2 page 87, line 40. Whilst working at Campbell's he was restricted to that lifting limit. The plaintiff's evidence was consistent with him approaching work mindful of his ongoing limitation of lifting strength in accordance with that evidence. Mr Fletcher continues to experience pain in his lower back and a disability in his right leg which he understands to be related to the back injury: Transcript Day 2 page 88, lines 41 to 49. The medical literature described occasions when Mr Fletcher suffered hand injuries prior to the subject incident, on one occasion when he punched furniture and on another occasion when he punched a wall.
Following the subject incident Mr Fletcher initially experienced pain and discomfort in his right wrist area of severity which restricted him from twisting his lower arm. He attended Gosford Hospital where the fracture was reduced. His lower arm was placed in a plaster cast. He was absent from his employment from Campbell's for 1 week. His plaster was removed and he commenced an apprenticeship with a new employer, DG Baker Building. That business installed sky domes and whirly birds in roofs. He was involved in roof installation work and attic work. His duties included delivering the whirly birds and tools onto the roof for Mr Baker to install. He was working with Mr Baker about 38 hours per week. In this work he noticed that he experienced restriction of use of his right hand when using hammers, nail guns and drills. He experienced the sensations of strain, pain and clicking which he had not experienced before the incident. When having to use those tools in his right hand only he would stop every couple of minutes. He told Mr Baker of his injury and of this civil claim. When his symptoms restricted him because the job was bigger than normal, such as when 2 or 3 skylights were being installed, he would take the next day off. He said that this occurred one to three times per month.
In June 2016 Mr Fletcher ceased working with Mr Baker.
Mr Fletcher commenced studying carpentry at TAFE in January 2014. He ceased TAFE in 2016 not having finished his carpentry qualification. He had two subjects to go plus one year of onsite work in order to achieve his qualification. His injury was not the cause of his ceasing TAFE and suspending his apprenticeship.
In July 2016 he obtained work with PJ Cook Building, Umina. He worked as a carpenter about 4 months until November 2016. That business constructed granny flats. During the initial 2-3 weeks he learned the job. He worked with five or more workers onsite. He used nail guns, drills, hammers and plane tools. He experienced pain in his right wrist when using a hammer and handling heavier tools particularly the nail gun. He said that he experienced pain with the twisting and pulling during the removal of nails. He used two hands to work with the nail gun because he found that he could not control the weight of it with his right hand only. He said that when he used the drill he experienced a weird "chalky" feeling in his arm.
Mr Fletcher conceded that his back impairment caused him problems weekly whilst working with Mr Baker. When asked to differentiate between right wrist impairment and low back impairment at work he said that he was no longer able to recall. He said that they contributed about equally to his difficulty with performing manual trade work. He said that due to his subject injury he uses his left wrist more than he did previously. He agreed that he favours his back by leaning to one side instead of working with a normal posture. He did not attribute his leaving employment with Mr Baker to his physical injuries. He said that he was going through a life trauma at the time.
In 2017 he started with a business known as Raffalo which is a roof installation business. He performs general duties unloading trucks and taking tools to the roof. He is required to use tin-snips with his right hand to cut metal roofing. He uses his left hand as much as he can because of his impairment. He is also required to use a nail gun, a hammer and all roofing tools. He continues to suffer some restriction, pain and weakness in his right hand.
On 21 February 2017 he experienced a popping sensation in his lower back. He attended Gosford hospital where he underwent MRI. He said that he suffered an L5 injury. He has not seen any regular treating Doctor since but he has been seeing Mr Paul Reach osteotherapist at Umina. At the commencement of the hearing in late April 2017, he had attended Mr Reach only once.
The lumbar injury suffered when working with Mr Raffalo caused him to take 3-4 weeks off work after which he has continued on restricted duties. At the time of hearing he was performing, quoting, cleaning and only rarely getting the tools to the roof manually. He continues to suffer pinching sensation in his back and pain to his knee. He has not submitted a workers compensation claim.
As stated above, the evidence does not permit arithmetic calculation in the estimation of future economic loss. The commonly provided evidence at such hearings of earnings of comparable workers, and of vocational experts for instance, is not available. The court is to perform an estimation of the "most likely" future circumstances but for the injury: s13(1) CLA. The court must assess the effect of Mr Fletcher's diminished earning capacity upon the economic value of his otherwise capacity to earn: New South Wales v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000] NSWCA 133. Section 13 CLA does not prohibit the assessment of damages by way of a "buffer". In Penrith City Council v Parks [2004] NSWCA 201 at [5] Giles JA said: "the occasion for a buffer is when the impact of the injury upon the economic benefit from exercising earning capacity after injury is difficult to determine." There is still a comparison between the economic benefits, although the difference cannot be determined otherwise than by the broad approach of a buffer. Section 13(1) can be fulfilled, and the assumptions as to exercising earning capacity before injury can be stated. In determined damages for future economic loss by way of a buffer, because of the broad approach there is no question of percentage adjustment, and so in the application of section 13(2) the percentage adjustment is nil.
Mr Fletcher's history of back injury and symptoms gives reason for serious concern that he is suited for long term labour based work. His capacity to earn so long as he continues in manual work is diminished by his back condition. He works with an understanding of a lifting restriction of 20 kilograms which is entirely unrelated to his right wrist injury. His right wrist injury is debilitating in the actions of hammering, twisting and manipulating weight in his right hand only, such as drills and nail guns. Mr Fletcher has not achieved any study, learning or skills other than in manual work.
In my opinion the evidence does not support that it is likely that Mr Fletcher will, in the long term, manage labouring work including any but modest lifting, climbing, working at heights and working in restricted places. In other employment, Mr Fletcher would require use of his dominant right hand. Doctor Ellis referred to some difficulty with writing. Nothing is said in the evidence of an impairment of operation of the keyboard but worldly experience would suggest that even in clerical work, the plaintiff would suffer some degree of diminished earning capacity into the future even in office work, sales work and other non-labouring types of employment. Mr Fletcher is only in his mid-twenties and therefore has a long working life ahead of him.
I assess a buffer in the sum of $75,000 for future economic loss.
Medical expenses: There is no claim for past and future medical expenses.
Had I determined that Mr Fletcher is entitled to damages under the provisions of CLA for his wrist injury I would have allowed damages in the total sum of $120,000.
Mr Fletcher's friends were able to observe the restraint of him from their position on the train carriage. The tort of wrongful imprisonment focuses on the vindication of liberty and reparation to the victim, rather than upon the presence or absence of moral wrongdoing on the part of the police. A substantial proportion of the ultimate award of damages for false imprisonment must be given for what has been described as the initial shock of being arrested: New South Wales v Smith [2017] NSWCA 194. There is no direct evidence of Mr Fletcher suffering humiliation or embarrassment but it is available to find that the wrongful actions of the police caused him that harm. The common law places such value upon a police officer depriving a citizen of liberty as SC Walker did of Mr Fletcher's right to liberty that "[e]ven apparently minor depravations of liberty are viewed seriously at common law."
The categories of damages that may be awarded for trespass to the person, assault or wrongful imprisonment are not self-contained. In a case such as the present, there is a close relationship between the award of ordinary compensatory damages for Mr Fletcher's feelings and an award of aggravated damages: Smith's case supra at [157] and [158]. While aggravated damages can be awarded to reflect the extent to which the circumstances of SC Walker's conduct increased the hurt to Mr Fletcher, a single sum can be awarded for both aggravated and exemplary damages: New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; [2006] HCA 57 at [35]. At [31] the High Court stated "aggravated damages are a form of general damages, given by way of compensation for injury to the plaintiff, which may be intangible, resulting from the circumstances and the manner of the wrongdoing". At [33] the High Court recognised that whereas aggravated damages fix upon the circumstances and manner of the wrongdoing of the defendant, and the function of exemplary damages is punishment and deterrence of the wrongdoer; nevertheless it can be difficult to differentiate between aggravated damages and exemplary damages.
In my opinion, in this case, the exercise of force to restrain Mr Fletcher and pull him away from Mr Cuthbertson employed by SC Walker, in circumstances which I have found required SC Walker to believe that the arrest process being employed by SC McArthur did not comply with section 99(3) LEPRA; deserve the disapprobation of the Court. In the circumstances of this case, the matters justifying an award of exemplary damages are also pertinent to an award of aggravated damages.
Mindful of the conceptual differences between ordinary damages for the assaults and aggravated and exemplary damages and of the danger of an excessive overall award where some or all of the factors supporting one head of damage also support the other; I intend to allow one sum for aggravated and exemplary damages whilst being conscious of not double compensating with ordinary damages.
In Coyle v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWCA 95, Tobias JA said of the harm of the shock of wrongful imprisonment, the following, which in my view is instructive here where inclusion of the physical binding behind Mr Fletcher was involved in the second assault: "[99] it is difficult to imagine for a person who is otherwise generally a law abiding citizen, a more humiliating experience, or a greater shock to one's equilibrium than being forcefully deprived of one's liberty for even a relatively short period in circumstances which are entirely unjustified. This is all the more so where that curtailment of liberty is accompanied, as in the present case, by the detained person being handcuffed and marched through a crowd of onlookers and then incarcerated in a police paddy wagon, locked in a cell at the police station, and fingerprinted and photographed as a criminal. Not surprisingly, the whole experience must have been both humiliating and highly embarrassing."
Obviously in the present case, Mr Fletcher was not handcuffed, incarcerated, carried in a paddy wagon, and processed as a criminal. Nevertheless, he was treated discourteously and physically restrained in the manner which I have described, in view of other friends onlooking from the train.
Approaching damages mindful of the principles above stated, I allow:
1. Ordinary damages for the first and second assaults and wrongful imprisonment $4,000
2. For aggravated and exemplary damages $7,000
Total $11,000.
The pat down of Mr Cuthbertson was a battery and again physical action which clearly interfered with his personal dignity and his right to feel physical personal security.
Employing the principles set out above, I allow ordinary damages for assault and trespass in the sum of $12,000.
Employing the principles set out in the case law referred to above, in my opinion the actions of assault by SC McArthur, particularly in circumstances where at no point did Mr Cuthbertson direct physical aggression in opposition at him and where Mr Cuthbertson, at the earliest opportunity to do so, provided him with his personal identification details; involved a manner of wrongdoing deserving of compensation to Mr Cuthbertson in the form of aggravated damages. In my opinion, after allowing for the "smart arse" behaviour of Mr Cuthbertson prior to the assault inflicted upon him by SC McArthur in the carriage vestibule and particularly having regard for the opportunity of the police officers to gather their thoughts when within the vestibule of the train before stepping out onto the platform in order to proceed with the second arrest; the unlawful conduct by SC McArthur is deserving of the disapprobation of the Court in the form of exemplary damages.
I have found wrongful imprisonment of Mr Cuthbertson of a period of up to 12 minutes. Damages for wrongful imprisonment are not to be assessed on an arithmetic calculation of time but rather compensation is to focus on vindication of liberty and reparation to the victim. A substantial portion of the ultimate award of damages to be in compensation for the initial shock.
The wrongful imprisonment involved the assaults for which Mr Cuthbertson is separately compensated for ordinary damages. I assess normal damages for wrongful imprisonment in the sum of $7,000.
I allow a single figure sum for aggravated and exemplary damages compensation for assault, trespass and wrongful imprisonment in the sum of $15,000.
In January 2014 the law practice received the fee disclosure of Woodbury of Junior Counsel (Exhibit F) and in February 2014 the law practice received the fee disclosure of Steirn SC (Exhibit G). Neither fee disclosure by counsel was forwarded by the law practice to Mr Cuthbertson.
On the 25th of February 2014 trial of the criminal proceedings commenced at Burwood Local Court and the hearing went over part heard to 7 May 2014. On 4 March 2014 the law practice wrote to Mr Cuthbertson advising of its increased estimate of costs to completion of the trial in excess of $60,000. The trial completed on the 7th of May 2014 with verdicts of guilty. On 19 May 2014 Mr Cuthbertson appeared at the sentencing hearing at Burwood Local Court.
On or soon after 26 May 2014 the law practice forwarded its "Costs Agreement" for the costs of an appeal to the District Court (Exhibit P). On 17 September 2014 Woodbury of Junior Counsel forwarded his fee disclosure for the appeal proceedings (Exhibit O).
On 22 October 2014 Finnane QC DCJ granted the appeal and overturned the verdict. Woodbury did not seek an order for costs. The defendant has not pleaded mitigation and does not rely on the failure to apply for costs as a failure to mitigate loss but says that it goes to causation of loss.
At about the end of October 2014 the law practice received bills of counsel for the trial in the Local Court and for the appeal in the District Court (Exhibits J and Q). On 16 December 2014 the law practice billed Mr Cuthbertson for legal services provided in the trial and in the appeal (Exhibits L and S). Counsel's bills accompanied the law practice's bills.
Mr Fahey agreed that costs of the law practice in the criminal proceedings have not been assessed. He said that he acted for Mr Cuthbertson in these civil proceedings between April 2015 and March 2017.
In cross examination Mr Fahey was interrogated in regard to his discussion with Mr Cuthbertson as to arrangements, if any, for the payment of legal services provided by the law practice.
Mr Fahey described his conversations with Mr Cuthbertson when initially instructed and again a couple of months after that time in the following evidence at transcript day 4, page 249, line 28 to line 32:
"Q: did you tell Mr Cuthbertson that he would not have to pay the legal costs relating to the Local Court criminal proceedings and the District Court appeal unless and until he succeeded in a civil claim for damages against the State for alleged assault and alleged false imprisonment?
A: I may have told him I'm prepared to wait until it's all finished."
Mr Fahey's evidence was that at some time before mid-May 2014 he would have said to Mr Cuthbertson:
"something along the lines of, you've probably got a bit of money. And there's a fair bit going on. You may or may not get money at the end. But we're going to send you a bill for it." Transcript Day 5, page 251, lines 27 to 29. He gave the following evidence:
"Q: What, if anything, did you say to Mr Cuthbertson at that time of that conversation, about what steps might be taken for him to get some money at the end?
A: I would have told him, that the costs can be recovered … recovered in civil proceedings, and not to worry too much" Transcript day 5, page 252, lines 21 to 29.
Mr Fahey described his expectation in relation to payment when the Costs Agreement (Exhibit P) was forwarded to Mr Cuthbertson on or about 26 May 2014 as:
"he would have to wait. He wouldn't be able to pay until he came into funds" Transcript Day 4, page 249, line 15.
In cross examination Mr Cuthbertson agreed that at or very soon after his initial attendance upon Mr Fahey with the Court Attendance Notices, Mr Fahey discussed with him the legal costs of defending the criminal proceedings but Mr Cuthbertson was unable to recall what was said. He did not recall being told that he would "get some money at the end" or "the legal costs of the criminal proceedings could be recovered in the civil proceedings". He recalled that at that stage of the commencement of receipt of legal services, or very soon after, Mr Fahey said, in effect, "he wasn't going to chase me for it" Transcript day 6, page 352, lines 9 to 38.
The law practice "Costs Agreement" dated 3 December 2013 informed Mr Cuthbertson of the rate of charge of $450 per hour. It provided an early estimate of fees of the criminal defence in the Local Court of $10,000, which estimate, (as above) in March 2014 was increased to exceed $60,000 including the fees of senior and junior counsel (Exhibit I). At that stage the law practice had engaged senior and junior counsel.
The question was not asked and Mr Fahey did not, in his evidence of discussions, describe an arrangement that it was recovery of costs of the criminal proceedings as a head of damages in the civil proceedings for which payment could wait. As can be seen from the passages of his evidence quoted above, it was put to him that the arrangement was that payment of the costs billed by the law practice in the criminal proceedings was contingent upon success in these proceedings for damages for assault and false imprisonment.
The evidence amounted to Mr Fahey and Mr Cuthbertson orally arranging that in circumstances where the law practice was aware that Mr Cuthbertson was not in funds to pay, the law practice would wait until he came into funds and an event in which he may come into funds would be judgment in these civil proceedings including an order for damages for assault and wrongful imprisonment.
That Mr Fahey commenced to act in these civil proceedings in April 2015, approximately 6 months after conclusion of the criminal proceedings is consistent with there not being an agreement between the law practice and Mr Cuthbertson at the time of delivery of the legal services by the law practice in the criminal proceedings, that the recovery would be conditional upon success in the civil proceedings. Consistent with this is also the evidence of Mr Fahey that between conclusion of the Local Court trial in May 2014 and the conclusion of the appeal in the District Court of the 22nd of October 2014, Mr Fahey asked Mr Cuthbertson if he could borrow money to pay costs and Mr Cuthbertson answered: "I have got nothing. I can't get anything" Day 5 Transcript page 253 lines 10 to 24.
In my opinion, it is not available on the evidence for the defendant to submit, as it does, that the law practice and Mr Cuthbertson entered into a conditional costs agreement because nothing in the evidence supports the submission that costs were only to be paid in the event of success in the criminal proceedings. Nor should it be found, as the defendant submits, that recovery in these civil proceedings is "related" for the purposes of a conditional costs agreement. There is no evidence of agreement of payment contingent upon recovery of those costs as a specie or head of damage in these proceedings.
On the whole of the evidence, the arrangement between Mr Fahey and Mr Cuthbertson was not more than that Mr Cuthbertson would pay the costs of the criminal proceedings as he was able to do, when he came into funds.
On the whole of the evidence I agree with the plaintiff's written submission dated 8 June 2017, "nothing Mr Fahey wrote or said indicated other than because Mr Cuthbertson was impecunious he was prepared to send an invoice but was willing to wait and defer payment [Transcript page 249 lines 11-16, 249 lines 28-32]. It was never suggested to Mr Fahey in cross examination that the costs invoice to Mr Cuthbertson would be completely abandoned if they could not be recovered in the civil proceedings."
The defendant submits that pursuant to section 317 LPA, because of the non-disclosure by his solicitors, Mr Cuthbertson "need not pay" the legal costs unless they have been assessed under Division 11 of the LPA. The defendant says that Mr Cuthbertson has therefore not suffered a loss.
The defendant concedes that section 317 does not have the effect of destroying the right of the law practice's entitlement to costs. The defendant submits that the law practice cannot proceed to recover those costs: The defendant points to Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145 at [55-56] per Santow JA, [148] to [160] per Basten JA; In the matter of Re Tetbury Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 37 at [29] to [30].
The defendant concedes that pursuant to section 319, (1)(c) the law practice is entitled to the fair and reasonable value of the legal services it provided - a quantum meruit basis.
The defendant submits that "the law practice cannot maintain proceedings to recover costs [pursuant to section 319], unless and until those costs have been assessed: section 317: written submissions 5 June 2017 at [66].
The limit of the opportunity for assessment is not a finite one as put on the defendant argument. At written submission [121] the defendant conceded that whereas its argument under the LPA is based partly upon the time for commencement of an assessment application having passed; pursuant to section 350 LPA, an application for assessment of costs could still be made, on determination of the Supreme Court, that it is just and fair for an application to be dealt with out of time.
The essence of the defendant's argument against the law practice costs of the criminal proceedings being recoverable by Mr Cuthbertson as damages in these proceedings takes the perspective of the right to recovery of its costs by suit or otherwise compelling Mr Cuthbertson to pay. At [102] of its written submission the defendant put it:
"however, as at the date upon which it falls to this Court to determine this civil proceeding, any quantum meruit claim by the law practice against Mr Cuthbertson would fail because Mr Cuthbertson could not be said to have been unjustly enriched by receiving legal services in the criminal proceedings without paying for those services, in circumstances where he was told that he need not pay unless the legal costs were recovered as damages in a civil proceedings and that has not occurred: references made to Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR and Lumbers v William Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) (208) 232 CLR 635."
Contrary to the factual essence of the defendant's submission (particularly at [102]) I have found that the oral arrangement between Mr Fahey and Mr Cuthbertson was not that payment of costs was conditional upon recovery of damages in these civil proceedings. Mr Fahey denied that proposition when it was put to him. The proposition was not put to Mr Cuthbertson in cross examination.
The defendant then submits "further and alternatively" at [103] that even if Mr Cuthbertson has a liability, he is not required to pay those costs and Foott Law and Co cannot maintain proceedings against him to recover those costs unless and until those costs are assessed
The question which arises from the defendant's submissions on the application of the LPA must be viewed from the perspective of the question for determination in this case, which is: whether or not the fact that time for assessment of the law practice costs in the criminal proceedings under the LPA has expired (subject to approval for assessment to proceed out of time being granted by the Supreme Court) the law practice cannot sue Mr Cuthbertson for recovery of its costs; means that there is no loss recoverable as damages. In my opinion, this question should be answered in the negative.
Three points to be made immediately are:
1. There is no evidence nor any submission concerning the prospects of success of the obtaining of approval of the Supreme Court for the assessment of costs. In the absence of any dispute between Mr Cuthbertson and the law practice and there being no evidence of an unwillingness or refusal to pay those costs by Mr Cuthbertson; the submissions do not dissuade from an assumption that such approval would be forthcoming if sought;
2. As I earlier found, I do not accept that the evidence supports the statement in the above quoted passage from defendant written submission [102] that Mr Cuthbertson was told that he need not pay unless the costs were recovered as damages in a civil proceeding; and
3. There is no evidence that Mr Cuthbertson is unwilling to pay the costs billed.
The common law will not conflict with social and commercial policy provided for in statute: Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarek (2009) 239 CLR 420; Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 [2014] HCA 36; (2014) 254 CLR 185. However, nothing contained in the LPA, and specifically in the sections relied upon by the defendant, extinguishes the entitlement of the law practice to its costs. The provisions only affect the law practice's right to proceed to recovery: Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 747 at [148] to [160] per Basten JA; and section 319 LPA.
As plaintiff written submissions properly put it, nothing in section 317(1) LPA denudes Mr Cuthbertson of his choice to pay his solicitors' costs without a costs assessment. I would add that plainly the vast majority of solicitor/client costs are satisfied without assessment.
Relying upon the principle stated in State of New South Wales v Koumdjiev (2005) 63 NSWLR 353; [2005] NSWCA 247 at [46] and [68] per Hodgson JA (Beasley and Hislop JJA agreeing); State of New South Wales v Randall [2017] NSWCA 88 at [45]-[46] per Basten JA and at [135]-[136] per McDougall J; the plaintiff claims recompense for loss being the costs incurred defending the offence of resist a police officer in the execution of his duty. The assault charges were dismissed and the arrest was unlawful. Police were not acting in the course of duty when effecting the unlawful arrest. In this way the costs of defending the "resist" charge are different to the costs of defending the "assault" charge in that the "resist" occurred after and in consequence of the wrongful arrest. The "assault" occurred before the arrest.
Having rejected the defendant factual submission that Mr Cuthbertson was told he did not need to pay legal costs unless they were recovered as damages in a civil proceedings; I would understand the defendant to concede that the principles of Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221; [1987] HCA 5 and Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 232 CLR 635; [2008] HCA 27 apply to the facts as I have found them.
In the present case Mr Cuthbertson and the law practice, by its principal solicitor Mr Fahey, from the outset of instructions proceeded on a mutual understanding that the services were being provided at the solicitor's hourly rate of $450 per hour and subsequently that fees for senior and junior counsel were being incurred by Mr Cuthbertson. Whilst Mr Cuthbertson did not sign the "Costs Agreement" documents, the evidence of Mr Fahey is that those documents and the correspondence of March 2014 were forwarded.
Mr Cuthbertson chose on those terms to continue to instruct the law practice to provide services and accepted services having been informed that he would be billed for the work. In December 2014 he was billed for that work. There can be no doubt that Mr Cuthbertson received the benefit of the legal services provided by the law practice. Opposite the facts in Lumbers case, the facts here fit neatly within the long established principles of restitution for a benefit described at the expense of the law practice justifying remedy against unjust enrichment: see Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 232 CLR 635; [2008] HCA 27 at [84]-[89]. The LPA does not extinguish the entitlement of the law practice to be paid. The obligation to pay is not denied by Mr Cuthbertson.
In further answer to the defendant's submission: as already noted, and as effectively conceded in the defendant written submissions, it is still available to the law practice to proceed for assessment, with leave of the Supreme Court and there is no evidence that Mr Cuthbertson would oppose that leave being granted. There is no basis for finding that the right of the law practice to proceed for recovery of its costs has expired. It has an entitlement to be paid and it is entitled to be paid for the fair and reasonable value of the legal services provided.
In my opinion the correct approach is to determine Mr Cuthbertson's entitlement to damages rather than the right of the law practice to proceed against him for payment. Even if the defendant submission is correct and the law practice cannot force Mr Cuthbertson to pay for the legal services which it provided; nevertheless, in my opinion he has suffered a loss of the fair and reasonable value of those legal services. The proposition that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover from the defendant the value of the services provided to him, by a third party, unless he can show that he is under a legal liability to pay for them, has not been acceptable since the decision of the High Court of Australia in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; [1977] HCA 45.
As to quantum: The "assault" charge and the "resist" charge were serviced simultaneously and proceeded simultaneously, according to the evidence. The consideration of causation of those services does not engage a field outside the realm of common knowledge and experience. Assessment of the reasonable value of legal services claimed here, is not like in cases where the loss is of medical or scientific description and, upon the evidence, it appears that the present state of knowledge does not admit of an affirmative answer and that competent and trustworthy expert opinion regards an affirmative answer as lacking justification, either as a probable inference or as an accepted hypothesis.
In this case, as already observed, but for the wrongful arrest, the charge of "resist" could not have arisen and the assaults and wrongful imprisonment would not have occurred. Assume, for illustration, it were available to identify a conference or advice which concerned only the charge of assault. Given the itemization in the bills showing the attendances; and in consideration of the intimate relationship between the events of the "assault" and the "resist" charges; it is likely that the vast majority of the legal services are a total harm, precise dissection of costs for services between the charges being unavailable.
In my opinion, the plaintiff submission (written 8 June 2017 paragraph 1) that the loss be equal to a 50:50 apportionment between the costs of defending the "assault" and "resist" charges is readily acceptable as reasonable: principles of damages at common law: Amaca Pty Ltd v Booth (2011) 246 CLR 36; [2011] HCA 53 at [69] to [71]; Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; [2012] HCA 5 at [21] to [28].
The defendant in written submissions 5 June 2017 at [149] refers to the statement of principles for application by the Court in assessing lump sum provision of costs pursuant to section 98 CPA in Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375. Unlike this case where the sum of the costs is relatively modest against the cost of an assessment process; in that case the costs disputed were well in excess of $1,000,000. Unlike that case where the assessment was for costs inter partes, in this case the assessment is of damages compensating for loss consequent of tortious action.
In my opinion, the Hamod Case is against the defendant's submission that the evidence in this case is insufficient to prove the fair and reasonable quantum of damages compensating for the harm of incurring a liability for costs incurred of defending the "resist" charge. Any concern otherwise is, as I have said, is relieved by the obvious fairness of the plaintiff's submission by which it concedes a 50:50 split between the "assault" and "resist" charges.
Hamod's Case at [777] and [821] is instructive of the desirability of the ready assessment of costs where the touchstone is one of confidence that the approach taken to estimate costs is logical, fair and reasonable. This is particularly so in this case where the plaintiff's claim of only 50% of the amount billed must be seen in the circumstances to which I have referred, to be conservative.
There is no fundamental right in the defendant to have the costs assessed in a formal assessment process in order for quantum to be found. The real loss for which damages are awarded is the loss which gave rise to the need for legal services defending the "resist" charge and that can be assessed by reference to the objective value of those services.
The criterion is reasonableness in proportion to the magnitude of the loss suffered. It is within the experience of the court that Mr Fahey's hourly rate of $450 an hour was not beyond market value. That the trial was sufficiently complex to justify the services of senior and junior counsel is made out by the fact that Mr Cuthbertson was at first instance convicted and only on appeal acquitted. The rates of charge of the law practice and of counsel are not plainly beyond the market value of those services: Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; [1992] HCA 54. Again, the allowance of 50% sought by the plaintiff is plainly reasonable.
In defendant written submission's 5 June 2017 at [134] the defendant accepts that this court is bound by State of New South Wales v Koumdjiev (2005) 63 NSWLR 353; [2005] NSWCA 247. The defendant otherwise submits that Koumdjiev was wrongly decided.
At [135] to [138] the defendant submits that this case is distinguishable from Koumdjiev because no costs order was sought on behalf of Mr Cuthbertson on his success in the District Court appeal by Woodbury. Reference is made to section 70(1) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). As already noted, the defendant did not plead mitigation and makes the point only in the context of causation.
The grounds for achieving an award of costs pursuant to section 70(1) require special circumstances including bad faith in the prosecution of the offence, which circumstances go beyond the natural and probable consequences of the realm of common law damages sought by the plaintiff. As Hodgson JA in Koumdjiev said at [67] "costs are rarely awarded in criminal cases."
In any event, in my opinion, the plaintiff properly submits that the defendant failed in its obligation to plead its reliance on section 70(1) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). Had it done so, the plaintiff would have been properly alerted to the field of evidence required in order for it to prove its case including, but not restricted to, the calling of Woodbury of counsel to give evidence. The defendant should not be permitted the benefit of raising a statutory defence after the close of evidence.
I allow Mr Cuthbertson damages compensating him for loss in the form of his need for receipt of legal services equal to one half of legal costs billed to him by Messrs Foott Law and Co ($91,367.75) in the rounded sum of $45,500.