1. By September 2014, when work was suspended, construction on Mr Draper's house had proceeded to the completion of the slab and frame stages, together with the roof trusses. In that month, Mr Draper commenced civil proceedings against Simonds Homes in VCAT. These culminated in a decision in his favour dated 29 April 2016[3]. In particular, VCAT ordered that Simonds Homes demolish the existing slab, because it had been laid at the wrong level. The frame was also demolished.
2. At around the same time as he commenced his civil claim, Mr Draper also raised complaints with the BPB about the conduct of the builder. On 9 February 2015 he requested that the BPB investigate his complaints.
3. By October 2015, it had not done so. So Mr Draper lodged an application under the then extant s 182A(3)(b) of the Building Act 1993 seeking that VCAT order that the BPB conduct an inquiry. He was clearly entitled to do this, as the person who had originally requested the BPB to conduct the inquiry.
4. The old s 182A set out the circumstances in which various persons had the right to apply to VCAT for reviews of decisions of the BPB. It provided as follows:

(1) A person to whom a decision of the Building Practitioners Board under Division 1 or 2 applies may apply to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a review of -

(b) a failure of the Board to make that decision within a reasonable time.

(2) If the Authority referred a matter to the Building Practitioners Board for inquiry under Division 2, the Authority may apply to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a review of -

(a) a failure by the Board to conduct an inquiry, within a reasonable time, into the matter referred to it; or

(b) a refusal by the Board to conduct the inquiry; or

(3) A person who requested the Building Practitioners Board to conduct an inquiry under Division 2 may apply to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a review of -

(a) a failure by the Board to conduct the inquiry within a reasonable time; or

(b) a refusal by the Board to conduct the inquiry; or

1. Thus it can be seen that the old sub-section (1) prescribed the matters which registered building practitioners could have reviewed by VCAT. Sub-section (2) prescribed the matters which the VBA could have reviewed by VCAT. And, most relevantly, sub-section (3) prescribed the matters which a person who had requested the BPB to conduct an inquiry could seek to have reviewed.
2. On 11 May 2016 the BPB notified Mr Draper that it had determined not to conduct an Inquiry into the professional conduct of Mr Simonds. Instead it was conducting an informal non-statutory 'Conduct Review'. Mr Draper was not satisfied with this, including because it only considered some of the issues he had raised.
3. On 1 September 2016, the new disciplinary regime for building practitioners referred to above came into effect. This replaced the former ss 177 - 187 inclusive, with a new and quite different set of provisions comprising the new ss 177 - 187. The old process involving the conduct of inquiry by the BPB, was replaced by a new 'show cause' process. There is a right for a person who is 'directly affected' to apply to VCAT for review (s 186).
4. On 15 September 2017, VCAT Senior Member Riegler upheld Mr Draper's application and ordered that an inquiry be conducted under s 178 of the Building Act 1993 into the professional conduct of Mr Simonds.[4]
5. However, there was quite some delay in carrying out the Inquiry. Mr Draper sought an enforcement order under s 122 of the VCAT Act. He also lodged a fresh application on 10 July 2018. This sought to rely on the old s 182A(3)(a) of the Building Act 1993. That enabled a person who requested the BPB to conduct an inquiry to apply to VCAT for a review of a failure by the BPB to conduct the inquiry within a reasonable time.
6. This fresh application was determined by Senior Member Farrelly on 3 October 2018. He determined that the old s 182A(3)(a) was no longer an avenue available to Mr Draper, as it had not been preserved by the applicable transitional provisions.[5]
7. In relation to the enforcement application, the Principal Registrar of VCAT declined to issue a certificate for filing in the Supreme Court. This was on the basis that the VBA had advised that the matter would shortly be set down for hearing.
8. The Amended Notice of Inquiry into Mr Simonds' conduct was dated 29 June 2018. The disciplinary hearing into the conduct of Mr Simonds was conducted by the BPB on 19 November 2018. The BPB handed down its decision that day. Mr Draper attended at hearing as an observer.
9. Thus, the BPB inquiry process which Mr Draper had instigated three and a half years before, in February 2015, was finally completed in November 2018. However, Mr Draper was not satisfied with it, and he took further steps.
10. In his submission, Mr Draper stated as follows: A formal statement of the outcome of the hearing was issued on 20 November 2018. This was a one and a half page document headed 'Notice of Decision of the Building Practitioners Board Victoria'. On 11 December 2018 he sent an email requesting a Statement of Reasons for the decision. He sought this pursuant to s 46(1) of the VCAT Act, which requires a decision-maker to provide a written statement of reasons for a decision as soon as practical, and in any event within 28 days after receiving a request. On 28 December 2018 he received a response from the VBA informing him that they would not be providing a response within that 28 day period. On 12 February 2019, he sent a further email regarding his request for reasons. No response was received. On 4 March 2019 he again contacted the VBA, threatening further action if the statement was not provided. On 5 March 2019 he received a statement of reasons. This was 80 days after his request.
11. On 13 March 2019 he submitted this application to VCAT for review. As noted, his previous two applications had been under the old s 182A(3)(b) of the Building Act, and the old s 182A(3)(a) respectively. This application was made under the third of these provisions, the old s 182A(3)(c).

Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear this application - transitional provisions

1. The transitional provisions brought in with the 2016 amendments relevantly provide as follows (with the 'commencement day' being 1 September 2016):
   1. Abolition of Building Practitioners Board

(a) the Building Practitioners Board is abolished and its members go out of office; and

(b) any subcommittee of the Building practitioners Board is abolished and its members go out of office.

(2) Subclause (1) does not affect any other provisions of this Part -

(a) dealing with proceedings before the Building Practitioners Board; or

(b) providing for the Building Practitioners Board to continue for certain purposes.

(3) If, under this Part, the Building Practitioners Board continues for certain purposes, the old provisions relating to the membership and procedure of the Board continue to apply for those purposes.

(1) If, before the relevant commencement date, the Building Practitioners Board has commenced an inquiry into the conduct of a building practitioner but the Board has not determined the inquiry, the Board may continue and determine the inquiry in accordance with the old provisions.

(2) A determination of the Building Practitioners Board referred to in subclause (1) is taken -

(a) in the case of a determination under section 179 of the old provisions, to be a decision of the Authority under section 182E of the new provisions; or

(b) in the case of a decision under section 180 of the old provisions, to be a decision of the Authority under section 181 of the new provisions.

(3) An application for a review that has been made under section 182A of the old provisions but not determined before the relevant commencement day may be continued and completed in accordance with the old provisions.

(4) If the time within which an application for review could be made under section 182A of the old provisions had not expired before the relevant commencement day, the application may be made and dealt with in accordance with the old provisions.

1. Decisions and actions of Building Practitioners Board

On the relevant commencement day, all decisions and actions taken by the Building Practitioners Board under this Act before the relevant commencement day are taken to be decisions and actions taken by the Authority in relation to any period on or after the relevant commencement day.

1. In my view, the most relevant transitional provision for consideration is clause 4(4). This requires that I determine what is the 'time within which an application for review could be made under s 182A of the old provisions'. If that is on or after the relevant commencement day (being 1 September 2016) then the application may be made and dealt with in accordance with the old provisions.
2. It was common ground that under the old s 182A, the time limit for bringing an application to VCAT for review was 60 days after the relevant decision was made[6]. Here, the BPB's decision was made on 19 November 2018. Sixty days after that is 18 January 2019.
3. Looking first at the text of clause 4(4), the plain meaning of the words in the first two lines is that they relate to the time limit for bringing an application under the old s 182A (which was 60 days) rather than referring to the date on which s 182A was repealed.
4. In my view, the effect of this provision is that Mr Draper had 60 days after 19 November 2018 to lodge an application for review of the BPB's decision on Mr Simonds' disciplinary Inquiry of 19 November 2018.
5. The contrary view is that since section 182A was repealed from 1 September 2016, then the time within which an application for review could be made must have expired long before 2019. In the hearing, the example was discussed of a decision of the BPB made in late August 2016, such that an application for review could be brought was up until late October 2016.[7]
6. Yet in this case, the argument runs, because the BPB decision was not made until November 2018, the time within which an application for review could be made under s 182A expired long ago. Therefore, clause 4(4) does not apply, and so the application may not 'be made and dealt with in accordance with the old provisions'.
7. However, in my view, on analysis, that argument is circular, since, in seeking to determine whether or not s 182A continues to apply in the present circumstances, its starting point is an assumption that it does not, because it has been repealed. But the purpose of transitional provisions is to specify those exceptional circumstances where the repealed provisions nevertheless continue to operate.
8. The respondent relies on the statement in the 3 October 2018 decision of Senior Member Farrelly[8] that s 182A(3)(a) was not able to be revived for the purpose of bringing a new application. I note, however, the present application is sought to be brought under s 182A(3)(c), not s 182A(3)(a). Also, on that occasion, Mr Draper had the avenue of enforcement proceedings under s 122 of the VCAT Act potentially open to him. In any event, in my view, despite the decision of 3 October 2018, a new application under s 182A(3)(c), in the circumstances of this case would not involve that provision being 'revived', but rather its continued operation pursuant to clause 4(4).
9. In my view, for the interpretation proposed by the respondent to find favour in this case, it would be necessary to identify a point at which a person in Mr Draper's position lost the ability to commence a VCAT proceeding. Yet on the view propounded by the respondent, no such point is apparent.
10. The BPB hearing was clearly conducted under the old provisions. The 'Inquiry Hearing' was expressed to have been conducted pursuant to s 178 and the decision to have been given under s 179(1). The Notice of Decision is stated to have been given pursuant to s 182(1). These are all references to the process conducted under the old provisions, not the new provisions.
11. In contrast, the new regime involves a show cause process, and uses the language of 'disciplinary action' rather than an 'inquiry' process. The decision-making body is now the VBA, instead of the BPB.
12. The respondent's argument has the effect that while the inquiry may be properly conducted by the BPB over two years after the coming into effect of the new regime (which abolished the BPB save for transitional matters such as this), the review right which is part of the old regime is regarded as having disappeared. Rhetorically, if despite the 1 September 2016 repeal, the BPB can nevertheless continue to operate in this transitional situation, and all the provisions enabling that continue to apply during this extended period, why should the review provision be treated differently?
13. It was said during argument on behalf of the respondent that it was assuming that clause 4(1) of the transitional provisions had applied in relation to the enquiry conducted here. I do not accept that is the case, however. Sub-clauses 4(1) and (2) relate to inquiries which had commenced by the BPB but not been determined before 1 September 2016.[9]
14. That is not what occurred here. Rather, it is sub-clauses 4(3) and (4) which have had application in this instance. These relate to applications to VCAT for review. Mr Draper's first application for review was made in October 2015, prior to the commencement day. So, in accordance with clause 4(3), the inquiry was continued and completed (after the commencement day) 'in accordance with the old provisions'. After that occurred, clause 4(4) has the effect that any application for review by VCAT, lodged within the applicable time limit, is also dealt with in accordance with the old provisions.
15. As a consequence of my finding that Mr Draper was able to bring this application to the Tribunal under the old section 182A(3)(c), I refuse the application for summary dismissal under s 75 of the VCAT Act, which was brought on the basis that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction.
16. Having determined that it is the old provisions which apply to the question of whether Mr Draper has the right to commence this VCAT review proceeding, it is not necessary for me to consider the respondent's submissions to the effect that Mr Draper does not have any accrued right under s 14(2)(e) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984.
17. I merely note that Mr Draper obviously could not have commenced any proceeding under s 182A(3)(c) until the BPB handed down its decision on 19 February 2019. In that sense, any 'right' to bring a proceeding had been lost before it became available. This suggests that it is only under the transitional provisions that Mr Draper's 'right' to commence a VCAT proceeding could have been preserved.
18. Nor is it necessary for me to consider the submissions from the respondent and Mr Draper about whether he is an 'affected person' under s 184 of the new provisions. This is not a review by VCAT under the new s 186. It is a review under the old s 182A(3)(c).

1. As Mr Draper's application to commence this proceeding was made out of time, it cannot proceed unless the Tribunal orders that time be extended under s 126 of the VCAT Act. That is a discretionary decision for the Tribunal.
2. At the outset, it is important to bear in mind the nature of the review which Mr Draper seeks be carried out in this case. The review he seeks would involve a rehearing of the disciplinary proceeding brought by the BPB against Mr Simonds.
3. In this regard, two matters should be noted. First, this was a disciplinary process brought by the regulator against the builder. Mr Draper was not involved. Second, the only issue of substance on any VCAT review would be the question of whether a different penalty to that determined by the BPB (a reprimand, and a fine of $3,464.64, plus costs of $14,429) should be imposed.

1. Mr Draper was not a party to that BPB inquiry. That was in accordance with usual practice. Disciplinary proceedings are sui generis (that is, in a category of their own).[10] Their primary purpose is the protection of the public. Generally, the role of the notifier, such as Mr Draper, is to draw the attention of the regulator to conduct of a registered practitioner which might warrant investigation and disciplinary action. It is the role of the regulator to conduct that investigation, and to act as 'prosecutor' in any disciplinary inquiry. Mr Draper had no role, other than in the event he was requested to provide any information in addition to that obtained by the regulator preparatory to the inquiry. (He was not required to give evidence as a witness here, since there was agreement between counsel assisting the BPB, and Mr Simonds' representative on all factual matters.)
2. The proceeding in which Mr Draper did have a direct interest was of course his civil action against the builder. As noted, this had been resolved in his favour in 2017.
3. Here, it is Mr Simonds who is directly affected by the process. He has been the subject of an inquiry, has conceded six of the allegations raised against him, with the seventh allegation being found proved (in part) and a penalty has been imposed on him. And it is Mr Simonds who would of course be affected if a review of the BPB's decision was to be carried out at VCAT. Although neither he, nor the respondent, seek that the disciplinary process be conducted over again before VCAT, the consequence of extending time would be that these two parties would be required to do that. And again, unless something unforeseen arises, Mr Draper will not participate in the review at VCAT which he will have caused to occur.
4. So the present circumstances are very different to the usual situation, where the person seeking review is the individual who has been subject to adverse disciplinary action by the regulator.

1. Further, any such review would be of limited scope. Mr Simonds has accepted six of the allegations (being numbers 1, 2 and 4-7). The residual component of allegation 3[11] relates to a 'bottom plate in an ensuite bathroom having been cut back excessively to approximately half its width'. This breach was described in the decision as being minor in nature, but nevertheless made out on the material before the BPB. The penalty imposed was a fine of $288.72 No review has been sought by Mr Simonds.
2. Hence any review hearing by VCAT would largely or wholly relate to the question of the penalty to be imposed.
3. Mr Draper's concern is with the way in which the inquiry process was carried out. He stated in his application that his reasons for making it were:

To create a situation where a fair and unbiased MERITS review is heard into the following failings:

Jurisdictional errors by decision-maker resulting in unlawful decision.

Failure to observe VCAT directions made in Draper v BPB.

Failure to properly perform disciplinary functions.

Misleading and deceptive conduct by decision-maker.

1. From his written and oral submissions, it is clear Mr Draper has long-running and broad ranging grievances against the building regulators, including the BPB and the VBA. He said:

For years I have battled to expose the wrongs I have suffered, only to be met by an unproductive, inefficient, incompetent and dare I say corrupt government agency, hellbent on minimising [the] effect of my complaint on a powerful player within the Victoria Domestic Building Industry.

1. As the processes have continued it seems additional grievances have arisen. As noted, the regulator's approach of carrying out a non-statutory 'Conduct Review' was in effect overridden by the decision of Senior Member Riegler of 15 September 2017. Mr Draper's submissions here included one indicating he is unhappy that the BPB information gathered in that process could not be presented at the VCAT hearing.
2. Mr Draper characterised the non-statutory 'Conduct Review' as a 'secret deal', which he said 'would be a hotbed for corruption'.
3. He stated that his complaint to the Victoria Ombudsman's Office has been escalated to a full-blown investigation.
4. He alleged that the procedures set out in the BPB's 'Inquiry Manual' had not been complied with.
5. Thus it is clear Mr Draper's purpose in pursuing this application is to raise issues well beyond the actual scope of a review of the hearing of the seven charges against Mr Simonds for breach of regulation 1502(a) of the Building Regulations 2006.
6. I asked Mr Draper during the hearing whether his concern was that Mr Simonds had not been given a severe enough penalty. His response emphasised the above matters, rather than the severity of the penalty actually handed down. He was not satisfied with the investigation on the bases summarised above, and believes that different and additional charges should have been laid against Mr Simonds.
7. Yet those matters would not arise in the conduct of a review at VCAT. On any such review, the same allegations as those which were before the BPB would be run against Mr Simonds again. There would be no occasion for these to be expanded. The VBA as 'prosecutor' would present the case against Mr Simonds. Given Mr Simonds has not himself made an application for the BPB's decision to be reviewed, it is fair to assume that he would adhere to his plea on six of the allegations, and not challenge the finding proved against him on the seventh. So in this instance, the VBA's case would consist of submissions about what the appropriate penalty should be (plus any argument, in relation to allegation 3cv, concerning the ensuite bathroom bottom plate, if that were necessary). Even if Mr Simonds did not adhere to his admissions on the six charges, it is not conceivable that the above matters concerning the investigation process which are of concern to Mr Draper, would not be raised in the VCAT hearing. VCAT's role would be to conduct a hearing of the allegations afresh. It would not review the BPB's processes. VCAT does not conduct judicial review. Only the Supreme Court does that.

1. The criteria set out the decision of Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment[12] are frequently used as a framework for consideration of extension of time applications in the Tribunal. Of course, they are only a guide, and do not have statutory status.
2. Those factors were summarised by the respondent as follows:

(1) Whether the Applicant can show an acceptable explanation for the delay;

(2) Whether it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time;

(4) Whether the Respondent is prejudiced by the delay;

(5) Whether the delay may result, if the extension is granted, in the unsettling of established practices;

(7) Considerations of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a like position.

1. The respondent referred to the statement in AED v Secretary to the Department of Justice[13], that s 126 enables the Tribunal to extend time where it is satisfied that an applicant would otherwise be unfairly denied the opportunity to have their case heard and determined.
2. On the face of it, in relation to his own conduct, and the conduct of the respondent, Mr Draper would in normal circumstances have a good argument for an extension of time.
3. As noted, Mr Draper said that on 11 December 2018, he requested a statement of reasons from the BPB for the decision of 19 November 2018 in relation to Mr Simonds. He said this was framed as a request under s 46 of the VCAT Act. He said he asked again in mid-February, and that on 5 March, he received written reasons. His suspicions were raised by the fact that when the reasons were ultimately produced on 5 March 2019, they bore the date 21 January 2019. This was around the time when the 60 day review period expired. Mr Draper said there was no explanation for the delay.
4. The respondent did not contend that these assertions by Mr Draper were incorrect. The BPB's counsel acknowledged the six-week discrepancy between the date on the reasons document, and the date it was given to Mr Draper. Hence it is clear the BPB produced the reasons for decision over two months after the latest date when it was required to do so under s 46 of the VCAT Act.
5. Also, there is merit in the argument made by Mr Draper, that it was reasonable for him to wait for these reasons, rather than simply lodge a review application, without having received the reasons. That is an acceptable explanation for his delay in making his application to VCAT. Further, Mr Draper has been pursuing this issue for some years, and there is little doubt the VBA was aware that he was not happy with the decision and that there was a high likelihood he would seek to have it reviewed. It could not be said his application to VCAT would have come as a surprise to the respondent.
6. In my view, however, these matters are all outweighed by the particular unusual circumstances of this case referred to above: This is a disciplinary proceeding in which Mr Draper has no involvement. Also, and more importantly, any such review would have limited scope, and would not deal with the issues which Mr Draper wishes to raise.
7. In my view, it is appropriate for me to take into account the fact that neither of the two protagonists in this case seek that a VCAT review be conducted. In particular, the regulator, who is given responsibility for the protection of the public in this instance, does not seek that this matter be ventilated again. There would be two unwilling parties participating in a proceeding at the behest of an absent third-party. This is undesirable.
8. This is a different situation to the one which pertained when Senior Member Riegler made his ruling on 15 September 2017. In that case, the decision being reviewed was the refusal of the regulator to conduct a disciplinary inquiry. The Tribunal had jurisdiction to review that decision, and on analysis, it found that there were sufficient grounds for matters relating to Mr Simonds' conduct to be the subject of inquiry.
9. Senior Member Riegler carried out this analysis by considering Mr Draper's numerous complaints against Simonds, and allocating them into 10 categories. In relation to seven of these, he found that the applicable threshold level was reached whereby further investigation was warranted. This threshold he said was not a high one, although it did require more than a bald assertion. The respondent, the BPB, accepted that the threshold was met, but contended that for other reasons, VCAT should exercise its discretion not to order an inquiry be held. These reasons included the fact that the non-statutory Conduct Review had already been undertaken, and in effect, that the key issues arising from the Wallan building project had already been dealt with. Senior Member Riegler found, however, that the allegations raised by Mr Draper went further than what was considered in the Conduct Review, and that an inquiry should be conducted.
10. The decision of Senior Member Riegler emphasised that the scope of the inquiry he had ordered to be conducted, and any allegations which comprise the inquiry, were matters for the BPB or the VBA to determine, not VCAT. That is, it was a matter for the BPB, or those assisting it, to determine in detail what allegations should be put as part of the inquiry, not VCAT, and not Mr Draper. That is of course consistent with the role of an agency given the task of carrying out such inquiry processes. Its job is to consider with precision which provisions might have been breached by particular conduct, and to analyse what evidence there is to support particular allegations. It is to be expected that the ultimate form in which the allegations are put will vary from the way in which the matters were raised in the initial complaint.
11. As noted, that process took place. The allegations raised by Mr Draper, and commented on by Senior Member Riegler were then considered, and ultimately a Notice of Inquiry was drawn up. I note that the matters in the seven categories identified by Senior Member Riegler as warranting further inquiry appear generally to have been reflected in the Amended Notice of Inquiry, which was ultimately considered by the BPB. Of course, in accordance with the statutory framework described above, those allegations did not reflect precisely what Senior Member Riegler had described, nor what Mr Draper had described.
12. Accordingly, the situation now is different to that which faced Senior Member Riegler. He was presented with a refusal to conduct an inquiry, and with evidence which he found justified an order that an inquiry be carried out. Now, that conduct has been analysed, distilled into allegations, and the inquiry conducted, findings made and penalties imposed. In contrast to the position in August/ September 2017, none of the matters put before me now provide any basis on which it can be concluded the decision of the BPB should be reviewed. The only basis put now is that Mr Draper wants a review to be carried out by VCAT.
13. Mr Draper seeks to exercise the right which he would have to apply to VCAT for a review of the BPB's decision on the inquiry (if the application had been made in time) in order to achieve a different outcome, namely exposure of the conduct of the regulator more broadly. But he will not be able to achieve that through this review being conducted.
14. I accept that in terms of the conventional analysis relating to applications for extension of time, there are several factors in Mr Draper's favour. His conduct in relation to the delay in lodging the VCAT application was meritorious. The delay in lodging the application is not long in the circumstances. The Building Act 1993 did provide for applications to be made by the person who requested that an inquiry be conducted.
15. I am nevertheless required to balance the factors for and against exercising the discretion to extend time, taking into account all the circumstances of the case as they appear before me here and now. The situation here is quite different from virtually all the reported cases, including cases referred to in Pizer's Annotated VCAT Act (sixth edition, edited by E Nekvapil) in which an applicant is seeking to lodge a review out of time in a matter where they stand to be adversely affected by the outcome. Typically, this is as a registered practitioner, whose right to practise is liable to being removed, or subject to conditions, or some kind of penalty being imposed on them. Mr Draper is not in jeopardy of any kind of adverse outcome of that nature here. So the consideration which is paramount in many instances, of justice requiring to be done in relation to potential direct adverse effects on the applicant, is not present here.
16. The fact that neither of the parties who would be required to be involved in the VCAT review, actually wish to participate in it, together with the narrow scope of any such review, and especially the fact that it would not deal with the matters which Mr Draper has raised in his application, are determinative in this case.
17. The appropriate way for the matters raised by Mr Draper to be pursued is through an investigation by the Ombudsman, or other person or body with authority to investigate the carrying out of statutory functions by agencies more broadly. The Tribunal does not have a supervisory role of that type. I note Mr Draper's statement that the Ombudsman is already investigating this matter at his request.
18. In reaching this conclusion I have placed limited weight on the prejudice which may be caused to Mr Simonds, due to his age (a factor the respondent urged me to take into account).
19. Mr Draper's application for an extension of time to commence this proceeding is refused.

[1] Allegations 3c.i-iv were withdrawn. Allegation 3c.v was contested by Mr Simonds, but found proved against him, and a fine of $288.72 imposed (2 penalty units).

[2] On page 1 of the reasons for its decision, the BPB describes Mr Draper as the 'former owner' of the property.

[3] Draper v Simonds Homes Victoria Pty Ltd [2016] VCAT 669.

[4] Draper v Building Practitioners Board (No 2) [2017] VCAT 1402.

[5] Draper v Building Practitioners Board [2018] VCAT 1524 at [31].

[6] Regulation 1605 of the Building Regulations 2006 - Paragraph 36 of the VBA's submissions.

[7] That is what occurred in the case of King v Victorian Building Authority [2019] VCAT 353, referred to by Mr Draper. In that case, an inquiry was commenced on 30 August 2016, and completed, with the conduct of the hearing, on 1 November 2017. The Tribunal noted at [3] that the transitional provisions allowed the BPB to continue to perform functions after 1 September 2016.

[8] Draper v Building Practitioners Board [2018] VCAT 1524 at [31].

[9] That is what was found to have occurred in the case of Ross v Building Practitioners Board [2017] VSCA 274 (28 September 2017) per Kyrou, Ferguson and McLeish JJA, which Mr Draper also referred to.

[10] Hanneberry v Legal Ombudsman [1998] VSCA 142.

[11] Allegations 3c.i-iv were withdrawn, leaving only allegation 3c.v.

[13] [2011] VCAT 2392, at [26].