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Facts

3. The offender robbed two service stations and a grocery store over 7, 9 and 29 April 2024. The statement of facts was before the court and there was CCTV footage of each of the robberies.

4. The first robbery occurred at the Shell Coles Express in Deakin on a Sunday morning. The offender entered wearing a bandana and hooded jumper and threatened the attendant, telling him he had a knife, although that was not the case. He took $260 from the till.

5. The second robbery occurred at the Friendly Grocer in Narrabundah in the mid-afternoon. The offender entered wearing a bandana and hooded jumper, threatened the attendant, used force to push her hand away as she attempted to stop him from taking money from the till, snatched the till and escaped. As he was escaping, he fell over and dropped a knife, although the knife was not produced during the robbery itself.

6. The third robbery occurred on 29 April 2024 at the Ampol Service Station in Braddon at about 9:50pm. The offender entered wearing a black face mask and hooded jumper. The offender carried a knife, visible in his right hand, and demanded money from the attendant. The attendant said he was calling the police and retreated to a safe room. He observed the rest of the robbery through cameras. The offender climbed over the counter and removed one of the tills. He attempted to cut the attached cables with his knife before pulling it free. He ran from the store, dropping the knife by the entrance and escaped via a vehicle.

7. The offender was identified, located and apprehended on 30 April 2024.

The court’s task

8. The court’s task is well-established. It is to sentence the offender in accordance with the sentencing purposes set out in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act), which include (in summary form) making the offender accountable and denouncing and adequately punishing his conduct, deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences, recognising the harm done to the victims of the crimes and the community and promoting an offender’s rehabilitation. Those considerations have been taken into account in the reasoning that follows.

9. The mandatory relevant considerations set out in s 33 of the Sentencing Act have also been considered below insofar as they relate to the offender’s circumstances, and in accordance with the principle of individualised justice: MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 at [56].

Nature and circumstances of the offence (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)

10. The approach the court takes is to evaluate the objective seriousness of the offending, according to well-established principles (set out recently in DPP v Tate [2025] ACTSC 327 (Tate) at [21]) and having regard to features of the conduct (Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 at [156]), with a view to ensuring that the overall sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the offending.

11. Features that inform the degree of seriousness here include whether there was actual or threatened violence, the vulnerability of the victim, the motivation (personal gain in each case here), the degree of planning and the nature and value of the items taken. For the two aggravated robberies at the service stations, Hall v The Queen; Barker v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 16 at [49]-[51] is of assistance in considering the features, where the circumstances of aggravation are also relevant.

12. The first robbery (simpliciter) at the Coles Express is the least serious, as the nature of the stolen property was cash (that is, not of sentimental value) and the quantity of cash stolen was small. The attendant was vulnerable by the nature of their employment. There was no physical interaction, although there was the threat of a knife. The offender’s clothing indicates pre-meditation although no real sophistication.

13. The second robbery was more serious. It involved the statutory aggravating feature of the presence of a cutlery knife, although the circumstances were that it was not brandished. There was less than $200 taken. Force was used on the attendant, but it was minimal. Again, the victim was vulnerable. The offence was brazen, occurring in daylight hours. There was pre-meditation and a lack of sophistication.

14. The third robbery was the most serious. It involved the use of a steak knife and this time the knife was on full display at the time of the robbery. It occurred at nighttime, in circumstances of increased vulnerability for the service station attendant, who retreated from the offender in fear. The entire till was taken. Although the value was not specified, the conduct caused a significant degree of inconvenience beyond the theft of cash.

Remorse (s 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act)

15. There was no evidence of any remorse.

Victim impact statements (s 33(1)(f) of the Sentencing Act)

16. There was one victim impact statement from the first victim. There was also a police statement made by the owner of the store involved in the second robbery.

17. The first victim spoke of the initial stress and anxiety caused, which resulted in sleep disruption, and memories of the incident. His sense of personal security has been affected more generally, in that he is more aware or cautious of people and has installed a dashcam in his car.

18. The business owner gave a real sense of the broader ramifications of this type of offending, which underscores why they are treated so seriously. She said that the worker involved had to take time off work, that she has workers who are 15 and 16 years old, whose safety and willingness to work are affected, and that the robbery affected the feeling of safety in the community, with people asking her questions.

19. What these victim impact statements should say to the offender is that if he thinks he is only taking a little bit of cash and not hurting anybody, he is wrong. He is harming vulnerable people and that has a ripple effect for the community in which these businesses are located.

Plea of guilty (ss 33(1)(j) and 35 of the Sentencing Act)

20. The offender pleaded guilty to the offences late, namely on the third day of a four-day hearing. He is entitled to a discretionary discount under s 35(3) of the Sentencing Act. The applicable principles are set out in cases such as Cranfield v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 3 at [37]-[38], Monfries v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 46; 19 ACTLR 99 at [47] and R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 at [49]. The utilitarian value is of primary consideration and here it was low. Having considered the statutory matters set out in s 35(2) of the Sentencing Act (including matters addressed separately elsewhere in these reasons, such as the seriousness of the offence and the impact of the offence on the victim), a discount of 5% is appropriate.

Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

21. The offender is 38. He was 36 at the time of the offences. He identifies as Aboriginal. The offender has had a disadvantaged childhood. Those words are a gloss on the true picture, but it serves no purpose to detail that history publicly, save to say generally that he has experienced trauma, grief and ongoing loss commencing before, but exacerbated by, involvement in a car accident which left him in a coma on life support. His supports in life have been scarce. It is trite that a person’s sense of belonging shapes how they later sit in society and how they interact in the community.

22. Unsurprisingly, drug addiction has featured heavily in the offender’s life from an early age. He was on methamphetamine at the time of the offending (s 33(1)(p) of the Sentencing Act). The offender disclosed to report writers that his offending was motivated by a desire to get money for his then-partner, who at the time was pregnant with his child, although I was not entirely convinced by that explanation.

23. The offences were committed while the offender was on conditional liberty, as he was on parole at the time. This is an aggravating factor: KQE v DPP [2024] ACTCA 7 at [40]. The offender also has a history of similar offending. Indeed, the offender’s considerable criminal history reflects a person who has had no guiding compass. It does not entitle him to leniency, although sentencing is more nuanced than one factor.

24. One of the matters of concern with regard to the offender’s criminal history is that his offending has been the subject of targeted court intervention in New South Wales in 2019, where he was sentenced for an offence of demanding property, with menaces, with intent to steal. A community corrections order was imposed, and he was required to engage in a drug rehabilitation program and to complete behavioural change interventions with the focus being on addictions, managing impulsivity and achieving goals. He said the treatment program in NSW was not as stringent in its requirements as the program in the Territory, and he felt he would benefit from those additional supports and routines.

Pre-sentence custody

25. As at the date of sentence, the offender has spent 532 days in custody solely referable to the subject offences. This will be taken into account by way of backdating the offender’s sentence pursuant to s 63(1) of the Sentencing Act.

Financial circumstances of offender (s 33(1)(n) of the Sentencing Act)

26. As the offender has been incarcerated for more than a year, he has little current prospect of paying any fine.

Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)

27. I have taken into account the sentences referred to by the prosecution, namely: (a) Tate and DPP v Hambilton [2024] ACTSC 70, in respect of the robbery; (b) DPP v Kaye (a pseudonym) [2025] ACTSC 169, DPP v Swain (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 209 (both of which involved child offenders) and R v Crowther [2019] ACTSC 338 (Crowther) in respect of the aggravated robbery.

28. The purpose of considering cases such as the above is to ensure consistency in application of principle, not to achieve numerical equivalence with similar sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction: see Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [48]. I consider the decision in Crowther to bear closest similarity to the facts constituting the two aggravated robberies here, although the conduct in Crowther was more serious in terms of the gravity of the offending involving physical injury to the victim.

Totality

29. The approach to principles of concurrency and accumulation has been set out in Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 at [37] (and the cases there-cited). There are three offences here, which occurred at different times with separate victims, which inevitably means a degree of accumulation. Similarly though, the type of offending is the same, and it occurred within close proximity such that the sentence imposed for one offence can, to some extent, comprehend the criminality of the other offence. An adjustment of some significance has been made, bearing in mind the offender’s history and the amount of time that he has spent in custody to date.

Disposition

30. The imposition of a term of imprisonment is a sentence of last resort: s 10 of the Sentencing Act. The gravity of the offending here is such that no sentence other than one of imprisonment is appropriate for each of the offences, to give effect to denunciation and punishment. That was accepted. The offender’s lengthy time in custody has also served the objective of specific deterrence and further recognises the harm to the victims in each of the offences. The length of the total effective sentence to be imposed and ensuring that it is proportionate to the gravity of the offending, is also a means of achieving all those objectives. However, the remainder of any sentence of imprisonment should thus be served in a manner that promotes rehabilitation and safe reintegration into the community.

31. With some hesitation, I have ultimately determined that disposition by way of a drug and alcohol treatment order is the appropriate outcome. The offender was found eligible for a drug and alcohol treatment order: s 80S of the Sentencing Act. I am satisfied that the offender has a drug dependency as outlined in the Canberra Health Services Suitability Assessment report dated 15 September 2025, and that this dependency substantially contributed to the commission of the offending (as he was affected by methamphetamine at the time): s 12A(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Sentencing Act.

32. I have considered the objects of a Treatment Order set out in s 80O of the Sentencing Act as follows: (a) facilitating the rehabilitation of the offender by providing a judicially supervised, therapeutically oriented and integrated treatment regime; (b) reducing the offender’s dependency on alcohol or a controlled drug; (c) reducing the health risks associated with such dependency; (d) assisting the offender’s integration into the community; and (e) promoting community safety by reducing re-offending.

33. These are all matters that apply to the offender here, given his criminal history and the nature of the offending. Other statutory pre-conditions to the making of the order are met, in that: (a) The offender has consented to the drug and alcohol treatment order, having been given a clear explanation of what it involves: s 12A(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act. (b) The offender will live in the ACT for the duration of the sentence except as directed by the court: s 12A(2)(a)(iii) of the Sentencing Act. (c) There are no concerns relating to the safety or welfare of any victim: s 12A(2)(b)(ii) of the Sentencing Act.

34. However, the court must not make a Treatment Order unless satisfied that it is suitable for the offender: s 80S of the Sentencing Act. Having considered, among other things, the report from Corrective Services (in compliance with s 80T), there is a real concern about whether he is presently suitable for a Treatment Order. There is no point in attempting to support an offender to grapple with drug addiction unless the offender’s psychological state and attitude in seeking to rehabilitate are at a point of evolution where the desire to remain abstinent is strong enough to withstand the cravings of addiction.

35. The offender has had periods of abstinence while in custody, but it is clear from the material contained in the report, which I accept, that he used drugs as recently as September 2025. There is also a concern about the offender’s ability to comply with the stringent conditions of a residential treatment service and the requirements of a Treatment Order, although as I have said, the offender appears to welcome that. His history in full time custody indicates that he is classified as a high-risk offender. He showed little interest in the Solaris program which is an equivalent abstinence-based program offered in custody. Under oath, he has now explained why that may have appeared to be the case. He said that being in custody required him to get to know those who were in the same cell block and that, having established a feeling of relative safety where he was, he was reluctant to move when the Solaris program was offered to him, which was early on during his period of incarceration. He was uncertain about what his future would be and fully intended to take up the opportunity to undertake the Solaris program if a full-time custodial sentence was imposed. He acknowledged that he lost patience during the interview where his suitability was being assessed. He has reflected on what he said, which was viewed as lacking a genuine intention to rehabilitate. Having heard from the offender under oath, I consider that he was flippant, and he did not take the assessment as seriously as he should have. He very much appreciates the nature and significance of the opportunity being given to him now.

36. Since the date of the reports, he has managed to secure residential accommodation through the Justice Housing program, which will facilitate his attendance at the day program that has been recommended by the health treatment team for reasons which were explained through the prosecution during the hearing and which I accept.

37. The offender has now been in custody for 532 days. If a Treatment Order is not made, then any full-time custodial sentence will carry a non-parole period that may well see the offender released into the community within the next 12 months and of course, he will be back in the community following the completion of the sentence regardless of whether he completes any rehabilitation program in custody or not.

38. An offender may well seek a Treatment Order because it gives them a ticket out of full-time custody. But it has been emphasised to the offender that such freedom is only temporary if the offender is unable to abstain from drugs. The order can be cancelled at any time for a variety of reasons, which include if the court forms the view that the offender is unwilling or unlikely to comply with a condition of the order: s 80ZE of the Sentencing Act. He has also been made aware of the concerns of the court about his ability to comply and the strength of will required for him to succeed on the order.

39. Understanding all this, he still maintains that he wishes to attempt the program. Although I share the concerns of the treatment team as to suitability, on a very fine balance, I am satisfied that with careful management, he is presently suitable to participate in the program. I conclude that a drug and alcohol treatment order is appropriate for this offender: s 12A(2)(b).

40. It is not necessary to set a non-parole period because the making of a drug and alcohol treatment order means that the sentence becomes an “excluded sentence of imprisonment” under s 64 of the Sentencing Act. Orders

41. The orders of the Court are: (1) For the offence of robbery, contrary to s 309 of the Criminal Code (CAN 2362/2025), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 13 months, reduced to one year and 10 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 29 April 2024 and conclude on 8 May 2025. (2) For the offence of aggravated robbery, contrary to s 310(b) of the Criminal Code (CAN 5417/2024), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year and 11 months, reduced to one year, nine months and 23 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 January 2025 and conclude on 23 October 2026. (3) For the offence of aggravated robbery, contrary to s 310(b) of the Criminal Code (CAN 4931/2024), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years and 25 days, reduced to one year, 11 months and 17 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 12 May 2026 and conclude on 28 April 2028. (4) The total term of imprisonment is four years.

Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (5) A Treatment Order under s 12A of the Sentencing Act is made for Matthew Whitney in respect of the eligible offence of aggravated robbery (CAN 5417/2024) for which he has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced to imprisonment for one year, nine months and 23 days. (6) That Treatment Order is extended to the eligible offence of aggravated robbery (CAN 4931/2024), for which Mr Whitney has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year, 11 months and 17 days. (7) The convictions and sentences imposed for the said eligible offences are hereby incorporated into the Treatment Order in the Custodial Part of the Order. (8) The Treatment Order is for two years, six months and 16 days from today, 13 October 2025 to conclude on 28 April 2028. (9) The Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order is for 18 months from today, 13 October 2025 to 12 April 2027. (10) The Custodial Part of the Treatment Order for the eligible offences will be suspended under s 80W of the Sentencing Act from today, 13 October 2025, until 28 April 2028. (11) Under s 80ZA of the Sentencing Act, Matthew Whitney is required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order, 13 April 2027, until the end of the total sentence, 28 April 2028. (12) A probation condition is imposed for Matthew Whitney to accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and to obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment. (13) For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order: a. The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y of the Sentencing Act are hereby imposed. b. Mr Whitney is to travel to Canberra Recovery Hub on 13 October 2025 and admit himself to the drug rehabilitation (day) program at that facility by 1:30pm. c. Mr Whitney is directed to complete the drug rehabilitation (day) program at Canberra Recovery Hub or any other program of intervention, treatment or counselling he is directed to complete, including urinalysis or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team. d. Mr Whitney is to obey all reasonable directions of any person in charge of the program and all the rules of the program and the facility, which may include directions about where he resides, with whom he associates and his attendance from time to time. e. Mr Whitney is not to leave his approved place of residence between any curfew hours directed by the Treatment and Supervision team, other than for a medical emergency, and he is to present himself to the front door of the residence if required by an officer of ACT Policing. f. Should Mr Whitney leave or be discharged from the program before completing it, he is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4:00pm on the next business day with a view to having his Treatment Order reviewed. g. Mr Whitney is not to consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs or prescription drugs not prescribed to him. h. Mr Whitney is to comply with any directions of the court from time to time about attendance at court in person or by electronic means.

I certify that the preceding forty-one [41] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice McWilliam. Associate: Date: