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Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

1. On 1 September 2025, Isaac John Gordon (the offender) pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to the following offences and was committed for sentence: (a) two counts of aggravated robbery, contrary to s 310(b) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN 5822/2025 and CAN 6870/2025); and (b) one count of recklessly threatening to kill another person, contrary to s 30 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (CAN 5830/2025).

2. The maximum penalty for the aggravated robbery offences is 25 years’ imprisonment, 2,500 penalty units, or both. The maximum penalty for the threat to kill offence is 10 years’ imprisonment.

3. As a result of this offending, the offender is in breach of a good behaviour order. On 29 October 2021, Elkaim J sentenced the offender in relation to offences of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm (SC CAN 139/2021) and possession of a prohibited item (CAN 3505/2020). He was sentenced to a total term of 2.5 years’ imprisonment, commencing on 27 April 2022 and suspended from 27 June 2023 upon the offender entering into a good behaviour order for three years (ending on 26 June 2026). As a result of the breach, the unexpired portion of the term is 1 year, 4 months.

Facts

Incident 1: Aggravated robbery on 26 May 2025 (CAN 5822/2025)

4. At approximately 12:53pm on 26 May 2025, Adam Brown and Telly Sa Vvoudiou were in the office of Cellarbrations in Gungahlin. Mr Brown heard the front sliding door buzzer, signifying that someone had entered the store. Mr Brown left the office and walked to the checkout counter where he saw the offender walking towards the counter from the rear of the store.

5. As the offender approached the counter, he pulled a knife from the rear of his shorts with his right hand. The offender held the knife to Mr Brown and said, “open the till, open the till.”

6. Mr Brown walked into the office, and said to Mr Sa Vvoudiou, “this guy’s got a knife”. The offender put the knife back into the rear of his shorts and walked a short distance from the office door.

7. Mr Sa Vvoudiou left the office, and the offender pulled the knife from his pants with his right hand. The offender told Mr Sa Vvoudiou and Mr Brown, “I’m not going to hurt you” and told Mr Sa Vvoudiou to open the till. He opened the till and stepped back. The offender placed the knife into his pants and walked behind the counter, taking three $50 notes and two $20 notes, a total of $190.

8. The offender walked around the counter to the exit, telling the two “I’m desperate”, “I can’t pay my rent” and “I’m struggling”. The offender then left the store.

9. Mr Brown called the police. He observed two $50 notes on the ground, picked them up and placed them back into the till. CCTV showed the two notes fall from the offender’s pocket as he ran from the store.

10. Police were provided with a copy of the CCTV capturing the offender during the incident.

11. Whilst conducting a patrol in the area to look for the offender, police located a black balaclava and a pair of black aqua shoes, each with a blue stripe down the middle, behind the wooden panelling where the offender was observed running. These items were seized for forensic testing.

12. Mr Brown told the police that he felt scared for his safety when the offender first produced the knife and held it to him.

13. At no time did the offender have permission to hold a knife to Mr Brown or Mr Sa Vvoudiou. At no time did the offender have permission to take $190 from the till.

Incident 2: Aggravated robbery on 2 June 2025 (CAN 6870/2025)

14. At 12:21am on 2 June 2025, Mohammed Haider Ali was in a white Toyota Camry, parked in the vicinity of Wanderlust Gentleman’s Club in Mitchell. Mr Ali was working as an Uber driver and waiting for his next booking. The offender approached Mr Ali’s vehicle and showed him a blue coloured ACT proof of age card in the name of Shane Cook, saying “my phone is flat and [I] cannot order an uber on the App, can you take me to 10 Cullen Street Watson. I’ll give you money once we get there. You can hold my licence as a guarantee.” Mr Ali agreed and the offender entered the vehicle through the front left passenger side door and sat in the front left passenger seat.

15. During transit, the offender produced a knife, held it against Mr Ali’s throat and said, “I’ll Kill you, give me $50.” The offender also held the knife to Mr Ali’s stomach. The knife was silver with a serrated blade.

16. Mr Ali felt shocked and thought his life may be over. Mr Ali offered to drive the offender to a nearby ATM to get cash out. At this time, Mr Ali was on the phone to his brother who, hearing this, contacted 000 and reported the matter to police.

17. At 12:32am, the offender and Mr Ali arrived at an ATM at the Watson shops. The offender took possession of Mr Ali’s bank card, phone and car keys and approached the ATM, where a knife fell from his pocket to the ground near the ATM, where it was found by police.

18. The offender was captured on CCTV accessing the ATM with Mr Ali’s card.

19. The offender withdrew $200 cash from the ATM and returned Mr Ali’s card, phone and keys to the vehicle that was still parked and running. While the offender was accessing the ATM, Mr Ali had fled on foot. The offender fled the scene.

20. At no time did Mr Ali give the offender permission to take his property, namely his bank card, phone and car keys, nor did he give the offender permission to withdraw money from his bank account, namely $200.

Incident 3: Reckless threat to kill on 2 June 2025 (CAN 5830/2025)

21. At about 4pm on 2 June 2025, the offender parked his motor vehicle in the carpark of an apartment complex in Watson. Whilst in his vehicle, the offender began self-administering heroin. He was observed by a resident of the apartment complex, Chloe McRae. Ms McRae began yelling from her vehicle at the offender, saying words to the effect of “fuck off stop using drugs.”

22. Ms McRae’s partner, Trann Davis, was inside his residence when he overheard Ms McRae yelling. Mr Davis immediately exited his residence and saw Ms McRae arguing with the offender in the carpark of the apartment complex.

23. Mr Davis approached Ms McRae and the offender and told the offender to “fuck off”. Mr Davis said words to the effect of: “We live here, we’ve got kids here. We don’t want people having shots in the carpark”, with the offender becoming agitated and yelling at Mr Davis. The pair began to argue, which escalated to the point the offender reached his right arm back to the right pocket area of his pants and removed a kitchen knife with a black handle and a 10cm silver blade. The offender ran towards Mr Davis with the knife and said words to the effect of “I am going to stab you, [I’ll] fucking kill you” and continued to say this multiple times. Mr Davis attempted to run back towards his unit and Ms McRae attempted to place her vehicle between Mr Davis and the offender.

24. Mr Davis immediately felt scared and angry because of the offender’s actions and believed the offender was going to use the knife on him. Mr Davis managed to get inside his residence but once inside, he realised that Ms McRae was still outside with the offender. When he went back out of the residence, Mr Davis’s American Staffordshire bull terrier dog escaped. Mr Davis chased after his dog. The dog went after the offender, who tripped over the dog. The dog bit the offender, who slashed the knife towards the dog. Mr Davis jumped on top of the offender, gaining control of the hand with the knife and possession of the knife to prevent any injuries to his dog. Whilst doing so, Mr Davis sustained grazing to his left shin, causing it to bleed, in addition to severe pain to his left wrist and the back of his head. The offender also sustained grazing to both of his hands, causing them to bleed.

25. Police arrived at the apartment complex and spoke with Ms McRae and Mr Davis who provided the knife used throughout the incident to police.

26. At no stage did Mr Davis consent to being threatened with the knife.

27. At 4:37pm, police located the offender at the Watson shops and he was arrested. He has been in custody since that time.

Victim impact

28. Although no victim impact statements were provided to the court, it is readily to be inferred that each of the victims in this matter felt a justifiable sense of fear engendered by the violent actions of the offender. Mr Ali in particular was in a vulnerable position and had every right to feel terrified.

Objective seriousness

Incident 1: Aggravated robbery on 26 May 2025 (CAN 5822/2025)

29. The sorts of factors relevant to the objective seriousness of robbery offences are well established: see R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346, which has been cited with approval in this jurisdiction on numerous occasions. The factors relevant to the present offending included: (a) the nature of the weapon used; (b) the degree of planning; (c) whether the offending involved violence; (d) the nature and value of the property taken; and (e) the effect on victims.

30. In incident 1, although the offending appears to have been opportunistic rather than pre-planned, and little of value was taken, the use of the knife, the threat of violence, and the effect on victims who were undertaking their duties in their place of work all aggravate the offence. It is a serious example of an offence of this type.

Incident 2: Aggravated robbery on 2 June 2025 (CAN 6870/2025)

31. Incident 2 is even more serious than incident 1. The victim, operating as a driver alone late at night, was particularly vulnerable. The production of the knife, and the immediacy of the threats of violence must have been terrifying. Despite the small amount taken, and the opportunistic nature of the offending, the other factors mean that the offending falls within the high range of objective seriousness.

Incident 3: Reckless threat to kill on 2 June 2025 (CAN 5830/2025)

32. In DPP v Jewell [2023] ACTSC 348 at [41], McWilliam J identified the following matters as the sorts of matters (without being exhaustive) relevant to objective seriousness for this type of offending: (a) if the threat is made in person or not; (b) the subjective fear engendered in a victim by the threat; (c) any use of drugs by the offender at the time the threat is made; (d) the nature and seriousness of the threat; (e) if the offender has a weapon at the time of the threat; (f) if the threat is capable of immediate realisation; and (g) any premeditation on behalf of the offender.

33. Here, the threat was made in person by the offender armed with a knife, and the threat was capable of immediate realisation. The victim was understandably scared. The offender had used drugs immediately before the incident. A scuffle involving the dog followed in which both the victim and the offender sustained injuries. The offender’s reaction to Ms McRae’s original approach, albeit not premediated, was wildly excessive. The offending falls within the upper range for offending of this type, albeit in the middle of that range. Subjective circumstances

34. The offender’s subjective circumstances are set out in a pre-sentence report dated 9 June 2026 and an updated pre-sentence report dated 16 June 2026.

35. The offender also tendered a Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List eligibility assessment report dated 21 November 2025 (which did not recommend that he progress to a suitability assessment), a psychological assessment report of Ms Ahu Kocak dated 16 June 2026 (with addendum dated 19 June 2026), an excerpt from the Bugmy Bar Book regarding early exposure to harmful alcohol and other drug use, a letter written by the offender, and an email chain indicating that the offender has been booked in to discuss his suitability for a program through GROW Australia.

36. This is in many ways a tragic case. The offender has spent most of his adult life incarcerated. He has become institutionalised, even to the extent of committing the offence in incident 3 hoping on his own account to be returned to prison. He has on his own account great difficulty existing in the world outside of prison.

37. The pre-sentence report speaks of a relatively normal childhood. His education was limited however, and he has had scant employment opportunities as an adult given his lengthy incarceration. He has been abusing drugs from a young age, starting with alcohol and cannabis at age 14. He has since progressed to heroin and methamphetamine. All of this has contributed to, or been underpinned by, extremely poor mental health.

38. The court has been assisted by the comprehensive report into the offender’s mental health by Ms Ahu Kocak, a forensic psychologist. It is not possible fully to do justice to this report for the purposes of this judgment. This report will be a very valuable resource in the ongoing treatment that the offender will require. To Ms Kocak, the offender described a difficult childhood, with physical punishment from his father, his parents’ separation, and subsequent financial difficulties. He had stopped caring about school by about the age of 15. He has had limited employment experience. From adolescence, he has developed significant substance abuse issues.

39. However, it is the offender’s mental health, no doubt contributed to by the factors just mentioned, that is of most concern. He has a complex and longstanding mental health history. He also has an extensive history of self-harm and suicidal ideation.

40. In relation to the current offending, Ms Kocak reported the offender as saying that he felt unable to cope in the community and that part of his motivation for the offending “was to return to custody”. He expressed shame and remorse for the offending.

41. As to his mental health, Ms Kocak is of the opinion that the offender has, both historically and currently, suffered from mental impairment, mental dysfunction, and emotional and psychological dysfunction. The material supports a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Stimulant Use Disorder, and Personality Disorder with mixed borderline antisocial and avoidant traits. All this impaired his ability to exercise appropriate judgment and make rational choices, although there was not a complete absence of rational capacity. His conditions had a disinhibiting effect and led to poor impulse control. However, he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.

42. Ms Kocak assessed the offender as having a high risk of reoffending. Given his history, it is hard to cavil with that opinion.

43. As to treatment, the matter is clearly complex and Ms Kocak has identified a program of ongoing psychological, psychiatric and substance-use treatment, some of which can be delivered in custody. Ms Kocak opines that the imposition of full-time custody will impact adversely on the offender’s mental health, although the matter is not straightforward. Custody for him does provide stabilising influences such as reduced access to illicit substances, access to medication, access to mental health care and routine.

44. In that regard, the offender has reported being abstinent from drugs in custody for the last eight months. That information is confirmed by the author of the pre-sentence report.

45. Supporting the offender’s rehabilitation when he is back in the community will be the real challenge.

Criminal history

46. The offender has an appalling criminal history, including offences involving violence. He has breached orders by way of reoffending on a number of occasions. Most relevantly, while in custody serving a sentence for aggravated robbery, he committed further offences including recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, for which he was sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment, to be suspended after serving one year, two months and one day on the condition that he be of good behaviour for three years. It was this order that he breached by the current offending.

Pleas of guilty

47. The offender pleaded guilty to the three current offences in the Magistrates Court on 1 September 2025, before a brief of evidence had been prepared. He is entitled to a 25% discount for what is unquestionably an early plea. Remorse

48. The pre-sentence report records the offender as expressing significant remorse, reporting that he viewed his behaviour as “pretty disgusting” and acknowledging the trauma caused by him to the victims.

49. In a letter addressed to the court, the offender has acknowledged the impact that his offending has had on the victims, their families and the wider community, stating that he feels a genuine level of remorse shame and guilt for what he has done and that he has a clear understanding of the emotional and mental trauma that he has caused for the victims. The letter goes on to detail his struggles with his mental health as an explanation for his offending, although he notes that this does not justify his behaviour.

50. I accept that the offender has expressed genuine remorse for his behaviour, albeit that he tends to concentrate on his own mental health as explaining his offending.

Time in custody

51. The offender has been remanded in custody since his arrest on 2 June 2025. He has therefore spent 395 days in custody in relation to the offending. That will be taken into account by backdating the first sentence.

Consideration

52. The offender’s counsel very reasonably accepts that a substantial sentence of full-time custody is inevitable. She does submit, however, that the offender’s “history of disadvantage” enlivens the principles in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 (Bugmy). She submits that while the history does not excuse the offending, it is to be taken into account as reducing moral culpability, as well as in crafting a sentence that is designed to overcome the childhood disadvantage.

53. I do not find that to be a particularly significant factor in this case, although certainly, the offender had a troubled adolescence. His early drug use has undoubtedly contributed to or exacerbated his mental health issues.

54. What is particularly relevant are the extensive and complex mental health issues suffered by the offender. As the offender’s counsel submits, the relevance of an offender’s mental health condition to the sentencing exercise is well established. The High Court in The Queen v Guode [2020] HCA 8; 267 CLR 141 at [8] (quoting R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 at [32]) summarised the ways in which mental health may be relevant as including, inter alia: (a) the condition may reduce the moral culpability of the offending conduct, as distinct from the offender’s legal responsibility. This might mean that denunciation is less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective. (b) the condition may have a bearing on the kind of sentence that is imposed and the conditions in which it should be served.

55. In the present matter, these factors may reduce the moral culpability of the offender to some extent. Ms Kocak considers that full-time imprisonment will likely be more onerous for the offender than for an average prisoner without his clinical profile, principally because of the interaction between his conditions. His personality dysfunction is particularly relevant to this because it is associated with affective instability, impulsivity, shame, anger, abandonment sensitivity, interpersonal mistrust and self-harm vulnerability. Such features can and have been shown to be exacerbated in custodial environments.

56. However, I must bear in mind that it is not suggested by Ms Kocak that the offender’s thinking was so impaired at the time of the offending as to suggest a complete absence of rational capacity.

57. Further, as the prosecutor points out, the factors relied upon as reducing moral culpability may also be relevant to the issue of community safety. The offender has shown violent, disinhibited conduct on many occasions. He has consistently put the safety of members of the community at risk. These factors militate against a reduction in sentence.

58. On balance, I accept that the offender’s moral culpability for these offences is somewhat reduced and have made allowance for this in the sentence to be imposed.

59. Just as it is inevitable that the offender will serve a significant period of imprisonment, so is it inevitable that he will be released into the community at some stage. The offender’s counsel submits, in my view reasonably, that while a further period of full-time imprisonment is the only available option, the court should consider imposing a low non-parole period in recognition of the offender’s rehabilitation prospects.

60. I regard the offender’s rehabilitation prospects as, at best, guarded. He has hitherto not shown the capacity to exist in the community without tending to violent offending. His present abstinence from drugs referred to above, however, is an encouraging sign however. Just how his transition from incarceration to the community is handled will be of great importance. I accept the submission made on the offender’s behalf that it is appropriate to fashion a non-parole period short enough to allow the Sentence Administration Board adequate flexibility to allow the offender to engage in the appropriate mental health and drug rehabilitation as it becomes available to him in custody. The Board would be best placed to determine his progress and accordingly deal with the issue of whether and when he should be granted parole.

Sentence for breach

61. Upon conviction for the three matters to which he has now pleaded guilty, the offender will be in breach of the good behaviour order with suspended sentence made by Elkaim J on 29 October 2021. That sentence (which I will refer to as “the original sentence”) was a total sentence of two years and six months’ imprisonment to commence on 27 April 2022, to be suspended from 27 June 2023, with the offender to enter into a good behaviour order for three years ending on 26 June 2026.

62. The court must cancel that good behaviour order and either impose the suspended sentence or resentence the offender for the offences. There is no presumption in favour of imposing the sentence that was suspended. In R v Curtis (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 34 at [18], Refshauge J considered the matters relevant to the decision as to the appropriate response to a breach of a suspended sentence: These include the proportion of the term of the Good Behaviour Order that had been served without breach, any rehabilitation attained by the offender prior to the breach, the nature of the offence which breached the order, including whether it is similar to the offence for which the sentence of imprisonment, then suspended, was imposed, the relative seriousness of the offence so that the imposition of the suspended sentence would be disproportionate to the gravity of the breach offending; and, the prospects of the offender’s rehabilitation.

63. Here, the offending which led to the breach is very serious. The offender did not attain any appreciable rehabilitation prior to the breach.

64. I have concluded that the appropriate way to proceed is to resentence the offender for the original offences, recognising the period already served in relation to those offences, but also recognising the serious nature of the offences.

65. Another matter raised by the breach of the suspended sentence is the possible application of s 72 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). That provision deals with offences committed whilst an offender is in lawful custody, as was the situation with the original sentence. The intent of the legislation is clearly that offences committed in custody will be served consecutively with the sentences of imprisonment that brought the offender into custody in the first place. Subsection 72(3) does give the court the power to direct that the sentences be served concurrently or partly concurrently.

66. I have determined that it is appropriate that the sentences for the three matters now before the court should be partly concurrent with the sentences I propose to impose in relation to the breach. To the extent that it is necessary under s72(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, I direct that the sentences be served partly concurrently.

Totality

67. There is another submission made on behalf of the offender that in my view has merit. The current offences for which the offender stands to be sentenced occurred over two separate days and within the space of a week. They bear the feature of being unsophisticated, if violent, offending and can be appropriately considered as part of a “spree” of offending. This submission has relevance to the totality of the sentence. As the offending is part of one episode, this will affect the extent of accumulation of the sentences, suggesting less accumulation.

68. On the other hand, as the prosecutor points out, there are separate victims here. It is appropriate that there be some accumulation of the sentences to recognise the separate harm suffered by each of those victims.

Current sentencing practice

69. The offender’s counsel referred the court to a number of recent sentencing decisions, which are set out in the appendix to this judgment. As Taylor J recently remarked in R v Oldman (a pseudonym) (No 3) [2025] ACTSC 524 at [52]: The limitations of the function of comparable sentences in an individual sentencing tasks are well recorded: see Bell CJ (Huggett J and Rigg J agreeing) in R v Thompson [2025] NSWCCA 133. No sentencing outcome is a precedent. Sentencing statistics and comparable cases do not define the range of available sentences nor place a cap on the upper or lower ranges of a possible sentence.

70. Of the matters referred to me by the offender’s counsel, not unsurprisingly given the variations in objective and subjective characteristics and the wide range of conduct covered particularly by the offence of aggravated robbery, a range of outcomes is disclosed. Generally, full-time custody is imposed, but the periods of imprisonment vary somewhat. I did not find any particular case to be of great assistance.

71. The prosecution did not proffer any particular cases as being of assistance, relying essentially on the principle outlined by Taylor J set out above.

Determination

72. The purposes of sentencing to which I have had regard are set out in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. As set out above, these offences are objectively serious, involving violence and threats of violence against innocent members of the community who are simply going about their business. The use of a knife in all these incidents is a concerning feature. Clearly, general deterrence is a significant factor given the necessity to protect members of the community. However, I accept that the offender’s moral culpability is somewhat reduced by his considerable mental health problems.

73. In relation to the breach matters, I have determined to cancel the good behaviour order and resentence the offender to two sentences which will accumulate to one year and four months’ imprisonment, taking into account the period already served in relation to those offences, but also recognising the serious nature of the offences.

74. In relation to the offence of aggravated robbery in incident 1, I have determined that a sentence of two years and three months’ imprisonment be imposed, reduced from three years to take into account the 25% discount for a plea of guilty.

75. In relation to the offence of aggravated robbery involved in incident 2, I have determined that a sentence of three years’ imprisonment be imposed, reduced from four years to take into account the 25% discount.

76. In relation to the offence of reckless threat to kill involved in incident 3, I have determined that a sentence of one year and six months’ imprisonment be imposed, reduced from two years to take into account the 25% discount.

77. To achieve totality of the sentence, there will be some accumulation of the individual sentences to reflect the harm suffered by the various individual victims, but attenuated so as to avoid a crushing sentence.

Orders

78. The orders of the Court are: (1) The good behaviour order dated 29 October 2021 is cancelled. In relation to SC CAN 139/2021, the offender is convicted and sentenced to one year and four months’ imprisonment to commence on 2 June 2025 and expire on 1 October 2026. In relation to the other breach matter (CAN 3505/2020), the offender is convicted and sentenced to four months’ imprisonment to commence on 2 June 2025 and expire on 1 October 2025. (2) For the offence of aggravated robbery (CAN 5822/2025), the offender is convicted and sentenced to two years and three months’ imprisonment to commence on 2 January 2026 and expire on 1 April 2028. (3) For the offence of aggravated robbery (CAN 6870/2025), the offender is convicted and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment to commence on 2 May 2026 and expire on 1 May 2029. (4) For the offence of reckless threat to kill (CAN 5830/2025), the offender is convicted and sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment to commence on 2 January 2028 and expire on 1 July 2029. (5) The aggregate term of imprisonment is four years and one month, commencing on 2 June 2025 and expiring on 1 July 2029. I set a non-parole period commencing on 2 June 2025 and expiring on 17 June 2027. (6) To the extent that it is necessary under s 72(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), I direct that the sentences for the three matters now before the court be served partly concurrently with the sentences in relation to the breach.

I certify that the preceding seventy-eight [78] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice White. Associate: Date: Annexure A: Comparative cases provided by the offender

Citation Summary Sentence Aggravated robbery DPP v Whitney Offences: Two counts of aggravated For the most serious [2025] ACTSC 457 robbery and one count of robbery. aggravated robbery: one year, 11 months and 17 The most serious aggravated robbery days’ imprisonment involved the offender entering a service station at night wearing a face mask and carrying a knife. He demanded money from the attendant. There was no actual or threatened violence beyond the knife. The attendant retreated to a safe room and the offender stole one of the tills. The offender was on parole at the time of the offending and had a considerable criminal history. He had a disadvantaged childhood and a problem with substance abuse (he was on methamphetamine at the time of the offending). There was no evidence of remorse. He entered a plea of guilty on the third day of a four-day hearing. DPP v Crowther Offences: One count of aggravated For the aggravated [2019] ACTSC 338 robbery and one count of assault. robbery: two years and three months to be served The offender attended a service station by way of an intensive with a knife, grabbed the attendant by correction order the front of his shirt (during which the attendant received a small cut to his finger from the knife, resulting in the assault charge), and threatened to stab the attendant if he was not given money. The attendant backed away and the offender took the money from the cash register. The offender had mental health issues, a problem with substance use, high prosects of rehabilitation and an insignificant criminal history. He pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity. R v Ford [2017] Two counts of aggravated robbery, one For the aggravated ACTSC 19 count of attempted aggravated robbery, robbery: two years and and other charges. one month’s imprisonment One of the aggravated robberies involved the offender holding a large knife in company and demanding money from a taxi driver. He obtained around $300. This offence was assessed as being in the low to mid-range of offences of this nature. The offender had a limited criminal history and a problem with substance use.

Threat to kill R v Pearson [2020] Offences: Various offences, including For the threat to kill: 12 ACTSC 375 one count of reckless threat to kill. months’ imprisonment The threat to kill offence occurred after the offender had assaulted the victim in the victim’s backyard and damaged property with a shovel. It involved the offender threatening to kill the victim and the victim’s children. The offender was heavily intoxicated on drugs at the time of the offence. He had a substance use issue and a short but significant criminal history. He was subject to conditional liberty at the time of the offence. R v Griffiths (No 2) Offences: aggravated burglary, unlawful For the threat to kill: [2020] ACTSC 118 confinement, dishonestly appropriating nominated term of 2 years’ property and threat to kill. imprisonment The threat to kill took place in the home of the victim (who was a stranger). The offender was approximately one metre away from the victim and was holding a knife with the blade pointed at the victim. He had a limited criminal history. He was found not guilty by reason of mental impairment.