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1. On 5 November 2025, Youssef Rekni (the offender) pleaded guilty to the following offences. He is now to be sentenced for those offences: (a) One count of an act of indecency in the third degree, contrary to s 59(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (CC2025/1532) committed against the first victim; (b) One count of act of indecency without consent, contrary to s 60(1) of the Crimes Act (SCCAN2025/438) committed against the first victim; and (c) One count of attempted sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s 54(1) of the Crimes Act by virtue of s 44 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CC2023/12322) committed against the second victim.

2. The maximum penalty for the offence of an act of indecency in the third degree is 10 years’ imprisonment.

3. The maximum penalty for the offence of an act of indecency without consent is 7 years’ imprisonment.

4. The maximum penalty for the offence of an attempted sexual intercourse without consent is 12 years’ imprisonment.

Facts

CC2025/1532 and SCCAN2025/438: 12 March 2022 Incident

5. At around 2:10am on 12 March 2022, the first victim was waiting alone at a bus stop in Watson, smoking a cigarette while listening to music. While sitting at the bus stop, the first victim saw a white van slow down and park nearby. She then saw the offender exit from the driver’s side of the van.

6. The offender approached the first victim, and asked whether she wanted a lift home. The first victim declined by shaking her head, and the offender walked back to his vehicle. Frightened by her encounter with the offender, the first victim decided to walk home, which was a short distance away in Watson. Her path took her along an unpaved footpath and towards the Ted Noffs Foundation. It was while walking towards the Ted Noffs Foundation that the first victim heard footsteps behind her, and was forcibly taken to the ground by the offender.

7. The first victim screamed for help and told the offender to get off her. She swore at the offender, and asked him what he was doing in an attempt to get the offender to leave her alone. The offender restrained the victim on the ground, preventing her from being able to get up. The victim kicked the offender and used her keys to try to force the offender to let her up, however he continued to hold her on the ground. During the attack, the offender placed his hand over the victim’s mouth to stop her from screaming. At times when the victim was on her stomach, the offender forced her face into the dirt (CC2025/1532 – act of indecency in the third degree).

8. While the victim was lying on her back on the ground, the offender lifted up her T-shirt and exposed her breasts. The offender made a comment about the victim’s appearance and that he liked her body (SCCAN2025/438 – act of indecency without consent).

9. The first victim told the offender she would stop screaming if he let her take off her backpack. The offender agreed. At the same time, a worker at the Ted Noffs Foundation who heard the first victim’s screaming approached, shouting and with a torchlight. The offender then got off the victim and ran towards his vehicle, fleeing the scene.

10. The first victim then returned to her residence and, at 2:44am, called 000 to report the crime.

11. A number of people heard the first victim’s cries for help during the incident. One person heard the first victim saying words to the effect “get off me, get off me, get off me” and then yelling for help. A 000 call during which the first victim’s cries for help can be heard was tendered in court.

12. The first victim participated in a “facefit” interview with police on 16 March 2022 during which an image was created that the first victim commented was a very good resemblance to the offender. Through a DNA match, CCTV evidence, and evidence from those who saw or heard the incident, the offender was eventually identified. Unfortunately, however, the identification did not take place until December 2024, well after the incident involving the second victim.

CC2023/12322: 26 November 2023 Incident

13. At around 2:00am on 26 November 2023, the second victim left Blackbird Bar in Civic. The second victim was highly intoxicated. She had no memory of leaving the bar and she intended to return home by walking to Braddon and then ordering an Uber.

14. The second victim encountered the offender while walking along Lonsdale Street. She did not know him. The offender asked whether the second victim needed to sit down. The second victim sat down with the offender, and had a cigarette with him.

15. The offender offered the second victim a lift home, which she accepted. Along the way, the offender stopped at the 7/11 in Braddon, telling the second victim that he needed to get something to eat. He went inside the store. The victim, developing concerns about accepting a ride from someone she did not know, left from the passenger side of the vehicle and went around the front of the car. The offender then ran back to the car, and spoke to the victim, opening the passenger-side door for her. She got in.

16. On the drive to the second victim’s home, she mentioned her dog. The offender asked to come and meet the dog. The second victim agreed, and let the offender into her house. The second victim could not remember much of the car ride to her residence due to her intoxication.

17. The second victim let her dog out of his crate. The offender patted the dog and asked the victim for a drink. The victim directed him to where the bar was and the offender took a beer from the fridge. The victim sat on her floor playing with her dog.

18. The victim and the offender continued to converse. During their conversation, the offender made a few moves toward the victim, including touching her leg. She moved away from him.

19. After some time in the house, the second victim asked the offender to leave, as she was going to bed. The offender suggested that the dog be put away; the second victim said she did not want to do so, and said to the offender that “you really need to fucking leave. Um, just get out.”

20. The offender did not leave and continued to insist that the victim’s dog go back into his pen. The victim reiterated to the offender that she wanted him to leave. At one point the offender told the victim that he wanted another drink and grabbed another beer. The offender picked up the dog and put him back in the crate. At the time the victim was sitting on the floor. When the offender put the dog away the victim went to get up to go and retrieve the dog. As she did this the offender pulled her down onto the floor and positioned his body on top of her attempting to kiss the victim.

21. The victim began screaming and attempting to unlock the crate where the dog was in the hope that the dog would come to her assistance. The victim was yelling at the offender to get off and telling him to stop. The offender used his body to pin one of the arms of the victim down. At this point the victim was lying flat on the floor. The offender was on top of the victim. His body weight and legs pinned her to the ground and she couldn’t get her legs free. The offender lifted up the victim’s shirt and pulled down her bra. He kissed her breast and twisted it. The victim was still screaming for help and began to scream louder. As a result of the offender grabbing at her breast, the victim sustained red marks on her right breast.

22. The offender continued trying to kiss the victim. He told the victim to shut up and put his hand over her mouth. The victim squirmed to get her mouth free, and when she was able screamed louder and louder. The victim screamed using a higher pitch hoping that someone might hear her.

23. The offender attempted to pull down the victim’s leggings and underwear, managing to get them partway down her legs. He used one hand to do this. At this point, the victim was able to move slightly from underneath the offender. The victim began screaming as loud as she could, in an attempt for one of her neighbours to hear her. The victim felt the offender touch her vagina lightly and she felt his hands trying to go into her vagina.

24. The victim managed to use her legs to push the offender off her after he touched her vagina. The offender left the victim’s apartment immediately after this occurred. (CC2023/12322 – attempted sexual intercourse without consent).

25. The victim sustained bruising to both arms, and carpet burn to her elbow during the offender’s assault.

26. After the offender left, the victim ran out of her apartment and sought assistance from her neighbour. She told the neighbour that “he tried to rape me”, and she was physically distressed.

27. The police attended later that morning and the victim disclosed what had occurred. The victim identified the bottles of beer from which the offender had drunk and DNA testing linked the offender to those bottles. The items of clothing worn by the victim were also seized by police. DNA recovered from a tapelift of the external front and internal waistband region of the victim’s underwear provided extremely strong support for the proposition that the offender was a contributor to the DNA profile obtained.

28. Police were able to identify the offender through CCTV footage which showed the offender and victim in the vehicle driven by the offender.

29. On 12 December 2023, the offender presented himself to the police station where he was placed under arrest. He was interviewed under caution. He admitted interacting with the victim, but attempted to minimise his involvement, attempting to lay blame on the victim. He stated “she is in the street. She invite me to come to her place.” He stated that he had started to touch her, she liked it at first but then she said “no”. He had then said “I’m so sorry. But why you invite me if you don’t like this one? Why you do this to me? … I am not force her too much.”

30. The offender initially stated that he the only touched the victim’s breasts, however he later stated that he touched her vagina, and then she started screaming.

Victim impact

31. The effect of the offence on the victims and the victims’ families is a matter that must be considered by the court: see s 33(1)(f) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). In deciding how the offender should be sentenced for the offence the court must consider any victim impact statement given: see s 53 Crimes (Sentencing) Act.

32. But more than that, victim impact statements provide an important insight for the court and the community about the effects of offences such as the present on victims and their families. They give victims and their families a chance to confront the offender in a controlled courtroom setting with the devastating consequences of the offender’s wrongdoing.

33. During the sentencing hearing, three victim impact statements were read. The Court cannot possibly do justice to these statements by attempting to summarise them. However I will attempt to refer to some aspects of the statements to emphasise just how comprehensive and long lasting were the effects on the victims of these crimes.

The first victim

34. The first victim spoke of experiencing a sensation of complete and utter disempowerment: “[f]or years after I couldn’t sleep, eat, work. I am still afraid of the dark and unable to walk outside on my own.” The first victim spoke of the myriad impacts on her life: on employment, education, relationships with others including her boyfriend. She spoke of the entitlement exhibited by the offender, stating that nothing could convey the impact that he had “the degree of audacity to decide my body, my self, is yours to manipulate.”

The first victim’s mother

35. The first victim’s mother spoke of her formidable and brave daughter who is loved and cherished by her family, partner and friends: “[s]he is smart, independent, hardworking, compassionate, and a fierce defender of social justice.”

36. Her mother spoke of her feeling powerlessness that she could not keep her daughter safe. Addressing the offender directly she said: “[b]ut it’s not about anyone’s failure in keeping [her] safe, it’s about your grotesque entitlement to deny [the victim] her safety, her personhood.” She added: Years later she is still paying the price of your offending. While you walked free she has been fighting a battle that at times felt worse than death. I wanted so much to take her pain. To make it better. Neither time nor I can fix this. This is something [the victim] will carry for life. The second victim

37. The second victim related that she hadn’t wanted to make a statement, but said: I feel it’s important to speak up to someone who smothered my mouth to muffle my screams. It’s hard to put in words how much this assault has affected me. I didn’t want to admit this impacted me at all, as I am resilient or at least, I thought I was. The truth is it has been a dark cloud that follows me, hanging over my head like a bad dream, stripping my life of joy. Nature and circumstances of the offence

38. The court is enjoined by s 33(1)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act to consider the nature and circumstances of the offence. This includes an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence which, for sexual offending, will be particularly relevant. As the Court of Appeal noted in The Queen v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25 at [44]: The primary sentencing considerations for sexual offending are punishment, deterrence, denunciation and recognition of the harm done to the victim. In the proceeding before the primary judge there was little by way of remorse demonstrated by the respondent beyond his plea of guilty to the offence. Personal deterrence should have been a relevant consideration at that time. General deterrence, or deterrence of others from committing like crimes, is always an important consideration in imposing a sentence for sexual offending. The above does not deny the relevance of rehabilitation in sentencing offenders such as the respondent, but in sentencing for sexual offences rehabilitation will ordinarily be given lesser weight than the other considerations to which we have referred due to the gravity of the offending.

39. In R v Wyper [2017] ACTCA 59 at [114] the Court identified the following “unifying principles” concerning sentencing for sexual offences: (a) Sexual offences are regarded as objectively serious offences by the courts; (b) The serious nature of sexual intercourse without consent demands that the sentencing purposes of deterrence, denunciation and recognition of harm to the complainant be given prominence; (c) A period of full-time imprisonment is usually necessary to give effect to the above sentencing principles. Act of indecency in the third degree, first victim

40. The offence of an act of indecency covers a broad range of offending: see DPP v Waters (a pseudonym) [2025] ACTSC 84 at [41]. Like Baker J in DPP v Murray [2026] ACTSC 172, I do not consider it necessary or helpful to attempt to label where the present offences lie on a spectrum of objective seriousness. Her Honour said in Murray at [40]: What is necessary is that the features which inform the objective seriousness of the offences be identified, not where the offending lies as a point on a hypothetical range.

41. An act of indecency in the third degree, involving as it does in this case an assault, is potentially more serious than an act of indecency simpliciter, as is shown by the respective maximum penalties for each offence. The present case is a very serious example of the offence. The victim was alone listening to music. It was just past 2am. There were few people around at that time in that area. The victim was completely vulnerable and was preyed upon by the offender. As the victim tried to walk away, spooked by the presence of the offender, she was stalked by the offender and violently thrown by him to the ground. He restrained her, preventing her from being able to get up. He placed his hand over her mouth to stop her from screaming. He forced her face into the dirt. It was in this context that the further offence of an act of indecency occurred.

42. The experience was completely terrifying for the victim. The level of violence was significant. There was a significant element of degradation of the victim for example in forcing her face into the dirt. The offence was an horrific instance of male entitlement. As the first victim identified, there was an audacity in deciding that her body was the offender’s to manipulate. Act of indecency, first victim

43. The act of indecency which followed the assault was again a very serious example of the offence. Having subdued the first victim as described above in relation to the act of indecency in the third degree, the offender exposed the first victim’s body and made lascivious and entitled comments. It was only through the quick thinking of the first victim, bargaining with the offender that she would stop screaming if she could take off her backpack, and the intervention of others, which led to the offender ceasing his crime and fleeing. Attempted sexual intercourse without consent, second victim

44. As Mossop J noted in R v Palmer [2017] ACTSC 357 at [22], the offence of sexual intercourse without consent covers a wide spectrum of criminal culpability. Justice Mossop referred to features which are typically taken into account in assessing the gravity of such offences. Those features include such matters as whether the offence was premeditated, whether the victim was injured, whether the victim was degraded and whether the victim was particularly vulnerable.

45. Of course, checklists of typical features of offending may assist in some cases, but should not detract from the unique circumstances of a particular offence. For my part, I have some difficulty with some checklists for this offence which include as an aggravating feature “whether the offending involved violence or threats of violence”: see, for example Jurj v R [2016] VSCA 57 at [80], referred to by McCallum CJ in R v Incandela (No 4) [2022] ACTSC 139 at [10]. The crime of sexual intercourse without consent is inherently a crime which involves violence. The checklist item must be taken to refer to some superadded violence. In the present case the second victim fought against her attacker, sustaining injuries in the process. Had she not done so, and many victims will either be too scared, too frozen, or judge it to be in their best interest not to struggle, the crime would not be any the less serious.

46. The present case is one of attempt. The offence of attempting to commit an offence is punishable as if the offence attempted had been committed: see Criminal Code s 44(9). In R v BI (No 4) [2017] ACTSC 71 at [39] et seq Refshauge J reviewed the authorities about how to sentence in cases of attempt. There was a conventional view that an attempt to commit an offence would be viewed less seriously than if the offence attempted had been committed. However, that will by no means invariably be the case. A persistent and serious attempt may well be as objectively serious as a completed offence. To take an example from a different offence type, in R v Doorey [2000] NSWCCA 456, Wood CJ at CL (Whealy J agreeing) said at [29] (with respect to an offence of attempted armed robbery): So far as it was suggested that the matter lacked objective seriousness being only an attempt, I would similarly reject that proposition. It is the case that an attempt attracts the same potential maximum penalty as the performance of the substantive crime. Every case has to be treated and assessed upon its merits. In some cases an attempt may constitute an offence of lesser seriousness, if there was a withdrawal or a failure to carry the matter through from a very early stage. In the present case, however, it was only the inability of the applicant to open the till, which meant that the substantive offence was not implemented. In the circumstances of this case I would regard the attempt as still constituting a matter of particular seriousness.

47. The present case is very much an example of an attempt of particular seriousness. In this case, the offender had inveigled his way into the victim’s home, a place where she was entitled to feel safe. The offender insisted, against the wishes of the victim, that her dog be put away and he himself picked up the dog and put it back in the crate. The offender then violently assaulted the victim, pulling her onto the floor and positioning his body on top of her. He pinned one of the victim’s arms down. His body weight was pinning her legs to the ground. He then lifted her top and kissed and twisted her breast, causing red marks. He told the victim to shut up as she was screaming for help and put his hand over her mouth. He pulled down her leggings and underwear. The victim felt the offender touch her vagina lightly and felt his hands trying to go into her vagina. The victim finally managed to push the offender off her and he fled the apartment.

48. The victim had sustained bruising to both arms and carpet burnt her elbow during the assault.

49. This was an offence of great seriousness. Although the offending was opportunistic rather than completely premeditated, there was more than a degree of artifice in the way in which the offender had engineered the situation prior to the offence. The victim suffered a terrifying ordeal and was injured as she struggled to repel her attacker. The victim was vulnerable being alone with someone she did not know in her own home, in circumstances where she had that evening become highly intoxicated before she met the offender, a factor of which the offender took full advantage.

Subjective circumstances

50. The offender was born in Morocco and moved to Australia in 2013 to live with his ex-wife. I am informed that he is an Australian citizen. He is now estranged from his ex-wife who has moved to Queensland with their two children aged 2 and 6. The offender grew up in a safe environment and was educated to university standard in Morocco. He has had a continuous history of employment since moving to Australia and had worked as a house painter for the last 10 years. He has no prior criminal history.

51. The offender sought to attribute much of the explanation for his offending to his consumption of alcohol and drugs, in particular cocaine. I will deal with this in more detail below.

52. As to what the offender told the author of the pre-sentence report of his attitude to the offences, in relation to the first victim, the offender acknowledged that his actions were unacceptable and continues to reflect upon them. However, he did state that alcohol and illicit substances were contributing factors to those offences, claiming that the day of the offence was the first time he had used cocaine.

53. As to the second victim, the pre-sentence report records that the offender: … accepted minimal responsibility and placed blame on the victim alleging they used drugs and drank together all the time and he assumed she consented to sexual activities. He however acknowledged the victim withdrew consent prior to touching her which led to her screaming. Mr Rekni expressed no victim awareness or empathy and indicated the victim had targeted him due [to] an unrelated incident with his friend. Mr Rekni minimised his offending, stating bruises were from the victim’s dog, noting he left of his own accord and no mention of actions he took against the victim. Mr Rekni advised he pled guilty as he wants to get this matter finalised.

54. Understandably in the light of that, the pre-sentence report concluded in relation to the second victim that the offender “took minimal responsibility and lacked any victim empathy or awareness”.

55. The offender gave evidence on his sentence and unfortunately sought to minimise the seriousness of his conduct in a way which raises issues about the extent of his remorse and his prospects of rehabilitation. I will return to that issue later in this judgment.

56. On behalf of the offender medical material was tendered which indicated some mental health difficulties which predated the current offending. The material tendered does demonstrate that at various times he has been under treatment for depression, anxiety and insomnia, as well as for a gambling disorder. It is not submitted on the offender’s behalf that his mental health issues provide any explanation for or excuse the offending. Rather it is put as being relevant to his prospects of rehabilitation and to the burden of imprisonment, which it is accepted on his behalf is inevitable.

57. The Court also has the benefit of an intensive correction order assessment report. The offender was assessed as not suitable for an intensive correction order because he did not have approved accommodation. In any event, given the seriousness of the offending, I would not have been disposed to give the offender the benefit of an intensive corrections order.

Criminal history

58. As noted, the offender has no prior criminal convictions.

Pleas of guilty

59. The offender pleaded guilty to the three offences in the Supreme Court on 5 November 2025, 19 days before his trial was due to commence in relation to the second victim. They are accordingly not early pleas, although as was pointed out on behalf of the offender, the pleas spared the complainants the burden of giving evidence, avoided two lengthy trials and conserved public resources. It is appropriate in those circumstances to recognise the utilitarian value of the pleas. Because of the limited remorse expressed by the offender and the limited insight shown by him into his crimes, any discount by reason of the plea of guilty will be largely, but not entirely limited to the utilitarian value.

60. The prosecution submits that in relation to the offence involving the second victim, the plea was entered late and, in any event, the case was overwhelming in terms of s 35(4) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. The prosecution submits that any discount would not exceed 5%.

61. I do not accept that the case was overwhelming in terms of s 35(4) although certainly it was a strong case. Invocation of that subsection by the prosecution seems to be so common as to be almost ritualistic. It needs to be borne in mind that s 35(4) will be sparingly invoked. As was said in R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 at [73]: We agree that the prosecution case was very strong, although largely circumstantial. However, we do not consider that it fell into the very small class of cases that satisfy the ‘overwhelmingly strong’ requirement in s 35(4) of the Sentencing Act.

62. Given the utilitarian value of the plea and the public interest in encouraging pleas of guilty, I propose to discount the sentence for the offence involving the second victim by a figure in the region of 10%.

63. In relation to the first victim, the Crown accepts that they were pleas at an earlier time in the sense that the matter had not been set for trial, but the Crown submits that the evidence was overwhelming. Again I do not accept that the case was overwhelming in terms of s 35(4) and I propose to apply a discount of 15% to mark the utilitarian value of the plea and the fact that, although not an early plea, it was entered well in advance of trial.

The offender’s evidence at the sentence hearing

64. The offender gave evidence and was cross-examined at the sentencing hearing. He professed to feeling great guilt at his offences, and apologised to the victims. He stated that he was ready to accept any punishment the Court saw fit to impose.

65. He gave evidence that he had been having problems in his relationship with his wife which had caused him to turn to alcohol and drugs. He also mentioned that his wife had blood cancer and the related stress on the relationship had meant that he and his wife were arguing on minor issues. This caused him tremendous stress. He also felt the separation from his family in Morocco.

66. The offender, who was recently remanded in custody, gave evidence that he was struggling because it was his first time in incarceration and his limited English was causing him communication difficulties.

67. Under cross-examination, the offender tended to minimise his conduct. In relation to the second victim, he stated he did not recall some aspects of his contact as he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs, although he admitted that he put his hand over her mouth and had put his hand in between her legs.

68. In relation to the first victim, he again claimed to have been intoxicated and stated that he went to touch her, not to assault her by hitting her. He agreed that he put his hand over her mouth and touched her breast but denied he was acting for his own sexual gratification.

69. So markedly did the offender attempt to minimise his conduct that I raised with his counsel whether he was close to traversing his pleas. The offender’s counsel, an experienced and senior practitioner, submitted that there had been no traversal of plea, and that the offender’s evidence was to be understood to mean that he had no intention of sexual assault in the lead up to the offences, and was not to be taken as a denial of the actual offences themselves.

70. I accept this submission that there was no traversal of plea. It remains the fact, however, that the offender in both his evidence before the Court and his remarks to the author of the pre-sentence report attempted to minimise his involvement and showed almost no insight into his offending behaviour, seeking to blame external factors and not accepting responsibility for his own actions.

Remorse and rehabilitation

71. It follows that the offender has expressed little remorse and must be sentenced accordingly. Further, his prospects for rehabilitation are clouded by his lack of insight into his behaviour and his tendency to blame others or external factors for his offending.

72. The offender’s counsel accepted that the offending was predatory, opportunistic behaviour in relation to vulnerable victims, but did not, he submitted, disclose the type of entrenched serial sexual offending often described as “predatory” in the fullest sense. Counsel did accept that remorse was limited, but submitted that the offender’s conduct in pleading guilty represented acceptance of his legal responsibility, and he had otherwise shown a willingness to engage with treatment and counselling.

73. Counsel did point to the offender’s educational attainments and his strong employment history as very positive prosocial factors which demonstrated an established work ethic, financial independence and sustained contribution to the community. I accept that those factors do work in his favour in assessing the prospects of his rehabilitation.

74. The prosecutor submitted that, noting there was no suggestion that the offender’s mental health had any contribution to the offending, nevertheless a willingness to undertake treatment might be suggestive of some level of protection for the community. However, that had to be viewed in the context of apparently entrenched attitudes of the offender towards sexual violence and the offender’s reliance on the disinhibitory factors which he said had contributed to his offending.

Accumulation and totality

75. The principles concerning accumulation and totality are well-known and were set out in Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 at [37]. I must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence, and then consider questions of accumulation, concurrency and totality. The principle of totality requires me to review the aggregate sentence, look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and consider whether the aggregate is just and appropriate for all offences. Where offences are discreet and independent, as is the case here as between the offending against the two victims, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend and reflect criminality of the other. This indicates that the sentences should be at least partly cumulative so as to reflect the total criminality.

Current sentencing practice Act of indecency in the third degree; act of indecency

76. I was provided with a table of what were said to be comparable cases by the prosecution, although I did not find it of great assistance. None of the cases referred to were actually comparable to the present case either in the nature and circumstances of the offending, or in the subjective factors of the offenders.

77. I was referred to DPP v Murray where Baker J very helpfully sets out a table of comparative sentences for the offence of act of indecency without consent. None of those cases, however, provide much assistance in the present matter. They tend to be cases where the offender and complainant either knew each other or were in a relationship. The present case is radically different in that the offender was engaging in predatory and frankly frightening behaviour in relation to a victim he opportunistically happened upon. As I have said earlier in these reasons, the offences of both act of indecency in the third degree and act of indecency involving the first victim were very serious examples of offences of this type. Accordingly, I do not find any of the matters referred to in DPP v Murray to be particularly helpful. Attempt to engage in sexual intercourse without consent

78. The offence against the second victim was a serious example of offending of this type. The offending was markedly predatory albeit opportunistic, and the victim was vulnerable, being intoxicated and alone with the offender in her own home.

79. Again, I was provided with a few “comparable cases” by the prosecution but did not find them of assistance as the nature and circumstances of the offending, and the subjective factors of the offenders, bore no comparison to the present case.

80. I have found some assistance in referring to R v Incandela (No 4), which was a case of opportunistic offending. The sentencing judge, McCallum CJ, did refer at [37] et seq to a number of comparable cases, none of which is particularly apposite to the present matter. The offender in Incandela (No 4) had pleaded not guilty, but did have a relatively strong subjective case. The sentencing judge found that there was no threat of violence, which distinguishes that matter from the present case.

81. I have also had regard to R v Sirohi [2015] ACTSC 252, confirmed on appeal in Sirohi v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 29. In that case, the offender, a taxi driver, had pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual intercourse without consent. The two offences involved the same complainant, a heavily intoxicated woman who had hailed a taxi driven by the offender so as to get home after a night of heavy drinking. The first offence involved digital penetration while the complainant was in the taxi, the second and more serious offence involved penile/vaginal intercourse at the offender’s home. The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years and 4 months in respect of the first offence and 6 years and 8 months for the second offence, with an effective aggregate head sentence of imprisonment for 7 years and 8 months. A non-parole period of 4 years was fixed. The primary judge had taken into account that the offender had no prior convictions, the offences were out of character, the offender had reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, the offender had pleaded guilty, and imprisonment was likely to be isolating for the offender as he had no family or other supports in the ACT. The judge also took into account favourable subjective features from the offender’s background and his remorse. On the other hand the sentencing judge considered that general deterrence was a significant consideration, noting that it was important to send a message that the fact that a woman was intoxicated was not an invitation for sexual abuse. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding that there was no basis for concluding that it was unreasonable or plainly unjust.

82. There are striking parallels between Sirohi and the present case. The taxi driver in that case was in a position of trust, which is a somewhat distinguishing feature, but the offender here did take cynical advantage of the inebriation of the second victim, and presented himself as someone she could trust.

Time in custody

83. The offender has been in custody since his bail was revoked on 24 June 2026. He had previously been in custody in relation to these matters for 4 days. I will accordingly backdate the start of any sentence to 20 June 2026 to take account of time served.

Consideration

84. As discussed above, each of these offences was a serious example of offending of its type. Apart from his pleas of guilty, the offender has expressed little remorse other than in a formulaic fashion, and has tended to blame his victims and external circumstances such as his alcohol and drug use for his predicament. On the other hand, the offender had no previous criminal history and has a strong employment record. He is a father with two young children and he has expressed the hope that when he has served his sentence he will be able to contribute meaningfully to their lives.

85. I accept that the offender has mental health and addiction issues which, although they did not contribute to the offence, will make imprisonment harder for him. He is also comparatively isolated, his family being in Morocco and his ex-wife and children having moved interstate. I have taken those matters into account in the sentence which I will pronounce.

86. Although the offender’s counsel accepted that a sentence of imprisonment was inevitable, he urged that at some point it be suspended. Given the seriousness of the offending I do not think that is appropriate. However in order to promote the rehabilitation of the offender, it is appropriate to provide a reasonably lengthy parole period, to enable parole to be granted to the offender when those responsible for the grant of parole judge him to be ready.

87. As to questions of accumulation and totality, the harm to the individual victims requires that there be a large measure of accumulation between the sentences so as to reflect the overall criminality. However, I have had regard to issues of totality and the necessity to avoid a crushing sentence.

88. In relation to the offence of an act of indecency in the third degree (CC2025/1532) I will impose a sentence of 3 years and 4 months’ imprisonment, reduced from 4 years on account of the plea of guilty.

89. In relation to the offence of an act of indecency without consent (SCCAN2025/438) I will impose a sentence of 2 years and 2 months’ imprisonment, reduced from 2 years and 6 months on account of the plea of guilty.

90. In relation to attempted sexual intercourse without consent (CC2023/12322) I will impose a sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment, reduced from 4 years and 6 months on account of the plea of guilty.

91. I will impose a total sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years’ imprisonment.

Orders

92. Youssef Rekni, please stand: (1) For the offence of act of indecency in the third degree (CC2025/1532) you are convicted and sentenced to 3 years and 4 months’ imprisonment to commence on 20 June 2026 and ending on 19 October 2029. (2) For the offence of act of indecency without consent (SCCAN2025/438) you are convicted and sentenced to 2 years and 2 months’ imprisonment to commence on 20 June 2026 and ending on 19 August 2028. (3) For the offence of attempted sexual intercourse without consent (CC2023/12322) you are convicted and sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment to commence on 20 June 2029 and ending on 19 June 2033. (4) I impose a total sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment to commence on 20 June 2026 and ending on 19 June 2033. I impose a non-parole period of 4 years’ imprisonment to commence on 20 June 2026 and ending on 19 June 2030.

I certify that the preceding ninety-two [92] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice White. Associate: Date: