DPP v Meshach [2025] VCC 1025

1. On 21 July 2025, I imposed the following sentences:

Charge 1 - Convicted and sentenced to one month's detention in a Youth Justice Centre (YJC).

Charge 2 - Convicted and sentenced to two years' detention in a YJC.

Charge 3 - Convicted and sentenced to two years' detention in a YJC.

Charge 4 - Convicted and sentenced to one day's detention in a YJC.

I directed that one year of the sentence imposed on Charge 3 be served cumulatively upon the sentence imposed on Charge 2, making a total effective sentence of 3 years' detention in a YJC.

I declared 161 days (not including the day of sentence) as the period of pre-sentence detention to be reckoned as already served under this sentence and I directed the fact that declaration was made, and its details, be noted in the records of the court.

Finally, in accordance with s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 ('Sentencing Act'), I declared that but for your pleas of guilty, I would have sentenced you to five years' imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of two years and six months.

1. At the time of sentencing you, I indicated I would provide my reasons for sentence at a later time. These are those reasons for sentence.

1. The prosecution filed a summary of prosecution opening for plea dated 16 June 2025 which I am told by your counsel I can treat as a statement of agreed facts for the purposes of sentencing you.[7]
2. You were born in August 2005 and are currently 20 years old. You were 18 at the time of the offending
3. The victim of the armed robbery (Charge 2) is Ms Sushma Aedunoothula, who was 29 years old at the time of the offending. Ms Aedunoothula was working alone at Coles Express Service Station in Keilor Park on the day of the offence.
4. The victims of the aggravated burglary are Mr Zhenyang Shen and Ms Jiahao. They were 23 and 22 years old respectively at the time of the offending.

1. At approximately 11:50pm on 12 March 2024, you attended the Coles Express Service Station in Keilor Park in the company of three unknown co-offenders. You all wore face coverings to conceal your identities. You were also wearing a black hooded top, black tracksuit pants and black runners.
2. You and your co-offenders arrived in a stolen white 2018 Kia Rio, bearing stolen registration plates. You initially parked at the bowsers before moving the car to a parking bay near the front door.
3. At the time, the store was open and Ms Aedunoothula was working behind the counter. Usually the store is kept locked at night, but she opened the door on this occasion to speak to a customer named Joshua Webb. As Mr Webb left, you and your co-offenders ran inside.
4. The first co-offender jumped onto the front counter, slid under the security barrier and approached the victim holding a hammer. He pointed the hammer at her and said, 'don't move, I'll hit you' and 'where do you keep the keys, I'll hit you'. You were carrying a black plastic bag and accessed the area behind the counter. You joined the first co-offender in making demands of the victim. She opened the cash register and you took a small amount of cash.
5. You demanded Ms Aedunoothula open the second cash register at the other end of the counter. As she complied, the first co-offender continued to keep the hammer raised, threatening the victim. You and the second co-offender attempted to access the locked cigarette cabinets. You took the hammer and struck the cigarette cabinets numerous times, while the second co-offender demanded the victim open them.
6. You and the first co-offender led Ms Aedunoothula out from behind the counter and demanded the keys to the cabinets, which she handed over. You gave the hammer back to the first co-offender and the victim remained under his control. You returned to the opened cash register and searched the area under the counter with the second co-offender.
7. When the key did not work you obtained a second key from a hook and ordered Ms Aedunoothula to assist with opening the cabinets. The second co-offender was able to open the cigarette cabinets and you both began emptying cigarettes into your plastic bag. The second co-offender also used a rubbish bin in the store to carry the cigarettes out to the car. You remained inside and continued filling the bag. The second co-offender returned with the bin and you carried the plastic bag, now full of cigarettes, to the car.
8. You returned to the store and took the hammer from the first co-offender, using it again to strike the cabinets. You dropped the hammer on the floor. You and the second co-offender continued to take cigarettes from the store.
9. You and the second co-offender attempted to rip out the second cash register, but failed. You demanded Ms Aedunoothula open a safe but she could not access it. You continued to try and unlock additional cigarette cabinets and carried more cigarettes to the car with the second co-offender.
10. You and the first co-offender demanded Ms Aedunoothula hand over her iPhone, valued at $900, and provide her password. She complied, but was scared and flustered and could not remember her password. She tried to back away from you and the first co-offender, raising her hands to protect herself.
11. The driver of the car sounded the horn and yelled at you and your co-offenders. You all ran out of the store, stealing food items on the way. You departed the scene in the vehicle you arrived in.
12. The combined value of the phone, cigarettes and food items is $23,157.
13. The incident was witnessed by two customers from outside. The victim's brother, Sharath Gongalla, attended the store to collect her as her shift finished at midnight. Ms Aedunoothula told her brother what had happened and he called the police.
14. Two police officers attended the service station at 12:20am. A hammer, four packets of tobacco, a cash register till, plastic bag and $5 notes were located and seized.
15. A crime scene officer also attended the scene. He took photographs and obtained forensic evidence, including fingerprints belonging to you, from a smashed cigarette drawer.

1. Between 1:15am and 1:40am on 13 March 2024, you and unknown co-offenders attended 49 Valley Parade, Glen Iris. The victims, Shen and He, were asleep in the house at the time.
2. You and your co-offenders entered the home through an unlocked rear window and rear door. You walked through the house and located keys to two motor vehicles on a hall table. You left the house with two vehicles: a 2014 Volkswagen Golf Hatch valued at $15,000 and a 2015 BMW X3 wagon valued at $30,000.
3. At approximately 8am, the victims awoke to find their keys and cars stolen. The back door, back window, front door and front gate were all open.
4. At 9:09am, two police officers and a crime scene officer attended the scene. Forensic evidence was obtained, including your fingerprints which were lifted from the external sash and internal frame of the rear window.

1. On 17 March 2024 at about 10am, you were found asleep in the stolen Volkswagen Golf. While waiting for back-up units, Senior Constable Sum Kung heard the car start and smashed the front driver window to stop you from driving away. Constable William Page was able to remove the key from the ignition and Kung removed you from the car. You were arrested.
2. You were found to be in possession of a driver's licence belonging to the victim He from the earlier aggravated burglary. The correct registration plates for the car were in the boot.
3. You were charged and bailed by Kung in relation to the theft of the Volkswagen Golf and possession of stolen items from the aggravated burglary. You provided the false name of Howard Riang, which was later discovered by investigators, and you were re-served with charges and bailed in the correct name.
4. Your phone was seized during your arrest and later analysed. Photographs were located on your phone, including 'selfies' of you wearing the red face covering from the earlier armed robbery. One of the 'selfies' included the caption, 'I done it with gang and I done it alone'.
5. On 12 July 2024, you attended Werribee police station where you made a 'no comment' record of interview.

1. The victims of your offending did not prepare victim impact statements. Nonetheless, where no victim impact statement is relied upon, a sentencer may draw reasonable inferences from the known circumstances regarding the likely impact of an offence upon any victim.[8]
2. The victims would have suffered considerable distress and anxiety as a result of your conduct. Ms Aedunoothula had a right to feel safe at work and the incident would have been a terrifying experience for her, particularly as she had been working late and was alone. Shen and He had a right to feel safe in their home. Although they were asleep at the time, it would have been frightening for them to wake up to find someone had been in their home and stolen their car keys.

1. Aggravated burglary and armed robbery are serious criminal offences, as indicated by their respective maximum penalties of 25 years' imprisonment, which is the highest fixed maximum penalty in the criminal calendar. Armed robbery is a Category 2 offence under the Sentencing Act if the offence was committed by the offender in company with one or more other persons, as is the case here.[9] This means, some irrelevant exceptions aside, a sentence of immediate imprisonment must be imposed on Charge 2.[10] This shows, unambiguously, how seriously the community, through the Parliament, views the conduct you have engaged in committing Charges 2 and 3.
2. These offences are often considered serious and violent, as they invariably involve a terrifying experience for the victims and threaten the wider community's sense of security.[11] In assessing the seriousness of your offending, the value, quantity or quality of the goods stolen is of less relevance than the violence, threats or fear instilled in the victims.[12]
3. In the Victorian Court of Appeal decision of Hogarth v The Queen ('Hogarth'),[13] a case involving a 'confrontational' aggravated burglary, the court said that: 'Home invasion is a particularly nasty form of criminal conduct'[14] and a particularly 'egregious form of aggravated burglary'.[15] This is especially so, it was said, where, as here, the offence is committed at night.[16]
4. I accept I am not sentencing you on Charge 3 for a 'confrontational aggravated burglary' in the Hogarth sense. Nonetheless, as I earlier observed, the invasion of Shen and He's home must have had a significant impact on them when it was discovered.
5. In DPP v Meyers ('Meyers')[17] the Victorian Court of Appeal outlined a number of relevant considerations that apply in determining the assessment of the relative seriousness of the offence of aggravated burglary. Those considerations include:[18]

(a) the offender's intent at the point of entry;

(b) the mode of entry;

(c) whether the offender was carrying a weapon;

(d) whether the offender was alone or in company;

(e) the time of day at which the burglary took place;

(f) what the offender knew or believed about who would be inside; and

(g) whether the offender was someone of whom the victim was particularly frightened beforehand.

I must also take care to ensure you are not doubly punished for offences committed after your entry into the home.

1. Your plea to the indictment acknowledges you intended, at the time of entry, both to trespass and to steal from Shen and He's home. You committed the offence with your co-offenders during the early hours of the morning, when the victims were asleep in bed. I accept entry was not forced, as you entered through an unlocked window. Moreover, there is no evidence you were carrying a weapon.
2. In relation to the armed robbery, Charge 2, I consider several common aggravating features of this kind of conduct are present in your case. You committed the offence in company, late at night[19] and while wearing a disguise.[20] You and your co-offenders were carrying a weapon and threatened to hurt Ms Adenoothula in order to procure her compliance with your demands.[21] However, I acknowledge the threats were not accompanied by actual physical violence against Ms Adenoothula.[22]
3. Considering all the circumstances, I assess your offending conduct in relation to Charge 2 to be in the mid-range for offences of this type. I assess your offending conduct in relation to Charge 3 to be an example of low mid-range offending. The Charge 1 theft is also a serious enough offence, particularly considering the significant value of the items stolen was $23,157. While Charge 4 is much less serious than the other offences, it is not trifling.
4. Clearly, denunciation, general deterrence and just punishment must be given significant weight in relation to Charges 2 and 3. Overall, I consider specific deterrence and protection of the community need be given some, albeit not great, weight.

1. You were assessed on 23 April 2025 by Jane Bidjossian, a psychologist engaged by your legal representatives. Ms Bidjossian prepared a confidential psychological report dated 5 April 2025 which was tendered at the plea hearing by your counsel.[23] I also ordered a suitability for youth justice centre order pre-sentence report dated 9 July 2025, prepared by Lou Pollard, court advice worker.[24] Both reports summarise your personal circumstances.

1. You were born in Kenya and are one of seven children, with two brothers and four sisters. One of your brothers and two of your sisters are from your father's second marriage. When you were two years old, for reasons unknown to you, your family relocated to Australia. Your father frequently travelled back to Africa to live with his other family, whom you believed he prioritised over yours and has led to ongoing feelings of neglect. Although you generally described your childhood to Ms Bidjossian as difficult, you did report having a positive relationship with all your siblings.
2. Growing up you witnessed repeated incidents of domestic violence perpetrated against your mother by your father. Your father would be cruel and demeaning towards you, including making you stand outside in the cold with the apparent intention of humiliating you in front of others. You have had no contact with your father since 2012, when he permanently relocated to Africa. To Ms Bidjossian, you described your mother as strict and controlling. You felt restricted by your upbringing and said your mother would occasionally become physically aggressive. To Ms Pollard, you indicated your relationship with your mother has improved. You described her as a 'beautiful woman' who provided for your family as best she could with limited income and spousal support.
3. Ms Pollard spoke to your mother over-the-phone to prepare her report. Your mother described you as a 'good boy' who never fought, argued or had any problems with anyone. She continues to be perplexed by your offending, using words such as 'shocked', 'heartbroken' and 'devastated'.
4. At 10 years old, you and your family experienced a period of homelessness which you attributed to financial hardship and the high cost of living. You told Ms Bidjossian you and your family were forced to sleep in their car for several months and would intermittently stay in hotels whenever your mother received Centrelink payments. This period of your childhood was incredibly stressful and traumatic. You often felt unsafe and emotionally unstable as a result of the lack of consistency and security. When you were 13, you were placed in emergency accommodation. Your family later secured government housing in Pakenham.
5. At 15 years of age, you moved in with your aunt. You told Ms Bidjossian this was because of interpersonal difficulties and ongoing conflict with your mother. Following the birth of your aunt's child, she was unable to continue looking after you and you returned to live with your mother. Ms Pollard's report outlines at the time of the offending you were residing with your mother and siblings. Ms Bidjossian's report says immediately before entering custody you were again living with your aunt.

1. You attended several different primary schools due to your family's financial hardship, but you reported your experience as being 'generally okay'. You were able to make some friends, but were bullied by others. You told Ms Bidjossian you did relatively well academically. You received support from a teacher's aide and would often stay back during recess and lunch time to catch up on school work, noting difficulties with concentrating during class.
2. You reported not enjoying high school. Although you were able to make some friends, you often kept to yourself and attributed your social withdrawal to the challenges, particularly financial, you and your family were experiencing at home. Your school occasionally assisted with the provision of books and you wore second-hand clothing. You denied being bullied during this time, but you continued to find it challenging to focus in class and, again, required support from a teacher's aide.
3. In relation to your employment history, you commenced working at McDonald's at 17 years of age. After a few months, however, you had to leave because you were unable to afford travelling to and from work whilst living in Pakenham. Ms Bidjossian writes you are interested in returning to school, following your release from custody, and have expressed a desire to study marketing, business and real estate. You echoed this interest to Ms Pollard, who discussed available certificates through Youth Justice that may benefit you.
4. At the time of the offending, you were receiving Centrelink benefits.

1. You denied to Ms Bidjossian having any significant romantic relationships to date. Your aunt is a supportive figure in your life and your maternal grandmother, who has recently relocated to Australia, is a source of support.
2. Ms Bidjossian and Ms Pollard both highlight in their reports the link between your peers and your engagement in criminal behaviour. You disclosed to Ms Pollard having attended a party at the beginning of 2024 where you met a group of older men you believed to be involved in a gang. You used drugs with this group and spoke about your financial struggles as you were unemployed at the time. The men offered you money, conveying to you that you were now indebted to them and they would harm you if you did not comply with their demands. You said to Ms Pollard you were led to believe you would repay your 'obligations' to the group if you participated in certain activities, like the present offending.
3. Ms Bidjossian opines:

Mr Meshach is likely to engage in instrumental violence when pressured or coerced by peers, as he feels the need to prove himself or fulfil obligations. This suggests his violent behaviour is driven by external motivations rather than direct violent intent.

1. According to Ms Bidjossian, your mental illness and feelings of isolation, which I will summarise shortly, may have made you more susceptible to peer coercion.

1. You have no significant medical history and reported no known family history of psychiatric disorders.
2. In your assessment with Ms Bidjossian, you denied having any formal mental health diagnoses. However, you did report experiencing a low mood intermittently and a tendency to avoid or distract yourself from past trauma you have faced during your formative years. Ms Bidjossian observed you were reserved when discussing your mental health, which may reflect ongoing discomfort or stress.
3. At 16 years of age you experienced considerable emotional distress, attributed to feeling betrayed by your peers, resulting in an attempt to stab yourself. You did not sustain any significant injury. Ms Bidjossian referred to collateral information[25] provided by Youth Justice, indicating you have openly acknowledged difficulties managing your mental health. You declined Youth Justice's assistance with a referral to mental health services at the time.
4. You denied any history of formal mental health treatment or psychiatric hospitalisations. You are not taking any medication, nor have you previously done so. At the time of the assessment, you described your mental health as 'alright'. You have experienced depressive symptoms and intrusive thoughts, but you manage these issues by attempting to keep yourself occupied. Ms Bidjossian did not observe any perceptual disturbances such as hallucinations, delusions, thought alienation or passivity experiences during the assessment. You also denied current suicidal ideation, plan or intent.
5. During the assessment, you did exhibit some signs of distractibility, such as fidgeting or difficulty maintaining focus. However, Ms Bidjossian writes your cognitive capacity is consistent with average intelligence and there is no evidence of cognitive impairment.
6. Ms Bidjossian administered the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS). DASS is a 21-item self-report questionnaire designed to measure an person's experience of symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress during the past week. Your results indicate you were experiencing extremely severe symptoms on the depression subscale, moderate symptoms on the anxiety subscale and normal on the stress subscale. Ms Bidjossian observed your reported feelings of sadness, hopelessness, and a lack of motivation consistent with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and likely compounded by your 'ongoing exposure to stressful life circumstances'.
7. You also undertook the Generalised Anxiety Disorder Assessment (GAD-7), a brief measure of symptoms of anxiety based on the GAD diagnostic criteria described in DSM-IV. You were required to evaluate your level of symptoms over the last two weeks. Ms Bidjossian recognises in her report the GAD-7 may be used as a screening tool and further evaluation is recommended when the score is 10 or greater. Your score on GAD-7 was 10, indicating moderate anxiety symptoms in the preceding fortnight. 'Moderate' for the purposes of the GAD-7 means persistent and intense symptoms which significantly interfere with daily functioning.
8. The International Trauma Questionnaire (ITQ) was also administered. The ITQ is an 18-item self-report measure that assists with the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and/or complex post-traumatic stress disorder (C-PTSD). Ms Bidjossian opines your scores are consistent with a diagnosis of C-PTSD and you also meet the prerequisite criteria for PTSD.

1. You began consuming alcohol when aged 18 years. This was primarily a way for you to cope with feelings of boredom and isolation. You would sneak out of the house to meet friends and drink alcohol, which provided you with a sense of freedom. You typically drank alcohol a couple of times a week, often involving a large quantity of spirits.
2. At approximately the same age, you began smoking cannabis. You reported daily use, mainly through 'joints' and 'bongs'. Your social circle contributed to your substance use, as your friends either stole alcohol or had cannabis readily available. You also disclosed sporadic use of non-prescribed benzodiazepine. You initially started using in an attempt to seem 'cool' and to 'fit in'. You would take one to two tablets at a time, resulting in increased agitation and aggression.
3. Ms Bidjossian administered the Drug Use Disorders Identification Test (DUDIT) and the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) during your assessment. The DUDIT measures substance use over the preceding 12-month period. The AUDIT is a 10-item screening questionnaire relating to alcohol use over the preceding 12-month period. On the DUDIT you scored 24/44, indicating drug-related problems. On the AUDIT you scored 28/32, demonstrating hazardous and high-risk alcohol consumption and dependence.
4. Ms Bidjossian assesses you as having developed:

(a) Alcohol use disorder;

(b) Sedative, hypnotic or anxiolytic use disorder; and

(c) Cannabis use disorder.

1. You reported to Ms Pollard having consumed alprazolam, Valium and cocaine on the evening leading up to the present offending. You divulged using these substances directly prior to the offending because you knew you would be unable to offend when sober.

1. You had no prior criminal history when you committed the present offences. However, you have since been dealt with for offences which you committed prior to the present offending. Your LEAP report, dated 19 May 2025, was provided to me by the prosecutor, with the consent of your counsel, after the plea hearing.[26]
2. On 10 December 2024, some nine months after the present offending, you appeared at the Melbourne Magistrates' Court in relation to charges of theft of a motor vehicle, dishonestly undertake the retention of stolen goods, unlicensed driving, stating false name and possessing cannabis. Without conviction, you were released on an adjourned undertaking for six-months. In relation to another theft of a motor vehicle charge, you were released on another adjourned undertaking, without conviction, and your driver licence was suspended for one month.
3. The next day, you appeared at the Moorabbin Magistrates' Court in relation to a charge of possessing cannabis. You were fined $250, without conviction. In relation to charges of using an unregistered motor vehicle on a highway, unlicensed driving and stating a false name, you received an aggregate fine of $1000, without conviction.
4. These findings of guilt are not prior matters because, at the time of the present offending, you had not been convicted and sentenced in respect of them. Nonetheless, I can treat them as subsequent offences.[27]
   1. While subsequent offences cannot be taken into account in the same way as prior criminal history can be, they bear upon my assessment of your character and shed light on your risk of recidivism, which is relevant to the weight I give to specific deterrence and protection of the community in sentencing you for the present offences. They are relevant also to my assessment of your prospects of rehabilitation.[28]

1. Ms Bidjossian opines your CPTSD, MDD and substance use disorders have significantly influenced your involvement in criminal behaviour. She writes:

In Mr Meshach's case, his emotional instability, exacerbated by feelings of betrayal and neglect during childhood, likely contributed to impulsive reactions, particularly in high-stress situations involving peer conflict or perceived injustice. His depression further compromised his ability to regulate emotions, increasing his vulnerability to acting out in response to negative feelings.

Mr Meshach's substance use, particularly alcohol, alprazolam and cannabis, further compounded his risk for criminal behaviour. Both substances are known to impair judgment, reduce inhibitions, and heighten aggression, all of which contribute to risky, often criminal, behaviour. Regular drinking and cannabis use likely impaired Mr Meshach's decision-making skills and increased his likelihood of engaging in illegal activities. Additionally, his intermittent use of alprazolam has been associated with increased disinhibition, leading to further risk-taking behaviour and aggression.

1. Overall, Ms Bidjossian assesses you as posing a high risk of future violence, without intervention, with a moderate risk of committing serious physical harm. This result means you require a high level of supervision and resources in order to address your risk. However, Ms Bidjossian does not consider you present with an imminent risk of reoffending owing to the absence of current violent ideation, lack of immediate stressors, and your recent period on remand, all of which have reduced your opportunities for further offending.
2. You are more likely to engage in violent behaviour when pressured by peers. Ms Bidjossian opines:

His future risk scenarios of violent reoffending would most likely occur in the context of continued association with negative peers, unresolved substance use issues, and inadequate engagement with support services, all of which may undermine his ability to comply with supervision requirements.

Mr Meshach's risk of violent reoffending can be reduced by addressing his peer associations, strengthening his engagement with support services, and developing coping strategies to manage external pressures and the need to prove himself.

1. In light of your offending conduct and high risk of future violence, I can, at best, only assess your prospects of rehabilitation as being somewhat guarded. Moreover, I must give real weight to specific deterrence and protection of the community in sentencing you.

1. I accept your pleas have been entered at a relatively early stage in the proceedings. You pleaded guilty to the present charges on 16 June 2025. Originally, the matter had been listed as an application for a sentence indication hearing, however your counsel informed the Court on 12 June 2025 that the matter had resolved. According to the outline of plea submissions filed on your on behalf dated 17 July 2025,[29] the plea offer that was eventually accepted by the prosecution had been conveyed in March 2025.
2. Your pleas of guilty have utilitarian benefit and have saved the victims the trauma of giving evidence in court. They also indicate your acceptance of responsibility for your offending conduct and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice.
3. I accept you are undoubtedly regretful for the situation in which you find yourself and the effect this has had on you. However, I must decide whether you demonstrate true contrition and remorse for your offending conduct.
4. As Winneke P observed in R v Cooper:[30]

[a] distinction must always be carefully drawn between true regret for wrongdoing and regret engendered by concern for the position in which the offender finds [himself].[31]

1. True remorse is a question of fact and is determined on the balance of probabilities.[32] An offender must satisfy the court there is 'genuine penitence and contrition and a desire to atone'.[33] In many cases the most compelling evidence of remorse comes from the offender's testimony.[34]
2. In CD v The Queen,[35] Harper JA, with whom Buchanan JA agreed, quoted his earlier observations in Phillips v The Queen,[36] where his Honour said:

[Genuine remorse] indicates realistic prospects of rehabilitation and a reduced need for specific deterrence. An offender who pleads guilty because he or she has an accurate appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or her offending, and of its impact upon its victim or victims, and who desires to do what reasonably can be done to repair the damage and to clear his or her conscience, is someone to whom mercy - in the form of a very substantial reduction in what would otherwise be an appropriate sentence - is very likely due.[37]

1. You expressed some regret for your actions to Ms Bidjossian, but you minimised your offending conduct to a degree by stating your involvement was not completely of your volition. It appears from Ms Bidjossian's report that your regret is predominantly linked to your concern regarding the punishment likely to be imposed on you as a consequence of your offending.
2. Ms Bidjossian writes:

Mr Meshach demonstrated limited insight into the factors that contributed to his offending behaviour. While he acknowledged the pressure and manipulation form peers, he expressed regret and remorse for his actions, indicating some awareness of the consequences. However, he did not appear to fully recognise the extent to which his mental health issues, substance use, and peer influence played a role in his decision-making.

1. However, your demonstrated more insight when you were speaking with Ms Pollard. You understood the violent nature of your offending conduct and acknowledged responsibility, admitting the conduct was premeditated, deliberate and planned with malice. You demonstrated to Ms Pollard a 'considerable capacity to self-reflect' and did not 'shy away' from the fact you were a main perpetrator in the commission of the offences.
2. Ms Pollard observes:

Mr Meshach demonstrated extensive victim insight and demonstrated notable accountability for his actions. Whilst Mr Meshach was articulating the effects on the victim, he was visibly uncomfortable. Mr Meshach highlighted both physical and mental consequences for his actions, emphasising the emotional trauma his actions have caused both the direct and indirect victims of his offending.

1. To Ms Pollard you identified your victims as 'innocent people that go to work every day to provide for their families' and you recognised your victims had a right to feel safe at work and in their homes. You said you felt 'sick about what [you] did to them'. When discussing indirect victims, you emphasised the effect your offending has had on your family, particularly your mother, who now is solely responsible for looking after your siblings. You said you have brought shame on your family and you wish to set a better example for your siblings in the future.
2. All things considered, I find there is evidence you are genuinely remorseful and you are developing insight into your offending conduct. While I am not bound to accept second-hand evidence of what you said during your psychological assessments,[38] I do accept your expressions of remorse are genuine and I will give them weight in sentencing you for these offences.

1. At 19 years of age - 18 at the time of the offending - you are considered a 'young offender'.[39] Accordingly, rehabilitation is a significant sentencing consideration in your case.[40]
2. The Victorian Court of Appeal in Azzopardi v The Queen ('Azzopardi'),[41] which your counsel relied on in submissions, stated:

There are a number of considerations which underlie the general primacy of an offender's youth as a sentencing consideration. Firstly, young offenders being immature are therefore 'more prone to ill-considered or rash decisions'. They 'may lack the degree of insight, judgment and self-control that is possessed by an adult'. They may not fully appreciate the nature, seriousness and consequences of their criminal conduct.

Secondly, courts 'recognise the potential for young offenders to be redeemed and rehabilitated. This potential exists because young offenders are typically still in a stage of mental and emotional development and may be more open to influences designed to positively change their behaviours than adults who have established patterns of anti-social behaviour...the effective rehabilitation of a young offender protects the community from further offending.

Thirdly, courts sentencing young offenders are cognisant that the effect of incarceration in an adult prison on a young offender will more likely impair, rather than improve, the offender's prospects of rehabilitation.[42]

1. In relation to your rehabilitation, you have displayed some insight into your offending and have used your time in custody profitably. I am told by your counsel you have undertaken mathematics, English and literacy courses and engaged in art activities. You previously worked in the kitchen and at the time of the plea hearing you were working as a unit billet, cleaning morning, midday and in the afternoon. This is your first custodial sentence and you are presently in adult jail, which is likely to have a deterrent effect.
2. All things considered, I assess your prospects of rehabilitation as being somewhat guarded. Much will depend on your ability to abstain from drug and alcohol use, and socialising with anti-social peers upon your release from custody. Your family support is a protective factor for you. Your mother indicated a willingness to support and accommodate you upon your eventual release.
3. However, the mitigatory effect of your age, while still significant, must be moderated against the seriousness and dangerousness of your offending, and the need to give significant weight to general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment.

1. Your counsel submitted the general principles adumbrated by the High Court of Australia in Bugmy v The Queen ('Bugmy')[43] are engaged in your case. The prosecutor fairly agreed.
2. In Marrah v The Queen ('Marrah'),[44] Redlich and Tate JJA affirmed the relevance of a disadvantaged background when their Honours observed:

Circumstances of deprivation, abuse and other social disadvantage occurring during an offender's formative years are more than matters of historical significance to the administration of justice. The effects of such social disadvantage do not generally diminish with the passage of time and are likely to have profound and lasting consequences. ... Though they do not provide an excuse for offending behaviour, they must be given due weight in the sentencing calculus.[45]

1. Importantly, their Honours observed that when sentencing an offender the court should not consider an 'offender's social disadvantage has the same mitigatory relevance for all of the purposes of punishment'.[46] Social disadvantage does not 'diminish the need for the sentence to vindicate the dignity of a victim and reflect the community's disapproval of the offending'.[47]
2. In Sabbatucci v The Queen,[48] the Victorian Court of Appeal explained the principles in Bugmy as follows:

Whether, and to what extent, social disadvantage warrants a reduction in moral culpability in a particular case falls to be assessed by reference to the nature and circumstances of the offence, the nature and severity of the disadvantage suffered and whether the effects of the disadvantage can be seen to be in any way explanatory of the offending.[49]

1. In DPP v Herrmann,[50] that Court further observed:

The significance of the 'general' approach enunciated in Bugmy is that the relevance of deprivation to sentencing does not depend on proof of such a nexus. ... 'the impact of disadvantage is complex, multilayered, non-linear and not easily "diagnosed" or measured'. The High Court's recognition that serious childhood deprivation is likely to make an offender less morally culpable than 'an offender whose formative years were not marred in that way' reflects the principle of equal justice.[51]

1. In applying Bugmy principles in this case I do not need to find the disadvantage you suffered as a child was 'profound'. In Sabbatucci, the Court also said the sentencer must evaluate whether the disadvantage warrants the offender being viewed as 'less morally blameworthy' than someone who commits the same offence but does not have the same disadvantaged or deprived background.[52] Coming to this conclusion does not depend on the Court being satisfied the circumstances establish 'profound disadvantage' or 'profound deprivation' because in every case 'it will be a question of fact and degree'.[53]
2. Your self-report to Ms Bidjossian and your counsel's submissions illustrate your childhood was marred by domestic violence, hardship and trauma. Your counsel did not seek to argue a causal link between your socially disadvantaged background and the offending. However, I acknowledge the difficulties you and your family faced when you were a child has led to you developing a number of mental health conditions and maladaptive coping mechanisms, and may have contributed to the circumstances surrounding your offending, such as 'getting in' with the wrong crowd and becoming involved with drugs and alcohol. Moreover, your childhood deprivation, being somewhat causative of the present offending, means the level of your moral culpability is somewhat reduced, albeit it remains relatively high.
3. These personal factors require me to moderate the weight I would otherwise have given to general deterrence, denunciation, and the punitive aspects of the sentences I impose on you. However, as the prosecutor submitted, these complex factors simultaneously increase the weight I must give to specific deterrence and protection of the community in sentencing you.

1. Your counsel submitted Verdins principles 5 and 6 are engaged in your case[54] and primarily relied on paragraphs 139 and 140 of Ms Bidjossian's report to support the submission. The prosecutor accepted Verdins principle 5 is engaged, but submitted there is insufficient evidence for Verdins principle 6 to be engaged.
2. It appears when Ms Bidjossian referred to Verdins principle 5 in her report, she was in fact addressing the factors relevant to principle 6, and vice versa. In relation to the disproportionate burden incarceration would have on your pre-existing mental health conditions (presumedly Verdins principle 5), Ms Bidjossian opines:

[T]here is evidence of longstanding emotional and psychological difficulties stemming from early trauma, disrupted attachment relationships, and persistent low mood. He has demonstrated avoidant coping strategies and limited help-seeking behaviour, which, when combined with the isolating and rigid environment of custody, may compound his emotional distress. As such, continued incarceration is likely to have a greater psychological impact on Mr Meshach compared to individuals without such vulnerabilities.

1. In relation to the significant risk imprisonment may have on your mental health (presumedly Verdins principle 6), Ms Bidjossian opines:

[H]e presents with features consistent with complex trauma, emotional dysregulation, and low mood. He has historically struggled to cope with stress and has limited engagement with support services. Notably, he reported using substances and social contact as ways to avoid distressing thoughts, and has shown signs of avoidance when discussing traumatic material. These factors suggest that continued incarceration may heighten his psychological distress, reduce his capacity to cope, and increase his vulnerability to further mental health deterioration.

1. I accept Verdins principle 5 is engaged in your case. Given you suffer from MDD and C-PTSD, it is likely the sentences I impose will weigh more heavily on you to some extent than they would on a prisoner in normal health. However, the extent to which the problems will arise, and their severity if they do, is unclear.
2. However, I will give very little weight to Verdins principle 6 in your case. That principle requires there be 'a serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on the offender's mental health' for this consideration 'to mitigate punishment'.[55] Although I recognise you have been in adult custody since 10 February 2025, which may be burdensome on you given your age, you seem to be making the most of your situation. Apparently, you are in regular telephone contact with your mother, sister and aunt, together with Zoom calls and monthly contact visits.[56] There is little evidence regarding the significant adverse effect imprisonment has had on your mental health.

1. I have had regard to current sentencing practice in relation to this offence as informed by the decisions of the High Court of Australia in R v Kilic[57] and DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym)[58] and the Victorian Court of Appeal decisions in DPP v Zhuang[59] and DPP (Cth) v Thomas.[60]
2. While current sentencing practice is relevant to the sentence I impose on you, it is only one of a number of sentencing considerations I must take into account in imposing a just sentence in your case.[61]
3. Moreover, it is difficult to gauge more than a general yardstick from so-called 'comparable cases', given the wide range of offending conduct that can constitute these offences and the myriad of personal circumstances pertaining to individual offenders. Nonetheless, to the extent I have been able to gain assistance from comparable cases, I have sought to do so in your case.
4. As I noted earlier, armed robbery is a 'Category 2' offence as defined in the Sentencing Act, if the offence was committed by the offender in the company of one or more persons, as is the case here.[62] Accordingly, a court must impose a sentence of imprisonment to be immediately served or detention in a YJC unless the exceptions specified in s 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act apply. Your counsel did not submit any of the exceptions apply in your case.
5. The basic purposes for which a court may impose a sentence are just punishment, denunciation, deterrence, both specific and general, protection of the community and rehabilitation. In sentencing you, I must have regard to a range of factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, your culpability for it, the effect of your offence on the victim and your personal circumstances.
6. In sentencing you for these crimes I am required to balance the interests of the community in denouncing your criminal conduct with the interests of the community in seeking to ensure that, so far as possible, you are rehabilitated and reintegrated into society, particular given youth youthfulness.
7. A young offender, such as yourself, is not to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an adult prison if such a disposition can be avoided.[63] Your counsel submitted I should sentence you to a period of detention in a YJC.[64] I can only make such an order if, after having received a pre-sentence report, I am of the opinion you have reasonable prospects of rehabilitation and there is a likelihood of you being subjected to undesirable influences in adult prison.[65]
8. Ms Pollard assessed you as suitable for a YJC order. As I have stated, I consider your prospects of rehabilitation as being somewhat guarded. Your prospects are likely to improve if you engage in opportunities available to you in a YJC and if you are separated from experienced adult offenders who might increase your criminal knowledge and possibility of reoffending.[66]
9. Accordingly, I imposed the sentences and made the other orders set out at the start of these reasons.

[1] Contrary to s 74(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 ('CA').

[8] See R v Miller [1995] VicRp 60; [1995] 2 VR 348, 354 (Southwell, Ormiston and McDonald JJ); R v Lomax [1998] 1 VR 551, 559-560 (Ormiston JA, Winneke P and Hedigan AJA agreeing); R v Rankin [2001] VSCA 158 [10] (Winneke P, Vincent JA and O'Bryan AJA agreeing); MA v The Queen [2012] VSCA 214 [83] (Neave JA, Bongiorno JA and Whelan AJA agreeing).

[9] Sentencing Act 1991 ('Sentencing Act') s 3 definition of 'category 2 offence' (da)(iii).

[11] See DPP (Vic) v Stevens [2013] VSCA 187, [31]; Comensoli v The Queen [2020] VSCA 2, [20] (Maxwell P and Whelan JA); R v Williscroft [1975] VicRp 27; [1975] VR 292, 301 (Adam and Crockett JJ, Starke J dissenting).

[12] DPP (Vic) v Crow [2003] VSCA 104, [13] (Winneke P, Callaway and Buchanan JJA agreeing).

[13] [2012] VSCA 302; (2012) 37 VR 658 ('Hogarth').

[14] Ibid 659 [1] (Maxwell P, Neave JA and Coghlan AJA).

[16] DPP v Brown [2004] VSCA 133; (2004) 10 VR 328, 336 [43] (Vincent JA) cited in Hogarth 667 [34].

[17] [2014] VSCA 314; (2014) 44 VR 486 ('Meyers').

[18] Ibid 498 [47]-[49] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Osborne JJA).

[19] Meyers 498 [48] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Osborn JJA).

[20] Walker v The Queen [2019] VSCA 137, [63] (Whelan, Kyrou and Kaye JJA); Balshaw v The Queen [2021] VSCA 78, [48]-[49] (Kaye and T Forrest JJA); Schaeffer v The Queen [2021] VSCA 171, [33] (Priest, Kaye and T Forrest JJA).

[21] DPP v Wol [2019] VSCA 268, [59] (Kyrou, Kaye and T Forrest JJA); Dean v The Queen [2020] VSCA 100, [86] (Beach, Kaye and Weinberg JJA); Shok v The Queen [2020] VSCA 294, [38] (Maxwell P and Niall JA).

[22] Cf Murrell v The Queen [2014] VSCA 337, [64] (Priest JA, Maxwell P and Redlich JA agreeing); Bidong v The Queen [2022] VSCA 33, [37] (Maxwell P and Kennedy JA).

[25] Youth Justice Bail Service Report of Kesniel Setefano, Youth Justice Case Manager at Department of Justice and Community Safety, dated 18 February 2025 cited in EX D2.

[27] See R v Phillips [1962] VicRp 6; [1962] VR 55 (Sholl J). Cf R v Wilson [1955] VicLawRp 85; (1956) VLR 199 (Gavin Duffy and Dean JJ, Lowe J diss). See also DPP (Tas) v Broadby [2010] TASCCA 13; (2010) 20 Tas R 399, 407 [19] (Evans J, Porter and Wood JJ agreeing).

1. [28] See R v Rumpf [1998] VR 466, 475 (McGarvie J, Young CJ and Murray J agreeing); Alexandros v Birchell [2000] VSC 306; (2000) 31 MVR 307, 310-11 [15], [18] (Smith J); DPP v Rongonui [2007] VSCA 274; (2007) 17 VR 571, 580 [37] (Maxwell P); Bellizia v R [2016] VSCA 21 [75], [77-78] (Santamaria JA); R v Pham [2003] VSCA 207 [12] (Vincent JA, Winneke P and Eames JA agreeing); Wilson v The Queen [2022] VSCA 2 [20] (Priest and Niall JJA).

[30] [1998] VSCA 39; (1998) 103 A Crim R 51 ('Cooper').

[31] Cooper 55 (Tadgell JA agreeing). See also Raptis v The Queen (1988) 36 A Crim R 362, 366 (Young CJ , O'Bryan & Tadgell JJ).

[32] Cooper 55; R v Gillick [2000] VSCA 127 [20] (Callaway JA, Chernov JA agreeing) .

[33] Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288; (2012) 226 A Crim R 354, 365 [38] (Maxwell P, Harper JA and T Forrest AJA) ('Barbaro').

[34] Barbaro 365-66 [38], [40]; Bonacci v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 194, 202 [44] (Neave, Mandie and Harper JJA).

[35] [2013] VSCA 95 [36].

[36] [2012] VSCA 140; (2012) 37 VR 594.

[39] Sentencing Act s 3 definition of 'young offender'.

[40] See R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235 ('Mills').

[41] [2011] VSCA 372; (2011) 35 VR 43 ('Azzopardi').

[42] Ibid 53-54 [34]-[36] (citations omitted) (Redlich JA, Coghlan and Macaulay AJJA agreeing).

[44] [2014] VSCA 119 ('Marrah').

[45] Marrah [16] (Redlich and Tate JJA) citing Bugmy 586-89 [24] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

[48] [2021] VSCA 340 ('Sabbatucci').

[49] Ibid [6] (Maxwell P and Emerton JA). See also Newton (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 22 [36]-[38] (Beach and Macaulay JJA).

[50] [2021] VSCA 160.

[51] Ibid [45] (Maxwell P, Kaye, Niall, T Forrest and Emerton JJA). See also Jawahiri v The Queen [2021] VSCA 287 [73(s)] (Priest and T Forrest JJA).

[54] See R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA) ('Verdins').

[55] Verdins 276 [32(6)] (emphasis added).

[57] [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256, 266-268 [21]-[25] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

[58] [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 444-447 [47]-[58] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 452-455 [78]- [85] (Gageler and Gordon JJ).

[59] [2015] VSCA 96; (2015) 250 A Crim R 282, 292 [30]-[31] (Redlich, Priest and Beach JJA).

[60] [2016] VSCA 237; (2016) 53 VR 546, 606-609 [173]- 183] (Redlich, Santamaria and McLeish JJA). See also Williams (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 35 [21]-[25] (Priest and Kyrou JJA); Russo v The Queen [2021] VSCA 244 [53]- [56] (Emerton JA, Priest JA agreeing).

[61] See DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428.

[62] Sentencing Act s 3 definition of 'category 2 offence' (da)(iii).

[63] Mills 241 (Batt JA, Phillips CJ and Charles JA agreeing). See also SA s 5(4).

[66] See, eg, R v Wright [1999] VSCA 145; [1999] 3 VR 355, 264-5 [39]-[41]; DPP (Vic) v REE [2002] VSCA 65, [21]; R v PP [2003] VSCA 100; (2003) 142 A Crim R 369, 374 [9]; DPP (Vic) v Bridle [2007] VSCA 173, [10] Moresco v The Queen [2018] VSCA 336, [50]-[51].