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1. Matthew Meekin (the applicant) has pleaded guilty to two series of offences involving drug trafficking, aggravated dangerous driving and dealing with proceeds of crime. His sentence proceedings are currently listed for hearing on 15 September 2026.

2. Whilst awaiting sentence, the applicant made an application for bail pursuant to s 20B of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT). As the applicant committed the second series of offences whilst he was subject to bail undertakings relating to the first series of offences, he must demonstrate that there are special or exceptional circumstances that warrant a grant of bail: s 9D of the Bail Act.

3. It has been held that an ongoing contravention of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) with respect to a detainee may constitute special or exceptional circumstances under s 9D of the Bail Act: DPP v Alexander (a pseudonym) [2024] ACTSC 161; 387 FLR 226. The applicant alleges that he has been subject to two breaches of the Human Rights Act whilst he has been held on remand. First, the applicant contended that his treatment by ACT Corrective Services following an earlier allegation of a human rights breach contravened s 19(1) of the Human Rights Act, which requires that detained persons be treated with humanity and with respect for their inherent dignity and/or s 10 of the Human Rights Act, which provides that no one should be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. Second, the applicant contended that Corrective Services has refused him access to paid newspaper subscriptions, including the Canberra Times. He contended that this refusal contravenes s 16(1) of the Human Rights Act, which provides that “everyone has the right to freedom of expression”, including the right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of borders, whether orally, in writing or in print, by way of art, or in another way chosen by them”.

4. The applicant also alleged that special or exceptional circumstances are established because he is not receiving adequate medical treatment in custody. He did not contend that this matter raised an issue under the Human Rights Act.

5. The applicant submitted that, considered together, these three matters constitute special or exceptional circumstances under s 9D of the Bail Act.

6. The applicant’s contentions raise some important questions of construction of the Human Rights Act. It has ultimately not been necessary for me to determine the questions of construction raised by the applicant’s submissions. For the reasons outlined below, the applicant has not established the factual basis upon which the alleged contraventions depend, nor has he demonstrated that he is not receiving adequate medical treatment. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that special or exceptional circumstances exist for the grant of bail. It follows that the applicant’s bail application must be refused.

Background

Offences

7. The applicant has pleaded guilty to two separate series of charges. The first series relates to offences committed on 30 March 2025 (the series one offences). The second series relates to offences committed between 20 June 2025 and 22 August 2025 (the series two offences).

8. The series one offences are as follows: (i) Trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis contrary to s 603(7) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (17.839g of methylamphetamine); (ii) Deal with proceeds of crime contrary to s 114C of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ($13,530.00); (iii) Trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis contrary to s 603(7) of the Criminal Code (138.580 grams of heroin); (iv) Trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis contrary to s 603(7) of the Criminal Code (0.218 g of LSD); and (v) First offender aggravated dangerous drive contrary to s 7(1) and by virtue of s 7A of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT).

9. The applicant was charged with the series one offences on 30 March 2025. The applicant was granted bail with respect to those charges by a Magistrate the following day.

10. The series two offences are as follows: (i) Trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis contrary to s 603(7) of the Criminal Code (33.985 grams of methylamphetamine); (ii) Trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis contrary to s 603(7) of the Criminal Code (8.789 grams of cocaine); and (iii) Trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis contrary to s 603(7) of the Criminal Code (19.745 grams of heroin).

11. On 22 August 2025, the applicant was arrested and detained in custody with respect to the series two offences. The applicant has remained in custody since that time.

12. The applicant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to the series one offences on 15 December 2025. The applicant pleaded guilty in this Court to the series two offences on 15 April 2026.

Procedural history

13. On 27 May 2026, the applicant made an application for bail pursuant to s 20B of the Bail Act.

14. On 2 June 2026, the bail application was first heard in this Court. The applicant was unrepresented on that occasion. The applicant indicated that one of the grounds upon which bail was sought concerned the adequacy of the medical treatment that he was being provided with in custody. The prosecutor sought a brief adjournment so as to enable the prosecution to obtain the applicant’s custodial health records. I acceded to the application and adjourned the bail application to 5 June 2026.

15. At the further hearing on 5 June 2026, the applicant remained unrepresented. The applicant submitted that he should be granted bail because his period of remand was likely to exceed any sentence imposed for the offending and because he was unable to obtain access to appropriate medical treatment in custody. He submitted that the combination of these two matters constituted special or exceptional circumstances under s 9D of the Bail Act. The applicant also indicated that he wished to further submit that his conditions of custody contravened s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act, because the cottage in which he was housed contained both sentenced and unsentenced prisoners.

16. After hearing from both parties, I delivered a short ex tempore judgment in which I held that I was not satisfied that that the applicant was likely to receive a sentence of less than the period he will spend in remand, and that I was also not satisfied that the health conditions raised by the applicant were such as to rise to special or exceptional circumstances. In relation to the applicant’s human rights submission, I directed the prosecutor to issue a s 34 notice to the Attorney-General and to the Human Rights Commissioner advising of the applicant’s human rights contentions. I then adjourned the application to enable that notice to be issued and responded to.

17. A s 34 notice was issued by the prosecution in accordance with this direction on 9 June 2026. That notice stated that it was understood that the applicant contended that he was housed in contravention of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act. On 17 June 2026, the Attorney-General advised the prosecution that she did not wish to intervene in the proceedings.

18. At the hearing of the bail application on 22 June 2026, the applicant was again self-represented. Ms Reiner Gould appeared for the Human Rights Commissioner. She informed the Court that the Commissioner did not seek leave to intervene in the proceedings at that time.

19. The prosecutor then called Ms Lucy Summers, the Director of Litigation at Corrective Services. Ms Summers gave evidence that she had directed that the applicant be moved from a cottage to the cell block (SU2). She explained that this direction was made in response to the applicant’s complaint as made in the bail application that he was intermingling with sentenced prisoners. Ms Summers was also cross-examined by the applicant. In cross-examination, Ms Summers explained that she did not consider that the applicant could maintain the position that residing in a cottage was a breach of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act but also maintain that he wished to remain in the cottage.

20. At the conclusion of Ms Summers’ evidence, the applicant indicated that, in addition to the alleged breach of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act, he contended that he had also been subjected to breaches of ss 16, 17 and 27A of that Act. The applicant explained that he had been seeking a newspaper subscription for some months. He submitted that the failure of Corrective Services to obtain a newspaper subscription for him constituted a breach of ss 16 and 17 the Human Rights Act. He also submitted that he did not have sufficient access to further educational, vocational and continuing training in contravention of s 27A of the Human Rights Act.

21. I informed the applicant that the existing s 34 notice did not extend to these additional human rights allegations I explained that if the applicant wished to rely on the additional matters in the present application, a fresh s 34 notice would need to be issued.

22. I asked the applicant whether he would prefer that I rule on his existing contentions, or whether he wished to seek an adjournment so as to enable a fresh s 34 notice to be issued, so that I could also consider his additional human rights allegations. I informed the applicant that the prosecutor had confirmed that the applicant would be permitted to make a second application for bail, relying on the additional human rights allegations, in the event that he was not successful in his application for bail on the basis of the existing allegations.

23. Mr Pappas of counsel was present in Court for an unrelated trial at this time. After receiving pro bono advice from Mr Pappas, the applicant sought an adjournment to enable him to adduce evidence concerning the additional human rights contentions. I acceded to this application, and adjourned the proceedings to 22 July 2026.

24. Subsequent to the hearing of the application on 22 June 2026, the applicant obtained the benefit of pro bono representation, from Dr Healey, solicitor, and Ms Andersen- Cooke, of counsel.

25. On 21 July 2026, Dr Healey filed a s 34 Notice of Human Rights Matter on behalf of the applicant. That notice advised the Human Rights Commissioner and the Attorney- General that the applicant contended that ss 10(1), 16(2), 19(1) and 40B had application in the proceeding. The notice further stated that the applicant sought a declaration of incompatibility, namely, that s 9D of the Bail Act (which, as noted above, creates a presumption against bail for repeat offenders) is not compatible with s 18(5) of the Human Rights Act (which provides that a person who is awaiting trial must not be detained in custody as a general rule).

26. The bail application was next listed for hearing on 22 July 2026. On that occasion, the applicant was represented by Ms Andersen-Cooke, instructed by Dr Healey, both of whom continued to assist the applicant on a pro bono basis. The Human Rights Commissioner was again represented by Ms Reiner Gould. There was no appearance for the Attorney-General.

27. At the outset of the proceedings, Ms Reiner Gould informed the Court that the Human Rights Commissioner did not wish to be heard on the human rights issues that were relevant to the determination of the applicant’s bail application, but that the Commissioner did wish to be heard on the application for a declaration of incompatibility. Ms Reiner Gould informed the Court that she understood that it was likely that the Attorney-General would also wish to be heard on that application.

28. Each of the parties, including the Human Rights Commissioner, agreed that the bail application could be determined separately from the application for a declaration of incompatibility. After hearing the evidence and submissions on behalf of the prosecution and the applicant, I agreed that this course was appropriate. In particular, noting that any declaration of incompatibility does not affect the validity, operation or enforcement of the law or anyone’s rights or obligations (s 32 of the Human Rights Act), I was satisfied that the question of incompatibility could have no bearing on the outcome of the bail application. In those circumstances, I gave leave to the Human Rights Commissioner to appear on the application for a declaration of incompatibility, and then adjourned that aspect of the proceeding to be heard on a date to be fixed by the Registrar.

29. At the hearing on 22 July 2026, an affidavit of Dr Healey was read on behalf of the applicant. That affidavit exhibited various documents concerning the procedural history of the matter as well as documents relating to the applicant’s accommodation whilst in custody, his access to newspaper subscriptions and the treatment of his medical condition whilst in custody. In reply, the prosecution called further oral evidence from Ms Summers concerning the appellant’s conditions of custody and access to newspapers. The evidence adduced on behalf of the applicant and the prosecution at this hearing is discussed below in connection with each of the applicant’s claims.

Determination

Overview

30. As noted above, ultimately, the appellant relied on three separate grounds to establish that special or exceptional circumstances exist for the grant of bail: (a) first that the decision of Corrective Services to move the applicant out of cottage accommodation and into a cell block and the manner in which this was carried out constituted a breach of ss 10 and/or 19(1) of the Human Rights Act; (b) second that the applicant’s lack of access to newspapers, including the Canberra Times, whilst in custody constituted a breach of s 16 of the Human Rights Act, and (c) third, that special or exceptional circumstances are established by reason of the unavailability of appropriate medication for the applicant’s medical condition. The applicant submits that these matters, considered individually and cumulatively, are such as to demonstrate special or exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 9D of the Bail Act.

31. Each of these allegations are addressed below.

Right to be treated with respect and dignity Evidence in support of the applicant’s claim

32. The applicant has been held on remand at the Alexander Maconochie Centre (AMC) for drug-related charges and an aggravated dangerous driving charge since 22 August 2025.

33. On or around 22 October 2025, the applicant was accepted into the Solaris Therapeutic Community residential program (Solaris Program) for detainees with drug dependency issues. In order to be able to complete the Solaris Program, the applicant was moved to the SCC East accommodation for the duration of that program.

34. Prior to moving to the SCC East accommodation, the applicant was informed that he may have contact with or share sleeping quarters with convicted detainees. The applicant was provided with a statement of reasons from a delegate of the Director- General which stated that the delegate was satisfied that the placement within the residential rehabilitation program outweighed any negative impact on the applicant caused by being accommodated with convicted detainees. A direction was accordingly made under s 44(4) of the Corrections Management Act 2007 (ACT), permitting the applicant to not be accommodated separately from convicted detainees.

35. On 18 February 2026, upon successful completion of the Solaris Program, the applicant was approved to reside in cottage accommodation within the AMC. He was then moved to Sentenced Cottage 3 (SC3). That cottage consisted of a number of self-contained “pods”. The applicant’s pod had the following features: (a) five bedrooms, which were shared between 5 to 7 detainees; (b) a shared kitchen, including cooking facilities, with the freedom to order groceries each week and for the inmates to cook their own meals in the kitchen; (c) a lounge area with a television and a computer, accessible to residents of the cottage without time restriction; (d) access to a balcony; (e) a bathroom; (f) a laundry; and (g) access to a football field sized outdoor reserve area adjoining a number of cottages.

36. The pod in which the applicant was housed contained only remand prisoners. However, other pods within SC3 contained sentenced prisoners. As a result, the applicant would at times “intermingle” with sentenced prisoners. In particular, the applicant would come into contact with sentenced prisoners when he accessed the outdoor reserve area, or when he travelled through common areas of the prison, for example, to attend medical or legal appointments.

37. As noted above, on 2 June 2026, the applicant appeared at his bail hearing unrepresented. On 4 June 2026, Corrective Services asked the applicant about his concerns relating to the cottage. The applicant was informed that if he felt uncomfortable, he could be relocated to the cell block, where only remand detainees are housed. The applicant responded that there were no concerns with his current accommodation in SC3. He told the Corrections Officer words to the effect of “there is no problem, I’m happy in the cottage, it’s just something I noticed”.

38. The applicant’s bail application was again listed on 5 June 2026. The applicant remained unrepresented at this listing. The applicant confirmed that he pressed his contention that he was housed in breach of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act, but also indicated that the cell block would be a “downgrade” compared to the conditions where he was residing in SC3. He stated that he did not want to move to the cell block.

39. Immediately following the applicant’s bail hearing, the prosecution sent an email to Ms Summers, which advised her that the applicant pressed his contention that he was housed in breach of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act. Upon receipt of that information, Ms Summers sent an email to the AMC operations managers, which stated as follows: HI all Can Mr Meekin please be moved to a remand accommodation unit? Please let me know if there are any issues. (As per the original.)

40. Later that afternoon, the applicant returned to the AMC from Court. Upon his arrival, the applicant was directed to move from SC3 to SU2. The applicant requested an explanation as to why he was being moved. The officer who had given the applicant the direction to move attempted to contact a person through radio to understand the reason why the applicant was being moved. The officer was unable to obtain further clarity except that “litigation” had made the direction. The applicant told the officer that he wanted to speak to a person about the decision to move him. No reasons were given. Instead, the squad team arrived and threatened the applicant with pepper spray. The applicant was then handcuffed and moved to SU2.

41. The applicant was not offered an opportunity to pack up his belongings prior to being moved. Upon his arrival at SU2, the applicant was not provided dinner or a change of clothes. There was no bedding in the applicant’s cell, nor any toiletries or hygiene goods, nor was there a towel for the applicant to use.

42. Since 5 June 2025, the applicant has resided in the cell block in SU2. This accommodation has the following features: (i) approximately 34 to 38 detainees sharing 20 cells, most cell accommodation is shared; (ii) detainees are locked in their cell overnight and can be locked in for long periods during the day if the AMC is short staffed or responding to an incident; (iii) access to common areas is limited to around six hours per day; (iv) there is only one computer which is shared amongst the 34 to 38 of detainees; and (v) cells do not have kitchens, laundries or private bathrooms.

43. As is clear from the above, the cell block affords considerably less freedoms and facilities for detainees and is generally more restrictive in comparison with the cottage accommodation.

Findings

44. When the applicant first appeared on the bail application, his contention was that the “intermingling” that occurs between sentenced and remand prisoners in the cottages in the AMC constituted a breach of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act, which requires that persons accused of offences must be segregated from convicted people, except in exceptional circumstances.

45. With the benefit of legal advice, the applicant no longer presses that contention. This was a proper concession. As counsel for the applicant acknowledged, the requirement for segregation in s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act does not require that remand prisoners never come into any contact with sentenced prisoners. There is only one prison in the Australian Capital Territory. In that context, complete segregation is not, and has never been, possible. The drafters of the Human Rights Act cannot have intended that compliance with s 19(2) would require the construction of a new prison only for detainees on remand.

46. There will, of course, be questions of degree. At one end of the spectrum is a remand prisoner who is required to share a cell with a sentenced inmate. As Mossop J held in Alexander at [48], subject to any finding that the individual circumstances requiring that arrangement are exceptional, this will constitute a breach of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act. At the other end of the spectrum is a remand detainee who is housed only with remand detainees, but who may pass a sentenced prisoner when accessing other parts of the correctional facility, for example on their way to legal or medical appointments. Such contact does not amount to a breach of s 19(2). In between these extremes is a situation where a prisoner shares a cell only with a remand prisoner, but is required to eat, socialise and exercise with sentenced prisoners. Whether those conditions satisfy the requirement in s 19(2) for segregation may be doubted.

47. In the present case, the applicant was housed in a pod in which he slept, had meals, socialised, undertook education and had access to fresh air (by accessing the pod balcony) with only detainees on remand. In my view, this does not constitute a breach of s 19(2). The applicant’s only contact with sentenced prisoners was passing such persons when moving to other parts of the AMC, or when accessing the outdoor reserve. In those circumstances, it was correctly conceded on behalf of the appellant that there was no continuing breach of s 19(2). This was particularly so in circumstances where the applicant had requested to be housed in the cottage, where he knew that he would have occasional contact with sentenced prisoners.

48. The contention that is now pressed on behalf of the applicant concerns the action that was taken by Corrective Services after the applicant raised the complaint concerning the segregation requirement in s 19(2). Specifically, the applicant complained that the decision of Corrective Services to move him from the cottage to a cell following his complaint breached s 19(1) of the Human Rights Act, which states that “anyone deprived of liberty must be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”.

49. From the perspective of the applicant, the concern is obvious. Immediately after confirming to this Court that he continued to allege that his human rights had been breached, the applicant was moved from his then existing accommodation, which afforded him significant privileges, to a cell block, which afforded him significantly less privileges. He was not given the opportunity to pack up his belongings before being moved. He was provided with no dinner, no bed linen, no toiletries and no towel for a shower. When he requested an explanation for why he was being moved, he was threatened with the use of pepper spray. He was not told the reason for his move. It is understandable that, in these circumstances, the applicant formed the belief that he had been punished for making a human rights complaint.

50. However, as Ms Summers explained in her evidence, the position that confronted Corrective Services was not straightforward. The applicant had made a clear complaint that his human rights were being contravened as a result of the way that he was accommodated in the AMC. Although Ms Summers was personally of the view that the applicant’s complaint was unfounded, she considered that there was a risk that this Court would not agree. So as both to mitigate the risk of an adverse finding against Corrective Services, and to ensure that there was no continuing breach of the applicant’s human rights, Ms Summers directed that the applicant be moved to an area of the prison in which it could be guaranteed that the applicant’s contact with sentenced prisoners would be kept to an absolute minimum.

51. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that Ms Summers was not a credible witness, and, in particular, that there were aspects of Ms Summers’ evidence which were exaggerated. I do not accept this submission. Ms Summers gave evidence before me on two separate occasions. Her answers were clear and consistent on both occasions. Ms Summers made reasonable concessions, both when cross-examined by counsel and when cross-examined by the applicant in person. Ms Summers impressed me as an officer who was doing her best to resolve a situation that did not admit of an easy answer.

52. There is no provision of the Human Rights Act which expressly prohibits a public authority from acting in retaliation for, or from acting with an intention to dissuade a person from, raising a human rights complaint. The applicant referred to r 57(2) of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) which provides that a prisoner “must not be exposed to any risk of retaliation, intimidation or other negative consequences as a result of having submitted a request or complaint”. The applicant submitted that because s 31 of the Human Rights Act provides that “international law, and the judgments of foreign and international courts and tribunals, relevant to a human right may be considered in interpreting the human right”, it follows that freedom from reprisal is “an incident of the humane and dignified treatment that s 19(1) of the [Human Rights Act] guarantees”. In this respect, the applicant also referred to the decision of McWilliam J in Hubzin v The Commissioner for Social Housing [2026] ACTSC 11; 400 FLR 254 at [82], which held, citing Certain Children (by their Litigation Guardian Sister Marie Brigid Arthur) v Minister for Families and Children [2016] VSC 796; 51 VR 473 at [143], that the rights contained in the Human Rights Act should each be construed in “the broadest possible way”.

53. In other words, as I understood the applicant’s contention, it was that the ability of a detainee to raise a human rights complaint against a public authority is an essential attribute of the “humanity and inherent dignity of the human person” which s 19(1) of the Human Rights Act protects. It is not necessary to determine whether the applicant’s construction of s 19(1) should be accepted in the present case, because the factual premise of the applicant’s contention is not made out.

54. I do not accept that the decision of Corrective Services to move the applicant was motivated out of retaliation for raising a human rights concern or to discourage other inmates from making such complaints. I accept Ms Summers’ evidence that her intention in directing that the applicant be moved from the cottage to the cell was solely to ensure that there was no continuing breach of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act. Although Ms Summers personally considered that the applicant’s human rights contentions were unfounded, it was reasonable for her to take a conservative approach, and to take action to ensure that there was no continuation of any human rights breach alleged.

55. It was contended on behalf of the applicant that “it is not the applicant’s burden to cure human rights deficiencies at the AMC”. This may be accepted. However, it is also not for the applicant to determine the way in which an alleged human rights contravention should be remedied. The right conferred by s 19(1) for detainees to be “treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person” does not confer upon a detainee a right to be housed in any particular part of the AMC. It was open to Corrective Services to determine that the alleged breach should be addressed by moving the applicant to a cell where there could be certainty that there would be no ongoing breach of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act.

56. The applicant also complained about the failure of Corrective Services to consult with him prior to making a decision to move him from the cottage. As I understood the submission, this contention was both an aspect of the applicant’s primary submission (that is, the decision to move him was made in retaliation for his having raised a human rights concern), and the basis of a separate contention that his human rights had been contravened by the failure to consult him prior to the move.

57. As to the former, I have considered Corrective Services’ interactions with the applicant in reaching my conclusion that the decision to move the applicant was not motivated by retaliation. In this respect, it is significant to note that the applicant had already been consulted by Corrective Services about the level of his contact with sentenced prisoners. He told Corrective Services that he was happy with his accommodation, but that he had “noticed” that he had some contact with sentenced prisoners, in apparent breach of the Human Rights Act. The applicant continued to maintain both propositions when he appeared on the bail application on 5 June 2026. Accordingly, the applicant’s position had been made clear to Corrective Services at the time that the decision to move him was made: whilst he was happy with his accommodation and did not wish to move, he also wished to rely on his ongoing contact with sentenced prisoners to form the basis of a finding that special or exceptional circumstances were established under s 9D of the Bail Act. The fact that Ms Summers did not return to the applicant to seek confirmation of that position does not support the applicant’s contention that her decision was made out of retaliation for the applicant having raised a human rights concern.

58. Similarly, the swiftness of Ms Summers’ decision to direct that the applicant should be moved does not support the applicant’s contention that the decision was made for retaliatory reasons. At the time that Ms Summers received advice from the prosecution that the applicant was pressing his human rights contentions, she was already well aware of the issues at play. In those circumstances, she was in a position to make a decision without lengthy deliberation.

59. The applicant’s contention that the failure of Corrective Services to consult with him prior to making a decision concerning his accommodation gave rise to a separate breach of the Human Rights Act must also be rejected.

60. Section 40B(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act states that it is unlawful for a public authority, in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right. The construction of this provision was the subject of extensive consideration by McWilliam J in Williams v Director-General of the Justice and Community Safety Directorate [2025] ACTSC 396; 397 FLR 280 at [161]-[187]. Importantly, as McWilliam J held in Hubzin at [64], the requirement that a public authority give “proper” consideration to a relevant human right: … simply means consideration that is ‘proper’ for the decision being made. That qualification recognises that there are a multitude of decisions being made by public authorities in the Territory every day, with varying degrees of impact on human rights. What may be proper in one statutory decision-making context may not be proper in another. The assessment is fact dependant and there is no test for assessing whether ‘proper’ consideration was given. The court simply examines the consideration that was given (if any) to the relevant human rights said to have been engaged in any particular case and determines whether it was proper. That involves an assessment of whether the consideration given to relevant human rights was one of substance, rather than tokenistic, with such an assessment informed by the context of the decision involved.

61. I have rejected the applicant’s contention that Corrective Services’ decision to move him from the cottage to a cell was motivated by retaliation. In view of this finding, the only human right that was in issue, and which required consideration, was the applicant’s then allegation that he was being held in breach of the segregation requirement in s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act. This allegation was the subject of proper consideration by Corrective Services, indeed, the allegation was central to the decision of Corrective Services to move the applicant out of the cottage. It was open to Corrective Services, having given proper consideration to s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act, to conclude that the appropriate response to the applicant’s complaint was to move him to a cell, where he would not have any ongoing contact with sentenced prisoners. Accordingly, I do not accept the applicant’s contention that Corrective Services failed to give proper consideration to his human rights.

62. The applicant’s final contention concerned the manner in which the decision to move him from the cottage occurred. As the prosecutor conceded, the manner in which the applicant was moved from his accommodation in the cottage to the cell block was not appropriate. Whilst it was open for Corrective Services to move the applicant out of the cottage, there was no urgency in doing so. There was no reason why the applicant could not have been moved the following morning. The applicant should not have been moved in a way which deprived him of his dinner, bed linen, a towel and toiletries, or the opportunity to pack up his belongings.

63. The prosecutor further conceded that the manner in which the applicant was moved constituted a breach of s 19(1) of the Human Rights Act. I understood this concession to be that, in failing to provide the applicant with dinner, bed linen, toiletries or a towel, the applicant was not treated with humanity or with respect for his inherent dignity. Against this concession, I note that it has been held that “impugned conduct must have some severity for it to amount to a violation of a right to be treated with humanity and inherent dignity”: Islam v Director-General of the Department of Justice and Community Safety Directorate [2018] ACTSC 322 per McWilliam AsJ (as her Honour then was) at [66], citing Haigh v Ryan [2018] VSC 474 per Ginnane J at [86].

64. It is not necessary to determine whether the prosecutor’s concession that the manner in which the applicant was moved constituted a breach of the Human Rights Act. For the reasons outlined above, I do not accept that the applicant’s current custodial accommodation, in a cell, rather than in within a cottage, constitutes a contravention of s 19(1) of the Human Rights Act. In those circumstances, any breach of s 19(1) could only have been occasioned by the failure of Corrective Services to provide him with bedding, a towel, toiletries and dinner on the evening of 5 June 2026.

65. In DPP v Hiscox [2025] ACTSC 17; 393 FLR 255, Mossop J held that a past and non-continuing breach of s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act did not constitute “special or exceptional” circumstances under s 9D of the Bail Act. In Hiscox, the applicant had been housed in unsegregated accommodation for the period from 12 August 2024 to 19 November 2024, but was being held in segregated accommodation at the time of his bail application in January 2025. His Honour held that s 9D of the Bail Act does not preclude “consideration of matters that have occurred in the past so long as they are relevant to whether special or exceptional circumstances exist favouring the grant of bail at the time when the court is considering the issue”: Hiscox at [11]. His Honour continued (at [12]): The bare existence of a breach of the law is not, in my view, sufficient to be a factor which presently favours the grant of bail. Further, even if it was a factor that favoured the grant of bail, it is not one which satisfies the requirement of there being special or exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail.

66. I agree with Mossop J that, whilst a past breach of the Human Rights Act with respect to an inmate may be capable of constituting “special or exceptional circumstances”, it is necessary to demonstrate that the past breach remains relevant, in that it is a matter “favouring the grant of bail at the time when the court is considering the issue”: Hiscox at [11]. In the present case, where, if there was a breach of s 19(1), the breach was short in duration, unintentional, isolated, and did not have ongoing adverse effects upon the applicant, I do not consider that it is such as to meet the requirement for special or exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail.

67. I note that as it has now been conceded on behalf of the applicant that his previous accommodation within the cottage did not contravene s 19(2) of the Human Rights Act, and as I have held that this concession was properly made, there would appear to be no reason why the applicant could not be returned to the cottage accommodation, assuming that such accommodation is still available.

Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment etc

68. As noted above, in the alternative to s 19(1), the applicant argued that Corrective Services had contravened s 10 of the Human Rights Act by treating or punishing him in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. The applicant relied on the submissions made in support of s 19(1) in support of this contention, in particular, his contention that Corrective Services had moved him from the cottage out of retaliation for making a human rights complaint. For the reasons outlined above, I have not accepted that Corrective Services was so motivated. It follows that the applicant’s submission that s 10 of the Human Rights Act was breached must also be rejected.

Right of freedom to receive information and ideas Evidence

69. On 8 November 2025, the applicant made a formal complaint to Corrective Services regarding the unavailability of newspapers at the AMC. In that complaint, the applicant stated that newspapers were not available “anywhere in the jail”. He submitted that newspapers are: … an essential human right as we need awareness of outside events for our ongoing legal situations, also so we can remain in touch with outside world in order to reintegrate upon release.

70. The applicant requested that the AMC “reinstate newspaper and magazine buy up”, and that local and national newspaper subscriptions be provided to the library and to each pod.

71. On 13 December 2025, the applicant sent a letter to the ACT Human Rights Commission concerning the lack of access to newspapers within the AMC. In that letter, the applicant stated that he had been asking for newspapers to read for some time. He explained that he would “like to stay up to date with news and current events and be aware of trends and current events in legal circles. eg. sentencing trends”. He stated that he had raised this request as a complaint, through the delegates process and through an official visitor, but that he had been told that only prison newspapers like “About Time” would be supplied. He stated: All I am asking is for there to be a newspaper to read once or twice a week. or even better to be able to pay for a subscription The responses to my enquiries also point out that news items are available on computer however I have only very limited access to a computer. I feel my human rights are being breached because I do not have good access to quality news and current affairs materials and information. Surely the jail can afford $10 a week to purchase a few newspapers for the library or even source a donation. (As per the original.)

72. On 23 January 2026, the applicant sent a further complaint to Corrective Services regarding unavailability of newspapers. In answer to the question “Have you spoken to a staff member about this complaint?”, the applicant ticked “Yes”. In answer to the question “Who did you speak to?” the applicant responded “any[one] who will listen”. Under the heading “Your complaint”, the applicant wrote Unavailability of newspapers and magazines. If the newsagent you used to deal with closed, then find a new one. Im sure there is a newsagent in Canberra who would love the business. NSW corrections manage to have newspaper/ magazine buy ups in both metropolitan and regional prisons. If you cant find a newsagent capable of fulfilling subscriptions, maybe contact publishers directly and they can help you. If you plan on offering e-subscriptions instead, then issue a computer or tablet to every inmate or at least every cell If for some reasons its too hard to bring back the newspaper/ magazine buyup, you could at least provide a paper for each yard and a few new magazines for the library Access to up to date news is a human right under Geneva Convention and TV news alone does not fulfil this obligation. (As per the original.)

73. On 12 March 2026, the compliance team of Corrective Services responded to the applicant’s complaint about the unavailability of newspapers and magazines. In that response, the compliance team stated: There are several news outlets and avenues to detainees including: - About Time – a national newspaper that is distributed each month to correctional facilities throughout the country. The AMC receive this in physical form one month and digitally on prisonpc on alternate months. Physical copies are made available in the AMC library. - Canberra Weekly – available from the AMC library - Special purchases (where appropriate).

74. On 10 June 2026, the Discrimination, Disability and Community Services Commissioner sent a response to a complaint that the applicant had made to the Human Rights Commissioner relating to access to newspapers.

75. In that response, the Discrimination, Disability and Community Services Commissioner indicated that she had made preliminary inquiries with Corrective Services concerning the news and media available to detainees at the AMC. The Commissioner recorded that she had been informed that: About Time is the only hardcopy newspaper provided in the AMC library. The ABC news website and SBS news websites are whitelisted and available from all PrisonPC computers (including the computers in the AMC library). Current affairs and news are available on televisions which most if not all detainees have access to. There are delivery procedures, security processes and other logistics that mean subscriptions to other print newspapers (like the Canberra Times) are impractical and/or likely to result in the paper not being available on the day of delivery. Digital subscriptions to news sites like the Canberra Times are impractical as they require ongoing daily monitoring and create cybersecurity issues. Following a recent audit, ACTCS is working towards installing additional computers in common areas which will increase detainees’ access to online resources including news. Individual detainees can choose to subscribe to a print newspaper at their own cost via a special purchase request form, though it may not be delivered on the day it is published/ delivered due to security and logistics processes.

76. The Commissioner concluded that, based on the information she had been provided, detainees had reasonable access to media as required by s 52 of the Corrections Management Act. She stated “[i]t appears that there are adequate news options for you, both free and paid services across multiple platforms, even if you do not agree and would like to see more and varied news resources for detainees at the AMC”.

77. On 20 June 2026, the applicant completed a detainee request form requesting a personal computer for his cell. That request was denied.

78. In her evidence in the proceedings on 22 July 2026, Ms Summers stated that the applicant has access to the SBS and ABC websites, both of which are “whitelisted”. Ms Summers explained that a “whitelisted” website is one for which detainees have unlimited access. Ms Summers told the Court that historically, newspapers were provided to detainees via an arrangement with a local newsagent. However, with the decline of print media, that newsagent is no longer in business. She explained that the applicant is also permitted to purchase newspaper subscriptions by filling in a “bluey” form. She stated that if the applicant wishes to obtain a Canberra Times subscription, he can fill in a “bluey”, and provided he is prepared to pay the cost of the subscription, and the Canberra Times can be delivered to the AMC (either via a newsagent, or direct), he should be able to receive that publication. She stated that she had not been able to find any record of the applicant having submitted an application for a newspaper subscription. In cross-examination, she acknowledged that it possible that a request had been made, but that she could not locate the request.

Findings

79. Section 16(2) of the Human Rights Act states that: Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of borders, whether orally, in writing or in print, by way of art, or in another way chosen by them.

80. Section 28 of the Human Rights Act provides that human rights may be subject to limits set by law if the limitation is reasonable and justifiable having regard to all relevant factors, including the nature of the right affected, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, and any less restricted means reasonably available to achieve the purpose the limitation seeks to achieve. See further discussion of s 28 in Hubzin at [87].

81. Section 12(1)(i) of the Corrections Management Act provides that “detainees must have reasonable access to news and education services and facilities to maintain contact with society”.

82. Section 52(1) of the Corrections Management Act provides that the Director General of ACT Corrective Services “must ensure, as far as practicable, that detainees have reasonable access to (a) newspapers, radio and television broadcasts and other mass media (including the internet) for news and information”.

83. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that s 16(2) of the Human Rights Act confers upon the applicant a right of access to newspapers which is “not lost by reason of imprisonment”. Citing s 31(1) of the Human Rights Act, the applicant contended that the content of s 16(2) and the standard of “reasonable access” in the Corrections Management Act is “informed by the recognised international standards for the treatment of prisoners”. The applicant submitted that these standards relevantly included rr 63 and 117 of the Nelson Mandela Rules. Rule 63 of the Nelson Mandela Rules provides that: Prisoners shall be kept informed regularly of the more important items of news by the reading of newspapers, periodicals or special institutional publications, by hearing wireless transmissions, by lectures or by any similar means as authorized or controlled by the prison administration.

84. Rule 117 of the Nelson Mandela Rules provides that: An untried prisoner shall be allowed to procure at his or her own expense or at the expense of a third party such books, newspapers, writing material and other means of occupation as are compatible with the interests of the administration of justice and the security and good order of the institution.

85. The applicant contended that, viewed in the context of these instruments, the denial of access to a newspaper subscription to the Canberra Times constitutes a limitation on his right under s 16 of the Human Rights Act and a departure from the mandatory standards in ss 12(1)(i) and 52(1)(a) of the Corrections Management Act. The applicant did not articulate how the Nelson Mandela Rules should affect the proper construction of either s 16(2) of the Human Rights Act or ss 12 and/or 52 of the Corrections Management Act. It is not necessary to determine the precise content of these provisions, or whether the Nelson Mandela Rules affect the construction of these provisions.

86. The evidence in the proceedings is that the applicant has access to ABC and SBS news. Further, although Corrective Services does not provide prisoners with access to paid subscription newspapers such as the Canberra Times, it is open to the applicant to request the provision of such subscription newspapers at his own cost.

87. Even if it were accepted that the Nelson Mandela Rules were effectively incorporated into s 16(2) of the Human Rights Act and/or ss 12 and/or 52 of the Corrections Management Act, it does not follow that those provisions oblige Corrective Services to pay for subscription media services for detainees. There are many demands upon the Corrective Services purse, and, as recognised by s 117 of the Nelson Mandela Rules, there is a difference between a requirement that detainees be provided with access to news sources at the expense of Corrective Services, and permitting a remand detainee to obtain newspapers at their own expense. Section 16 of the Human Rights Act and ss 12 and 52 of the Corrections Management Act do not oblige Corrective Services to provide paid subscription media to detainees at the cost of Corrective Services.

88. The position might be different if Corrective Services unreasonably restricted prisoners’ access to only State-owned media sources and did not permit a remand detainee to ever obtain access to subscription news services at the detainee’s own cost. That is not the position here. As noted above, the evidence is that it is open to the applicant to request a subscription to the Canberra Times at his own cost, by filling in a form referred to as a “bluey”.

89. In Dr Healey’s affidavit, it was asserted that, on multiple occasions since 8 November 2025, the applicant has attempted to purchase a physical subscription to a newspaper “via a special purchase request form or by other means”. However, Ms Summers gave evidence that there is no record in the prison system of the applicant having ever submitted a “bluey” requesting a subscription to any newspaper.

90. Ms Summers accepted that it was possible that a request had been made, and that she had been unable to locate that request. However, there is no evidence from the applicant as to when he submitted a “bluey” seeking a subscription to the Canberra Times or any other publication, nor is there any documentary evidence that such a request has ever been refused. The most likely inference is that, if the applicant has filled in a “bluey” seeking a subscription to the Canberra Times at his own expense, that request has become lost, and has not been answered. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that Corrective Services has refused a request made by the applicant to obtain a paid newspaper subscription at the applicant’s own expense.

91. Accordingly, the applicant’s contention that there has been a breach of the Human Rights Act by reason of the failure of Corrective Services to procure a subscription to the Canberra Times must also be rejected.

Access to specialised medical attention

92. The applicant suffers from chronic psoriasis in his hands, elbows and ears, which causes him pain and irritation.

93. In my ex tempore judgment delivered on 5 June 2026 I noted that the applicant’s custodial medical records recorded that he was prescribed creams for his psoriasis, but that an entry from March 2026 also recorded that the applicant had not been regularly using those creams. I also observed that the applicant had explained to me that he had ceased using the creams because they were “not working”. In that judgment, I also considered other claims raised by the applicant in connection with his medical treatment in custody. I concluded that I was not satisfied that the health conditions raised by the applicant were of such a nature that should be considered special or exceptional circumstances.

94. Exhibited to Dr Healey’s affidavit that was read in the proceedings on 22 June 2026, was a discharge summary from Ochre Medical Centre, Kingston, dated 4 June 2026. This document records that the applicant has a longstanding history of plaque psoriasis since childhood with “2-3 flares per year”. The discharge summary indicates that the condition was managed with topic steroids and emollients, and that an option of UV light therapy on release had also been discussed. This additional evidence does not alter the conclusion which I reached on 5 June 2026.

95. It is not infrequently the case that remand detainees will have medical conditions which can be treated more effectively in the community than in custody. Whether any lack of treatment available in custody is such as to constitute special or exceptional circumstances must be considered on a case by case basis. In the present case, the evidence demonstrates that the applicant’s skin condition is being treated within the custodial environment. The potential availability of treatment in the community which might be more effective does not, without more, amount to special or exceptional circumstances.

Conclusion

96. The applicant has not established that there is any ongoing breach of the Human Rights Act or any other aspect of his custody which, either considered separately or cumulatively, is sufficient to constitute special or exceptional circumstances. It follows that the requirement in s 9D of the Bail Act is not satisfied.

97. If s 9D had been satisfied, it would have been necessary for me to consider whether the criteria set out in s 22 of the Bail Act had been demonstrated. I accept that there would be little risk of the applicant failing to appear on sentence. I also accept that the risk of the applicant committing a further offence in the relatively short period until he is sentenced for the present offences (in September 2026) is not high. Each of these matters would have weighed in favour of a grant of bail.

98. However, s 22(2) of the Bail Act provides that, where the elements of an indictable offence have been proved in relation to the person, but the person has not been sentenced, a court “must consider the likelihood of the person being given a sentence of imprisonment”. There is a question as to whether, in the absence of a provision such as s 22B of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW), bail should be refused where there is little risk of a person engaging in the conduct set out in s 22(1), but where the likelihood of a further period of imprisonment is high. As I have concluded that the threshold in s 9D is not met, it is not necessary to determine this question, nor to reach a concluded view as to whether the applicant would have otherwise satisfied the s 22 criteria.

99. Finally, I wish to thank Ms Andersen-Cooke and Dr Healey for the considerable assistance that they have provided, on a pro bono basis, to both the applicant and to the Court. Orders

100. The orders of the Court are: (1) The application for bail is refused.

I certify that the preceding one hundred [100] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Justice Baker. Associate: Date: