[2025] VCC 1537
General information, not legal advice.
County Court of Victoria
2025-10-23
Original judgment source is linked above.
Sentence: Total effective sentence of 5 years' imprisonment - Non-parole period 2 years and 6 months
(a) You agreed you first met the victim at the Bendigo train station a week prior to meeting her at the Southern Cross station on 1 September 2023.
(b) You said it was the victim who asked you for your phone number.
(c) You said the victim asked you to meet her at Southern Cross station to wait with her.
(d) You agreed you had exchanged text messages with the victim.
(e) You said you walked from Southern Cross station to Batman Park with the victim and her dog.
(f) You agreed you sat on the blanket with the victim.
(g) You said you were at Batman Park for less than 20 minutes and that when you were at the park, you and the victim played with the dog.
(h) You said you felt uneasy being with the victim because of things she was saying to you, and that you wanted to leave.
(i) You denied kissing the victim, touching her breasts or penetrating her vagina with your fingers.
(j) You said you are impotent and have been for a couple of years.
(k) You said you walked the victim back to Southern Cross station and decided to 'abandon' contact with her and you got back on a train to Bendigo.
It should not be forgotten that the crime of rape is an intensely personal crime which, for sentencing purposes, cannot be divorced from its effects on the victim. But the effects include not only those which flow from the physical invasion of the victim's person and security, but also those which flow from the violation of the more intangible intellectual properties of the victim's rights and freedoms.
Determining the middle range of seriousness for rape is difficult, since, as was observed in Lawrence (and has been observed in other cases), 'the crime of rape covers a very wide spectrum of different activities carried out in a wide variety of circumstances of differing degrees of objective gravity'. And notwithstanding the standard sentence, by reason of s 5(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act 1991 a sentencing judge is still required to assess the nature and gravity of the offence in the conventional way.
(a) Your offences were committed against an intellectually disabled 16-year-old girl.
(b) You developed a sexual interest in the victim very soon after meeting her. You sent her numerous texts expressing your interest in her and giving her compliments in the days leading up to the offending. However, I accept your counsel's submission that this does not equate to a formed intention to rape or sexually assault Ms Barnett during this time. I consider you ought to be sentenced on the basis of an opportunistic and relatively spontaneous act arising at the park.
(c) You penetrated Ms Barnett's vagina with your finger causing her discomfort and a burning sensation. The duration of the digital penetration was short, lasting some five or ten seconds.
(d) The penetration was preceded by sexual touching involving kissing the victim's face and touching her breast.
(e) Ms Barnett made it very clear to you she was not consenting to your advances, and she resisted and pleaded with you to stop throughout her ordeal.
(f) There was a significant period of resistance by the victim prior to your advances before she was penetrated. However, beyond the physical persistence of touching her over her objections, there was no overt violence beyond what is inherent in any crime of rape.
(g) You raped and sexually assaulted Ms Barnett at a public park where she had the right to feel safe.
(h) Digital rape does not involve some of the risks of penile rape, namely contracting a sexually transmitted disease and pregnancy, however that does not mean any particular instance of it is less serious than other forms of rape.[20]
(i) You took advantage of the victim's vulnerability to satiate your desire for sexual gratification.
throughout my engagement with Samuel I have observed him as an individual who is trying to overcome the negative experiences of his past, make positive changes in his life and work on improving his mental health and overall wellbeing.
Delay is normally relevant in two ways. First, it is relevant to rehabilitation that has occurred during the delay and the effect that has in turn on specific deterrence. Secondly, delay is relevant in the sense that the anxiety and uncertainty of having the prospect of a sentence hanging over one's head during the period of delay is akin to punishment in itself.[26]
Mr Jacobson's profile encompasses multiple converging risk factors, including significant psychopathology, interpersonal isolation, cognitive dysfunction, chronic substance use, and a personal history of sexual victimisation.
Mr Jacobson's history of institutional abuse and persistent PTSD likely make imprisonment more burdensome and destabilising for him than an average offender. Further, his complex clinical profile reduces his functional capacity and renders him more susceptible to the criminogenic effects of incarceration. He is also unlikely to have access to targeted interventions which limits his prospects of rehabilitation in custody.
Circumstances of deprivation, abuse and other social disadvantage occurring during an offender's formative years are more than matters of historical significance to the administration of justice. The effects of such social disadvantage do not generally diminish with the passage of time and are likely to have profound and lasting consequences. ... Though they do not provide an excuse for offending behaviour, they must be given due weight in the sentencing calculus.[32]
Whether, and to what extent, social disadvantage warrants a reduction in moral culpability in a particular case falls to be assessed by reference to the nature and circumstances of the offence, the nature and severity of the disadvantage suffered and whether the effects of the disadvantage can be seen to be in any way explanatory of the offending.[36]
The significance of the 'general' approach enunciated in Bugmy is that the relevance of deprivation to sentencing does not depend on proof of such a nexus. ... 'the impact of disadvantage is complex, multilayered, non-linear and not easily "diagnosed" or measured'. The High Court's recognition that serious childhood deprivation is likely to make an offender less morally culpable than 'an offender whose formative years were not marred in that way' reflects the principle of equal justice.[38]
On Charge 1, sexually assaulting Ms Aliyah Barnett, you are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for three months.
On Charge 2, raping Ms Aliyah Barnett, you are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for five years.
On Summary Charge 3 (committing an indictable offence whilst on bail) you are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for seven days.
I order that the sentences imposed on Charge 1 and Summary Charge 3 be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on Charge 2. This makes a total effective sentence of imprisonment for five years.
Under s 11A(4) of the Sentencing Act 1991, because you are being sentenced for a standard sentence offence, I am required to fix a non-parole of at least 60% of the total effective sentence, unless I consider that it is in the interests of justice not to do so. In your case, I consider that because of your disadvantaged childhood, alcohol and drug dependence, the mental health conditions from which you suffer, and the application of Verdins principle 5 in your case, it is in the interests of justice for me to fix a non-parole period of 50% of the total effective sentence I have imposed. This is intended to allow for the possibility of a longer period of parole supervision so as to aid your eventual rehabilitation and reintegration into society. These are to be regarded as my reasons for adopting this course.[49]
Accordingly, I direct that you serve a minimum of two years and six months before becoming eligible for parole.
I am required to state the reasons for imposing the sentence I have imposed on Charge 2.[50] They are contained in these reasons for sentence.
I am also required to explain how the sentence imposed on Charge 2 relates to the standard sentence of ten years' imprisonment which applies to that offence.[51] The sentence I have imposed on Charge 2 is five years less than the standard sentence for that offence.
**I declare 211 days (not including this day) as the period of pre-sentence detention to be reckoned as already served under this sentence and I direct the fact that declaration was made, and its details, be noted in the records of the court.
The operation of s 34(1)(b) of Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 has the effect that you are deemed to have been found guilty of a single Class 1 offence for the purposes of determining the reporting period applicable to you under that Act.[52] That reporting period is 15 years.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004, I declare that you are a registerable offender and order you to comply with the reporting obligations of that Act for 15 years.[53]
[1] Contrary to s 40 of the Crimes Act 1958 ('CA'), as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2016.
[3] Contrary to s 30B of the Bail Act 1977.
[7] Pursuant to s 30B of the Bail Act 1977.
[9] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.
[11] [2001] VSCA 63 [8] (Winneke P, Tadgell and Buchanan JJA agreeing).
[12] Sentencing Act 1991 ('SA') s 5A(1); CA s 38(3).
[17] See Brown v The Queen [2019] VSCA 286; (2019) 59 VR 462, 464 [4], 479 [55] (Maxwell P, Priest, Kaye, T Forrest and Emerton JJA) ('Brown'), applying Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120, 132 [27] ((French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
[18] [2022] VSCA 89 [28] (Priest JA and Walker JA).
[19] As to features which are typically taken into account by courts in assessing the gravity of a particular offence of rape see Jurj v The Queen [2016] VSCA 57 [80] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Beach JJA) ('Jurj').
[20] DPP v McArthur [2019] VSCA 71 [81] (Ferguson CJ, Kaye and Weinberg JJA); R v Brown [2002] VSCA 207; (2002) 5 VR 463, 478 [57] (Chernov JA, Eames JA and O'Bryan AJA agreeing).
[24] Ex D5. 'Cannabis and Me (6 hours)' and 'Ice and Me' programs.
[26] Ibid 445-446 [36] (Warren CJ and Redlich JA) (citations omitted). See also Tones v The Queen [2017] VSCA 118 [36] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Kyrou JJA) and Thomas v The Queen [2019] VSCA 223 [66] (Ashley and Weinberg JJA).
[27] See R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA) ('Verdins').
[29] Verdins 276 [32(6)] (emphasis added).
[31] [2014] VSCA 119 ('Marrah').
[32] Marrah [16] (Redlich and Tate JJA) citing Bugmy 586-89 [24] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
[35] [2021] VSCA 340 ('Sabbatucci').
[36] Ibid [6] (Maxwell P and Emerton JA). See also Newton (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 22 [36]-[38] (Beach and Macaulay JJA).
[38] Ibid [45] (Maxwell P, Kaye, Niall, T Forrest and Emerton JJA). See also Jawahiri v The Queen [2021] VSCA 287 [73(s)] (Priest and T Forrest JJA).
[41] [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256, 266-8 [21]- [25] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).
[42] [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428 (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ).
[43] [2015] VSCA 96; (2015) 250 A Crim R 282, 292 [30]- [31] (Redlich, Priest and Beach JJA). See also Williams (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 35 [21]- [[25] (Priest and Kyrou JJA) ('Williams').
[45] DPP v Palliyaguruge [2021] VCC 958 (Judge Chambers); DPP v Abdi [2020] VCC 1668 (Judge Dawes); DPP v Singh [2019] VCC 1484 (Judge Lauritsen); DPP v Amin [2019] VCC 1756 (Judge O'Connell); DPP v Sang (a pseudonym) (Judge Brimer).
[46] See DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428.
[47] See SA s 3(1) definition of 'category 1 offence' paragraph (d).
[49] In accordance with SA s 5B(4)(b).
[52] See R v Cheetham [2006] VSCA 126; (2006) 13 VR 304, 306-307 [10]-[15] (Nettle JA, Buchanan and Chernov JJA agreeing).
[53] See Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 s 34(1)(b)(i) and Schedule 1, item 1.
DPP
Jacobson [2025] VCC 1537
(2011) 244 CLR 120
(2002) 5 VR 463
(2013) 40 VR 436
(2007) 16 VR 269
(2013) 249 CLR 571
(2016) 259 CLR 256
(2006) 13 VR 304
(2017) 262 CLR 428
(2019) 59 VR 462