DPP v HR

1. On 17 October 2025, I provided the parties with the reasons contained in Parts A to F below. As those reasons make clear, I determined to make a non-custodial supervision order. At that time, there was no body that was prepared to act as supervisor of HR, and much of those reasons deal with the issues that arise in those circumstances. On receipt of those reasons, the parties applied jointly for the matter to be adjourned prior to orders being made. Then, under cover of a letter dated 6 November 2025, addressed to my chambers and copied to the parties, the Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health, or Forensicare, indicated that it would be prepared to act as supervisor.
2. In the circumstances, I have decided to revise my earlier reasons to take account of that development, not simply to replace them. This Part, that is Part AA, and Part G below, headed 'Addendum', have been added. The balance is otherwise in the form provided to the parties on 17 October 2025.

1. On 20 March 2025, I published reasons setting out my conclusion that when HR[1] attempted to poison her daughter (at the same time that she attempted to kill herself) she was suffering from a major depressive disorder that caused her thinking to be bordering on delusional and that had the effect that she could not at the time reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether her conduct of administering a poison to her daughter, as perceived by reasonable people, was wrong. In accordance with that conclusion and s 20(2) of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 ('the Act'), I ordered that a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental impairment be recorded on the indictment in relation to a charge of attempted murder brought against HR and published reasons for doing so.[2]
2. I then extended HR's bail, on conditions including that she continue to attend for treatment with her doctor at least weekly and to comply with all medications and treatments prescribed or directed by her, and ordered, among other things, that:

(a) Pursuant to s 41 of the Act, a report be prepared by a registered medical practitioner or psychologist addressing the matters referred to in s 41(1) of the Act;

(b) Pursuant to s 47 of the Act, the Secretary to the Department of Health provide the Court with a 'certificate of available services'; and

(c) Pursuant to s 40(2)(a) of the Act, a report be prepared by a registered medical practitioner or psychologist who had personally examined HR on the possible effect on her behaviour of an order releasing her unconditionally.

1. I now have to decide whether to release HR unconditionally, which is what she seeks, or to make a 'supervision order'. A supervision order may be either a 'custodial supervision order' or a 'non-custodial supervision order'. Unsurprisingly, with a custodial supervision order, HR would remain in custody in a prison or at some other 'appropriate place'. With a non-custodial supervision order, HR would be released 'on conditions decided by the court and specified in the order'. An unconditional release, as the name suggests, would have the effect that HR would be released into the community without any ongoing restrictions or supervision of her.
2. These reasons consider the order that should be made.

1. I will first, though, explain one aspect of what occurred on 20 March 2025 after I delivered my reasons for finding that HR was not guilty by reason of mental impairment.
2. Although it might be thought sensible that the decision on whether to release a person in HR's position unconditionally or to make a supervision order of some type should be delayed until after further material addressed at that issue has been obtained, the Crown submitted on 20 March 2025 that the Act was 'predicated' on an order being made at the time the finding of not guilty by reason of mental impairment was made. In support of that submission, it relied on s 23 of the Act and the procedural processes set out in that Act. Section 23 of the Act provides as follows, and is expressed in mandatory terms:

23 Effect of finding of not guilty because of mental impairment

If a person is found not guilty because of mental impairment, the court must -

(a) declare that the person is liable to supervision under Part 5; or

(b) order the person to be released unconditionally.

24 Court may make orders pending making of supervision order

(1) If the court declares a person liable to supervision, the court may make any one or more of the following orders pending the making of a supervision order -

(a) an order granting the person bail;

(b) subject to subsection (2), an order remanding the person in custody in an appropriate place;

(c) subject to subsection (3), an order remanding the person in custody in a prison;

(d) if it is of the opinion that it is in the interests of justice to do so, an order -

(i) that the person undergo an examination by a registered medical practitioner or registered psychologist; and

(ii) that the results of the examination be put before the court;

(e) any other order the court thinks appropriate.

(2) The court must not make an order remanding a person in custody in an appropriate place unless the court has received a certificate under section 47 stating that the facilities or services necessary for that order are available.

(3) The court must not make an order remanding a person in custody in a prison unless satisfied that there is no practicable alternative in the circumstances.

1. As the text of s 24 makes clear, the power given by s 24(1)(a) to grant bail to a person found not guilty by reason of mental impairment and the power given by s 24(1)(d) to order the person to undergo a medical examination and the broad power given by s 24(1)(e) are only enlivened if the Court has already declared that a person is liable to supervision.
2. Section 41 of the Act provides that:
   1. Reports on mental condition of persons declared liable to supervision

(1) If a person is declared to be liable to supervision under Part 5, the appropriate person must arrange to have prepared and filed with the court that made the declaration a report, prepared by a registered medical practitioner or registered psychologist, on the mental condition of the person containing -

(a) a diagnosis and prognosis of the condition or an outline of the person's behavioural problems; and

(b) the person's response to treatment, therapy or counselling (if any); and

(c) a suggested treatment or other plan for managing the condition.

(2) The report must be filed within 30 days after the declaration or within such longer period as the court allows.

1. Again, the power given by s 41(1) to obtain a report from a doctor or psychologist dealing with 'a suggested treatment plan or other plan for managing the condition' is enlivened only if the Court has already made a declaration that the person is liable to supervision. The term 'appropriate person' is defined to be the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation (now, the Department of Justice and Community Safety)[3] if the person is in custody in a prison or the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services if the person is in custody in a residential treatment facility or receiving services from certain providers.[4]
2. It is convenient here also to note s 47 of the Act, which provides that:

(1) A court must request the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services to provide the court with a certificate of available services if the court is considering -

(a) imposing a supervision order on a person -

(i) committing a person to custody in a designated mental health service or a residential treatment facility; or

(ii) providing for a person to receive services in a designated mental health service or a residential treatment facility or from a disability services provider, a mental health and wellbeing service provider within the meaning of the Mental Health and Wellbeing Act 2022 or the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services; or

(2) A certificate of available services must -

(a) state whether or not there are facilities or services available for the custody, care or treatment of the person (as the case requires); and

(b) if there are, give an outline of those facilities or services.

(3) If there are no facilities or services available, the certificate may contain any other options that the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services considers appropriate for the court to consider in making the proposed order.

(4) The Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services must provide a certificate to the court within 7 days after receiving a request under subsection (1) or within such longer period as the court allows.

1. Finally, s 40 of Act provides that:

40 Matters to which the court is to have regard

...

(2) The court cannot order a person to be released unconditionally or otherwise release a person from custody under Part 3, 4 or 5, or significantly reduce the degree of supervision to which a person is subject, unless it -

(a) has obtained and considered the report of at least one registered medical practitioner or registered psychologist, who has personally examined the person, on -

(i) the person's mental condition; and

(ii) the possible effect of the proposed order on the person's behaviour; and

...

(c) is satisfied that the person's family members and the victims of the offence with which the person was charged (if any), have been given reasonable notice of the hearing at which the release or reduction is proposed to be ordered; and

(d) has considered any report of the family members or victims made under section 42; and

...

1. The Act read as a whole, the Crown submitted, meant that, having decided that HR was not guilty by reason of mental impairment, the appropriate process was first to declare under s 23 of the Act that HR was liable to supervision, and then to require the various reports and certificates that may then be obtained, before deciding, finally, with the benefit of those reports, what order should be made.
2. There is something in what the Crown submitted, particularly because s 24 of the Act only empowers the Court to make an order granting the person bail or remanding them in custody after it has declared that they are liable to supervision. On that basis, if such a declaration were not made at the same time that a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental impairment is recorded on the indictment, it is difficult to see what the Court could do to maintain the status quo pending determination of whether the person should be released unconditionally or under a supervision order and if so what type of supervision order. Similarly, s 40 seems to prevent the Court from releasing the person unless certain steps have been gone through which, it may be assumed, may not have been gone through in advance of the Court deciding the threshold question of whether the person is not guilty by reason of mental impairment or should face a trial.
3. Acting on the Crown's submission, and in accordance with my provisional view that a non-custodial supervision order that imposed some conditions was the order I was likely to make, on 20 March 2025 I declared in accordance with s 23 of the Act that HR was liable to supervision and made the other orders referred to above including the extension of her bail.
4. Counsel for HR submitted, at the time, that HR should be released unconditionally. Her counsel sought an assurance that if the declaration were made, in accordance with what the Crown submitted was the appropriate or preferable course, it would not preclude HR from arguing for an unconditional release after the additional material had been obtained. I gave that assurance, and said that I would if necessary set aside the declaration or otherwise do what was required to allow for that result if I ultimately formed the view that HR should in fact be released unconditionally. The Crown acceded to this process.
5. Having reflected further on the matter, I consider that the better course probably would have been not to have made the declaration when I did. Probably, the better course would have been to have published reasons for my decision, but not then to have directed that a verdict by reason of mental impairment be recorded, and simply adjourned the proceeding for final orders and extended bail on the same conditions until final orders were made. Probably, on a proper construction of the Act, the powers to obtain the various reports required would have been enlivened in these circumstances in any event. But it is not necessary for me to decide whether this is so because I am still of the view, for the reasons set out below, that the appropriate order is that a non-custodial supervision order be made. Accordingly there is no need for me to set aside, assuming that it may be done, the 20 March 2025 declaration.

C Should a custodial supervision order be made, or a non-custodial supervision order be made, or should HR be released unconditionally?

1. On 25 June 2025, Dr Hemlata Ranga, HR's treating psychiatrist, provided a report in which she opines that:

(a) HR has been compliant with her medication and her major depression is in remission;

(b) HR does not present with any symptoms or signs suggestive of risk to herself or others; and

(c) The current intention is that HR will continue on antidepressant medications 'life long' and Dr Ranga does not have any plans, at present, to discharge her from her care.

1. Dr Ranga has also prepared a 'relapse prevention plan' that identifies the 'early warning signs' and the suggested responses should those signs emerge. The report notes that if HR does become 'acutely unwell' again, that would likely develop over several weeks, rather than hours or days.
2. Dr Ranga also gave oral evidence on 26 June 2025. She said that she had been 'very clear' to HR that she will need to be on medication and under care of a psychiatrist for the rest of her life.

1. On 23 May 2025, Dr Sobia Khan provided a psychiatric report in response to the request made under s 41 of the Act. She is a Director of Clinical Services at Forensicare and an experienced forensic psychiatrist, and had conferred with Dr Ranga. Dr Khan opined that:

(a) HR's major depressive disorder is currently in remission;

(b) HR's risk of future violence in the next six months is low and her 'case prioritisation' was moderate, 'requiring some special management strategies such as ongoing treatment and monitoring by a psychiatrist';

(c) HR's background predisposes her to developmental trauma and mental illness, for a variety of reasons, but she displays 'several protective factors, including a help-seeking attitude, a supportive mother and husband, and a current willingness to continue to accept treatment and support';

(d) Her current risk level of interpersonal violence is low, and while she stays well in her mental state, that there does not appear to be any scenario in which she can be a risk of harm to her daughter or the wider public;

(e) 'Given her enhanced understanding of her own mental health needs and improved psychoeducation of her family, it is likely that any future episodes of mental health deterioration may not lead to the same levels of risk and violence';

(f) HR's 'current treatments and service providers involved in her care are sufficient and appropriate to manage the risk of harm to herself and her vulnerability';

(g) A supervision order managed by Forensicare would not add any material value 'for [HR's]'s health and risk management needs' and 'the current level of service input and treatments on offer are sufficient'; and

(h) A decision to unconditionally release HR would not increase her risk to members of the public.

1. It is relevant that according to the history taken by Dr Khan, HR said that she thought that she could cease taking her antidepressants 'in three to four months' time'. Dr Khan, who also gave oral evidence, said that she told HR that she should consider medication for the rest of her life, and that HR received that information quite positively and said that she would 'follow the advice of her doctor'. Dr Khan also noted that HR had, at the moment, 'personal supports ... around her' and had been able to cope with stressors, but reiterated that she needed 'to remain under [the] care of a ... psychiatrist' rather than merely a general practitioner. Dr Khan said that she believed that HR would continue to do so. Dr Khan also said that ceasing treatment would create a risk of relapse but the likelihood of a relapse or the speed or severity of any relapse was a matter of conjecture.
2. It became apparent that Dr Khan's opinion that a non-custodial supervision order would be 'overly prescriptive' was based on her assumption that any non-custodial supervision order would require HR to attend case management reviews and a supervising psychiatrist with Forensicare in addition to seeing her own treating doctors. Ultimately, her opinion, as I understood it, was that HR needed to continue in her treatment with a private psychiatrist, she would probably do so, and that there was no need for any additional services from Forensicare.

1. On 27 May 2025, Forensicare wrote a letter in which it noted that Dr Khan had not identified any Forensicare treatments or services that were appropriate for the supervision of HR, and provided a certificate of available services under s 47 of the Act that stated:

Given the assessment of [HR] as outlined in the report of Dr Sobia Khan dated 23 May 2025, there are no appropriate treatments or services which could be provided by Forensicare for the supervision of [HR].

1. On the basis of the opinions of Dr Ranga and Dr Khan, counsel for HR submitted that I should release HR unconditionally. The Crown submitted that HR should be 'placed on a non-custodial supervision order' on the basis that 'risk management needs to be managed by her current treatments and service providers'.
2. Section 40(1) of the Act provides that the Court, when deciding whether or not to make a supervision order, 'must have regard' to:

(a) the nature of the person's mental impairment or other condition or disability; and

(b) the relationship between the impairment, condition or disability and the offending conduct; and

(c) whether the person is, or would if released be, likely to endanger themselves, another person, or other people generally because of his or her mental impairment; and

(d) the need to protect people from such danger; and

(e) whether there are adequate resources available for the treatment and support of the person in the community; and

(f) any other matters the court thinks relevant.

1. I accept HR's counsel's submission that HR, so long as she remains in remission as she is now, poses no risk to the community or to herself, and so there is no need for a custodial supervision order.
2. However, it is still less than three years after HR was sufficiently unwell to make a planned and deliberate attempt to kill her child and herself. She continues to have an underlying depressive illness albeit one that is in remission. The opinions that she presents no risk to herself or others is predicated on her continuing, at least for the moment, to engage with treatment for that condition including by the taking of antidepressant medication. She could become a danger to others and herself, again, if she were to cease her treatment. I consider it vital that HR not cease taking medication, or cease receiving treatment, unless her doing so is in accordance with medical advice. If she were to be released unconditionally, she would be free, should she wish to do so, to cease her treatment. It follows, in my view, that an unconditional release would only be appropriate if I were satisfied that there was no appreciable risk that HR would cease her treatment including her medication if she were free to do so.
3. I am concerned that while Dr Ranga says that she had made it clear to HR that she would need to remain on antidepressants lifelong, HR told Dr Khan that she thought she could cease taking her medication in 'three to four months' time'. Dr Ranga said that when she subsequently raised this with HR, HR said that she had only told Dr Khan that she might change her medication in a few months' time in accordance with Dr Ranga's suggestions. Dr Ranga stated, however, that she had never indicated to HR that she might change her medication in a few months' time and had, at most, said that in 'quite a few years' she might be able to reduce the level of her medication.
4. It may be that HR simply misunderstood what Dr Ranga's advice to her was or that Dr Khan misunderstood what HR said to her, but this seems unlikely in light of Dr Ranga's evidence. At present, I am not satisfied that there is no appreciable risk that HR will cease taking medication if she were free to do so. I consider it appropriate that there be an ongoing legal requirement on her that she remain in treatment for her psychiatric condition. Equally, I accept that there is no need for any further treatment, or services from Forensicare, beyond what HR is currently accessing privately.
5. It follows that in my assessment, the appropriate order to make is a non-custodial supervision order with conditions that HR continue to attend on, and to accept and to follow the advice of, her treating psychiatrist and, as discussed further below, that ensure that regular reports are provided by her treating psychiatrist so that if it is thought that her risk profile changes, appropriate steps may then be taken.
6. Section 27 of the Act provides that a supervision order is for 'an indefinite term', and s 28(1)(b) requires the court to set a 'nominal term' for a supervision order of 25 years where a person has been found not guilty by reason of mental impairment of attempted murder. But the court may direct that the matter be brought back to the court for review at the end of a specified period. I would direct that the matter be brought back for review in two years' time.
7. The next question that arises, however, is whether this is an order that I am able to make. Associated with this is the question as to whether it is necessary for there to be a 'supervisor', and if so what entity should be that supervisor.

D Can I make a non-custodial supervision order in the absence of treatments or services being provided by Forensicare?

1. When the proceeding was before me on 26 June 2025, counsel for the Crown submitted that because the certificate from Forensicare had stated that there were no appropriate treatments or services which can be provided by Forensicare for the supervision of HR, s 26(3)(b) of the Act meant that I was 'unable' to make a non-custodial supervision order. That section provides as follows:

(1) If a court declares that a person is liable to supervision under this Part, the court must make a supervision order in respect of the person.

(2) A supervision order may -

(a) commit the person to custody (custodial supervision order) -

(i) subject to subsection (3), in an appropriate place; or

(ii) subject to subsection (4), in a prison; or

(b) release the person on conditions decided by the court and specified in the order (non-custodial supervision order).

(3) The court must not make a supervision order -

(a) committing a person to custody in an appropriate place; or

(b) providing for a person to receive services in an appropriate place or from a disability service provider or the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services -

unless it has received a certificate under section 47 stating that the facilities or services necessary for the order are available.

1. I am satisfied that this submission is wrong. The purpose of s 26(3) is to prevent a supervision order being made that requires the person to receive services from certain providers if those providers are not able to provide those services. Here, I am not anticipating making an order that provides for HR to receive services from Forensicare or the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services, and so s 26(3)(b) is simply not engaged.
2. So much was made clear, also, by Richards (a pseudonym) v The Queen (No 2).[5] In that case, Mr Richards was found unfit to stand trial due to organic brain injuries he had suffered. A jury found that he had committed the crimes alleged and a County Court judge declared that Mr Richards was liable to supervision under the Act (rather than entitled to be released unconditionally). It then fell to the judge to decide whether to make a custodial supervision order or a non-custodial supervision order and on what terms. The Department of Health and Human Services provided a report saying that because Mr Richards did not have a disability or intellectual disability within the meaning of the Disability Act 2006, there were no facilities or services available for his custody, care or treatment, and Forensicare provided a report saying that it could not provide any appropriate treatments or services. The judge wanted to release Mr Richards under a non-custodial supervision order to an identified aged care facility with the Department acting as supervisor, but considered that:

(a) Section 26(3)(b) of the Act meant that he was not able to do so; and

(b) Section 41 of the Act, reproduced in para 9 above, meant that there had to be someone who could provide the court with the necessary reports, and noted that the Department was not prepared to undertake that role.

1. His Honour therefore, and reluctantly, ordered a custodial supervision order with the result that Mr Richards went to prison. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal. It concluded that if a court proposes to make a non-custodial supervision order that does not provide for the receipt of services referred to in s 26(3)(b), then no certificate of the kind there referred to is required, and that if a person is not to receive such treatment or services then a report under s 41 is not required. The Court of Appeal stated that: 'despite a certificate confirming that no facilities or services are available, the court might still need to consider other options'.[6] The Court of Appeal made a non-custodial supervision order with conditions including that Mr Richards reside at the aged-care facility and not leave the premises unaccompanied and that he 'seek a referral from his general practitioner for a mental health plan for the purpose of obtaining counselling and treatment for PTSD as appropriate'.[7]
2. Having regard to this decision, I am satisfied that I am able to make a non-custodial supervision order of the type set out in para 31 above.
3. The next question is whether I should nominate a supervisor, and if so whom.

E Who, if anyone, should be the supervisor?

1. Whilst submitting that a non-custodial supervision order should be made, and not contending that the Director of Public Prosecutions ('the Director') is not able to act in that role, the Director advised (through counsel) that he is 'not prepared and does not consent to being nominated as supervisor'. The Director submitted that 'Corrections Victoria', which I take to be effectively equivalent to a reference to the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety, should instead be the supervisor, and submitted that this had been done in no less than at least eight other non-custodial supervision orders under the Act. I will return to this submission shortly.
2. The very term 'supervision order' suggests that there will be a supervisor, but 'supervisor' is not a defined term and the identity and role of any supervisor in a non-custodial supervision order remains surprisingly uncertain. Indeed, the Act simply does not seem to anticipate the situation where a person is not in custody and is receiving services from a private provider.
3. The Court of Appeal in Richards (a pseudonym) v The Queen (No 2)[8] also considered the question as to who, if anyone, the order should identify as the 'person having supervision' of Mr Richards. The two options considered were the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Director. The Director (somewhat reluctantly, it seems) indicated that they were prepared to undertake the role of supervision if the Court considered that to be appropriate. The Court did consider that to be appropriate, and included as the final paragraph in its order:

The Director of Public Prosecutions is the person having supervision of the appellant under the non-custodial supervision order for the purposes of the Act, and must take steps to ensure that he is informed by the staff of [the aged-care facility] of any failure by the appellant to comply with the conditions of this order.[9]

1. I note that was done with the Director's consent.
2. Significantly, however, the Court of Appeal said that the Act did not 'require' that the court make an order identifying a person having supervision of the person subject to the order.[10] Rather, it left open the possibility that there not be an identified supervisor, but in the circumstances of that case, decided to identify the Director as the person with that responsibility.
3. The only provisions of the Act I have located that impose a specific obligation on a supervisor are:

(a) Section 38E, which requires 'a person having the supervision' to provide information to the Director when they become aware of a court hearing that is a review of the supervision order or an application for its variation or revocation; and

(b) Section 40(2)(ab), which provides that the Court may not order a person to be released unconditionally or release a person from custody or significantly reduce the degree of supervision to which a person is subject unless it has 'obtained and considered the report of a person having the supervision of the person subject to the order'.

1. That said, under s 29 of the Act, both 'a person having the supervision' and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services may apply to the Court for a variation of a non-custodial supervision order if it appears that the person subject to the order has failed to comply with it.[11] Under s 30A of the Act, both 'a person having supervision' and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services may apply for a warrant to arrest such a person if they have failed to comply with the order or left Victoria. Under s 30 of the Act, 'a person having the supervision' also has, along with a police officer and an ambulance officer and a person of a prescribed class, the power to apprehend a person under a non-custodial supervision order in certain circumstances. Under s 31, 'a person having the supervision' of the person may, along with the person subject to the order, a person having the custody, care or control of that person, the Director and the Attorney-General, may apply for the variation or revocation of a non-custodial supervision order. In this way, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Director and the Attorney-General are given certain powers to take certain steps to protect the public even if they are not acting as supervisor.
2. As noted above, the Court of Appeal in Richards (a pseudonym) v The Queen (No 2) said of s 40(2)(b) of the Act, which, similarly to s 40(2)(ab), provides that the Court may not order a person to be released unconditionally or release a person from custody or significantly reduce the degree of supervision to which a person is subject unless it has considered a report provided under other sections of the Act, stated: 'if a person is not receiving treatment or services (and is not in custody), then it simply follows that no reports as to his or her mental condition are required'.[12] By like reasoning, it might be said that if there is no supervisor, then s 40(2)(ab) and s 38E of the Act are simply not engaged.
3. Also, the repeated use of the indefinite article, rather than the definite article, before the words 'person having the supervision' perhaps supports the Court of Appeal's conclusion, referred to earlier, that the Act does not require that there must always be a supervisor.
4. As noted above, the Director submitted that in at least eight other non-custodial supervision orders made under the Act, Corrections Victoria (which I understand as being wide enough to include the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety) had been made the supervisor of a person under a non-custodial supervision order. However, when asked to provide details about these matters, this number was revised to five matters. Those matters included DPP v Ali,[13] where the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety was not in fact nominated as supervisor. Mr Sajed Ali was charged with numerous sex crimes and was found unfit to stand trial, owing to cognitive defects. Mr Ali was declared liable for supervision, and a s 41 certificate of available services and a s 47 report were requested from Forensicare, who advised that it was not possible to determine whether Mr Ali had a disability as defined by the Disability Act 2006 and therefore was not eligible to access forensic disability supports provided by the Department of Health and Human Services including facility based accommodation, treatment or supports_._ There were also complications arising from his status as an unlawful non-citizen that precluded Mr Ali from accessing supports and funding. Ultimately her Honour Judge Riddell concluded that a non-custodial supervision order should be imposed, and that the Director of Public Prosecutions was the appropriate body to nominate as supervisor. This was because the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation (as it then was) was not a party to the proceedings and the Director was better positioned to liaise with immigration officials and well able to inform the Court of any breach.
5. The remaining four matters are decisions from the County Court where the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety (or the Department) was nominated as supervisor. In two of those matters, the Secretary to the Department of Justice or the Department of Justice were deemed appropriate because they were facilitating sex offender programs as part of the supervised person's treatment program.[14] In the third matter, I was provided with the form of the non-custodial supervision order made on 23 July 2019 and a ruling on an application heard on 9 August 2022 to vary the non-custodial supervision order.[15] The accused had been charged with sexual offences, but found unfit to stand trial. The non-custodial supervision order included an order that he be under the supervision of the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety but also required that the he report to a local Community Corrections service and attend any programs as directed by the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety. It seems likely that he was to be provided with some services provided by or under the authority of that Secretary. In the fourth matter, I was provided with a transcript of a ruling made on 13 September 2023 on an application to replace a non-custodial supervision order made on 26 March 2020 with a custodial supervision order.[16] The details of this case are not clear, but it emerged from the ruling that the non-custodial supervision order anticipated that the person was to be provided with services and there is nothing to suggest that they were not to be provided only privately.
6. This matter is quite different. HR has not been accused of, nor is there any reason to believe she would be at risk of committing sexual offences. The Crown did not suggest that there was any treatment that could be provided by the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety or Corrections Victoria. Despite the Crown's urging, I am not persuaded that the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety or Corrections Victoria are best placed to monitor and supervise HR in circumstances where they would not be providing any treatment or services.
7. There is no section in the Act that empowers me to appoint a supervisor, indeed there is no definition of that term, and the Court of Appeal has allowed for the possibility that there may not be a supervisor. It is tempting, but in my view would be wrong, to appoint HR's treating psychiatrist as her supervisor: not only would it be unfair on a treating psychiatrist to impose potential obligations on her that she may not have the legal facility or inclination to perform, but it could also undermine the therapeutic relationship.
8. In my view, the better approach is for me not to appoint, or to purport to appoint, a supervisor, but instead to impose additional conditions that provide for reports to be provided to the Director and the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services, and to the Court, each six months or otherwise if HR fails to comply with Dr Ranga's directions or becomes unwell such that she poses a risk to her family or to members of the public. I appreciate that this Court may not order Dr Ranga to do this, but it can impose, as a condition of the non-custodial supervision order, that HR irrevocably authorise and instruct in that regard. As noted in para 46 above, the Director and the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services have the power to take steps if they wish to do so in the public interest, and by the imposition of such a condition they should be provided with the information necessary for them to take such steps if they wish to do so.

1. I will not release HR unconditionally. Subject to hearing from the parties on the precise formulation, I will make a non-custodial supervision order with a nominal term of 25 years and impose conditions that:

(a) HR continue to see Dr Ranga, and to follow Dr Ranga's advice and to take any medication prescribed by and in accordance with the directions of Dr Ranga; and

(b) In the event that HR is unable to continue to see Dr Ranga, she is to see instead another psychiatrist, and follow that psychiatrist's advice and take any medication prescribed by and in accordance with the directions of that psychiatrist;

(c) HR immediately and irrevocably authorise and direct Dr Ranga, or if not Dr Ranga her treating psychiatrist, to write, and HR ensure that Dr Ranga, or if not Dr Ranga her treating psychiatrist, writes, a report identifying what treatment has been provided and how HR has responded to that treatment and setting out that psychiatrist's opinion as to HR's mental state and any risks that she does or may pose to members of her family or the public, and send that report to both the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and to the Director and to the Registry of the Supreme Court of Victoria:

(i) on or before 30 January of each year; and

(ii) on or before 30 July of each year;

(d) Further, HR immediately and irrevocably consent to, and direct, Dr Ranga, or any other psychiatrist she sees in accordance with the conditions of the non-custodial supervision order, to communicate to the Director and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services in the event that HR:

(i) ceases to follow that psychiatrist's advice; or

(ii) has become acutely unwell such that, in that psychiatrist's opinion, HR poses a risk to the safety of her family or the public; and

(e) HR provide a copy of these reasons and the Orders made today to Dr Ranga and, in the event that she sees instead another psychiatrist, to that psychiatrist.

1. I will order that this matter be brough back for review on 15 October 2027 or on such other date as the Court notifies the parties.

G Events subsequent to provision of the above reasons

1. As noted in Part AA above, upon provision of a set of reasons containing the above paragraphs to the parties on 17 October 2025, the parties applied jointly for the matter to be adjourned prior to orders being made.
2. Then, under cover of a letter dated 6 November 2025, addressed to my chambers and copied to the parties, Forensicare provided a certificate of available services and a letter from Dr Khan dated 21 October 2025. The letter from Dr Khan stated that HR could be 'appropriately placed on a Non-Custodial Supervision Order ... under Forensicare's supervision' and set out some proposed conditions. The proposed conditions were that:

(a) HR be under the supervision of the Authorised Psychiatrist of the Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health ('Forensicare') or their delegate.

(b) HR resides in a location known and approved by the Authorised Psychiatrist of Forensicare or their delegate.

(c) HR abides by the lawful directions of the Authorised Psychiatrist of Forensicare or their delegate.

(d) HR complies with treatment testing and attends appointments as directed by the Authorised Psychiatrist of Forensicare or their delegate.

(e) HR does not leave the State of Victoria without the written permission of the Authorised Psychiatrist of Forensicare or their delegate.

1. The certificate of available services, which was dated 6 November 2025, relevantly stated:

Should the court decide to place [HR] on a Non-Custodial Supervision Order, she would receive treatment through her local treating psychiatrist, Dr Hemlata Ranga.

Her progress and mental health would be monitored through a delegate of the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare as required by reference to clinical need and risk acuity. Quarterly reports would also be obtained from her treating service.

Her progress and mental health would be reported to the court annually through reports prepared by Forensicare.

The facilities and resources necessary for Forensicare to supervise [HR] on a Non-Custodial Supervision Order are available if required.

1. I acknowledge and am grateful for this helpful change in position by Forensicare. After hearing from the parties, and in circumstances where Forensicare is prepared to assume the responsibilities of supervising HR as set out in the letter from Dr Khan, I consider it no longer appropriate to make orders in the form anticipated in Part F above. Instead, I propose to make a non-custodial supervision order with a nominal term of 25 years that provides for supervision by the Authorised Psychiatrist of Forensicare or their delegate.

1. HR opposed the imposition of the second and fifth conditions proposed by Dr Khan, that is, that HR reside in an approved location and that she not leave the State of Victoria without written permission.
2. The restrictions on HR's freedom and personal autonomy should be kept to the minimum consistent with the safety of the community.[17] As the above reasons make clear, and having regard to the fact that while mentally unwell HR tried to kill her child, I have decided that conditions are required that ensure as best as may be that HR remain under ongoing psychiatric supervision and treatment for the time being from her personal psychiatrist. Where HR is to be supervised by the Authorised Psychiatrist or their delegate, I am satisfied that it is necessary and appropriate that I impose a condition that HR reside at a location known by the Authorised Psychiatrist or their delegate, so that the Authorised Psychiatrist or their delegate may quickly and conveniently locate HR if they feel the need to do so.
3. I am also satisfied that it is necessary and appropriate that HR not leave the State of Victoria for any prolonged period without permission. Leaving the State of Victoria for any prolonged period would or would likely remove HR from her treating team. If this is to happen, I am satisfied that it is necessary and appropriate that HR first advise the Authorised Psychiatrist or their delegate of her plans and satisfy them that she is well enough, or has made sufficient arrangements, for her to do so. The same problem would not arise with a short interstate trip. In these circumstances, I consider that three weeks is an appropriate duration. Accordingly, I will impose a condition that HR not leave the State of Victoria without the written permission of the Authorised Psychiatrist or her delegate, but will formulate that condition so that it only applies if HR is to leave the State of Victoria for a period of longer than three weeks.
4. I am not satisfied that it is necessary and appropriate that I impose a condition that the Authorised Psychiatrist or their delegate 'approve' the location at which HR resides. There is no suggestion that HR might move to an inappropriate location within Victoria, whatever that might be, and it does not seem necessary that the Authorised Psychiatrist of their delegate have what would amount to a veto power in the event that HR and her family wish to move house.

1. Given that HR was charged with attempted murder, the nominal period of the non-custodial supervision order is 25 years.[18] I am required to declare the day from which the nominal term runs.[19] In fixing that day, I may take into account any period of time during which HR was held in custody or detained in an 'appropriate place'. Following her arrest, HR was held in custody for 9 days, and was then an inpatient at a psychiatric hospital, as a condition of her bail, for a further 21 days. For this reason, I will declare that the nominal term of her non-custodial supervision order runs from 7 October 2025.

1. HR sought that the review period be 12 months, not the two years that the above reasons anticipated. I remain of the view that a review period of two years is appropriate.

1. I note that on 12 August 2025, Elliot J made a suppression order pursuant to s 17 of the Open Courts Act 2013 that prohibits the publication of particulars likely to lead to the identification of HR. It operates at least until the conclusion of 12 months after any trial and so continues to be in effect.

1. For all the above reasons, I will make, pursuant to s 26(2)(b) of the Act, a non-custodial supervision order in respect of HR, subject to the following conditions:

(a) That HR be under the supervision of the Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health.

(b) That HR reside at a location known by the Authorised Psychiatrist of Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health or their delegate and, if she moves address, inform the Authorised Psychiatrist of Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health or their delegate of her new address.

(c) That HR abide by all lawful directions of the Authorised Psychiatrist of the Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health or their delegate.

(d) That HR comply with treatment and testing and attend appointments as directed by the Authorised Psychiatrist of Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health or their delegate.

(e) That HR not leave the State of Victoria for a consecutive period of more than two weeks without the written permission of the Authorised Psychiatrist of Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health or their delegate.

1. Pursuant to s 28 of the Act, the nominal term of the non-custodial supervision order is set at 25 years, with the nominal term to run from 7 October 2025.
2. Pursuant to s 27(2) of the Act, the Director of Public Prosecutions must bring the matter back before the Court for further review no later than 5 November 2027.

[1] A pseudonym is used in this matter in accordance with a suppression order made by Elliot J on 12 August 2024, see DPP v HR [2024] VSC 467.

[2] DPP v HR [2025] VSC 129.

[3] Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 38AAA; Public Administration Act 2004 (Vic) s 10; Premier (Vic), 'Order establishing and renaming departments' in Victoria, Victorian Government Gazette, No S 552, 29 November 2018, 1.

[4] Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997, s 41(4).

[5] [2017] VSCA 174.

[9] In its reasons, the Court of Appeal described this as a 'direction' - see [61].

[11] The language of s 29 is unclear. It provides that: 'A person having the supervision of a person under a non-custodial supervision order (the supervisor), the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services may apply ...'. The single comma, sitting alone, creates ambiguity: it is open to read these words as defining the Secretary as the supervisor, or as empowering both the Secretary and the supervisor to apply. Both parties, and the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services, submitted in Richards v The Queen (No 2) [2017] VSCA 174 that the latter was the correct interpretation - see [21]-[23], [53]. The Court of Appeal seemed to accept this submission - see [50], [57].

[13] [2020] VCC 748.

[14] DPP v James, an unreported decision of Judge Murphy made 1 August 2014, and DPP v McNeight [2018] VCC 619.

[15] DPP v Raymond Jones (Ruling), an unreported decision of Judge Bourke made 9 August 2022.

[16] It was a ruling in a matter concerning a Mr Damien Jones.

[17] Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic), s 39.