DPP v Froome [2026] VCC 286

Sentence: Total effective sentence of 4 years and 6 months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years.

1. Raymond Froome, on 23 September 2025, you pleaded guilty before his Honour Judge Lyon to two charges of causing injury recklessly (Charges 1 and 2),[1] one charge of common assault (Charge 3)[2] and one charge of persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order (Charge 4).[3]
2. Additionally, on that date you consented to this Court dealing with transferred related summary offences comprising one charge of aggravated cruelty to an animal (Summary Charge 7)[4] and one charge of unlawful assault (Summary Charge 10), and you pleaded guilty to those charges.[5]
3. The plea hearing proceeded before me on 9 December 2025 at Geelong.
4. The maximum penalties for these offences are as follows:

Causing injury recklessly - 5 years' imprisonment.[6]

Common assault - 5 years' imprisonment.[7]

Persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order - 5 years' imprisonment.[8]

Aggravated cruelty to an animal - 2 years' imprisonment or 500 penalty units.[9]

Unlawful assault - in the circumstances of this case, 6 months' imprisonment or 25 penalty units.[10]

1. The prosecutor filed a summary of prosecution opening for plea dated 19 September 2025, which I am told by your counsel I can treat as a statement of agreed facts for the purpose of sentencing you.[11]
2. The victims in this matter are Megan Watson[12] and Rachel Sharp.[13] They are your former partners and were unknown to each other.

1. You met Ms Watson in early December 2023 and immediately entered into a relationship. At your home in Norlane on a date around 18 December 2023, you and Ms Watson engaged in consensual sex.
2. You were on top of Ms Watson when you suddenly grabbed her neck with both hands and squeezed hard. While verbally abusing her, you tightened your grip and squeezed your thumbs into the sides of her neck. The strangulation lasted about two minutes. (Charge 1)
3. During this time, Ms Watson was unable to breathe. Although she did not lose consciousness, she was left feeling dazed. The next day, her neck was swollen and sore. You packed her belongings and kicked her out of your house. She went home, where she became very ill and was unable to see out of her left eye.
4. On 20 December 2023, Ms Watson's mother, Marlene FitzPatrick,[14] attended her daughter's house as she had not been able to get in contact with her. Ms FitzPatrick located Ms Watson in her bed, covered in faeces and urine. Ms Watson was distressed as she could not see. Ms FitzPatrick observed her left pupil and iris were discoloured. She immediately took her to the emergency department of a hospital.
5. Ms Watson was admitted to hospital that day. She disclosed the strangulation to hospital staff and the onsite social worker. She reported left sided facial tingling, ongoing neck pain and difficulty swallowing. Tests were conducted which indicated she had an altered voice. There was no underlying neck fracture or vessel injury. Ms Watson was discharged on 22 December 2023.
6. On 26 January 2024, D/Sgt Ashlee Bull contacted Ms Watson. She again disclosed the strangulation. D/Sgt Bull made an application for a full exclusion family violence intervention order (FVIVO) to protect Ms Watson from you.
7. At about 4pm on 28 January 2024, D/Sgt Bull and S/C Lilly Hine attended your house. You were arrested and taken to Corio police station and you were served the FVIVO.

1. You and Ms Sharp met through a friend in August 2024 and shared a brief relationship. At some point before 17 August of that year, Ms Sharp was bitten by her pet cat. Ms Sharp was hurt and stated, in anger, she wanted to 'get rid of it'. The next day she had calmed down.
2. Ms Sharp could not find her cat but continued to put food out for him. She also started walking the streets in an attempt to find him. After Ms Sharp did this for a couple of days, you said to her, 'he is not coming home, I killed him'.
3. Ms Sharp did not believe you. She continued to leave food out and look for her cat. After several more days, you repeated you had killed the cat. Ms Sharp asked you to prove it. You told Ms Sharp where she could find the cat's collar. She found the collar and noticed there was blood on it. Ms Sharp asked you to show her where the cat was. You led her to the backyard and pointed to an area at the rear of the yard next to the shed.
4. Ms Sharp told you to exhume the cat. You complied and she observed the cat was stiff, bloody and had an eye popped out of his head. When asked how you killed her cat, you replied, 'I hit him in the back of the head'. You used a piece of wood and hit the cat several times until he had a seizure and died. You then buried him (Summary Charge 7). Ms Sharp was very upset as she loved her cat. He was reburied with some of his items in a nicer spot in the backyard.
5. On Saturday 17 August 2024, when Ms Sharp was sitting on the couch, you yelled at her because she was not doing what you had asked. You pushed her into a lying position. You grabbed around her neck with your right hand and squeezed tight while continuing to yell phrases like, 'I can end you', 'I'm dangerous' and calling her retarded. Ms Sharp was unable to breathe. She was left feeling very dizzy, but did not lose consciousness (Charge 2).
6. On Tuesday 20 August 2024, you and Ms Sharp were having an argument about you inviting your ex-partner to her house. You threw a chocolate bar at her head and said, 'I can have you ended' and 'I can kill you'. Although you are not charged with any offence in relation to this behaviour, it provides context to later charges.
7. You then walked up to Ms Sharp, who was sitting on the bed, and pushed your right hand into her neck with force. Ms Sharp was winded and you pushed her hard enough for her to be thrown back onto the bed into a lying position (Charge 3). You hovered over Ms Sharp, putting your face directly in front of hers as you continued to yell at her. You then got up and left the house. Ms Sharp fled and did not return until the next day.
8. When Ms Sharp returned, you were waiting for her. You had a verbal argument in the bedroom and you pushed Ms Sharp, with force, into the wardrobe. She fell backwards into the bedside table, hurting her ribs and rolling her ankle (Summary Charge 10).
9. On 22 August 2024, S/C Amber Kessler contacted Ms Sharp in respect of an unrelated matter. Ms Sharp disclosed your assault and strangulations. S/C Kessler made an application for a full exclusion FVIVO to protect Ms Sharp from you.
10. That evening, D/S/C Daniel Hose and S/C Jake Weakley attended a house in Norlane. You were arrested and taken to Corio police station. You were bailed with conditions closely mirroring a FVIVO and to attend Geelong Magistrates' Court the next day for an intervention order hearing.
11. Once you were released from the police station, you called Ms Sharp. She agreed to meet you on a street in Norlane. You were being nice to Ms Sharp and asked her to change the intervention order so you could return home. Ms Sharp refused.
12. The next day, 23 August 2024, you texted Ms Sharp to ask her for a favour in relation to the intervention order hearing and about your belongings. You attended court in compliance with your bail conditions, consented without admissions and agreed to the FVIVO being made. The order made was a full no contact order.
13. That evening, you and an ex-partner entered Ms Sharp's house and slept in her bedroom. Ms Sharp was left in the loungeroom and felt uncomfortable. She had not given you permission to be there and your conduct was in breach of the FVIVO.
14. On 24 August 2024, you texted Ms Sharp again, stating you were on the way to her house. You attended Ms Sharp's home several times, on that day and the next, to pick up your belongings. She did not give you permission to do so. Your conduct between 23 and 25 August 2024 persistently breached the FVIVO (Charge 4).
15. On 25 August 2024, Ms Sharp attended the emergency department at a hospital as she had been feeling unwell. Ms Sharp disclosed the assaults and strangulations to the hospital staff and the onsite social worker. She reported her neck was still sore and her voice raspy since the strangulations, which the hospital staff had observed. Ms Sharp was examined. There was no underlying fracture or vascular injury. She was discharged the next day.
16. Hospital staff contacted the police. S/C Hayley Bloor attended and spoke to Ms Sharp, who reported the strangulation. S/C Bloor noticed Ms Sharp's voice appeared hoarse and she took photographs of her neck.
17. On 29 August 2024 at approximately 2pm, D/S/C Roger McCrae attended an address at in Norlane. You were located, arrested and transported to Geelong police station for a formal interview.
18. During the interview:

(a) you denied all matters relating to Ms Watson;

(b) you denied strangling Ms Sharp on both occasions;

(c) you made full admissions to killing Ms Sharp's cat, saying, 'it bit [Rachel], nasty fucking cat' and 'I told her it ran over the fence but I knocked it on the head with a piece of wood I cut for piping'.

(d) you admitted to pushing Ms Sharp in the bedroom, but claimed you did not mean to attack her, you 'just wanted to get past'.

1. Following the interview, you were charged and remanded in custody.

1. Victim impact statements (VIS) were prepared by Megan Watson[15] and Rachel Sharp[16] and were read aloud by the prosecutor.
2. In her VIS, Ms Watson describes the profound impact your offending has had on her sense of safety, wellbeing, and ability to live freely. Since the incident, she has become fearful of leaving home, particularly when travelling to unfamiliar areas, and feels constantly unsafe and judged. Because of her small stature and disability, including the loss of an eye (for which you are not responsible), Ms Watson feels especially vulnerable and describes feeling like 'an easy target' in the wider world. This fear has led her to withdraw socially, particularly from men, and to feel that being loved or accepted has become more difficult.
3. Your offending has also caused severe disruption to Ms Watson's physical and mental health. She experienced significant sleep deprivation for months owing to trauma, hospital treatments, and medication, including waking hourly and crying and talking in her sleep. Normal sleep for her only resumed once she learned that you were remanded in custody. Ms Watson has also suffered weight loss, loss of appetite, and now requires ongoing psychiatric care.
4. Ms Watson describes a loss of her formal carefree and trusting nature and feels forced to change her entire way of life. She now lives in a state of hiding and expresses a strong desire to leave Geelong altogether to feel safe. While she is attempting to regain independence and resilience without relying heavily on medication, your offending has left her permanently altered, fearful, and aware that her sense of safety can no longer be taken for granted.
5. In her VIS, Rachel Sharp stated that since the offending, she has been unable to return to a normal day-to-day life and now lives in a constant state of fear and hypervigilance. She feels unsafe around other men, despite knowing they have done nothing wrong.
6. Ms Sharp experiences intrusive visual disturbances, such as seeing dark shadow figures, and an ongoing sense that you are present, standing behind her or watching her. During these episodes, her body becomes numb and being unable to move or speak, sometimes occurring even during the day. Ms Sharp struggles to fall or stay asleep and finds being in bed 'like torture'. She describes a pervasive fear of you, and feels as though you are present everywhere she goes.
7. In sentencing you, I take into account the impact of your offending on both women. Clearly, your offending has had profound, traumatic and lasting effects upon both victims.

1. I consider the charges of recklessly causing injury to both Ms Watson and Ms Sharp are grave examples of that offence. Your counsel conceded these charges are made serious given the manner of their infliction and that your offending conduct took place within intimate-partner relationships concerning two separate victims.
2. Family violence has repeatedly been described by the Victorian courts as a grave social problem requiring a firm sentencing response.
3. In DPP v Smeaton,[17] Dodds-Streeton JA observed:

Violence, and in particular violence by men against women as a means of control in current relationships or in relationships which have ended, is a prevalent and even critical social evil.[18]

1. Her Honour expressed the view that sentences must

[s]ufficiently express the deep abhorrence excited by a violent and brutal physical assault by an adult male on a slight young woman, which is in no degree abated by the fact of a prior relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.[19]

1. While some of the circumstances her Honour refers to are not applicable in this case, nonetheless, the general tenor of her Honour's remarks remain apposite.
2. Your offending is aggravated as it involved a serious breach of trust and security.[20] A partner, such as Ms Watson or Ms Sharp, is entitled to feel safe in their own home and in their relationship.[21] The law is clear that offending in a domestic context can never mitigate seriousness and, in cases such as this, substantially increases both the gravity of the offending and your moral culpability.[22]
3. I turn to the nature of the violence itself. Your offending included strangulation, which the courts have consistently identified as an especially serious and dangerous form of violence. Your counsel submitted you did not use a weapon in your offending,[23] however the absence of a weapon does not lessen the seriousness of using your hands to restrict another person's breathing.
4. In DPP v Reynolds, the Victorian Court of Appeal described choking as a 'pernicious and dangerous form of violence' whose risk cannot be ignored when assessing its gravity.[24] In the context of family violence, it represents a 'chilling exploitation of physical power and dominance'.[25]
5. The Victorian Parliament has reinforced that non-fatal strangulation is 'a particularly dangerous and insidious form of family violence'.[26] In the Second Reading Speech for the Crimes Amendment (Non-fatal Strangulation) Bill 2023, the Minister for Police said:

Strangulation is a highly dangerous and easily fatal form of violence which can cause unconsciousness within seconds and death within minutes... In circumstances of family violence, non-fatal strangulation is rarely an isolated event and often reveals an ongoing and escalating pattern of violence and coercive control. Someone who survives non-fatal strangulation by a current or former intimate partner is seven times more likely to be seriously injured or murdered by that partner. Because of this, non-fatal strangulation is recognised in Victoria's Family Violence Multi-Agency Risk Assessment and Management framework as a serious risk factor, associated with increased likelihood of death or serious injury for victim-survivors.

1. Your offending was not preplanned and developed in the moment, as your counsel submitted, but it was nonetheless dangerous. The prosecutor did not allege Ms Watson's eye injury was caused by your conduct and I accept your seriousness of your offending against Ms Watson is reduced by the lack of need for any surgical interventions. However, Ms Watson did suffer from a swollen neck, ongoing neck pain, difficulty swallowing and an altered voice.
2. Ms Sharp had similar symptoms and both victims had impaired breathing. While I acknowledge your conduct did not result in any loss of consciousness, both Ms Watson and Ms Sharp felt dazed and dizzy during the episodes of strangulation.
3. I accept persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order is a serious enough criminal offence. Your conduct was not incidental or isolated and, as the prosecutor submitted, commenced immediately after you were served with the order and continued until your arrest. While I acknowledge the contravention does not involve engaging in further violence, it does demonstrate your ongoing disregard for court orders. From Ms Sharp's perspective, each breach would have reinforced her fear and caused her to recall your past violence.
4. In relation to Summary Charge 7, I accept the submission made on your behalf that you did not kill the cat for the express purpose of punishing or coercing Ms Sharp, and the offending was not accompanied by an overt intention to use the animal's death as a direct means of control. However, after killing the cat, you allowed Ms Sharp to believe the animal was still alive. Your deception prolonged her distress and uncertainty, demonstrating a callous disregard for the emotional harm caused.
5. The Victorian Government has recognised harm to animals in a domestic context often has a profound emotional impact, particularly where the animal is a companion and a source of comfort. Although you are not charged with an offence under the Family Law Act 1957 (Cth), the Act does define family violence and includes examples such as 'intentionally causing death or injury to an animal'.[27] Your conduct was not momentary or accidental; it involved an ongoing choice to withhold the truth and allow suffering to continue. Moreover, the manner of the cat's death would have been a truly terrifying experience for the poor animal.
6. Overall, I find your moral culpability for the offending conduct directed towards both victims is high. Just punishment, general deterrence and denunciation must be given significant weight in sentencing you for these offences, albeit moderated to some extent by reason of your personal circumstances which I discuss below.
7. I consider the common law assault and the unlawful assault to Ms Sharp are serious enough charges, albeit each occasion of offending involved a single physical act. I will sentence you accordingly.

1. You were assessed by Mr Jeffrey Cummins on 12 September 2025 and by Dr Linda Borg on 21 November 2025. Mr Cummins prepared a psychological report dated 18 September 2025,[28] and Dr Borg prepared a confidential psychological report dated 24 November 2025.[29] Both reports summarise your personal circumstances and were tendered at the plea hearing by your counsel.
2. You were born in Armadale, Western Australia and identify as belonging to the Warnandi people. You were raised by your mother and step-father, whom you refer to as your father. You also have two younger siblings.
3. You disclosed to Mr Cummins and Dr Borg having been physically assaulted by your mother as a child and often witnessing your father's alcohol abuse. Owing to the ongoing physical abuse, you left home when you were about 15 or 16 years old. You have not had contact with your family since about 2003 or 2004.
4. Prior to your remand, you were living in a share house. You told Dr Borg you were independent in managing your domestic duties and finances, but admitted you had 'no idea' what you were going to do upon release and would need assistance to secure accommodation.
5. You reported to Dr Borg having one or two long-term partnerships, none lasting more than a year. You have a young son but have not been in contact with him for several years.

1. You completed secondary school up until Year 10, telling Dr Borg you 'hated school' and found it difficult. You attributed your academic challenges to being unable to 'keep up', but denied ever receiving tutoring or educational support. Your mother arranged for you to be tested for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), but received no diagnosis or treatment.
2. To Dr Borg, you disclosed being subjected to sexual abuse at school and engaging in trauma counselling through Forensicare.
3. After leaving school, you worked in various short-term jobs including labouring, construction and kitchen work. Your longest period of employment did not last longer than a year. You last worked in 2021. Prior to your remand, you were receiving a disability support pension owing to a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder. You are not currently engaged with the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS).

1. When you were 15 or 16 years old, you began smoking cannabis daily and continued to do so until you were aged 25. Since then, your cannabis use has significantly decreased due to adverse side effects. You told Dr Borg cannabis 'sends [you] a bit nutty'.
2. Your methamphetamine use commenced when you were 19 years old and quickly escalated to daily consumption. You maintained this pattern until your first arrest. Following this, Dr Borg writes your use became cyclical and would resume upon release from custody. Any periods of abstinence have only occurred when incarcerated. You also disclosed using heroin for 8 to 12 months during a period in which you lived in Queensland.
3. You first consumed alcohol at age 15 or 16 and you also did this daily. You described to Dr Borg drinking 'as much as [you] could' and estimated a minimum intake of 20 cans of beer per day. Your alcohol use decreased when you were about 25 years old.
4. You deny experiencing any drug overdoses or participating in formal drug and alcohol rehabilitation or detoxification programs. You displayed some positive insight into future drug use, stating 'I don't really wanna use again, it causes too many dramas', but acknowledged you may 'end up using again'. You also told Dr Borg you have applied for drug rehabilitation following your release from custody.

1. In 2008 or 2009 you were diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder following a term of imprisonment for about 10 years and 6 months. Both Dr Borg and Mr Cummins agree with this diagnosis. You have been engaged with a psychologist since October 2025. You told Dr Borg you consider your condition to be well controlled with your current medication.
2. Dr Borg had regard to your mental health service history, dating back to 2008, and in particular letters from West Moreton Health. Your history confirms you had been under the care of the Prison Mental Health Service (PMHS) while incarcerated at Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre, commencing on 6 May 2020.
3. You denied other formal mental health diagnoses to Dr Borg, but said your treating psychologist suspected you may have post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). You disclosed one prior suicide attempt in childhood. You did not report any further attempts or suicidal ideation. Dr Borg considers 'there is longstanding diagnostic support' for antisocial personality disorder, as documented in your mental health records and previous psychological assessments.
4. During your assessment, Dr Borg administered the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS), a 21-item self-report inventory designed to assess an individual's experience of symptoms typically associated with depression, anxiety and stress during the past week. Accepting the limitations inherent in a self-reporting tool, Dr Borg opines your results are indicative of mild anxiety, moderate stress and severe depressive symptoms.
5. Dr Borg also conducted a neuropsychological assessment. Dr Borg opines your reading ability is at a Grade 6 level. Your auditory attention span was low average and you displayed significant deficits in memory and generally sustaining and dividing attention. Dr Borg's findings in relation to your cognitive functioning will be further summarised in the mitigating circumstances section of my reasons.
6. In relation to your physical health, you recounted to Dr Borg possible losses of consciousness following assaults, including being hit while in custody. You also claimed to have been stabbed in 2007, with a possible loss of consciousness for 'a couple of weeks', but you could not recall the name of the hospital where you received treatment. Aside from psychiatric treatment, you denied other hospital admissions or ongoing medical issues. Your medication regimen at the time of Dr Borg's report included 5mg of Olanzapine, an antipsychotic drug.

1. Your criminal history is extensive, relevant and spans several Australian jurisdictions.
2. In Western Australia, you first appeared on 14 June 2000 at the Bunbury Court of Petty Sessions, where you were fined $250 for a charge of criminal damage. You continually appeared in various Western Australian courts from 2000 to 2007.
3. In Queensland, you first appeared on 3 September 2008 at the Southport Magistrates' Court in relation to breach of release condition and breach of bail condition offences. On the breach of release condition charge, you were convicted and sentenced to one months' imprisonment, to be suspended for 12 months. On the breach of bail condition charge, you were convicted and sentenced to four months' imprisonment, to be suspended for 12 months. You continually appeared in various Queensland courts from 2008 to 2023.
4. In Victoria, outside of the present offending, you have only once appearance, at the Geelong Magistrates' Court on 20 May 2024 for a charge of contravene a FVIVO. You were convicted and fined $1000.
5. The prosecutor drew my attention to two relevant entries in your criminal record. On 28 October 2010, you were sentenced in the Cairns District Court to 10 years' imprisonment for three counts of rape, and to 4 years' imprisonment for one count of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm. On 18 March 2021, you were sentenced in the Beenleigh District Court to 3 years' imprisonment for assault occasioning bodily harm while armed and to 6 months' imprisonment for common assault.

1. Dr Borg and Mr Cummins both administered the Historical Clinical Risk Management-20 (HCR-20) in your assessment. This is a clinical tool designed to assess the risk of violence by evaluating offender-specific and other criminogenic variables that are historical, clinical and inform risk management.
2. You were less willing to answer questions in your assessment with Mr Cummins compared with Dr Borg, and Mr Cummins could not accurately evaluate your level of risk as a result. Nonetheless, on the basis of the information he had, Mr Cummins assessed your risk as being moderate-high. With Dr Borg your overall score on the HCR-20 was 38/40, indicating a high risk of violent reoffending. According to Dr Borg, your risk of future reoffending is 'directly linked to your substance use, impulsivity and limited insight, all of which are exacerbated by [your] cognitive deficits and mental health issues'.
3. Given your relevant and concerning prior criminal history and your high risk of violent reoffending, I must give significant weight to specific deterrence and protection of the community in sentencing you for these offence, particularly on Charges 1 and 2, albeit moderated to some extent by reason of your personal circumstances which I discuss below.

1. You pleaded guilty to the present charges on 23 September 2025. Your pleas of guilty have utilitarian benefit and have saved the victims the trauma of giving evidence in court. They also indicate your acceptance of responsibility for your offending conduct and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice.
2. I accept you are undoubtedly regretful for the situation in which you find yourself and the effect this has had on you. However, I must decide whether you demonstrate true contrition and remorse for your offending conduct.
3. As Winneke P observed in R v Cooper:[30]

[a] distinction must always be carefully drawn between true regret for wrongdoing and regret engendered by concern for the position in which the offender finds [himself].[31]

4. True remorse is a question of fact and is determined on the balance of probabilities.[32] An offender must satisfy the court there is 'genuine penitence and contrition and a desire to atone'.[33] In many cases the most compelling evidence of remorse comes from the offender's testimony.[34]
5. In CD v The Queen,[35] Harper JA, with whom Buchanan JA agreed, quoted his earlier observations in Phillips v The Queen,[36] where his Honour said:

[Genuine remorse] indicates realistic prospects of rehabilitation and a reduced need for specific deterrence. An offender who pleads guilty because he or she has an accurate appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or her offending, and of its impact upon its victim or victims, and who desires to do what reasonably can be done to repair the damage and to clear his or her conscience, is someone to whom mercy - in the form of a very substantial reduction in what would otherwise be an appropriate sentence - is very likely due.[37]

6. You acknowledged to Dr Borg a longstanding tendency towards violence and issues with anger management. You also acknowledged you were 'probably' responsible for your conduct and that the victim's experiences were 'probably pretty bad'. Dr Borg opines you have a limited and superficial demonstration of remorse for your offending, stating:

While he has expressed some regret for his actions and acknowledged that his conduct was wrong, his statements often lack genuine empathy for the victims and tend to focus on the personal consequences he faces, such as a longer prison sentence. His limited insight into the emotional impact of his actions on others, coupled with his tendency to rationalise or minimise his responsibility, suggests that his expressions of remorse may lack depth and genuine feeling.

1. Mr Cummins made a similar observation and in his opinion your level of insight was limited and you require assistance in developing a more informed understanding of what is meant by victim empathy.
2. I find you lack sufficient insight into the reasons for your offending conduct. On the evidence as it currently stands, I cannot make a determination that you are genuinely remorseful for your offending conduct and fully appreciate, and desire to atone for, the deleterious effects your conduct has had on your innocent victims. You have some way to go before gaining valuable insight into the impact of your conduct.

1. Your counsel submitted that because you come from a socially disadvantaged background, the principles discussed by the High Court of Australia in Bugmy v The Queen[38] are engaged in your case. I accept this is so.
2. In Marrah v The Queen ('Marrah'),[39] Redlich and Tate JJA confirmed the relevance of a disadvantaged background when their Honours observed:

Circumstances of deprivation, abuse and other social disadvantage occurring during an offender's formative years are more than matters of historical significance to the administration of justice. The effects of such social disadvantage do not generally diminish with the passage of time and are likely to have profound and lasting consequences. ... Though they do not provide an excuse for offending behaviour, they must be given due weight in the sentencing calculus.[40]

3. Importantly, their Honours held that when sentencing an offender the court should not consider that an 'offender's social disadvantage has the same mitigatory relevance for all of the purposes of punishment'.[41] Social disadvantage does not 'diminish the need for the sentence to vindicate the dignity of a victim and reflect the community's disapproval of the offending'.[42]
4. In Sabbatucci v The Queen (Sabbatucci)[43] the Victorian Court of Appeal referred to the principles in Bugmy and explained:

Whether, and to what extent, social disadvantage warrants a reduction in moral culpability in a particular case falls to be assessed by reference to the nature and circumstances of the offence, the nature and severity of the disadvantage suffered and whether the effects of the disadvantage can be seen to be in any way explanatory of the offending.[44]

5. That Court further observed in DPP v Herrmann:[45]

The significance of the 'general' approach enunciated in Bugmy is that the relevance of deprivation to sentencing does not depend on proof of such a nexus. ... 'the impact of disadvantage is complex, multilayered, non-linear and not easily "diagnosed" or measured'. The High Court's recognition that serious childhood deprivation is likely to make an offender less morally culpable than 'an offender whose formative years were not marred in that way' reflects the principle of equal justice.[46]

6. In applying the principles in Bugmy to this case, I do not need to find the disadvantage you suffered as a child was 'profound'. In Sabbatucci, the Victorian Court of Appeal said the sentencer must evaluate whether the disadvantage warrants the offender being viewed as 'less morally blameworthy' than someone who commits the same offence but does not have the same disadvantaged or deprived background.[47] According to Sabbatucci, coming to this conclusion does not depend on the court being satisfied the circumstances establish 'profound disadvantage' or 'profound deprivation' because in every case, 'it will be a question of fact and degree'.[48]
7. You have been exposed to, and are a victim of, physical and sexual abuse, and your upbringing was deeply compromised as a result. These complex factors mean I must moderate to some extent the weight I would otherwise have given to general deterrence, denunciation and the punitive aspects of the sentence I impose on you. They also inform the weight I give to specific deterrence and protection of the community in your case.

1. Your counsel submitted Verdins principles 1, 3 and 4 are engaged in your case.[49] To illustrate the submission, your counsel primarily relied on Dr Borg's assessment.
2. In addition to Dr Borg diagnosing you with bipolar affective disorder and finding there is a diagnostic support for antisocial personality disorder in your medical history, she opines:

Mr Froome's neuropsychological profile reveals impairments in impulse control, reasoning, higher-order attention, and processing speed, with secondary impacts on learning efficiency and episodic memory retrieval. When taken together with the available history, these deficits are deemed consistent with a diagnosis of Mild Neurocognitive Disorder...and are most likely attributable to chronic polysubstance use - particularly methamphetamine...[emphasis removed]. > > ...The functional consequence of these cognitive impairments affects Mr Froome's ability to organise information, inhibit automatic responses, shift attention, encode new material, and regulate his behaviour.

3. Dr Borg does not consider your cognitive impairment and psychiatric diagnoses as directly causal of your offending, but notes they are likely to have been contributory factors. Dr Borg opined:

His longstanding Bipolar Affective Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder and Mild Neurocognitive Disorder due to polysubstance use have resulted in deficits in impulse control, reasoning, and executive functioning, which would have reduced his capacity for self-regulation and increased his vulnerability to acting impulsively or aggressively under stress. However, it is important to note that acute intoxication - particularly from methamphetamine - appears to be a major factor influencing his behaviour at the time of offending, markedly impairing his judgment, increasing paranoia, and further diminishing his ability to control his actions.

1. So far as principle 1 is concerned, your cluster of mental health conditions does have the effect of reducing your moral culpability to a limited extent and therefore the weight I would otherwise have given to denunciation and just punishment. However, given the nature of the offending and your significant and relevant prior criminal history, your moral culpability is still very high and any reduction can only be relatively small. I will also moderate the weight I give to specific deterrence, so far as principle 4 is concerned, but again, due to your significant criminal history and high risk of recidivism, this would only be a slight moderation.
2. Regarding Verdins principle 3, a moderation in general deterrence is only appropriate where the offender's mental health condition makes them unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or understand the consequences of their conduct.[50] It is not the case that a diagnosis of a mental impairment automatically means general deterrence is reduced as a sentencing factor.[51]
3. In Verdins the Court quoted with approval a passage from the judgment of Winneke ACJ in R v Yaldiz ('Yaldiz') as follows:[52]

It is not appropriate to simply fasten on to the words "recognised psychiatric disorder" and then, without reference to the symptoms and consequences of that disorder, to contend that purposes of general deterrence have no part to play in the sentencing process. Whether in the particular case a psychiatric condition should reduce or eliminate general deterrence as an appropriate purpose of punishment will depend upon the nature and severity of its symptoms and its effect upon the mental capacity of the accused.[53]

The Court also quoted with approval a passage from the judgement of Batt JA in Yaldiz, in which his Honour described 'the correct approach' as follows:[54]

... general deterrence is not eliminated but still operates, sensibly moderated, in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or severe intellectual handicap.[55]

1. Finally, in another passage quoted with approval by the Court in Verdins,[56] the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Wright,[57] opined:

It is an accepted principle of sentencing that general deterrence should often be given very little weight in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or abnormality because such an offender is not an appropriate medium for making an example to others. In most of the cases in which that principle is applied, the offender has suffered from a significant mental illness or retardation, but such a condition is not a necessary condition for the principle to be applied. Considerations of general (or even personal) deterrence are not rendered completely irrelevant, and the significance of the offender's mental incapacity is to be weighed and evaluated in the light of the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. The reason for the principle is that the interests of society do not require such persons to be punished as severely as persons without that disability because such severity is inappropriate to their circumstances. The full understanding of the authority and requirements of the law which is attributed to the ordinary individual of adult intellectual capacities cannot be expected of a person whose intellectual function is insufficient to have that understanding. The means by which the courts give effect to that principle (as an instrument of social administration) is to moderate the consideration of general deterrence to the circumstances of the particular case. But, if the offender acts with knowledge of what he is doing and with knowledge of the gravity of his actions, the moderation need not be great.[58]

1. The nature of your diagnoses and cognitive functioning may have caused you not to fully understand the wrongfulness of your actions or their consequences for your innocent victims. This justifies a degree of moderation to the principle of general deterrence and I will sentence you on that basis.

1. I accept your counsel's submission that you have undergone some therapeutic programs whilst in custody. You have worked as a 'program support worker' in the prison since 27 May 2025, and completed a number of programs as follows:[59]

(a) Healthy Coping (a program that focused on relationship between AOD and mental health).

(b) Skating on Ice (a 27-hour program that targets problematic methamphetamine use)

(c) Keeping Your Cool (a 12-hour program that aims to increase participants' ability to manage anger)

(d) Check Your Thinking (a 15-hour program that aims to address participants' problematic thinking styles that can lead to engagement in anti-social behaviour)

(e) Building Better Relationships (a 12-hour program that aims to increase participants' ability to create and maintain healthy relationships)

(f) Ice and Me (a 6-hour remand program that targets problematic methamphetamine use)

(g) Healthy Balance (a 9-hour program that aims to increase participants' ability to engage in emotion regulation)

1. I consider the encouraging approach you have adopted to the time you have spent in custody, augers well for your future prospects of rehabilitation. Nonetheless, on balance with your extensive criminal history and high risk of violent reoffending, I assess your prospects of rehabilitation as being somewhat guarded. Much will depend on your ability to remain drug-free upon your release from custody and to continue to engage in substance abuse programs and psychological treatment.

1. I have had regard to current sentencing practice in relation to these offences as informed by the decisions of the High Court of Australia in R v Kilic[60] and DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym)[61] and the Victorian Court of Appeal decisions in DPP v Zhuang[62] and DPP (Cth) v Thomas.[63]
2. While current sentencing practice is relevant to the sentences I impose on you, it is only one of a number of sentencing considerations I must take into account in imposing just sentences in your case.[64]
3. Moreover, it is difficult to gauge more than a general yardstick from so-called 'comparable cases', given the wide range of offending conduct that can constitute these offences and the myriad of personal circumstances pertaining to individual offenders. Nonetheless, to the extent I have been able to gain assistance from comparable cases, I have sought to do so in your case.
4. The basic purposes for which a court may impose a sentence are just punishment, denunciation, deterrence, both specific and general, protection of the community and rehabilitation. In sentencing you, I must have regard to a range of factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, your culpability for it, the effect of your offence on the victim and your personal circumstances.
5. In sentencing you for these crimes I am required to balance the interests of the community in denouncing your criminal conduct with the interests of the community in seeking to ensure that, so far as possible, you are rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.
6. As I earlier observed, your offences were committed in the context of domestic violence. As Maxwell P and Redlich JA observed in Kalala v The Queen:[65] 'Sentencing law has long recognised the prevalence of violence by men against women in (or after) domestic relationships, and the importance of general deterrence in such circumstances.'[66] The community abhors such conduct and is completely unwilling to tolerate it.[67] Family violence 'undermines the foundations of personal relationships and family trust upon which our society rests',[68] and so requires that denunciation, just punishment and general deterrence be given primacy in sentencing you for these offences.[69]
7. Stand up Mr Froome
8. On the charge of causing injury recklessly to Ms Watson (Charge 1), you are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months.
9. On the charge of causing injury recklessly to Ms Sharp (Charge 2), you are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months.
10. On the charge of common assault to Ms Sharp (Charge 3), you are convicted and sentenced to sentenced to imprisonment for 12 months.
11. On the charge of persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order (Charge 4), you are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 3 months.
12. On the charge of aggravated cruelty to an animal (Summary Charge 7) you are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 months.
13. On the charge of unlawful assault to Ms Sharp (Summary Charge 10) you are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 3 months.
14. I order 1 year and 3 months of the sentence imposed on Charge 2, 6 months of the sentence imposed on Charge 3, 1 month of the sentence imposed on Charge 4, 1 month of the sentence imposed on Summary Charge 7 and 1 month of the sentence imposed on Summary Charge 10 are to be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed on Charge 1 and on each other.
15. This makes a total effective sentence of imprisonment for 4 years and 6 months.
16. I order you serve a minimum period of 3 years before becoming eligible for parole.
17. I declare 565 days (not including this day) as the period of pre-sentence detention to be reckoned as already served under this sentence and I direct the fact that declaration was made, and its details, be noted in the records of the court.
18. In accordance with s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), I declare that but for your pleas of guilty, I would have sentenced you to an total effective sentence of 6 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years.
19. Under section 12 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986, I order that you are disqualified from being the owner or a person in charge of any domestic animal for a period of 10 years.
20. Under section 21A of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986, I order that any prevention of cruelty to animals inspector is authorised to monitor your compliance with this Order for the length of this Order.

[1] Contrary to s 18 of the Crimes Act 1958 ('CA').

[3] Contrary to s 125A of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 ('FVPA').

[4] Contrary to s 10(1) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 ('PCAA').

[5] Contrary to s 23 of the Summary Offences Act 1966 ('SOA').

[10] If the court finds the assault is of such an aggravated nature that it cannot sufficiently be punished under s 23 of the SOA. See s 24(1)(a) of the SOA. Given the nature of the assault and the fact it was committed on a female, I so find.

[12] A pseudonym used to protect the identity of a victim of domestic violence.

[13] A pseudonym used to protect the identity of a victim of domestic violence.

[14] A pseudonym used to protect the identity of a victim of domestic violence.

[17] [2007] VSCA 256.

[20] Shau v The Queen [2020] VSCA 252, [46] (Priest and Niall JJA).

[21] DPP v Natoli [2016] VSCA 35, [45] (Osborn, Whelan and Beach JJA).

[22] DPP v Evans [2019] VSCA 239, [84]-[85] (Maxwell P, T Forrest and Weinberg JJA).

[24] [2022] VSCA 263, [80]

[26] Victoria, Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 9 October 2023, 3927 (Anthony Carbines MP, Minister for Police, Minister for Crime Prevention, Minister for Racing).

[27] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AB(2)(f).

[30] [1998] VSCA 39; (1998) 103 A Crim R 51 ('Cooper').

[31] Cooper 55 (Tadgell JA agreeing). See also Raptis v The Queen (1988) 36 A Crim R 362, 366 (Young CJ , O'Bryan & Tadgell JJ).

[32] Cooper 55; R v Gillick [2000] VSCA 127 [20] (Callaway JA, Chernov JA agreeing) .

[33] Barbaro v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288; (2012) 226 A Crim R 354, 365 [38] (Maxwell P, Harper JA and T Forrest AJA) ('Barbaro').

[34] Barbaro 365-66 [38], [40]; Bonacci v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 194, 202 [44] (Neave, Mandie and Harper JJA).

[35] [2013] VSCA 95 [36].

[36] [2012] VSCA 140; (2012) 37 VR 594.

[39] [2014] VSCA 119 ('Marrah').

[40] Marrah [16] (Redlich and Tate JJA) citing Bugmy 586-89 [24] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

[43] [2021] VSCA 340 ('Sabbatucci').

[44] Ibid [6] (Maxwell P and Emerton JA). See also Newton (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 22 [36]-[38] (Beach and Macaulay JJA).

[45] [2021] VSCA 160.

[46] Ibid [45] (Maxwell P, Kaye, Niall, T Forrest and Emerton JJA). See also Jawahiri v The Queen [2021] VSCA 287 [73(s)] (Priest and T Forrest JJA).

[49] R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA) ('Verdins').

[50] Sikaloski v The Queen [2012] VSCA 130 [44] ('Sikaloski') (Cavanough AJA, Weinberg JA agreeing). See also Muldrock 138-139, [53]-[55].

[51] Barton v The Queen [2013] VSCA 360 [40] (Tate JA, Whelan JA agreeing), citing Sikaloski [44].

[53] R v Yaldiz [1998] 2 VR 376, 383 (Winneke ACJ, Hampel AJA agreeing) ('Yaldiz').

[55] Yaldiz 381 (Batt JA, Winneke ACJ and Hampel AJA agreeing). See also R v Lewis (unreported, Court of Appeal, 20 April 1998) 9-10 (Charles JA, Winneke P and Brooking JA agreeing); R v Swingler [2001] VSCA 26 [13] (Buchanan JA, Callaway JA and Coldrey AJA agreeing); R v Chambers (2005) 152 A Cim R 164, 171-172, [26]-[28] (Charles JA, Winneke P and Buchanan JA agreeing; R v Ahmed [2006] VSCA 200 at [28].

[57] (1997) 93 A Crim R 48 ('Wright').

[58] Wright 273-74 [20] (Hunt CJ at CL, Gleeson CJ and Hidden J agreeing) (emphasis original, citations omitted).

[60] [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256, 266-268 [21]-[25] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

[61] [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 444-447 [47]-[58] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 452-455 [78]-[85] (Gageler and Gordon JJ).

[62] [2015] VSCA 96; (2015) 250 A Crim R 282, 292 [30]-[31] (Redlich, Priest and Beach JJA).

[63] [2016] VSCA 237; (2016) 53 VR 546, 606-609 [173]-[183] (Redlich, Santamaria and McLeish JJA). See also Williams (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 35 [21]-[25] (Priest and Kyrou JJA); Russo v The Queen [2021] VSCA 244 [53]-[56] (Emerton JA, Priest JA agreeing).

[64] See DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428.

[65] [2017] VSCA 223; (2017) 269 A Crim R 1 ('Kalala').

[67] Kalala 19, [63] quoting Price J (Harrison J agreeing) in Efthimiadis v The Queen (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 9, [86].

[68] Felicite v The Queen (2011) 37 VR 329, 333, [20] (Redlich JA. Harper JA and Robson AJA agreeing).

[69] Ibid; DPP (Vic) v Evans [2019] VSCA 239, [83]-[85] (Maxwell P, T Forrest and Weinberg JJA); DPP (Vic) v Smith [2019] VSCA 266, [35] (Kyrou, Kaye and T Forrest JJA); Baker (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 158, [30], [32] (McLeish and Osborn JJA).